Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Fiscal consolidation under imperfect credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.     

EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a single currency zone should have symmetry of shocks and structures across regions. Research on monetary union in Europe has either assumed these conditions to hold close enough not to cause problems, or has focussed on asymmetries in shocks. But what if economic structures and/or market responses differ between countries or regions? This paper examines the consequences of a single monetary policy when there are asymmetries in i) the monetary transmissions; ii) the wage/price transmissions; and iii) private sector asset holdings. We find the first and last destabilise the business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one another in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. The effect is to delay convergence.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

Modelling the Eurozone as an Extraordinary Exchange Rate Union

The Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) imbalances within the Eurozone can be interpreted as a sign of a missing balance of payments adjustment mechanism for the member countries. As the Eurozone lacks a fiscal union, in theory it is more of an exchange rate union or a system of fixed exchange rates than a monetary union. This paper will show why the TARGET is a crucial indicator for the Eurozone not being a monetary union but instead an exchange rate union, and why countries holding TARGET liabilities against the European System of Central Banks can be compared to a reserve currency country, like the US under the Bretton-Woods System.     

Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?

An important issue for the EMU countries is to what extent fiscalpolicy can be used to stabilise the domestic economy in thecase of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. The paper reviews possiblereforms of national fiscal policy institutions in order to promoteefficient fiscal stabilisation policy: (i) the introductionof a more transparent legal framework for the government's stabilisationdecisions; (ii) the establishment of an independent advisoryFiscal Policy Council; and (iii) the delegation of actual stabilisationdecisions to an independent Fiscal Policy Committee. The conclusionis that the Fiscal Policy Committee solution has much to speakfor itself. It seems possible to delegate fiscal stabilisationpolicy decisions, in much the same way as monetary policy hasbeen delegated to central banks, at the same time as fiscalpolicy decisions focusing on income distribution and socialefficiency are kept in the political sphere. Such delegationcan be made compatible with democratic accountability. (JELE61, E63, P16)     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

Fiscal Multipliers and Their Relevance in a Currency Union – A Survey

The article reviews the debate on government spending multiplier and provides a detailed discussion of the underlying economic mechanisms, focusing on the role of the state of the business cycle and the monetary policy reaction. Special emphasis is on the effects of fiscal policy within a currency union and its implications for the euro crisis.     

Do Monetary Unions Make Economic Sense? Evidence from the Scandinavian Currency Union, 1873–1913

Popular propositions as to what constitutes a successful single currency area are examined by looking at the Scandinavian Currency Union (1873–1913) formed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Applying a frequently used indicator of the desirability of monetary union, we study the symmetry of country-specific structural shocks (measured net of the non-Scandinavian influence) in these three countries. It is found that country-specific shocks are not highly symmetric. This conclusion is also supported by the absence of clear-cut differences between the pattern of structural shocks in Belgium and structural shocks in the Scandinavian countries. This suggests that the three Scandinavian countries did not form an optimum currency area during the period 1873–1913.
JEL classification : F 15; F 33; N 13     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

Is East Asia an optimum currency area?

This paper assesses the empirical desirability of the East Asian economies to an alternative exchange rate arrangement (a monetary union) that can potentially enhance the exchange rate stability and credibility in the region. Specifically, the symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances of the East Asian economies is examined as satisfying one of the preconditions for forming an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). We extend the existing literature by improving the methodology of assessing the symmetry shocks in evaluating the suitability of a common currency area in the East Asian economies employing the Bayesian State-Space Based approach. We consider a model of an economy in which the output is influenced by global, regional and country-specific shocks. The importance of a common regional shock would provide a case for a regional common currency. This model allows us to examine regional and country-specific cycles simultaneously with the world business cycle. The importance of the shocks decomposition is that studying a subset of countries can lead one to believe that observed co-movement is particular to that subset of countries when it in fact is common to a much larger group of countries. In addition, the understanding of the sources of international economic fluctuations is important for making policy decisions. The falling share of country specific factor and the rising role of region factor indicate that East Asia has become increasingly favorable for a monetary union. However, the share of country-specific factor that is still significant implies that it could be costly to renounce individual currencies to advance into a monetary union in East Asia.     

Central bank independence,fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa

Can central bank independence (CBI) help to reduce fiscal balances? In this paper, we answer this question using novel measures of CBI based on the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) and the Garriga measure of legal independence for 30 African countries for the period 1990–2017. Our novel measures of CBI capture the degree of alliance between the fiscal authority and the monetary authority which can potentially lead to debt monetization and higher fiscal balances. Thus, we classify central bank governor changes into ally changes or non-ally changes; in addition to that, we decompose our full sample into CFA zone countries and non-CFA zone countries to capture the effect of currency union membership. Our results show that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy, when proxied by the turnover rate of central bank governors, is associated with a decrease in fiscal balances and replacing a central banker with a non-ally, is negatively and significantly associated with fiscal balances.     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West

Recent events in the European Monetary System on the one hand and monetary disintegration in the former Soviet Union on the other hand have revived interest in the question of how to design and choose a monetary regime for both parts of Europe that ensures monetary stability. The objective of monetary stability can be achieved either by complete monetary union or by currency competition. Building on Hayek's ideas, I argue that both regimes are viable solutions depending on the circumstances. The paper first focuses on the misperceived benefits of flexible exchange rates, making the case for monetary union in Western Europe. However, monetary union is no alternative for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Instead currency competition could be used to retain the benefits of flexible exchange rates and to foster monetary stability at the same time.     

Commentary. An alternative stability pact for the European Union

This paper proposes an alternative stability and growth pactto the one which accompanied the introduction of the euro inJanuary 1999. The latter is part of the third stage of economicand monetary union and, will govern the economic policies ofthe member countries which have joined the single currency andstrongly constrain the policies of those who do not join. Thealternative proposed in this paper is a Full Employment, Growthand Stability Pact and would have a number of features, themost important of which is the creation of new institutionalarrangements, including the creation of an investment bank.     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40