INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY*

This paper discusses the issue of competition policy and innovation. First, a short review on the theoretical analysis of competition and innovation is provided, relying on the recent book by Aghion and Griffith (2005 ). Then, we examine how such innovation related issues as collaborative research, patent pool, merger in the technology intensive sector and bundling in the software industry are treated under Japan's Anti‐Monopoly Act. We contend that traditional competition policy framework is capable of dealing with innovation related issues but there are several points that should be kept in mind when competition policy deals with innovation related issues.     

COURNOT AND BERTRAND EQUILIBRIA COMPARED: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND AN EXTENSION FROM THE OUTPUT‐STRUCTURE VIEWPOINT*

This paper compares Bertrand competition with Cournot competition. In previous studies, the welfare ranking has not been examined in any general setting. One purpose of this work is to fill this gap. In the Zanchettin model, the ranking regarding the less efficient firm's output is sensitive to the degree of asymmetry between firms, whereas the welfare ranking is not. Another goal of this study aims at dealing with this paradox. We demonstrate that the rankings regarding average price, average output and the Herfindahl index are not sensitive to the degree of asymmetry, and hence can explain the welfare ranking.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

COMPETITION, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COST-REDUCING INNOVATION

Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.     

PROTECTION BY TARIFF BARRIERS AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTION COSTS

Using estimates of protection in the EU market against US exports, this paper illustrates the relative importance of natural and policy sources of protection and the measurement errors induced in the measurement of effective protection by omitting transactions costs. It also considers protection in the EU ‘domestic’ and export market, and the implications of the elimination of tariff barriers only on relative rates of protection in ‘domestic’ and export markets.     

INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE OPTIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION: THE CASE OF COURNOT‐TYPE COMPETITION UNDER NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

We derive the optimal subsidy policy for an interconnection agreement between two symmetric Internet service providers (ISPs) competing á la Cournot in a network service market. The interconnection quality agreed upon is lower than the socially optimal level, as suggested by Crémer et al. (2000 ). In the basic model where both ISPs compete in the domestic market, the optimal investment subsidy rate depends positively on the strength of network externalities. In the extended model where home and foreign ISPs compete in the home market, the optimal subsidy rate for the home government is higher than in the basic model.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

QUALITY AND WELFARE IN MIXED DUOPOLY: EFFECTS OF CAPACITY REDUCTION*

Under rationing of a public service due to its lower price and higher quality, the “privatization” could be regarded as a reduction in the capacity of the public service. We develop a model of mixed duopoly in which the service is vertically differentiated, a public firm is in a Stackelberg leader position, rationing happens, and the market is not covered. In one of two possible cases, it is shown that any reduction in the capacity of a public service will lower total surplus unless the price of the public service is too low and its quality is too high.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS*

This paper analyses export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander‐Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine welfare‐enhancing policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity value of the slope of the inverse demand curve and the market share. It is also shown that for policy makers, export quotas are superior to export subsidies under certain conditions.     

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.     

Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade

This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMPETITION ON SECTORAL GROWTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This paper examines the impact of competition on the total factor productivity (TFP) of 21 manufacturing sectors in eighteen OECD countries over the period of time 1990–2006. We assume that the source of TFP growth can be either domestic or foreign innovation or technology transfer from the technological frontier. Trade openness, R&D, and human capital can have two effects: a direct effect on TFP (e.g., through innovation) and an indirect effect depending on the productivity gap between a given country and the technological frontier. We find that tougher domestic competition is always associated with higher sectoral productivity. Both import and export penetrations are positively associated with an increase of TFP. However, the channels through which higher TFP is materialized are different: export penetration works through level effect, while import penetration acts mainly when conditional on the level of technological development. The economical magnitude of the effect is not trivial.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT*

This paper analyses the welfare effects of a market‐share Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) in the presence of foreign direct investment utilizing a duality approach. Introducing the cost burden of VIE explicitly, this paper considers the conditions under which a market‐share VIE is voluntary to the importing country. It is shown that the voluntary nature of VIE depends upon the capital import, cost burden and price difference effects and that a VIE is truly voluntary if it is accompanied by direct investment. We also show the existence of a complementary relationship between VIE and direct investment in attaining a particular level of welfare.     

TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This paper examines the gains from cooperative agreements on transportation infrastructure investments when there are terms of trade and technological spillovers between countries. In a two ‐country model, cooperation on investment levels will result in a lower level of transport costs. However, the cooperative equilibrium may have a higher or lower level of infrastructure investment between the partner countries in the case of preferential liberalization. The paper also addresses the desirability of linking trade and infrastructure agreements when investment choices can be used strategically.