NOMINAL BONDS AND INTEREST RATES*

In this article, I integrate the microfoundation of monetary theory with the model of limited participation to analyze the competition between nominal bonds and money. The market for government nominal bonds is centralized and Walrasian, whereas the goods market is modeled as random matches. The government imposes a legal restriction that requires all government goods to be purchased with money but not with bonds. By contrast, private agents can exchange between themselves with both money and bonds. I show that an arbitrarily small legal restriction is sufficient to prevent matured bonds from being a medium of exchange. I also analyze the effects of monetary policy with and without the legal restriction. Some of those effects differ significantly from traditional monetary models.     

COMMENTS ON GREEN–ZHOU “MONEY AS A MECHANISM IN A BEWLEY ECONOMY”*

This article discusses the paper by Green and Zhou “Money as a Mechanism in a Bewley Economy” as presented at the second Karaken Conference.     

A COMMENT ON “PRICE DISPERSION,INFLATION, AND WELFARE” BY A. HEAD AND A. KUMAR*

The principal results of Head and Kumar's article are derived under the natural assumption that the number of price offers received per period by buyers is distributed Poisson. This case is of interest for two reasons. First, because the infinite sums and integrals that enter the equilibrium conditions can be solved in closed form, the derivations of the model's implications are straightforward. Second, by regarding the arrival rate as the relevant measure of search intensity, the analysis of endogenous search effort is simplified.     

A NOTE ON CHAMBERS'S “LONG MEMORY AND AGGREGATION IN MACROECONOMIC TIME SERIES”*

This note reviews some results on aggregating discrete‐time long memory processes, providing a formula for the spectrum of the aggregates that considers the aliasing effect.     

“ENVIRONMENT”, “NEEDS” AND REAL INCOME COMPARISONS(1)

Conventional measures of national product make no pretence of including everything that affects welfare. As increasing attention is being paid to environmental pollution, the problem of incorporating certain non-economic variables into the analysis of well-being becomes more relevant. The object of this note is to show how a difference in “needs” for, and hence expenditures on, anti-pollutants, which will show up in conventional national accounts comparisons as differences in “tastes”, should be converted into differences in real income.     

THE ASYMMETRIC IMPACT OF “INFORMATIVE” AND “UNINFORMATIVE” FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE STATEMENTS ON ASSET PRICES

This paper examines the effect of the information content of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements on the level and volatility of Treasuries and stock returns. Statements are separated into “informative” and “uninformative” groups with informative statements delivering important information which was not previously anticipated by the consensus. We find evidence that the information content of FOMC statements tends to generate an asymmetric response, with informative statements having a larger effect than uninformative statements. Asymmetries tend to be more pronounced for the conditional mean than conditional volatility. The behavior of volatility is tent‐shaped, spiking during policy announcements and declining before and after the release. We also find that the evolution of the language of the FOMC statements does matter to market participants and that joint releases of target rate changes and informative statements have a distinctly more pronounced impact than other types of announcements. (JEL E52, E58, E65, G12, G14)     

WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF-INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT*

We develop a model of political support seeking politicians and support supplying voters. Based on Downs' original formulation, the framework yields endogenous political weights with both liberal and conservative properties. Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self-interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns. We show that the “altruistic” aspect of government behavior is consistent with its “self-interested” behavior. We determine that the Olson-Becker pressure group model is not unique. An increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy. Smaller groups receive a larger per capita subsidy. These results are consistent with Becker's model.     

COMMENT ON “THE DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY BALANCES AND THE NONNEUTRALITY OF MONEY,” BY ALEKSANDER BERENTSEN,GABRIELE CAMERA,AND CHRISTOPHER WALLER*

An example is constructed to illustrate some points about the Berentsen‐Camera‐Waller article, followed by some comments.     

Picking “Lemons” or Picking “Cherries”? Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Norwegian Manufacturing*

We compare the performance in employment, wages and productivity for domestic plants acquired by new domestic and foreign owners. Prospective foreign owners pick large, high‐wage, high‐productivity plants, while new domestic owners choose average performers of above‐average size. Employment, labour productivity, and total factor productivity decline in domestic acquisition targets before acquisitions; only wages recover afterwards. Employment, wages and labour productivity increase after foreign acquisitions. The sample selection introduced by long‐term comparisons and a focus on unique events introduces a downward bias into the results for domestic acquisitions and an upward bias for the foreign acquisitions.     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”