Exploring the value of party political advertising for youth electoral engagement: an analysis of the 2001 British General Election advertising campaigns

One of the central, non‐party issues in the latter days of the 2001 British General Election campaign was encouraging the electorate to vote. With turnout at British elections in decline, particularly among young people, British democracy appears to be facing a crisis. This disengagement offered both opportunities and challenges for the election advertising campaigns, however, the campaigns employed have been accused of failing to engage a disinterested young electorate. The aim of this paper is to explore youth attitudes to electoral advertising and to explore its value for public servants tasked with increasing voter engagement and turnout among young people for future British general elections. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities

I study whether bailouts of local governments carry electoral benefits for state governments with a dataset covering 421 municipalities in the German state of Hesse over the period 1999–2011. I find that past bailouts have no economically significant effect on the municipality-level vote share of the parties that formed the state government in subsequent state elections. On the other hand, bailouts lead to vote increases for the ruling parties in subsequent local elections. On balance, these results suggest that electoral concerns are not the reason why central governments find it difficult to commit to a no-bailout policy.     

The 1997 Election: Can an Improving Economy Secure a Fifth Tory Term?

The current government is in deep electoral trouble. Nothing is certain in politics, but it still seems very likely the Tories will be defeated by New Labour this spring. Yet the economy is in fine shape – inflation and interest rates are at historically low levels, economic growth is proceeding at a respectable rate, and unemployment continues to fall. Why won’t the electorate reward the government? In this article Simon Price argues that the Tories lost their reputation for economic competence in 1992 and this has swayed the public’s opinion.     

Fiscal policy options ahead of the Autumn Statement

• In our view the case for a fiscal stimulus is incontrovertible. The vote to leave the EU has dampened the outlook for growth, while there is limited scope for monetary policy to offer more support. The existing fiscal plans will exert a sizeable drag on growth and with borrowing costs so low, there is a strong case for relaxing the squeeze.
• Scenarios run on the Oxford Global Model suggest that raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in each of the next two fiscal years could boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. We also find that the package would, in some respects, pay for itself, with the public sector net debt‐to‐GDP ratio peaking at a lower level. The main bar to this package would be whether there are sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects available.
• Political considerations might encourage the government to opt instead for packages geared towards boosting current spending – perhaps on the NHS – or cutting taxes. But our modelling suggests that this would offer a smaller boost to activity and would also generate poorer fiscal outcomes than an infrastructure‐led package.
• While the case for a stimulus package is very strong, our expectations for delivery are fairly low. The Conservatives have enjoyed electoral success on the back of a strong austerity message and suggestions that they might loosen fiscal policy appear to be aimed at averting a worst‐case scenario, rather than a conviction that this would be a positive policy to boost both short‐ and long‐term growth prospects. So if the economic data remains firm, the prospects of a sizeable stimulus package will recede. And if a package is implemented, the temptation to favour crowd‐pleasing tax cuts over higher investment may prove to be irresistible. Therefore, we view a large, infrastructure‐focused, stimulus package as an upside risk to our forecast, not a core assumption.

     

Forecasting government support in Irish general elections: Opinion polls and structural models

Election forecasting is a cottage industry among pollsters, the media, political scientists, and political anoraks. Here, we plow a fresh field in providing a systematic exploration of election forecasting in Ireland. We develop a structural forecast model for predicting incumbent government support in Irish general elections between 1977 and 2020 (the Iowa model). We contrast this structural model with forecasts from opinion polls, the dominant means of predicting Ireland’s elections to date. Our results show that with appropriate lead-in time, structural models perform similarly to opinion polls in predicting government support when the dependent variable is vote share. Most importantly, however, the Iowa model is superior to opinion polls in predicting government seat share, the ultimate decider of government fate in parliamentary systems, and especially significant in single transferable vote (STV) systems where vote and seat shares are not always in sync. Our results provide cumulative evidence of the potency of structural electoral forecast models globally, with the takeaway that the Iowa model estimating seat share outpaces other prediction approaches in anticipating government performance in Irish general elections.     

“Ministering to the Social Needs of the People”: Samuel Jones,Strong Mayor Government,and Municipal Ownership, 1897–1904

Debates in the Progressive era between supporters of the franchise system and supporters of municipal ownership provide an example of conflicting views of appropriate models of state development. The former wanted to continue the public‐private partnerships that characterized much of 19^th‐century state building, while the latter maintained that this system inevitably led to corruption and exacerbated inequality, calling for a new system of publicly run programs. Mayor Samuel Jones of Toledo worked to expand municipally owned utilities and transportation. Jones argued that granting franchises for the provision of public services enabled private companies to accrue profits that belonged to the people. He actively promoted an alternative model based on his faith in the potential of government, through a program of public ownership, to exemplify a sense of community, brotherhood, and love. Yet obstruction by the city council and lack of mayoral power blocked his efforts. As a result, he attempted to secure a “strong mayor” charter that would enable him to enact his program. The voters, however, rejected the plan, fearing centralization of power and loss of popular accountability. This outcome highlights the importance of the relationship between electoral structures and functional expansion in American political development.     

Beware of ‘Good’ Outliers and Overoptimistic Conclusions*

The main goal of this paper is to warn practitioners of the danger of neglecting outliers in regression analysis, in particular, good leverage points (i.e. points lying close to the regression hyperplane but outlying in the x‐dimension). While the types of outliers which do influence regression estimates (vertical outliers and bad leverage points) have been extensively investigated, good leverage points have been largely ignored, probably because they do not affect the estimated regression parameters. However, their effect on inference is far from negligible. We propose a step‐by‐step procedure to identify and treat all types of outliers. The paper of Persson and Tabellini [American Economic Review (2004) Vol. 94, pp. 25–46] linking the degree of proportionality of an electoral system to the size of government is discussed to illustrate how the choice of a measure and the existence of atypical observations may substantially influence results.     

Measuring Electoral Control

If voters do not pay attention to whatrepresentatives do, representatives are not stimulatedto be responsive. Therefore, electoral control, theextent to which voters base their vote on thebehaviour of representatives is, at least potentially,an important variable in the explanation of thebehaviour of representatives. Moreover, electoralcontrol seems to be an important variable from anormative point of view. In this article four ways tomeasure the minimal level of local electoral controlusing the outcomes of local elections (electoralstatistics) are presented. The general idea behind themeasures is fairly simple. If local elections arecompletely determined by nonlocal factors, then thelosses and gains of local divisions of nationalparties from one local election to another are`identical' across municipalities. A deviation fromthis pattern can be interpreted as an indication ofthe minimal level of local electoral control in aspecific municipality. The measures are externallyvalidated using data from a survey among council members.     

Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot

The secret ballot was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral reform to create fair elections and protect democracy. Submitted: May 25, 1999 / Accepted: July 24, 2000     

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral model where parties differ in their valences – the electorally perceived, non-policy “quality” of the party leader. It is assumed that valence may either be exogenous, in the sense of being an intrinsic characteristic of the leader, or may be due to the contributions of party activists, who donate time and money and thus enhance electoral support for the party. Theorem 1 shows that vote maximization depends on balancing these two opposed effects. Theorem 2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral mean when activist valence is zero. The paper then examines empirical electoral models for the Netherlands circa 1980 and Britain in 1979, 1992 and 1997 and shows that party divergence from the electoral mean cannot be accounted for by exogenous valence alone. The balance condition suggests that the success of the Labour party in the election of 1997 can be attributed to a combination of high exogenous valence and pro-Europe activist support.     

All change? Prospects for the UK economy under “New” Labour

The opinion polls suggest Labour will win the General Election and form the next government. In this article, Andrew Sentance discusses how the UK economy might fare under "New" Labour. He argues that there is likely to be a considerable degree of continuity in macroeconomic policy, but more change in approach to supply-side issues. He highlights four key policy challenges which Labour would face at an early stage if elected and which will give an indication of how policies developed in opposition will be applied in practice.     

Maximizing political vote in multiple districts

This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts.     

Affect versus cognition: Wishful thinking on election day: An analysis using exit poll data from Belgium

Citizens tend to overestimate the electoral success of their preferred party. We investigate the extent to which Belgian voters overestimate the result of the party that they vote for and the factors that explain which voters do so more than others. Our focus is on the impact of educational attainment and partisan attachment on the overestimation of one’s party’s result. Previous research in this field has relied on data gathered in the months before the elections, which introduces a substantial amount of uncertainty and variation over time into the measurements of citizens’ vote share estimations. As an alternative, we investigate voters’ estimations of their party’s electoral success by means of data gathered in an exit poll survey. Our results show partisan attachments to have a strong impact on overestimations, which suggests that a wishful thinking mechanism is in play. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which partisan attachments increase citizens’ overestimations depends on a voter’s level of education.     

Auditor Industry Specialization,Political Economy and Earnings Quality: Some Cross‐Country Evidence

Using cross‐country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross‐country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.     

THERE'S MANY A SLIP…

There has to be a General Election at some time in the next eighteen months. It has long been clear that the economy will not be in the best of shape in time for the election and that the best the Conservatives can hope for is a significant reduction in inflation and interest rates together with modest output growth. Our October forecast suggested that this combination was feasible and that the government would be able to go to the country with base rates of 12 per cent, retail price inflation at half its present level and output growing at a rate of 2per cent after a relatively short and shallow recession. It may turn out that this is an overly optimistic central forecast and in this Forecast Release we examine some of the ways in which it could go wrong. In a worst possible scenario the government may have to face the electorate with the economy in recession, inflation high and interest rates still at or close to their present levels.     

And a populist New Year: global hopes and fears framework

• Get ready for more populist governments. There is now sufficiently widespread backing for global populism that at least one further victory in a major economy is very likely in the next year or so, our analysis of populist policies and support in 20 large economies shows.
• While there are no populist electoral front‐runners, many large economies have elections coming up in which populists have a decent chance of capturing sizeable votes. If you roll the dice enough times, the populist number is likely to come up somewhere – there is now around a 50% chance of a populist government in one key Eurozone country; bookmakers' odds suggest an even higher probability.
• Donald Trump's victory showed how market reaction to populism is hard to predict. Our survey provides a framework for assessing the diverse and complex channels.
• We see limited possibilities of Trump‐like, populist‐propelled fiscal expansions elsewhere in the world, which are typically market positive. Even where populist‐leaning politicians have a chance of power, they have shown little appetite for fiscal expansion.
• Globally, populist policies are focussed more on immigration, trade, and governance, which are typically market negative. As such, populist electoral victories would imply modest downward revisions to baseline growth forecasts and risk greater instability.
• Populist electoral victories in Europe would result in unsettling brinksmanship and provide an existential threat to the EU, though compromise is the most likely outcome and subsequent risks are two‐sided. For example, (i) reductions in free movement in labour could make Brexit softer; (ii) populism could challenge unhelpful pro‐cyclicality in the Stability and Growth Pact.

     

Selecting Indexes of Electoral Proportionality: General Properties and Relationships

Measuring the proportionality of outcomes in termsof each party's vote and seatshares is an important task in electoral analysis.Various indexes have been designedthat provide a summary statistic of electoralproportionality/disproportionality. Claimsand counter-claims have been made regarding thestrengths and weaknesses of particularindexes. Important consequences follow from thismethodological pluralism. First, it isnot always clear which index has been employedwhen particular electoral outcomesare discussed. Second, recent additions to thelist of indexes have not been thoroughlyscrutinised and appraised. Third, the lack ofknowledge about the general relationshipbetween indexes means that observations might bedifferent had a different index beenused. This article seeks to identify and clarifythe particular properties of different indexesof proportionality. Relatively new, and largelyuntested, indexes of proportionality areexamined and some unusual and potentially damagingproperties are identified. We alsocompare different measures of disproportionality inan effort to specify some generalproperties of the inter-relationships between them.Understanding the particular patternsof electoral competition and vote distributionsthat affect the relationship between thesemeasures should enable users to anticipate theconsequences of preferring one index overothers.     

The ‘Singapore scenario’: the uncertain prospects for labour standards in post‐Brexit Britain

The Conservative government of Theresa May asserted that labour standards would be preserved post‐Brexit. The Labour Party also privileged labour standards in its anti‐austerity programme. The threat remains however that Brexit will provide an incentive to erode labour standards in a global ‘race to the bottom’ in a ‘Singapore scenario’.     

DO INSTITUTIONS AFFECT CITIZENS' SELECTION INTO POLITICS?

Political economy has primarily paid attention to the principal‐agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited, this perspective needs to be complemented with an economics of political selection that takes into account the heterogeneity in the quality of those elected to political office. We review the emerging literature, which investigates the institutional determinants of political selection. We discuss pay in politics, parties, their candidate selection procedures and electoral rules, institutions enhancing transparency in politics, and institutions which govern dual office holding in different branches of government. We argue that further comparative analyses are essential in order to gain an improved understanding of the impact that institutions have on political outcomes, not only via the channel of accountability, but also via the channel of selection.     

Regional heterogeneity and U.S. presidential elections: Real-time 2020 forecasts and evaluation

This paper exploits cross-sectional variation at the level of U.S. counties to generate real-time forecasts for the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The forecasting models are trained on data covering the period 2000–2016, using high-dimensional variable selection techniques. Our county-based approach contrasts the literature that focuses on national and state level data but uses longer time periods to train their models. The paper reports forecasts of popular and electoral college vote outcomes and provides a detailed ex-post evaluation of the forecasts released in real time before the election. It is shown that all of these forecasts outperform autoregressive benchmarks. A pooled national model using One-Covariate-at-a-time-Multiple-Testing (OCMT) variable selection significantly outperformed all models in forecasting the U.S. mainland national vote share and electoral college outcomes (forecasting 236 electoral votes for the Republican party compared to 232 realized). This paper also shows that key determinants of voting outcomes at the county level include incumbency effects, unemployment, poverty, educational attainment, house price changes, and international competitiveness. The results are also supportive of myopic voting: economic fluctuations realized a few months before the election tend to be more powerful predictors of voting outcomes than their long-horizon analogs.