COMPETITIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING

Franchising and renewing of franchises for cable television systems is an important urban policy issue. Of particular interest is whether franchise authorities ought to grant more than one franchise to provide cable service in a given area. This paper reports results of an empirical investigation into the cost structure of large, modern, urban cable systems. We find modest economies of scale in dimensions relevant to the feasibility of direct competition. The economies are not so large as to rule out the possibility that competition…whether direct or potential…can be an important disciplinary force in the marketplace.     

THE PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIP UNDER MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION

The standard economic approaches (screening and signalling) to product quality imply an upward sloping relationship between price and product quality. In the case of screening models it is a relationship which applies to the product line of each individual firm. In the case of signalling models it applies across firms. Both types of model have their shortcomings. An alternative approach is presented which involves endogenising the quality control process. Firms voluntarily provide a warranty contract for their products and this, in turn generates an incentive to control quality. The model compares monopolistic and competitive markets in respect of warranties. quality control and the price-quality relationship. Under monopoly, the price-quality relationship is always upward-sloping or flat. Under competition, however, cost shifts or certain demand side shifts can generate a downward-sloping relationship between price and quality.     

CONCENTRATION-PROFITS MONOPOLY VS. EFFICIENCY DEBATE: SOUTH AFRICAN EVIDENCE

Using the new official measures of concentration, this study finds a strong and highly significant correlation between concentration and industry profitability for South African manufacturing industries. This correlation is consistent with both the monopoly hypothesis of the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm and Demsetz's efficiency hypothesis that concentration of industry reflects the dominance of superior low-cost firms. Using the four-firm concentration ratio, this study applies Chappell and Cottle's extension of the Demsetz test to distinguish between the monopoly explanation of this correlation and the efficiency explanation. Using a conventional regression specification of the concentration-profits relationship with no control for efficiency, this study finds a statistically significant coefficient only for the industry and large size class regressions. Because small firms should do at least as well as large firms, under the price umbrella provided by large firms, this result is inconsistent with the monopoly hypothesis but consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. Specifying a variable that measures the efficiency of large plants relative to smaller plants—the cost advantage ratio—yields striking results. Similar to the results obtained by Chappell and Cottle for the United States, this study finds the efficiency variable to be highly significant in the industry and large size class regressions, while concentration becomes insignificant. Moreover, the efficiency variable is insignificant in the smaller size classes Both the statistical insignificance of concentration and the pattern of the efficiency variable coefficients suggest that including concentration in the regression specification without the efficiency variable simply highlights the effect of the efficiency variable. Coming as they do from an environment as different from the United States as the South Africa of the 1980s, these results strongly support the Demsetz efficiency hypothesis.     

BERTRAND COMPETITION CAN YIELD HIGHER PRICES THAN MONOPOLY

If we take into account the spatial dimension of markets, prices of incumbent firms may be higher and consumer surplus may be lower with competition than with monopoly. This result obtains unambiguously, even in the supposedly highly competitive case of Bertrand competition. Moreover, we are able to show that consumers of the commodity may be worse off with duopoly, if the distance between the firms' sites is sufficiently large.     

垄断性产业管制机构的几个理论问题

垄断性产业的管制机构不同于一般政府行政机关,具有较高的管制效率;管制机构的相对独立性是维持其权威性,保持管制执法公正性的基本前提;应以现代管制理念为基本原则设立高效率的管制机构;管制机构的基本权力是履行其管制职能的法律基础,主要体现在准立法权、行政权和准司法权;只有当管制机构的管制收益大于成本时,管制机构才是有效的,两者的对比关系是评价管制机构有效性的重要指标。     

一个客源竞争的案例分析

惠客隆和真实惠是位于佛山、南海两市交界的文沙东地区的两座大型超市。由于二者的空间距离相近，规模接近，经营的商品类同，价格差异不大，且都以区内居民为主要服务对象，形成了两个“邻里购物中心”，进行着激烈的客源竞争。文章从区位因素、消费者因素、集聚效应、服务因子、经营手法和宣传力度等方面分析在客源竞争中真实惠优胜而惠客隆失利的原因。     

BORK'S PARADOX: STATIC VS. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Judge Robert Bork holds two opposing attitudes towards perfect competition. It is a highly useful economic model for illustrating allocative efficiency, but it is a defective policy model because it deliberately omits productive efficiency. He reconciles these attitudes by combining perfectly competitive allocative efficiency with dynamically competitive productive efficiency in his analysis.
However, these two kinds of competition do not readily mix. One is a static equilibrium concept, the other a dynamic disequilibrium concept. One assumes perfect knowledge and the absence of change; the other assumes imperfect knowledge, learning, and continual flux. Each kind of competition is built on assumptions which, if true, would preclude the existence of the other.
Bork's policy conclusions require the simultaneous existence of both kinds of competition. If he drops dynamic competition from the analysis, a much more stringent antitrust policy is called for. If he drops static competition, economic theory does not justify even his strictures against mergers and cartels.     

COMPETITION IN CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED GASOLINE MARKETS

During the decade ending in 1981, more than 100,000 gasoline dealers exited the industry. This tremendous decline gave rise to numerous allegations that the major oil companies were engaged in anticompetitive activity designed to eliminate their dealers. This paper examines the legislative responses to these allegations, discusses some current economic issues, reviews changes in gasoline marketing before and after decontrol, and evaluates empirically the impact of these events on competition. The primary conclusions of the paper are (1) that these changes in gasoline marketing have resulted from competitive responses to changing market conditions, (2) that most statutes proposed to aid dealers in fact make their demise more likely, (3) that dealers' share of sales has stabilized after decontrol, and (4) that divorcement tends to increase market concentration significantly.     

LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.