Private equity and Covid-19

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions during the pandemic should indicate what they perceive as being important for both the preservation and creation of value. PE managers believe that 40% of their portfolio companies are moderately negatively affected and 10% are very negatively affected by the pandemic. The private equity managers—both investment and operating partners—are actively engaged in the operations, governance, and financing in all of their current portfolio companies. These activities are more intensively pursued in those companies that have been more severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, they expect the performance of their existing funds to decline. They are more pessimistic about that decline than the venture capitalists (VCs) surveyed in Gompers et al. (2021). Despite the pandemic, private equity managers are seeking new investments. Rather than focusing on cost cutting, PE investors place a much greater weight on revenue growth for value creation. Relative to the 2012 survey results reported in Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), they appear to give a larger equity stake to management teams and target somewhat lower returns.     

Risk Capital: Theory and Applications

After a brief review of the current theory and practice of risk capital by financial firms, the authors define the concept of risk capital and identify the costs and benefits of using more or less of it. Next, they present their procedure for allocating risk capital to assets and lines of business on the basis of marginal default values, and in a way designed to prevent risk shifting and internal arbitrage. Then, they show how allocations of risk capital are likely to be affected by, and in turn influence, a financial firm's decisions about both the scale and composition of its portfolio of businesses. Finally, the authors present a number of applications and consider their implications for maximizing the value of financial firms. In so doing, the authors also show how their method produces very different allocations of risk capital than those based on two measures that have long been widely used by financial firms: value at risk (VaR) and risk‐adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Moreover, the adjusted present value (APV) rule for evaluating investment opportunities is shown to be workable for nonfinancial as well as financial firms.     

Investment Decisions in Anticipation of Recessions and Outperformance of Pre-Acting Firms

We empirically examine whether firms make investment decisions in anticipation of recessions and subsequently perform better. Using a large quarterly dataset of fixed asset investments for U.S. firms during 1984–2012, we show that not all firms efficiently adjust their investment decisions in anticipation of a recession. However, we find that pre-acting firms that properly adjust their investment decisions (i.e., underinvest) before a recession outperform re-acting firms that fail to make proper investment decisions (i.e., overinvest) before a recession in subsequent returns on assets, returns on investments, and market-adjusted return measures.     

How industries change

It's fairly obvious: To make intelligent investments within your organization, you need to understand how your whole industry is changing. But such knowledge is not always easy to come by. Companies misread clues and arrive at false conclusions all the time. To truly understand where your industry is headed, you have to take a long-term, high-level look at the context in which you do business, says Boston University professor Anita McGahan. She studied a variety of businesses from a cross section of industries over a ten-year period, examining how industry structure affects business profitability and investor returns. Her research suggests that industries evolve along one of four distinct trajectories--radical, progressive, creative, and intermediating--that set boundaries on what will generate profits in a business. These four trajectories are defined by two types of threats. The first is when new, outside alternatives threaten to weaken or make obsolete core activities that have historically generated profits for an industry. The second is when an industry's core assets--its resources, knowledge, and brand capital--fail to generate value as they once did. Industries undergo radical change when core assets and core activities are both threatened with obsolescence; they experience progressive change when neither are jeopardized. Creative change occurs when core assets are under threat but core activities are stable, and intermediating change happens when core activities are threatened while core assets retain their capacity to create value. If your company's innovation strategy is not aligned with your industry's change trajectory, your plan for achieving returns on invested capital cannot succeed, McGahan says. But if you understand which path you're on, you can determine which strategies will succeed and which will backfire.     

Riding the waves of technology through the decades: The relation between industry-level information technology intensity and the cost of equity capital

This paper examines the effect that information technology (IT) investments have on the industry cost of equity capital. We find that industry IT intensity, defined as the relative amount of IT investment to total fixed asset expenditures, is negatively related to the industry cost of equity capital. These results indicate that industries with higher levels of IT investment have lower cost of equity capital. We also find that the relation between IT intensity and cost of equity capital changes over time. Initially, investors viewed IT investments as risky ventures and demanded higher levels of cost of equity (or higher return on their investment) for those industries investing in IT. However, beginning in the 1980s, as IT became more reliable, more cost effective, and had the ability to transform businesses, investors viewed IT Intensity as a positive business strategy with less associated risks and reduced their required cost of equity capital (or lower return on their investment). Extrapolating from our industry results, IT investments allow firms to potentially raise capital at a lower price so they have more assets to employ, indicating that IT investments can be a key factor for business success.     

Private Equity in the U.S.: Building a New Future

Despite the recent downturn, private equity firms still have an important role to play in the global economy. At the same time, many PE firms may need to rethink their strategies. Practices that have been worked in the past may not produce acceptable returns in a future, particularly given the current constraints on financing and leverage. One source of PE's comparative advantage, as demonstrated during the recent crisis, has been the ability of the best and most experienced firms to reorganize their portfolio companies when they get into financial trouble. But in addition to their financial management skills, specialized operating expertise has become more critical to success, and those PE firms that have not acquired it are especially likely to find that past success in raising capital is no guarantee of success in the future. The authors begin by providing a brief overview of the past three decades of global private equity to identify how the market arrived at its current position. Using the findings of academic research together with case studies and interviews with PE practitioners in the U.K., the authors suggest a number of building blocks for the future that reflect the considerable success of the most reputable and experienced PE firms in increasing the value of their portfolio companies.     

The surprising economics of a "people business"

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).     

Operational Improvement: The Key to Value Creation in Private Equity

With credit tightening having reduced the availability of leverage and intensified the competition for new deals, the economic recession has caused many companies in private equity firm portfolios to under-perform. These changes are forcing the private equity firms to depend even more on their ability to improve operating performance to achieve their investment goals and generate attractive returns. But few PE firms have proved capable of achieving such improvements in portfolio companies consistently over time.
In this paper, the authors discuss several ways that private equity firms use their operating expertise to drive value in their portfolio companies. They also examine the analytical framework used by some PE firms when assessing and prioritizing the many operational initiatives that could be undertaken within a newly acquired company. Part of that examination involves a detailed look at how private equity firms assemble an attractive mix of operational improvement projects in their initial 100-day plans. Finally, the authors explore one of the challenges faced by private equity firms when attempting to implement operational enhancements in newly acquired companies: bringing about change without alienating company management.
The real-world application of this approach is demonstrated with a case study that shows how one private equity buyer put its operational skills into practice to help create value within a mid-sized portfolio company.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on The State of Global Private Equity

In this discussion led by Alan Jones, Morgan Stanley's head of Global Private Equity, the University of Chicago's Steve Kaplan begins by surveying 25 years of academic research on private equity. Starting with Kaplan's own Ph.D. dissertation on leveraged buyouts during the 1980s, finance academics have provided a large and growing body of studies documenting the ability of private equity firms to make “sustainable” (that is, maintained over a three‐ or four‐year period) improvements in the operating performance of their portfolio companies, whether operating abroad or in the U.S. Even more impressive, the findings of Kaplan's new study (with Tim Jenkinson of Oxford and Bob Harris of the University of Virginia) suggest that these improvements have been large enough to enable PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008 to deliver returns to their limited partners that have averaged 300 to 400 basis points higher per year than the returns to the S&P 500. And given the “persistence” of PE fund returns—the tendency of the funds of the same PE firms to show up in the top quartile of performers year after year—that Kaplan has documented in earlier work, the performance of private equity seems notably different from that of mutual funds and hedge funds, where there has been little if any consistency in the returns provided by the top performers. Following Kaplan's overview of the research, four representatives of today's leading private equity firms explore questions like the following:

• ? How do the best PE firms, after paying premiums to acquire their portfolio companies and collecting large management fees, provide such consistently high returns to their limited partners?
• ? How did PE portfolio companies perform during the last recession, when many popular business publications were predicting the death of private equity—and what, if anything, does that tell us about how private equity adds value?
• ? What can PE firms do to avoid, or at least limit the damage from, the overpricing and overleveraging that tend to occur near the end of the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to be a permanent feature of private equity?

As Jones notes in his opening comments, the practitioners' answers to such questions “should help investors distinguish between the alpha that the firms represented at this table have generated through active management from the ‘closet beta’ that critics say results when private equity firms simply create what amounts to a levered bet on the public equity markets.”     

University of Texas Roundtable on The State of the U.S. Private Equity Market

In this discussion that took place at the 2017 University of Texas Private Equity conference, the moderator began by noting that since 2000, the fraction of the U.S. GDP produced by companies that are owned or controlled by global private equity firms has increased from 7% to 15%. What's more, today's PE firms have raised an estimated $1.5 trillion of capital that is now available for investing. And thanks in part to this abundance of capital, the prices of PE transactions have increased sharply, with EBITDA pricing multiples rising from about 8.8X in 2012 to 11.5X at the beginning of 2017. Partly as a consequence of such abundant capital and high transaction prices, the aggregate returns to U.S. private equity funds during this four‐year period have fallen below the returns to the stockholders of U.S. public companies. Nevertheless, the good news for private equity investors is that the best‐performing PE firms have continued their long history of outperforming the market. And the consistency of their performance goes a long way toward explaining why the overwhelming majority of the capital contributed by limited partners continues to be allocated to funds put together by these top‐tier PE firms. In this roundtable, a representative of one of these top‐tier firms joins the founder of a relatively new firm with a middle‐market focus in discussing the core competencies and approaches that have enabled the best PE firms to increase the productivity and value of their portfolio companies. Effective financial management—the ability to manage leveraged capital structures and the process of readying their companies for sale to potential strategic or financial investors—is clearly part of the story. But more fundamental and critical to their success has been their ability to find undervalued or undermanaged assets—and either retain or recruit operating managements that, when effectively monitored and motivated, are able to realize the potential value of those assets through changes in strategy and increases in operating efficiency.     

University of Texas Roundtable on LP Perspectives on the State of Private Equity

In this wide‐ranging discussion among four limited partner investors in private equity, the LPs commented on the rates of return they expect from PE, the fees they pay their general partners, and the length of their time commitments to PE investments. After noting the enormous growth in the value of assets under private management, and the reduction in public equity investment by many large institutional investors, each of the four LPs said that their institutions expected to maintain or continue to increase their proportion of portfolio investment in PE. The LP panelists were virtually unanimous in expecting PE rates of return in the 9%‐11% range, as compared to 7%‐8% for public equities. The panelists also seemed to agree that although committing to PE investments for terms longer than the traditional seven to ten years could result in higher returns and lower costs, they were reluctant to make such commitments because they valued the financial flexibility afforded by shorter holding periods. Several LPs claimed that their institutions were scrutinizing the explicit and implicit fees charged by the GPs, and the level of fees was encouraging LPs to co‐invest in deals alongside the GPs. And in response to a closing suggestion that the recent flurry of IPOs could signify the beginning of a major reversal away from private capital, another LP expressed strong doubt, noting that “the private ownership model has clearly shown superior governance, and greater ability to manage leveraged capital structures and create value than public companies over the long term.”     

Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America?

We examine how corporate culture influences firm behavior. Prior research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion. We find that this relationship also influences organizational behavior. Firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure, as measured by variances in equity returns or returns on assets. They exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth, but generate a more positive market reaction, when they announce new investments. Finally, chief executive officers are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in their previous firm when they switch employers.     

Real Options, Product Market Competition, and Asset Returns

We study how competition in the product market affects the link between firms' real investment decisions and their asset return dynamics. In our model, assets in place and growth options have different sensitivities to market wide uncertainty. The strategic behavior of market participants influences the relative importance of these components of firm value. We show that the relationship between the degree of competition and assets' expected rates of return varies with product market demand. When demand is low, firms in more competitive industries earn higher returns, whereas when demand is high firms in more concentrated industries earn higher returns.     

The Wealth Effects of Capital Investment Decisions: An Empirical Comparison of Korean Chaebol and Non‐Chaebol Firms

Abstract:   This paper investigates the capital investment decisions of Korean firms and their impact on shareholder wealth. Overall, we find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcements of 697 cases of investment projects during the period 1992–1999. This paper also finds that the investment decisions of business group ( chaebol ‐affiliated) firms do not increase shareholder wealth, while the capital investment decisions of non‐ chaebol firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The multivariate tests provide consistent evidence that the announcement effects for chaebol firms are lower than for non‐ chaebol firms, after growth opportunities, investment size and firm size are controlled for. The findings support the view that the organizational structure of Korean chaebols creates an incentive for managers to make non‐value maximizing capital investment decisions.     

Levered Returns

This paper revisits the theoretical relation between financial leverage and stock returns in a dynamic world where both corporate investment and financing decisions are endogenous. We find that the link between leverage and stock returns is more complex than static textbook examples suggest, and depends on the investment opportunities available to the firm. In the presence of financial market imperfections, leverage and investment are generally correlated so that highly levered firms are also mature firms with relatively more (safe) book assets and fewer (risky) growth opportunities. A quantitative version of our model matches several stylized facts about leverage and returns.     

提升高校固定资产使用效益的有效途径研究

高校固定资产是一项价值占比较大的资产,在支撑学校的发展过程中起着相当重要的作用,但是高校长期以来养成了重投入轻效益、重实物轻价值、重使用轻责任、重存在轻利用等通病,为了更有效率地配置和使用高校固定资产,需要探索一条有效的路径,首先需要创新管理理念,其次需要通过实施严格的成本管理和责任承担、整理校内和区域间高校资源建设共用实验中心、淡化非经资产和经营资产界限而以科学指标体系予以考核、管理权与使用权分离等一系列措施,可以获得健康有序发展的良好效果。     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Capital structure with risky foreign investment

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.     

Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes

A significantly larger number of firms increase the expected rate of return on pension plan assets (ERR) to make their reported earnings meet/exceed analyst forecasts than would be expected by chance. In the short run, the stock market reacts positively to these firms’ earnings announcements, suggesting that investors fail to recognize that earnings benchmarks are achieved through ERR manipulation. In the long run, however, firms that employ this earnings management strategy significantly underperform control firms in both stock returns and operating performance.