THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*

We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.     

企业社会责任标准国际化背景下企业进入策略研究*

本文通过构建博弈模型，对企业社会责任（CSR）标准国际化背景下企业进入策略进行研究。本文发现，企业最优进入策略受到进入成本影响，当进入成本较低时所有企业都适合选择进入高CSR标准市场，当进入成本较高时所有企业都不适合选择进入，当成本介于两者之间时适合部分企业选择进入。在对社会福利的分析中还发现，当进入是企业最优策略时，无论是部分进入还是全部进入，企业承担更高的社会责任能同时提升企业利润和社会福利水平。     

OUTPUT–EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP ACROSS SECTORS: A LONG‐ VERSUS SHORT‐RUN PERSPECTIVE

This paper investigates the nature of the output–employment relationship by using the Turkish quarterly data for the period 1988–2008. Even if we fail to find a long‐run relationship between aggregate output and total employment, there are long‐run relationships for the aggregate output with non‐agricultural employment and sectoral employment levels for seven of nine sectors that we consider. However, a further investigation for the output and employment relationship within a short‐run perspective does not reveal statistically significant relationships for either total employment or non‐agriculture employment, or eight of the nine sectors that we consider. Although there are various long‐run relationships between output and employment, the short‐run links between demand and employment are weak. The various implications of this for the economy and the labour market are discussed. As a result, maintaining high levels of output in the long‐run creating demand is essential for employment generation.     

Personal Income Distribution and Market Structure

Income distribution affects market demand and its elasticity, and, as a consequence, the optimal behaviour of firms and market equilibrium. This paper focuses on the effects of income polarization, and presents a model where – for any unimodal density function describing income distribution of the consumers – income polarization leads to market concentration, i.e., to a smaller number of firms able to survive in the long run, provided that the firms' fixed costs are sufficiently low.     

INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.     

GRADUAL NETWORK EXPANSION AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

ABSTRACT 1 : Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.     

DUOPOLY IN THE JAPANESE AIRLINE MARKET: BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR THE ENTRY GAME*

This paper provides an econometric analysis of a duopoly game in the Japanese domestic airline market. We establish a novel Bayesian estimation approach for the entry game, which allows the incorporation of flexible inference techniques. We find asymmetric strategic interactions between Japanese firms. This result implies that competition is still influenced by the former regulation regime. Furthermore, our prediction analysis indicates that the new Shizuoka airport will suffer from a lack of demand in the future.     

SPINOFFS AND THE MARKET FOR IDEAS*

We present a theory of entry through spinoffs where workers generate ideas and possess private information concerning their quality. Because quality is privately observed, adverse selection implies that the market can only offer a price that reflects the average quality of ideas sold. Only workers with good ideas decide to spin off, whereas workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Existing firms pay a price for ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits. Hence, firms’ project selection is independent of firm size, which can lead to scale‐independent growth. This mechanism results in invariant firm‐size distributions that resemble the data.     

TRIGGER-POINT MECHANISM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTRY, COLLUSION, AND WELFARE

When fixed, sunk investment costs are high, firms may not have sufficient incentive to enter the market unless future entry is constrained. In this case, the government faces a dilemma between a full commitment and noncommitment of restricted future entry. A way out is to consider a commitment conditional on the realization of the uncertain parameters, such as the trigger-point mechanism (TPM) that sets conditions on current production level, excess capacity, and demand growth under which future entry will be allowed. This article shows that the TPM facilitates the incumbents' collusion but may improve social welfare under certain circumstances. ( JEL L13, L43, L50, H10, H54)     

Firms’ efficiency,exits and government procurement contracts

This study shows that productivity trends in Russia are similar to those in other countries where technology leaders enjoy productivity growth, with a gap increasing between them and other companies. The survival analysis suggests that the most efficient firms quit the market at a faster rate than other companies do. Survival functions of the least efficient firms do not always differ significantly from those of other enterprises. Additional financial support from government contracts helps firms in all efficiency groups survive but this effect is stronger for laggards. The shift of gains from the public procurement system towards low productive firms leads to the distorted allocation of resources in the economy and, in the long run, may undermine economic growth by allowing inefficient companies to stay in the market significantly longer than would be the case in a more competitive environment.     

Relative Emission Standard versus Tax under Oligopoly: The Role of Free Entry

We compare the effects of an emission tax, and those of a relative emission standard, on welfare and pollution levels under oligopolistic market structures. We consider the cases where the number of firms is fixed and where there is free entry and exit of firms. When the number of firms is fixed, (i) a relative emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent emission tax, and (ii) an emission tax is emission-superior to a welfare-equivalent relative emission standard. Under free entry and exit, the results are just the opposite when the inverse demand function is concave.     

ENTRY REGULATIONS,WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE

Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.     

On competition and endogenous firm efficiency

Summary. Conventional wisdom holds that product market competition disciplines firms into efficiency of operation. However, in a well known paper, Martin (1993) has shown that in a linear Cournot setting (with costs determined first and product market competition taking place in a second stage) the exact opposite obtains – a larger number of firms competing in the market implies lower firm efficiency. The note clarifies further the links between market structure and efficiency. Specifically, it argues why (and how) the result derived by Martin (1993) depends upon the assumptions made regarding the structure of demand and nature of conjectures held by firms as to their rivals' behavior. An illustrative counter-example (with Bertrand behavior and non-linear demand) in which entry increases efficiency is provided as well. Received: March 2, 2000; revised version: September 19, 2000     

结构变化、效率改进与能源需求预测——以中国电力行业为例

本文利用宏观经济学的方法提出一个长期电力需求模型以分析影响中国电力需求的主要因素。如预期的一样 ,当各种因素受市场力量的进一步约束时 ,影响需求的各项变量之间的关系在中国经济改革以后更加稳定也更为显著。一个误差修正模型为预测中国电力总需求的短期波动提供了适合的框架。 1 978年经济改革以后 ,需求的GDP弹性估计为 0 .8左右 ,低于改革前 (1 978年以前 )。结果表明 ,虽然GDP仍是影响电力需求的最重要因素 ,但电力需求与中国的结构变化及效率改进是负相关的。这意味着对于一个快速增长的经济来说 ,GDP的高速增长并不总是伴随着高的电力需求 ,并解释了为什么 1 998年经济增长率为 7 8% ,但电力消费却只增长了 2 8%。     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY,MONETARY UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN AUSTRALIA

The demand for money and its stability in Australia has received a great deal of attention in the past and has resulted in its own literature. Depending upon estimation method and period of analysis, previous research has provided mixed findings. By including a measure of economic uncertainty and a measure of monetary uncertainty (both GARCH‐based) in the long‐run money demand for M3, and by using the bounds testing approach under which variables could be stationary or non‐stationary, we provide strong evidence that the M3 money demand in Australia is stable. Both uncertainty measures do have short‐run as well as long‐run effects on the demand for M3 in Australia, factors that previous research did not consider.     

Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

In entering a new market, firms face demand uncertainty. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. We allow firms to locate outside of the city and assume that market conditions are common knowledge. We then introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. We find that demand uncertainty can be seen as a differentiation force when faced by the first entrant and as an agglomeration force when faced by the second entrant. Finally, the second firm’s imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.     

Trade liberalization,firm entry,and income inequality

This paper examines the short‐ and long‐run effects of trade liberalization via tariff reductions on income inequality in an economy, which is characterized by an imperfectly competitive urban manufacturing sector and a perfectly competitive rural agricultural sector. Tariff reductions reduce domestic output in the importable urban manufacturing sector, leading to shifts of capital from the urban sector to the rural agricultural sector. This can narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in the short run. However, the lowered capital cost attracts new firms, and subsequently excessive entry of firms, to the urban manufacturing sector. This firm entry effect can mitigate the favorable effect of tariff reductions on wage inequality in the long run. Empirical study confirms the findings.     

Market competition and firms' social performance

This paper investigates whether market competition encourages firms to be more socially responsible. We find that firms in more competitive markets exhibit better overall social performance, as measured by doing well (“strength”) and doing badly (“concern”) in areas such as community, environment, human rights, and treatment of employees. To deal with endogeneity, we instrument market competition on entry barrier and observe that market competition only significantly reduces social concerns but not increases social strengths. Thus, firms are more reactive in reducing social concerns than proactive in augmenting their social strengths. Amongst these concerns, firms appear to be more active in reducing environmental concerns. The paper underscores the limitations in relying on the “invisible hand” of the market to deal with the multi-dimensional challenges of firms’ social performance.     

Deregulation,innovative entry and structural diversity as a source of stable and rapid economic growth

The importance of free innovative entry (deregulation) for diversity of structure and competition is studied. I demonstrate quantitatively that even with a narrow definition of entry (firms), and given observed entry behavior, successful entrants completely dominate the long-run performance characteristics of the economy. Rapid and stable long-run macro economic growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous. Free access to markets alone is a necessary condition, with competence a sufficient condition. It is probably wrong to believe that the (ex ante) threat of entry is sufficient for dynamic competition. A growing economy requires a steady showering with optimistic entrants, a few of which turn out ex post to be superior performers. Failing and exiting firms are part of the innovation costs to society for steady and rapid economic growth. The benefits of financial innovations like junk bonds are to reduce barriers to competitive entry to make both successes and failures possible.