浅析信息不对称与银行信贷风险防范

经济学基本假设前提中，最重要的一条就是“经济人”拥有完全信息。正如人们所知道的那样，现实生活中市场主体不可能占有完全的市场信息，信息不对称必定导致信息拥有方为牟取自身更大的利益使另一方的利益受到损害，这种行为在信息经济学上就称作道德风险和逆向选择。银行信贷风险的重要成因是银行与借款人之间的信息不对称。因此，如何将这种信息不对称降至最低，是银行信贷风险管理的重要方面。     

交叉上市、风险分散与溢出效应

本文从非交叉上市公司对交叉上市的市场反应入手，利用对比公司法（MatchedFirmApproach）和事件研究法，实证分析了交叉上市对国内非交叉上市公司带来的影响。分析表明，我国的交叉上市政策增强了国内股票市场的风险分散功能，给国内上市公司带来了正的净溢出效应。     

农户信贷市场的信息不对称与风险规避

当前研究信贷市场非效率现象的个经典模型是斯蒂格里茨和维斯的模型，它以信息经济学为理论基础．以信贷双方信息不对称为逻辑起点，研究逆向选择与道德风险对市场效率的影响。近几年来国内大多数信贷市场效率的研究都以此模型为基础，结合国内现状进行多角度分析，都认为信贷市场多层次     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".     

论信息不对称下银行信贷风险的防范

信息不对称是银行信贷风险产生的主要原因。本文分析了银行信贷信息不对称的存在形式以及可能导致的不良后果,提出了信息不对称下银行信贷风险防范的策略。     

银行信息不对称风险及其防范机制研究

由于银行信息披露的不完全和不规范,监管机构搜集和处理信息的成本高昂,因而银行风险监管中的信息不对称现象较为严重,并因此产生风险。其原因,一是信息披露主体出于利益上的考虑而存在的信息选择性倾向;二是信息的披露和传递机制存在诸多障碍时,缺少一个严格而有效的监管机制,因而造成信息不对称现象的惯性发展。毫无疑问,必要的监管机制和有效的监管手段是防范信息不对称风险的重要途径。     

信息不对称与金融市场脆弱性

在金融市场中,信息起着至关重要的作用.作为金融市场中普遍存在的现象,信息不对称是导致金融市场脆弱性的主要原因之一.本文对金融市场中的信息不对称现象进行了详细的分析,同时提出了相应的解决措施.     

基于信息不对称测度模型的投资者关注与股价崩盘风险

选取2011—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,利用双边随机前沿模型构建出信息不对称测度模型,在信息不对称测度模型的基础上研究投资者关注与股价崩盘风险的关系。研究结果表明：投资者关注能够显著降低企业股价崩盘风险;投资者更偏向关注国有上市公司,国有上市公司股价崩盘风险更低;此外,投资者关注后所获得的信息相比于管理层隐藏的负面信息,前者对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更强。     

信息不对称与国有商业银行经营管理

90年代以来，随着金融全球化浪潮的涌动，我国金融市场不确定因素急剧增长，尤其是国有商业银行的经营管理面临越来越严峻的形势，从表象上来看，资源的非优化配置，信贷资产结构和质量的恶化、管理手段和方式的落后都是重要的促成因素，但透过表象探寻更深层次的原因，就会发现国有商业银行内部存在的信息不对称现象、以及由此引致的逆向选择和道德风险、是阻碍其建立现代商业银行制度的深层原因。本文分析了目前我国国有商业银行经营管理中存在的信息不对称现象，指出应采取有效措施，改善金融资源交易过程中的信息条件，以从根本上提高我国国有商业银行的经营管理的效率。     

Corporate Risk Management under Information Asymmetry

This paper examines the financial and operational hedging activities of US pharmaceutical and biotech firms that are subject to a high level of information asymmetry stemming from R&D investments during 2001–2006. We find evidence in support of the information asymmetry hypothesis à la Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) that hedging helps mitigate the under‐investment problem. Specifically, we find that the use of financial derivatives is associated with greater firm value and that the value enhancement is larger for firms subject to greater information asymmetry and better growth opportunities. There is a synergy between financial hedging and operational hedging where the latter is used to counter product development risk. The results are robust with respect to alternative performance measures, industry‐specific growth measures, and the endogeneity problem. Our work is differentiated from existing studies that examined commodity‐based industries without addressing information asymmetry.     

Information Asymmetry about Investment Risk and Financing Choice

Though it is generally accepted that information asymmetry has an impact on capital structure policy, the nature of the information asymmetry is not well understood. Recent theoretical work and empirical evidence suggests that financing choice depends upon the information asymmetry associated with the investment risk of the particular use of proceeds. Consistent with this view, using the sources and uses of funds framework, we find that equity is used to fund projects with greater information asymmetry about their risk such as research and development expenditure, while debt is used to fund investments with lower information asymmetry about their risk such as liquidity enhancement.     

Debt Maturity,Credit Risk,and Information Asymmetry: The Case of Municipal Bonds

Using a system of equations approach, this paper empirically tests the impact of credit quality, asset maturity, and other issuer and issue characteristics on the maturity of municipal bonds. We find that under conditions of lower information asymmetry that prevails in the municipal sector, higher‐rated bonds have longer maturities than low‐rated bonds. This result differs from that observed in the corporate sector. Overall, our results support the asset maturity hypothesis. In addition, our analysis finds that fundamentals matter. Issue features that provide additional protection or convenience to the investor tend to increase debt maturity.     

Information Asymmetry and Bidders' Gains

Abstract:  Undervalued firms with high information asymmetry may announce takeover bids to attract the attention of investors with a view to increasing the share price through revaluation. Announcement period returns to such bidders should include both revaluation and synergy gains although the revaluation gains should be confined to early bids and decline with the number of bids announced within a reasonable period. Our results offer strong support to these predictions. Undervalued firms with high pre-bid information asymmetry gain the most from early bids and the gains decline with the number of bids announced. These findings are robust to methods of payment, relative size of deals, target status, relatedness of businesses, domicile of target, M&A activities and alternative measures of information asymmetry, and confirm that gains from early bids include revaluation as well as synergy gains, especially in the cases of undervalued firms with high information asymmetry.     

Information Asymmetry and Corporate Cash Holdings

This study analyzes the effect of information asymmetry on corporate cash holdings. Using various measures of information asymmetry, this study shows that companies that operate in environments with higher information asymmetry have smaller cash holdings. This study continues to find a negative relationship between information asymmetry and corporate cash holdings from a battery of sensitivity analyses, including the tests using different regression methods and the difference‐in‐difference tests employing brokerage‐firm merger and closure events. On the whole, the results support the monitoring cost hypothesis of cash holdings over the investment opportunities hypothesis.     

信息不对称与小额信贷创新

面向落后群体或遭受信贷歧视的经济主体开展的“小额信贷”(Microcredit,或称“微贷”),是对信贷市场失灵的一种补充,然而其本身也同样面临着信息不对称问题.从导致金融市场失灵最核心的因素即信息不对称出发,讨论在过去几十年间,小额贷款技术创新在修正这一市场失灵上所取得的进展,并对其中涉及的主流小额贷款技术进行评价,以期对我国的小额信贷产业发展起到借鉴作用.     

Information Asymmetry Around Earnings Announcements

This study examines bid-ask spreads to determine how the anticipation and release of earnings announcements affect information asymmetry in the stock market. I use regression analysis and find that bid-ask spreads are negatively related to public information availability and positively related to earnings variability and the market reaction to prior unexpected earnings. The results suggest that firms for which earnings is expected to yield a relatively larger stock market reaction have greater information asymmetry than firms for which earnings are expected to yield a smaller market reaction.I also find that bid-ask spreads gradually increase in the four days prior to earnings announcements, and increase sharply the day prior to, the day of and the day after the earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads seven to ten days after earnings announcements are not significantly different from bid-ask spreads seven to ten days prior to earnings announcements.     

Target Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Price

This study investigates the effects of target information asymmetry in a takeover transaction. We find that a target with more information asymmetry receives a larger bid premium from the acquirer. We examine the response of the acquirer's investors to the bid to clarify whether the larger bid premium is an overpayment by the acquirer. We observe that the acquirer's investors respond more positively to the acquisition of an opaque target, indicating that the market recognizes the acquirer's valuation of the opaque target and agrees with the offer price. Our results indicate that corporate takeovers help to resolve asymmetric information in the capital market.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.