Stock vs. stock-warrant units: evidence from seasoned offerings

Recent theories based on sequential financing and information signaling reveal a special role for warrants. Data from initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock-warrant units have been used to test the theories, and we extend the analysis to seasoned offerings. Consistent with predictions from both families of theories, we find that issues made by smaller and younger firms are more likely to involve stock-warrant units, and firms with greater stock price volatility are more likely to issue units in seasoned offerings. Moreover, firms with relatively high levels of long-term debt, and those whose issues are underwritten by less prestigious underwriters are more likely to employ stock-warrant unit financing. Consistent with information signaling, we find that firms with high managerial ownership are more likely to issue units. Firms that include warrants in their stock offerings are predicted to have experienced higher abnormal stock returns than if they had issued shares alone. Thus, consistent with both theoretical explanations, some firms can reduce capital costs by adding warrants to shares in seasoned offerings.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Pricing of Bank Issued Options versus Options Exchange Options

Since 1998, large investment banks have become active as issuers of options, generally referred to as call warrants or bank‐issued options. This has led to an interesting situation in the Netherlands, where simultaneously call warrants are traded on the stock exchange, and long‐term call options are traded on the options exchange. Both entitle their holders to buy shares of common stock. We start with a direct comparison between call warrants and call options, written on the same stock and with the same exercise price, but where the call option has a longer time to maturity. In 13 out of 16 cases we find that the call warrants are priced higher, which is a clear violation of basic option pricing rules. In the second part of the analysis we use option pricing models to compare the pricing of call warrants and call options. If implied standard deviations from options are used to price the call warrants, we find that the call warrants are strongly overpriced during the first five trading days. The average overpricing is between 25 and 30%. Only a small part of the overpricing can be explained by rational arguments such as transaction costs. We suggest that the overvaluation can be explained by a combination of an active financial marketing by the banks and the framing effect.     

The determinants of the hybrid security issuance decision for Australian firms

The Australian capital market has number of distinct characteristics that distinguish it from typical U.S. and European markets. There is a limited listed debt market where most firms use bank debt, convertible debt is not callable and stand alone warrants are used to raise capital. This paper examines the determinants of security choice for hybrid issuers in the Australian market. The results support the pecking order model and the impact of financial distress costs and taxation. Alternatively, the results provide support for the sequential financing model where firms with high profitability use convertible debt and firms with low profitability use warrants, to solve the sequential financing problem.     

我国认购权证负溢价问题研究

从理论上讲,认购权证的价格应高于其内在价值,即认购权证溢价应为正。然而从实际情况来看,我国的认购权证在2007年却大量出现负溢价的情况。本文将从套利者、投资者、投机者的角度以及权证市场参与者共同存在的一些限制等方面对我国认购权证出现负溢价的问题进行解释,并给出诸如以发行美式认购权证等方法解决这一问题的政策建议。     

Calls of Warrants: Timing and Market Reaction

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.     

In-the-Money Warrant Extensions

This paper examines the warrant price and stock price reactions to the extension of the expiration date of in-the-money warrants. The warrant prices increase significantly in response to the announcement, consistent with option pricing theory. Shareholders experience no significant abnormal returns at the announcement, contrary to the conjecture that an extension will transfer wealth from shareholders. There is support for the idea that firms extend warrant life because the existing assets' cash flow obviates the need for additional financing. The data show that both the stocks and the warrants perform poorly in the month following the extension announcement.     

CONVERTIBLE BONDS: MATCHING FINANCIAL AND REAL OPTIONS

For companies whose value consists in large part of “real options”‐ growth opportunities that may (or may not) materialize‐convertible bonds may offer the ideal financing vehicle because of the matching financial options built into the securities. This paper proposes that convertible debt can be a key element in a financing strategy that aims not only to fund current activities, but to give companies access to low‐cost capital if and when their real investment options turn out to be valuable. In this sense, convertibles can be seen as the most cost‐effective solution to a sequential financing problem‐how to fund not only today's activities, but also tomorrow's growth opportunities (some of them not yet even foreseeable). For companies with real options, the ability of convertibles to match capital inflows with corporate outlays adds value by minimizing two sets of costs: those associated with having too much (particularly equity) capital (known as “agency costs of free cash flow”) and those associated with having too little (“new issue” costs). The key to the cost‐effectiveness of convertibles in funding real options is the call provision. Provided the stock price is “in the money” (and the call protection period is over), the call gives managers the option to force conversion of the bonds into equity. If and when the company's investment opportunity materializes, exercise of the call feature gives the firm an infusion of new equity (while eliminating the debt service burden associated with the convertible) that enables it to carry out its new investment plan. Consistent with this argument, the author's recent study of the investment and financing activities of 289 companies around the time of convertible calls reports significant increases in capital expenditures starting in the year of the call and extending three years after. The companies also showed increased financing activity following the call, mainly new long‐term debt issues (many of them also convertibles) in the year of the call.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF WARRANT-DEBT FINANCING

Stock price reactions to warrant-debt unit financing announcements are examined and a significant two-day average abnormal return of ?1.32 percent is found. The negative average abnormal return is similar to that observed for convertible debt financing announcements in previous research. Warrant-debt financing decisions result in large increases in capitalization; on average, issuers' long-term debt increases by 84 percent, and common shares outstanding increase by 18 percent assuming full exercise of the warrants.     

投资者是非理性的吗——卖空限制下我国权证价格偏离探析

本文研究了影响我国权证价格偏离的主要因素。以往文献的重售动机理论和便利收益理论不能诠释权证定价偏差的不对称性。我们的研究提出理性避险动机是权证价格偏离的主导因素,即我国投资者并不是非理性的进行重售投机,也并没有忽视权证的避险性能。本文避免了以往文献的Black-Scholes模型依赖,在平价准则的基础上构造了非模型的误差度量方法,从而剔除了模型假设导致的价格偏差,保证了研究结果的有效性和准确性。     

Risk Changes around Calls of Convertible Bonds

We examine changes in equity and asset betas around convertible bond calls and report two major findings. First, calling firms exhibit an increase in asset betas following the call. We argue that the finding is consistent with the implications of the sequential financing theory but not of the backdoor equity financing theory. Second, abnormal returns at call announcements are negative only for the subsample of firms that also exhibit an increase in equity beta. We conclude that risk changes help explain the market reaction to convertible bond calls.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF FORCED WARRANT EXERCISE

We examine stock price reactions to announced calls of in-the-money warrants and find a significant average devaluation in excess of 4 percent, consistent with the recent literature. We test theoretical predictions based on asymmetric information, agency costs, and corporate control in a cross-sectional model of announcement-period returns and find support for voting rights and ownership dilution as an explanation. We find evidence of some price recovery after the call announcement; however, further evidence of a liquidity-based explanation is mixed.     

Optimal policies of call with notice period requirement

When an American warrant or a convertible bond is called by its issuer, the holder is usually given a notice period to decide whether to sell the derivative back to the issuer at the call price or to exercise the conversion right. Several earlier papers have shown that such notice period requirement may substantially affect the optimal call policy adopted by the issuer. In this paper, we perform theoretical studies on the impact of the notice period requirement on issuer’s optimal call policy for American warrants and convertible bonds. We also examine how the optimal call policy of the issuer interacts with holder’s optimal conversion policy.     

A SEQUENTIAL SIGNALING MODEL OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT ISSUE AND CALL POLICIES

This paper offers a new explanation for why some risk‐averse firms may prefer to issue callable convertible debt. Here, the convertible debt issue and call policies are integrated into a unified financing policy. It is then shown that for firms with relatively low unsystematic risk, convertible debt issuance followed by an appropriate in‐the‐money signaling call policy reduces more unsystematic equity risk than equity, callable straight debt, or their combination. The model is modified to incorporate asymmetric information at the issue stage to explain the stock price behavior at announcements of convertible debt sales.     

Determinants of corporate call policy for convertible bonds

For a sample of convertible bonds issued during the period 1980 through 2002, we empirically investigate the determinants of call policy. We find that the risk of a failed call over the call notice period helps explain why firms call only after conversion value exceeds call price by a substantial safety premium. We find strong evidence that cash flow considerations and a desire to mitigate agency conflicts influence call policy. We also find evidence that the decision to issue and subsequently call a convertible bond is influenced by a desire to obtain backdoor equity financing and to finance growth options. There is no evidence, however, that firms with favorable inside information are more likely to delay calls. Finally, we find that a significant portion of calls are associated with restructuring and merger activity, and with bond rating upgrades and downgrades. In these cases, there is little if any call delay.     

Pricing Warrants: An Empirical Study of the Black-Scholes Model and Its Alternatives

This paper uses a sample of over 25,000 daily warrant prices to empirically investigate potential problems with the commonly used warrant pricing model proposed by Black and Scholes as an extension of their call option model. One problem seems to be especially important: the constant variance assumption of the dilution adjusted Black-Scholes model appears to cause biases in model prices for almost all warrants and over the entire sample period. We show that more accurate price forecasts are obtained with a specific form of the constant elasticity of variance model.     

Fair Terms and Fair Pricing for Multiple Warrant Issues

Abstract

Some firms utilize one or more tranches of warrant issues to supplement their capital base. Unlike exchange-traded options, the exercise of warrants requires the issuance of stock by the company, resulting in a form of dilution. Some previous studies of warrant valuation relied on “the value of the firm,” which is nonobservable, making it difficult to apply the corresponding valuation formula. This paper derives closed-form formulas to value single and multiple tranches of warrants based on the underlying stock price, its volatility, and other known parameter values. The paper first establishes the equivalence of the Black-Scholes formula for both call options and warrants in the case of a single tranche. Thereafter, it considers the impact on the value of previously issued warrants that results when a new tranche of warrants is subsequently issued, showing in each case that fair treatment of the first-issued warrant holders requires an adjustment (due to dilution) in the terms of those warrants and a corresponding modification in the warrants’ value once a second tranche of warrants is issued. To promote such fair treatment, terms of a warrant indenture would specify the nature of the adjustment required when future warrants are issued or exercised, analogous to the antidilution terms related, for example, to stock dividends. Unlike multiple issues of traded options, which are valued independently of one another, multiple warrant issues will be shown to have prices dependent on other warrants outstanding. Also examined is the sensitivity of the fair-value adjustment to changes in the underlying variables, and the theoretical fair-value prices are compared with Black-Scholes prices and with market prices of warrants in the case of two publicly traded companies, each with two warrant issues outstanding. As warrant issues modify the equity structure of a firm, the methodology of valuing warrants presented here will be useful to investment actuaries in situations in which a comprehensive market value for all of a firm’s securities is called for. In addition, risk management practices may sometimes include the use of warrant transactions to hedge stock positions similar to the way that call options are used for that purpose. This may include hedging the risk in equity-linked insurance contracts when the equity position includes stock in companies that have one or more warrant issues that are traded. The methods developed here are also applicable to multiple issues of executive stock options (ESOs) or to combinations of warrant issues and ESOs.     

Price-Formation Process of an Emerging Futures Market: Call Auction Versus Continuous Auction

This study assesses the market qualities of alternative price-formation processes for an emerging futures market—the Taiwan futures market. In 2002, the price formation process in the market changed during the period of trade between call auction and continuous auction. The performances of call auction and continuous auction are compared using intraday data. Empirical results show that the market is more liquid, and volatility is slightly lower, under continuous auction than under call auction. Also, there is robust evidence that continuous auction improves informative efficiency. The study suggests that for an emerging futures market like that of Taiwan, continuous auction offers a better trading environment for futures trading. In addition to demonstrating the virtue of continuous auction, this study also finds that the asymmetry in volatility is related to the price formation process. The asymmetry effect exists under continuous auction, but not under call auction.     

The Book-to-Price Effect in Stock Returns: Accounting for Leverage

This paper lays out a decomposition of book‐to‐price (B/P) that derives from the accounting for book value and that articulates precisely how B/P “absorbs” leverage. The B/P ratio can be decomposed into an enterprise book‐to‐price (that pertains to operations and potentially reflects operating risk) and a leverage component (that reflects financing risk). The empirical analysis shows that the enterprise book‐to‐price ratio is positively related to subsequent stock returns but, conditional upon the enterprise book‐to‐price, the leverage component of B/P is negatively associated with future stock returns. Further, both enterprise book‐to‐price and leverage explain returns over those associated with Fama and French nominated factors—including the book‐to‐price factor—albeit negatively so for leverage. The seemingly perverse finding with respect to the leverage component of B/P survives under controls for size, estimated beta, return volatility, momentum, and default risk.     

An empirical investigation of the factors that determine the pricing of Dutch index warrants

This paper investigates the pricing of Dutch index warrants. It is found that when using the historical standard deviation as an estimate for the volatility, the Black and Scholes model underprices all put warrants and call warrants on the FT-SE 100 and the CAC 40, while it overprices the call warrants on the DAX. When the implied volatility of the previous day is used the model prices the index warrants fairly well. When the historical standard deviation is used the mispricing of the call and the put warrants depends in a strong way on the mispricing of the previous trading day, and on the moneyness (in a non-linear way), the volatility, and the dividend yield. When the implied standard deviation of the previous trading day is used the mispricing of the call warrants is only related to the moneyness and to the estimated volatility, while the mispricing of put index warrants depends in a strong way on the moneyness, the volatility, the dividend yield and the remaining time to maturity.     

The impact of derivatives hedging on the stock market: Evidence from Taiwan’s covered warrants market

We examine the impact of derivatives hedging on the spot market using accurate hedge ratios of covered warrants traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). Results present significant positive abnormal returns and trading volumes before the announcement of a warrant’s issuance, and the effect is stronger when the hedging demand is larger. Moreover, a significantly positive relationship exists between stock return volatility and the price elasticity of hedging demand. Finally, we observe a significantly negative price effect upon the underlying stock after a call warrant has expired in-the-money due to the liquidation of hedging portfolios.