Welfare analysis of tax reforms using household data

This paper discusses a methodology for calculating the distribution of gains and losses from a policy change using data for a large sample of households. Estimates are based on the equivalent income function, which is money metric utility defined over observable variables. This enables calculations to be standardised and a computer program to compute the statistics presented in the paper is available for a general demand system. Equivalent income is related to measures of deadweight loss, and standard errors are computed for each of the welfare measures. An application to U.K. data for 5,895 households is given which simulates a reform that involves eliminating housing subsidies.     

ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME*

When a country faces a sudden surge of import, GATT allows it to impose an import quota to protect its domestic import-competing firms. Nevertheless, various types of OMAs (orderly marketing arrangements) are often utilized instead of import quotas. This paper shows that the threat of the exporting country's retaliation approved by GATT makes it advantageous for both the exporting and importing countries to establish an OMA. By designing an OMA under which its deadweight loss is appropriately distributed to them, they avoid the retaliation approved by GATT which causes an additional deadweight loss.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

Optimal Management Under Institutional Constraints: Determining a Total Allowable Catch for Different Fleet Segments in the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery

Many real world fisheries have an individual vessel quota system with restrictions on transferability of quota or entrance of new vessels into the fishery. While the standard economic reasoning is that these institutional constraints lead to welfare losses, the size of those losses and optimal second-best policies are usually unknown. We develop a dynamic bioeconomic model, in which a scientific body provides an optimal TAC given restrictions on (i) transferability between vessel segments and (ii) entrance of new vessels. Further, we also quantify welfare losses arising from not maximizing economic welfare, but physical yield—which is actually the case in many fisheries. We apply the model to the Northeast Arctic cod fishery, and estimate not only the cost and harvesting functions of the various vessel types, but also the parameters of the biological model as well as those of the demand function. This allows us to determine optimal second-best policies and quantify corresponding welfare effects for our case study fishery.     

THE (HIDDEN) COST OF EMPLOYER PARKING POLICIES*

It has been argued that distortionary tax policies, which stipulate that employer parking is not taxed as a benefit in kind, as well as minimum parking requirements induce welfare losses. Using Dutch data, we show that current tax policies induce welfare losses of about 10% of employer parking resource costs. Hypothetical minimum parking requirements for employers, at levels currently applied in the United States, induce an additional deadweight loss of 18% of employer parking resource costs.     

The Potential Compensation Principle and Constant Marginal Utility of Income

In policy applications, industrial economists are wont to invoke the Kaldor–Hicks potential compensation principle to justify the use of deadweight loss as a measure of the welfare cost of market power. This usage rests on two assumptions. One of these assumptions, that changes in consumer and producer surplus are weighted equally, is well understood. The other assumption, that the marginal utility of income is constant, receives less attention. In a simple model, I show that if there is decreasing marginal utility of income, the use of deadweight loss as an index of market performance rests on shaky ground.     

How Much is Transfer and How Much is Insurance in a Pay‐as‐you‐go System? The German Case

Pay-as-you-go pension systems provide insurance against longevity-related old-age poverty and related risks. They are commonly also used as instruments for redistribution. This paper provides several estimates of the insurance and transfer share of the German public pension system. Estimating these shares is important because they are indicative of taxation-related deadweight losses and influence public acceptance of the pension system. We also disentangle intragenerational from intergenerational transfers. Although our estimate of intragenerational transfers is smaller than recent semi-official estimations, such transfers create substantial deadweight losses. Intergenerational transfers are much larger, thereby contributing to strong negative participation incentives for the younger generation.
JEL classification : H 55; J 26     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.     

Estimates of optimal public capital stocks in Japan using a public investment discount rate framework

The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the optimality of the level of public capital in Japan. We use a methodological approach based on Burgess's (1988) procedure for calculating the public discount rate. This approach involves estimating a production function, but does not necessarily require utility function estimation. The results indicate that, although the Japanese economy experienced a public capital deficiency over the period 1960–1982, public capital moved toward optimal levels throughout the period. First version received: March 1997/final version received: June 1998     

Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms

This paper establishes a political support model of immigration reforms. The analysis highlights the distinction between border enforcement and employer sanction measures in that the former can be more aptly characterized as an income transfer from employer to native labor interests, whereas the latter generates deadweight losses that are borne entirely by producers. We show that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by "wiping the slate clean" and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures.     

THE EFFECTS OF FIRM BOUNDARY AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON UTILITY COSTS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES

ABSTRACT: A number of studies have examined costs and potential for scale and scope economies in electricity distribution; however, few if any, have examined this area in terms of the unique constraints associated with municipal ownership or historical and regulatory constraints associated with former municipal ownership. This paper focuses on 19 distribution‐only municipally owned utilities for a ten‐year period (1988–97). Distortions from variable outputs but largely fixed inputs are minimized. The data used were collected specifically to assess productivity, cost, and efficiency performance and include value‐based capital inputs and service prices. Outputs include energy conveyed and number of connections; inputs include capital, system losses, labour, and materials. We examine the effect of using third‐party financing (e.g., connection charges), with its inherent principal‐agent problems, on utility costs, as well as the effect of shared services and multi‐utility output (e.g., electricity and water). A translog total cost function is estimated. Our findings suggest significant returns to scope but also significant increases in costs associated with the use of third‐party financing. The results also suggest scale diseconomies. Shared outputs, which have been greatly restricted or eliminated under restructuring, may have provided larger, and now lost, economies than the scale returns blindly pursued by some through restructuring or incented/forced mergers or divestitures. Finally, it is clear that third‐party financing can raise costs; such financing is widely used among utilities providing electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, and should be closely scrutinized.     

Learning from Transition Economies: Assessing Labor Market Policies across Central and Eastern Europe

Central and Eastern European countries transformedradicallytheir unemployment benefit systems and altered significantly the composition of their active labor market policy budgets in the transition process. Their recent experience is valuable from an OECD country perspective. Based on a rich data base of district-level outflows from registered unemployment and active labor market policy expenditures and intakes, this paper provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of active labor market policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Estimates of an augmented matching function do not point to significant deadweight losses associated with active program intakes. This does not rule out the possibility that active policies displace those already employed, but such substitution effects may not be undesirable given the stagnancy of the unemployment pools in these countries.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 366–384. Università Bocconi and IGIER, Istituto di Economia Politica, via Sarfatti, 25, 20136 Milan, Italy.     

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DEMAND SYSTEM* AND OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION

We have two major tasks in this paper. The first is to obtain a reasonable estimate of the Japanese demand system, which includes leisure, income and commodity choices. The second is to compute and evaluate the optimal tax equilibrium. The estimation result, based on the Almost Ideal Demand System, is found to be consistent with the microeconomic theory. We evaluate the optimal commodity tax structure by calculating the equilibria under lump‐sum, optimal commodity and uniform commodity taxation schemes. The deadweight losses under uniform taxation are very small, and the optimal commodity tax rates are strikingly close to uniform.     

ESTIMATING TEMPTATION AND COMMITMENT OVER THE LIFE CYCLE

This article estimates the importance of temptation for consumption smoothing and asset accumulation in a life‐cycle model. We use two complementary estimation strategies: first, we estimate the model‐implied Euler equation; second, we match liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation using the method of simulated moments. In both cases, we find that the utility cost of temptation is one‐quarter of the utility benefit of consumption. Further, temptation is crucial for correctly estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS): EIS estimates are biased downward when ignoring temptation. Finally, the model only matches the share of illiquid wealth if temptation is in the preference specification.     

Redistribution from a constitutional perspective

In its traditional form, Paretian welfare economics has little to say about policies of redistribution. I argue that by adopting a constitutional perspective, elements of a theory of redistribution can be developed without recourse to interpersonal utility comparisons. Individuals who find themselves under an imperfect veil of uncertainty at a constitutional stage face a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of redistribution. The benefits consist of a reduction in the variance of a risk-averse agent's income distribution. The costs are represented by deadweight losses caused either by bureaucracy or by disincentive effects associated with the transfer scheme. My simple formal analysis shows that individuals may, even under an imperfect veil of uncertainty, be able to agree unanimously on a certain transfer policy if their personal characteristics are not too different from each other. This paper is a modified version of a chapter from my Master's thesis, submitted at the University of Bonn in 1992. Revisions were done during a stay at DELTA/Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. A scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Urs Schweizer, Hartmut Kliemt, Niclas Berggren, and an anonymous referee of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions, which have greatly improved the paper.     

Wants and Working Wives: Household Demand and Saving in Australia*

Household survey data are used to compare the consumption and savings behaviour of families in which both husband and wife work with the behaviour when only the husband is employed. Other household characteristics allowed for are age, socio-economic class and family size. A linear systems model is used and attention is focused on alternative methods of estimating the parameters of the Klein-Rubin utility function. The preferred method involves the use of information from time-series studies in estimating the ‘subsistence’ parameters.     

Prices and Deadweight Loss in Multiproduct Monopoly

The paper investigates prices and deadweight loss in multiproduct monopoly with linear interrelated demand and constant marginal costs. We show that, with commonly used models for linear demand such as the Bowley demand and vertically or horizontally differentiated demand, the price for each good is independent of demand cross‐effects and of the characteristics and number of other goods. This contrasts with the oft‐expressed view that prices critically depend on demand cross‐effects. We also show that for these linear models, the deadweight loss due to monopoly amounts to half the total monopoly profit. Finally, we show how a production subsidy might restore social efficiency.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

How justified is abandoning money in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia on the grounds of instability in the money‐demand function?

The role of money in the design and conduct of monetary policy has reemerged as an important issue in both advanced and developing economies, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis. A growing body of recent literature suggests that the causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation remains intact across countries and over time and that this relation is not conditional on the stability of the money‐demand function or whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Moreover, critical for a rule‐based monetary policy is the presence of a long‐run stable money‐demand function, rather than a short‐run money‐demand model that may exhibit instability for many reasons, including problems with estimating a money‐demand model with high‐frequency data. Provided that a stable money‐demand function exists, it could be useful to establish long‐run equilibrium relations among money, output, prices, and exchange rates, as the classical monetary theory suggests. Within this analytical framework, this paper addresses the question of whether money has any role in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia. The conventional wisdom is that the money‐demand function in Australia has been unstable since the mid‐1980s due to financial deregulation and reforms; this led to a change in the strategy of monetary policy for price stability in the form of inflation targeting that ignores money insofar as inflation and its control are concerned. This paper reports empirical findings for Australia, obtained from a longer quarterly data series over the period 1960Q1–2015Q1, which suggest that instability in the narrow‐money‐demand function in Australia was primarily due to the exclusion of variables which have become important in the deregulated environment since the 1980s. These findings are confirmed by an expanded form of the narrow‐money‐demand function that was found stable over the past two decades, although it experienced multiple structural breaks over the study period. The paper draws the conclusion that abandoning the monetary aggregate as an instrument of monetary policy in Australia, under a rule‐based monetary policy such as inflation targeting, cannot be justified by instability in the money‐demand function or even by lack of a causal link between money supply growth and inflation.