失业保险金与再就业行为

现有的失业理论及实证研究都认为失业保险金的提高会增加失业者的失业持续时间。在本文中,我们试图从失业者面临工作机会的工资分布结构出发,对失业保险金与失业者再就业工资分布的关系进行描述。通过对传统工作搜寻理论模型的扩展,我们证明失业保险金对失业持续时间的影响存在三种不同的传导路径,同时我们得到两个推论:失业保险金的增加一方面将提高失业者接受"高"工资工作机会的概率;但另一方面对失业者从事"低"工资工作机会的影响是不确定的。如果将正式工作视为"高"工资的工作机会,而将非正式工作视为"低"工资的工作机会;则基于微观层面的数据所进行的实证研究结果验证了我们的推论。     

ASSET‐BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE*

This article studies a model of consumption, savings, and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self‐insurance. The government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individual’s asset position, but not on her efforts of finding a job. To compensate for the impediments to self‐insurance, benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing‐constrained individuals with zero liquid funds. A quantitative exercise reveals that the U.S. unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor, but far too generous for wealthier individuals.     

OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE,WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION,AND DURATION DEPENDENCE*

This article introduces the possibility of a deterioration in job opportunities during unemployment into the standard optimal unemployment insurance (UI) design framework and characterizes the efficient UI scheme. The optimal program may display two novel features, which cannot be present in stationary models. First, UI transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient contract. Second, the optimal scheme implies a wage subsidy for long‐term unemployed workers. Numerical simulations based on the Spanish and U.S. economies suggest that both assistance transfers and wage subsidies should be part of the UI scheme in these countries.     

搜寻理论、失业救济金与中国城镇人口失业持续时间

通过对享受失业救济金者和不享受者失业救济金者的再就业概率的分析,我们可以发现,与享受失业救济金者相比,人力资本特征、家庭特征和宏观经济环境对不享受失业救济金者的再就业概率有显著正向影响,转换模型也得出了失业救济金会降低再就业概率、延长失业持续时间的结论。     

STICKY WAGE, EFFICIENCY WAGE AND KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT

Abstract.  This paper provides a model of involuntary unemployment by combining the insights of the sticky wage theory and the efficiency wage theory. It implies that employed workers tend to supply more effort in response to economic downturns. Thus, a negative shock to an economy has intriguing impacts on the unemployment. The model also shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small effect on output since changes in work effort serve to partially mitigate the effects of the shock. Moreover, it yields some implications that complement the existing 'work sharing' literature.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT*

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.     

NONPARAMETRIC LIKELIHOOD: EFFICIENCY AND ROBUSTNESS*

Nonparametric likelihood is a natural generalization of parametric likelihood and it offers effective methods for analysing economic models with nonparametric components. This is of great interest, since econometric theory rarely suggests a parametric form of the probability law of data. Being a nonparametric method, nonparametric likelihood is robust to misspecification. At the same time, it often achieves good properties that are analogous to those of parametric likelihood. This paper explores various applications of nonparametric likelihood, with some emphasis on the analysis of biased samples and data combination problems.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.     

新公平/效率观——对公平与效率问题的重新审视

公平是效率的前提,效率是公平的结果;公平产生效率,效率反映公平;公平与效率是一个硬币的两面。公平是市场经济必须遵循的基本原则,也是市场经济产生效率的基本条件。     

CRIME,DETERRENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*

This paper uses aggregate data from 42 police-force areas over 12 years to test predictions of Becker's economic model of crime. The effects of measures for deterrence on the incidence of three types of acquisitive criminal activity (burglary, theft, robbery) in England and Wales are explored. Mixed support for the Becker model emerges. The growth in unemployment is seen to impact positively on two of the three types of criminal activity examined. Per capita household income is seen to have a negative effect on the recorded rates of burglary and theft, but there is some evidence that the income variable is a proxy for the effects of unemployment. Poor housing conditions and the relative youth of the population were also found to play a role in the determination of criminal activity.     

UNEMPLOYMENT AND HOURS OF WORK: THE NORTH ATLANTIC DIVIDE REVISITED*

I examine the dynamic evolutions of unemployment, hours of work, and the service share since the war in the United States and Europe. The theoretical model brings together all three and emphasizes technological growth. Computations show that the very low unemployment in Europe in the 1960s was due to the high productivity growth associated with technological catch‐up. Productivity also played a role in the dynamics of hours, but a full explanation for the fast rise of service employment and the big fall in aggregate hours needs further research. Taxation has played a role but results are mixed.     

FISCAL EXPANSIONS,UNEMPLOYMENT, AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

Structural VARs indicate that for many OECD countries labor force participation, employment, and the unemployment rate significantly increase following increases in government expenditures under a variety of specifications and identification schemes. Fiscal expansions also tend to increase real wages. Existing models have difficulties in generating such responses. We show that the empirical regularities can be reproduced with two additions into a standard New Keynesian model with matching frictions: (a) a labor force participation choice and (b) workers’ heterogeneity.