Return spread and liquidity: Evidence from Hong Kong ADRs

Fifteen Chinese H-shares listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong are cross listed as ADRs on the NYSE. We empirically determine the role of security specific liquidity associated with those ADRs and their underlying H-shares on return spreads, differences between the returns on ADRs and their corresponding H-shares after controlling for ADRs and H-shares excess market returns and their respective price inverses denoting conditional betas. We use three proxies for liquidity, trading volume, turnover, and illiquidity (Amihud, 2002) and find that only trading volume and turnover are consistent determinants of return spread for the majority of Chinese ADRs with primary listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK). We use a switching regression model and find that the model parameter estimates are not stationary and change, often drastically between pre and post 2000 and 2003. Further tests using Bai Perron indicate return spreads data as non-stationary with multiple regime changes during the sample period. Further the causes of non-stationarity seem to be largely security specific and not driven by broad market swings in either market.     

Market Reactions to the Hong Kong Trading Suspensions: Mandatory versus Voluntary

This paper investigates the market reactions to regulator-initiated (mandatory) suspension and issuer-initiated (voluntary) suspension on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. It is found that there is substantial devaluation of the stocks during either suspension, and both the variance and trading volume are higher in the post-suspension period than in the pre-suspension period. However, the changes in value and variance are sensitive to the reason for the suspension. The evidence shows that mandatory suspensions are more effective than voluntary suspensions in disseminating information, although both suspensions may not effectively ease unusual volatility immediately.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

The delegated portfolio management problem: Reputation and herding

We study the relationship between financial intermediaries’ reputation and herding in a delegated portfolio management problem context. We identify conditions under which equilibria exist such that intermediaries with good reputation invest in private information, whereas those with poor reputation herd. The model’s empirical predictions are discussed and found to be consistent with previous evidence. From a normative stand, our work points out the possible existence of a policy trade-off between protecting investors by demanding more transparency from intermediaries and encouraging herding by free-riders for whom imitating portfolio decisions would be easier under tighter regulation, such as more frequent portfolio disclosure.     

Market power and reputational concerns in the ratings industry

This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm. Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise. In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.     

A SPECIALIST'S QUOTED DEPTH AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE VARIABLE: AN APPLICATION TO SPREAD DECOMPOSITION MODELS

Although there is a sizable literature demonstrating that liquidity and transaction costs are multidimensional, researchers continue to estimate adverse‐selection costs using only prices. We present a model of a profit‐maximizing specialist who posts prices and depths. The model is simulated to measure changes in the adverse‐selection component of the spread that result under different levels of informed trading. We find that spread decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse‐selection risk when specialists choose depth. We recommend that researchers use adverse‐selection measures that account for depth as well as spread to mitigate this problem.     

The Market Quality of Dealer versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities

Abstract:  Over the last decade, electronic limit-order trading systems have been sweeping securities exchanges around the world. This paper studies a transitional case, namely, the commencement of trading of a group of moderately liquid stocks on SETS of the London Stock Exchange. The evidence reveals that the liquidity of those stocks dropped substantially after the introduction of the limit order book and the removal of the market makers' obligations. This transition provides an example that a hybrid market with a limit order book and voluntary dealers may not perform as well as a dealership market with obligatory market makers.     

Earnings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone

Quarterly earnings conference calls are becoming a more pervasive tool for corporate disclosure. However, the extent to which the market embeds information contained in the tone (i.e. sentiment) of conference call wording is unknown. Using computer aided content analysis, we examine the incremental informativeness of quarterly earnings conference calls and the corresponding market reaction. We find that conference call linguistic tone is a significant predictor of abnormal returns and trading volume. Furthermore, conference call tone dominates earnings surprises over the 60 trading days following the call. The question and answer portion of the call has incremental explanatory power for the post-earnings-announcement drift and this significance is primarily concentrated in firms that do not pay dividends, illustrating differences in investor behavior based on the level of cash flow uncertainty. Additionally, we find that a context specific linguistic dictionary is more powerful than a more widely used general dictionary (Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial).     

内地银行赴港上市后面临的法律风险及其防范措施

内地银行到香港上市将面临新的法律风险。包括商业银行及其员工的违法行为、商业银行经营管理不善以及内地法律政策变化带来的风险。商业银行作为第一责任者应深入学习香港法律和内地法律，提高法律意识；完善公司治理机制和内控机制，强化董事会职能，合法合规经营，防止内幕交易和违规关联交易，防止出现大案要案；制定详细的信息披露制度并严格执行；高度重视投资者关系管理工作等。国家也有责任为商业银行防范法律风险提供环境和政策支持，包括主要以法律手段管理经济；以规范、统一的方式发布政策；提供相应的政策支持，如减轻税负、开展综合经营试点、实施员工激励计划等。     

内地银行赴港上市后面临的法律风险及其防范措施

内地银行到香港上市将面临新的法律风险。包括商业银行及其员工的违法行为、商业银行经营管理不善以及内地法律政策变化带来的风险。商业银行作为第一责任者应深入学习香港法律和内地法律,提高法律意识;完善公司治理机制和内控机制,强化董事会职能,合法合规经营,防止内幕交易和违规关联交易,防止出现大案要案;制定详细的信息披露制度并严格执行;高度重视投资者关系管理工作等。国家也有责任为商业银行防范法律风险提供环境和政策支持,包括主要以法律手段管理经济;以规范、统一的方式发布政策;提供相应的政策支持,如减轻税负、开展综合经营试点、实施员工激励计划等。     

Do uninformed crossed and internalized trades tap into unexpressed liquidity? The case of Nokia

Crossed and internalized upstairs trades are analysed in a dataset in which institutional investors can be identified. Earlier findings that upstairs trading is uninformed, taps into unexpressed liquidity, and does not affect market quality are revisited. The permanent price effect of crossings and internalized upstairs trades is significantly lower than that of limit order book trades due to the fact that the least informed institutional trades are routed upstairs. Crossed and internalized trades affect the depth and transaction costs in the limit order book and a greater reliance is placed on the upstairs market when liquidity is low and volatility is high.