ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

EXTENSIONS OF THE STANDARDIZED CROSS‐SECTIONAL APPROACH TO SHORT‐HORIZON EVENT STUDIES

Strong evidence indicates that short‐horizon event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility vary significantly over event days. Event‐study methods that assume constant event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility over event days have potentially inflated Type I error rates and poor test power. Our simple extensions of the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) approach scale abnormal returns with conditional variance, which is estimated with GARCH(1,1) and an indicator of the event in a two‐stage estimation. Our method improves the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen approach on model specification and test power, even under challenging event‐induced mean and volatility structures, and could standardize short‐horizon event studies.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

Wall Street’s bailout bet: Market reactions to house price releases in the presence of bailout expectations

The rise and subsequent collapse of US house prices was one of the factors underlying the recent financial crisis. One could expect that the crisis brought increased attention to the housing market and thus led to stronger market reactions to house price news. We find that reactions indeed change, but with a peculiar twist: from September 2008 on, good news from the housing market are associated with falling US stock prices, and vice versa. The likely explanation, for which we provide cross-sectional evidence, is that falling house prices increased the market’s trust in a government bailout, thereby increasing market valuations of firms that were expected to benefit from government rescue measures.     

SHORT‐TERM EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In this article I use a sample of 178 Czech firms that were in the first wave of voucher privatization to test changes in efficiency and profitability. Based on a previous study's methodology, nonparametric tests reveal that efficiency and profitability decreased immediately following privatization. This is in contrast to earlier studies that find privatization increases these measures. Changes in firms' operations do not vary significantly by size or ownership but do vary by industry type, with nonmanufacturing firms having more positive (or less negative) changes after privatization. Evidence indicates that in spite of the disappointing findings, positive operating performance changes are taking place, such as a decrease in employment. JEL classification: G32, L33, 052     

SHORT‐MATURITY OPTIONS AND JUMP MEMORY

We investigate jump memory using an extensive database of short‐term S&P 500 index options. Jump memory refers to the attenuation of the implied jump intensity and magnitude parameters following a crash event. We use a genetic algorithm to obtain a time series of implied parameter estimates and posit behavioral and rational explanations for parameter attenuation following a crash event. We find that a nested form of the jump‐diffusion model sharpens the remaining parameter estimates and has a negligible effect on pricing accuracy.     

CREDIT SPREADS AND THE ZERO‐COUPON TREASURY SPOT CURVE

We examine the relation between credit spreads on industrial bonds and the underlying Treasury term structure. We use zero‐coupon spot rates to eliminate the coupon bias and to allow for a consistent study both within and across the different credit ratings. Our results indicate that the level and slope of the Treasury term structure are negatively correlated with changes in the credit spread on investment‐grade corporate bonds. We also find that the relation between credit spreads and the Treasury term structure is relatively stable through time. This is good news for value‐at‐risk calculations, as this suggests that the correlations among assets of different credit classes are stable; therefore use of historic correlations to model spread relations can be valid.     

THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CONDITIONING INFORMATION ON PORTFOLIO EFFICIENCY IN THE PRESENCE OF COSTLY SHORT‐SELLING

The economic significance of conditioning information in the presence of costly short‐selling is investigated. Using a compact testing framework, results demonstrate that fixed‐weight stock‐bond portfolios appear inefficient with respect to stock‐bond portfolios with weights determined by extant predictors. However, this result is highly dependent on ex ante knowledge of the predictor set and the ability to short‐sell at low cost. In the absence of such conditions, fixed‐weight stock‐bond portfolios appear efficient with respect to conditioning information.     

MODELING THE TERM STRUCTURE FROM THE ON‐THE‐RUN TREASURY YIELD CURVE

We propose a new model to estimate the term structure of interest rates using observed on‐the‐run Treasury yields. The new model is an improvement over models that require a priori knowledge of the shape of the yield curve to estimate the term structure. The general form of the model is an exponential function that depends on the estimation of four parameters fit by nonlinear least squares and has straightforward interpretations. In comparing the proposed model with current yield‐curve‐smoothing models, we find that, for the data used, the proposed model does best overall in terms of pricing accuracy both in sample and out of sample. JEL classification: E43, G12     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

Did the repeated debt ceiling controversies embed default risk in US Treasury securities?

We examine whether the financial market charged a default risk premium to US Treasury securities when the US Federal government repeatedly reached the legally binding debt limits between 2002 and 2006. We show that for the first two of the four recurrences since the first episode in 1996, the financial market charged a small default risk premium to the Treasury securities. However, we find no significant evidence of a pricing effect in the last two recurrences. The results suggest that the financial market gradually perceived the budget standoffs as the boy who cried wolf.     

EX‐DIVIDEND DAY PRICE BEHAVIOR OF EXCHANGE‐TRADED FUNDS

We document that for exchange‐traded funds (ETFs), the price falls on average by the dividend amounts on the ex‐dividend day, and there are significantly positive abnormal volumes. This is because trading in ETFs entails lower transaction costs and lower risk than trading in equity closed‐end funds (CEFs) and individual stocks. Similar results are also found for equity CEFs. However, regression analyses indicate that transaction costs and risk are indeed negligible for ETFs but not for equity CEFs and that risk remains important for a sample of stocks matched based on transaction costs. Overall, the results support the short‐term traders hypothesis.     

The increasing default risk of US Treasury securities due to the financial crisis

This paper examines the impact of the current financial crisis on long-term US Treasury yields by testing the impact of a series of events from December 2007 to March 2009 on the spread between 10-year USD LIBOR swap and 10-year US Treasury (constant maturity) rates to measure risk associated with Treasuries. Controlling for the liquidity of the two markets, the default risk of the swap, and the net foreign purchases of Treasury securities, we find that 13 of the tested 20 events have significantly negative coefficients. We conclude that the lower spread is consistent with greater default risk for US Treasury securities.     

IS THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET RATIO A MEASURE OF RISK?

We develop a leverage‐based alternative to traditional asset pricing models to investigate whether the book‐to‐market ratio acts as a proxy for risk. We argue that the book‐to‐market ratio should act as a proxy because of the expected relations between (1) financial risk and measures of capital structure based on the market value of equity and (2) asset risk and measures of capital structure based on the book value of equity. We find no relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in all‐equity firms after controlling for firm size, and an inverse relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in firms with a negative book value of equity.     

INTANGIBLE ASSETS,BOOK‐TO‐MARKET,AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS

I examine two anomalies where the Fama and French three‐factor model fails to adequately explain monthly industry and index returns. Both anomalies are consistent with a bad model problem where the book‐to‐market factor introduces a negative bias in the intercepts. I propose the intangibles model as an alternative where the three‐factor model is known to have difficulty. This alternative model, which replaces the book‐to‐market factor with zero investment portfolio returns based on prior investments in intangible assets, is well specified in random samples, has comparable power, and fully explains both anomalies.     

Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

ARE TREASURY INFLATION PROTECTED SECURITIES REALLY TAX DISADVANTAGED?

In 1997, the U.S. Treasury introduced Inflation Protected Securities, commonly known as TIPS. Several in the finance field have since described these securities as “tax disadvantaged” relative to conventional securities, leading to serious questions regarding their appropriateness outside of tax‐deferred accounts. In this article, we develop a framework that demonstrates that at least in a real sense the tax treatment of TIPS is trivially different from that of conventional Treasury securities. Moreover, empirically we find evidence that TIPS generally have after‐tax yields comparable to, if not exceeding, conventional fixed‐rate Treasury securities. We also show that TIPS have generally outperformed matched‐maturity conventional Treasury securities in terms of after‐tax rates of return.     

SHORT SELLING AND MISPRICINGS WHEN FUNDAMENTALS ARE KNOWN: EVIDENCE FROM NYSE‐TRADED CLOSED‐END FUNDS

The larger a closed‐end fund's premium over its portfolio value, the more intensely it is sold short. This behavior should reduce mispricings. However, short selling affects neither the observed rate at which premia revert to fundamental values nor the rate of return on a fund's shares. This apparent contradiction can be explained as follows: short selling does reduce prices, but the effect is impounded into prices by the time short positions are tabulated by the NYSE each month. Consequently, the monthly short selling data do not predict future price movements.     

END‐OF‐DAY PRICING IN THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET: A COMPARISON OF GovPX AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

We compare end‐of‐day indicative U.S. Treasury prices from GovPX and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). We find that the two sources rarely quote identical prices, and differences are not simply due to noise or rounding. The average bid price differential is 2 cents for notes and bonds, but it is only ¹/₁₀ of 1 cent for bills. Bid‐ask spreads in both sources appear to be largely artificial and contain limited information. Finally, we find that the end‐of‐day indicative FRBNY bid prices are closer to true intraday GovPX market quotes than end‐of‐day indicative quotes provided by GovPX itself.