UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE OF CLOSED‐END FUNDS

I find a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the initial and long‐run aftermarket performance of closed‐end funds. This relation persists even after controlling for fund characteristics, types, and investment strategies. The positive relation between underwriter reputation and initial returns supports the notion that prestigious investment bankers tend to promote a price run‐up in the immediate aftermarket to enhance their reputation with the issuers and the investors. The better long‐run performance for funds underwritten by prestigious underwriters suggests that prestigious underwriters protect their reputation by underwriting only high‐quality issues that will perform well in the long run.     

Which Factors Affect Bond Underwriting Fees? The Role of Banking Relationships

The question of which factors are relevant in determining bond underwriting fees is empirically investigated by analysing 2,202 bond issues completed by European firms during the 1993 – 2003 period. Four major results emerge from the analysis. First, the introduction of the single currency in 1999 has generated an increase in competition among banks, and, as a result, a reduction in underwriting fees. Second, a strong relationship with the issuer's main bank reduces the level of underwriting fees. Third, new issuers are charged with lower underwriter fees relative to firms that have completed issues without building any strong relationship with a bank. Fourth, higher reputation banks charge lower underwriting fees. The implications of these findings are also discussed.     

When the Underwriter Is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three-month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker; he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing.     

Bought deals: The value of underwriter certification in seasoned equity offerings

The bought deal is the predominant method of underwriting SEOs in Canada. Offer prices are set and underwriters commit to purchase offerings several days earlier for bought deals than for firm commitment issues, implying stronger underwriter certification for bought deal issues. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, this study finds a significantly smaller negative stock price reaction around the announcement of bought deals compared to firm commitment issues. Bought deals are further shown to have smaller offer price discounts and smaller underwriting fees, implying superior pricing and thus, higher quality offerings. These findings suggest that investment banks’ underwriting method of choice is informative of issue quality.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

Investor interest, trading volume, and the choice of IPO mechanism in France

This paper investigates the relationship between underpricing and investor interest level prior to and after the IPO date. Empirical tests show a significant 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal return of 19.15%. It is positively related to the share demand-to-offer ratio in the pre-market period and to trading volume in the aftermarket. Despite a high initial underpricing for some book-built issues, the book-building procedure allows for more effective pricing and a lower divergence of opinion among investors in the aftermarket than the auction-like procedure.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

Stabilization Activities by Underwriters after Initial Public Offerings

Prior research has assumed that underwriters post a stabilizing bid in the aftermarket. We find instead that aftermarket activities are less transparent and include stimulating demand through short covering and restricting supply by penalizing the flipping of shares. In more than half of IPOs, a short position of an average 10.75 percent of shares offered is covered in 22 transactions over 16.6 days in the aftermarket, resulting in a loss of 3.61 percent of underwriting fees. Underwriters manage price support activities by using a combination of aftermarket short covering, penalty bids, and the selective use of the overallotment option.     

Seasoned equity offerings: Quality of accounting information and expected flotation costs

Flotation costs represent a significant loss of capital to firms and are positively related to information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. We measure a firm's information asymmetry by its accounting information quality based on two extensions of the Dechow and Dichev [2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. Accounting Review 77, 35–59] earnings accruals model, which is a more direct approach to assessing the information available to outside investors than the more commonly used proxies. Our main hypothesis is that poor accounting information quality raises uncertainty about a firm's financial condition for outside investors, though not necessarily for insiders. This accounting effect lowers demand for a firm's new equity, thereby raising underwriting costs and risk. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), we show that poor accounting information quality is associated with higher flotation costs in terms of larger underwriting fees, larger negative SEO announcement effects, and a higher probability of SEO withdrawals. These results are robust to joint determination of offer size and flotation cost components and to adjustments for sample selection bias.     

Foreign Entry into Underwriting Services: Evidence from Japan's “Big Bang” Deregulation

We examined the effect of foreign entry into bond market underwriting activity using issue‐level data from the Japanese “Samurai” and euro–yen bond markets. We found that the fees charged by Japanese underwriters were higher on average than those of foreign underwriters, but the difference could be explained by conditioning on issue characteristics. Our results also suggest that bond issuers sorted properly across underwriters, as switching across underwriter nationalities would be expected to result in higher fees. However, the savings enjoyed by firms issuing with foreign underwriters were modest and statistically insignificant, while those of firms issuing with Japanese underwriters were substantial and statistically significant. This result suggests that Japanese underwriters priced their services aggressively over the sample period, perhaps in an effort to retain or gain market share. This conjecture is supported by a matching exercise that examined the liberalization of foreign underwriter access to the Samurai bond market, using euro–yen bond issues as a control. Foreign entry led to a statistically and economically significant decrease of 16 basis points on average in underwriting fees in the Samurai bond market. Overall, our results suggest that the international market for Japanese bond underwriting services was partially segmented by nationality as issuers appear to have preferred habitats, but that liberalization increased overall market competition.     

Advantageous innovation and imitation in the underwriting market for corporate securities

Investment banks that develop new corporate securities systematically lead the new underwriting market despite being imitated early by equally competitive rivals. We study how innovators and imitators set underwriting fees in order to identify empirically the source of this advantage. Using data of innovative securities since 1985, we do find that innovators set systematically higher fees than imitators. This premium decreases as more issues occur, and faster for later generation products. Imitation is also quicker for later generations. This evidence supports the hypothesis that the innovator has superior skills in structuring any given issue of the new security.     

Do the equity holding and soundness of bank underwriters affect issue costs of SEOs?

This paper examines the effects of characteristics of bank underwriters on issue costs in seasoned equity offerings in Japan following deregulation in 1999. I find that banks’ holding loans have a negative effect on price discounts and no effect on underwriting fees. However, banks’ equity holdings have no effect on discount rates and a positive effect on underwriting fees. Furthermore, issuers with unhealthy banks pay higher discount rates, are more likely to be weak in their ex-post operating performance, and are less willing to switch underwriters. I conclude that the characteristics of banks have different effects on issue costs.     

Deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing: New insights on IPO pricing

We decompose initial returns into deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing using stochastic frontier analysis. We model deliberate underpricing as a function of proxies of information asymmetry surrounding IPO value between market participants. Equity retained is an unlikely signalling mechanism to convey IPO value to outside investors through deliberate premarket underpricing. The presence of lock-in agreements, underwriter fees, number of uses of proceeds, and venture capital or private equity backing have positive impacts on deliberate premarket underpricing. Demand for firms' capital also explains deliberate premarket underpricing, whereas new issues market conditions have no impact. All these factors are found to explain a significant fraction of the variations in our deliberate underpricing estimates. Deliberate underpricing is the more dominant component that makes up initial return when compared to the fraction of aftermarket mispricing. We attribute aftermarket mispricing to trading volume in IPO shares on the first day, price adjustment between the filing price range and the offer price, and offer size. Equity retained explains the aftermarket mispricing rather than the deliberate premarket underpricing in contradiction to the signalling argument. More reputable underwriters are likely to provide price support in the early aftermarket, whereas we observe no impact on deliberate premarket underpricing.     

On the marketing of IPOs

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.     

Does it pay to be loyal? An empirical analysis of underwriting relationships and fees

We examine underwriting fees for repeat issuers of new securities to determine the relation between loyalty to an underwriting bank and the fees charged. For a sample of offers over the 1975–2001 period, we find that loyalty is associated with lower fees for common stock offers, consistent with valuable relationship capital being built through loyalty. For debt offers, however, we find the opposite pattern, consistent with relationship capital not being as valuable. For both offer types, firms that graduate to higher-quality banks face lower fees. Firms that are more likely to be switching banks to improve analyst coverage face higher fees for common stock offers, but not for debt offers.     

Overconfident individual day traders: Evidence from the Taiwan futures market

A specific day-trading policy in Taiwan futures market allows an investigation of the performance of day traders. Since October 2007, investors who characterize themselves as “day traders” by closing their day-trade positions on the same day enjoy a 50% reduction in the initial margin. Because we can identify day traders ex ante, we have a laboratory to explore trading behavior without the contamination of potential behavioral biases. Our results show that the 3470 individual day traders in the sample incur on average a significant loss of 61,500 (26,700) New Taiwan dollars after (before) transaction costs over October 2007–September 2008. This implies that day traders are not only overconfident about the accuracy of their information but also biased in their interpretations of information. We also find that excessive trading is hazardous only to the overconfident losers, but not to the winners. Last, we provide evidence that more experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day trading behavior, although they do not learn their types or gain superior trading skills that could mitigate their losses.     

Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs

Firms with poor aftermarket performance are given higher target prices and are more likely to receive strong buy recommendations, especially by analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter. This favorable coverage is relatively short lived, typically lasting less than six months. Controlling for the quantity of coverage received, stock prices of newly public firms increase more when the target price ratio is high and recommendation is a strong buy. These results suggest that when a firm goes public, underwriter-affiliated analysts provide protection in the form of “booster shots” of stronger coverage if the firm experiences poor aftermarket stock performance.     

The under-pricing of IPOs in the Gulf cooperation council countries

We document the phenomenon of under-pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) for 47 Gulf firms that went public between 2001 and 2006. The IPOs had, on average, initial abnormal returns of 290 percent, far exceeding those documented for both developed and emerging markets. In aftermarket performance, we find that these IPOs provide investors with negative abnormal returns over a one-year period, which seems to be consistent with findings in other industrial and emerging markets. The empirical models fail, however, to provide us with a satisfactory explanation using the common independent variables employed in the literature. Nevertheless, it appears that country- and industry-specific characteristics, in addition to the timing of the offers, play a key role in explaining IPO behavior in the region. This paper's empirical findings support the hypothesis that investors are initially over-optimistic about an IPO's performance, but grow more pessimistic over time.     

Drexel Burnham Lambert's bankruptcy and the subsequent decline in underwriter fees

In the 1980s, Drexel Burnham Lambert dominated the underwriting of junk bonds with close to a 50% market share. In 1990, Drexel went bankrupt and was liquidated, and the percentage underwriting fees for junk bonds subsequently dropped dramatically. We present strong evidence that the exit of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the resulting increase in competition for market share were major contributing factors to the decline in junk bond underwriter fees.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.