Federal Monetary Policy

What is the optimal institutional structure for a federal central bank? The framework developed in this paper is used to analyze under what conditions an individual region will prefer a monetary union to be organized according to regional or common influences and how a combination of both can be rationalized. The implications of an enlargement of a monetary union for changes in its institutional setup are also derived.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Federal Monetary Policy: A Comment

We comment on an article published in this journal by Hefeker (2003) and reveal an inconsistency in his analysis of monetary policy in federal monetary unions. We clarify an implicit assumption in his model and show that even when this further assumption is met, Hefeker's (2003) claim that a pure majority vote by the regions and the central government results in a monetary authority consisting solely of regionally appointed governors is not generally valid in the context of his model.     

我国应放弃汇率名义锚

尽管我国宣布将货币供应量作为货币政策调控目标,但是,货币供应量近年来却高速增长,造成我国物价水平不断攀升。本文通过对近年我国货币政策实际操作考察发现,我国货币政策名义锚并非货币供应量而是汇率,其他货币政策工具均受制于此。汇率名义锚使我国货币政策走入困境,央行面临着物价稳定和经济紧缩的重大取舍。历史经验告诉我们,在巨大贸易不平衡下,汇率名义锚具有不可持续性。参照国际成功经验,本文建议我国应逐步放弃汇率名义锚,渐进迈向物价名义锚,实现货币政策独立和经济良性发展。     

Monetary policy rules and directions of causality: A test for the euro area

Abstract

Using a VAR model in first differences with quarterly data for the euro zone, the study aims to ascertain whether decisions on monetary policy can be interpreted in terms of a “monetary policy rule” with specific reference to the so-called nominal GDP targeting rule (Hall and Mankiw, 1994 Granger, C.W.J. “Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods.” Econometrica, 1969, 37 (3), 424–438.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; McCallum, 1988 McCallum, B. “Nominal GDP Targeting”, Shadow Open Market Committee, October 21, 2011. [Google Scholar]; Woodford, 2012 Taylor, J.B., Williams, J.C. “Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 15908, April, 2010. [Google Scholar]). The results obtained indicate a causal relation proceeding from deviation between the growth rates of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and target GDP to variation in the three-month market interest rate. The same analyses do not, however, appear to confirm the existence of a significant inverse causal relation from variation in the market interest rate to deviation between the nominal and target GDP growth rates. Similar results were obtained on replacing the market interest rate with the European Central Bank refinancing interest rate. This confirmation of only one of the two directions of causality does not support an interpretation of monetary policy based on the nominal GDP targeting rule and gives rise to doubt in more general terms as to the applicability of the Taylor rule and all the conventional rules of monetary policy to the case in question. The results appear instead to be more in line with other possible approaches, such as those based on post Keynesian analyses of monetary theory and policy and more specifically the so-called solvency rule (Brancaccio and Fontana, 2013 ———. Macroeconomics, 2nd ed., Pearson Education Company, ch. 30. [Google Scholar], 2015 Brancaccio, E. The Central Banker as “Regulator” of Conflict. In G. Fontana and M. Setterfield (eds.), Macroeconomic Theory and Macroeconomic Pedagogy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 295–308.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). These lines of research challenge the simplistic argument that the scope of monetary policy consists in the stabilization of inflation, real GDP, or nominal income around a “natural equilibrium” level. Rather, they suggest that central banks actually follow a more complex purpose, which is the political regulation of the financial system with particular reference to the relations between creditors and debtors and the related solvency of economic units.     

Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in Euroland

In this paper we analyze the effects of different decision rulesin the ECB on monetary stability. We consider a model where asymmetricshocks and divergent propagation of shocks on output and inflation arepotential causes of tension within the ECB concerning the conduct ofmonetary policy. Given divergence of desired interest rates we analyze theeffect of different voting procedures within the Governing Council of theECB. We find that under ECB-rule the ECB Board is able to impose its desiredinterest rate as the Euro-wide interest rate. Large countries benefit fromECB-rule as it implies higher voting power for them at the GoverningCouncil. Our welfare analysis indicates that under particular parameterspecifications ECB-rule is strictly preferred to Nationalistic rule.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

Monetary Rules and Deficit Shocks

Modern theory on interest rate rules is based on the representative agent framework with infinite-horizon consumers, thereby ignoring redistributions of the fiscal burden across generations due to deficit shocks. We show how the ‘Taylor principle’ relies on this restrictive assumption. In a dynamic New Keynesian general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, the existence of a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium may also occur under a passive monetary policy. However, active monetary policy is still required to stabilize the economy in response to fiscal shocks. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee, Andrea Costa, Jordi Galí and Giancarlo Marini for very useful comments and discussions. Financial support from CNR and the FIRB project is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

析货币政策的科学性与艺术性

货币政策的制定和实施离不开科学原则作指导,但货币政策的实时决策又是极其复杂的,需要中央银行家的审时度势和敏锐判断,也即货币政策的艺术性。详细分析了货币政策科学性和艺术性的具体表现,认为货币政策的科学性与艺术性在实践中是难以分割和同等重要的,好的货币政策总是需要好的政策实施者,需要将科学性原则与中央银行家们的决策艺术完美地结合起来。     

中国货币政策规则稳健性研究——基于不确定性视角

通过中国货币政策规则的统计特征和调整模式研究中国货币政策规则的稳健性以及不确定性,结论表明:中国货币政策调整规则基本符合调整频率低、每次调整幅度小、反转调整次数少且在长时间静止之后再进行反转调整的稳健性特征,除此之外,声誉不确定性也是导致中国货币政策规则稳健性特征的主要原因之一.     

Monetary policy shocks and productivity measures in the G-7 countries

An implication of two-country international real business cycle models is that total factor productivity should be an exogenous stochastic process. Economic theories which feature labor hoarding, variable capacity utilization, and increasing returns predict that measured productivity shifts are not exogenous; instead, expansionary aggregate demand shocks should lead to an increase in measured productivity. For each of the G-7 countries, this paper measures quarterly aggregate total factor productivity for the domestic country and its rest-of-world (G-6) counterpart. In each case the domestic productivity measures are not strictly exogenous: expansionary U.S. monetary policy shocks, as well as other G-6 monetary policy shocks, lead to productivity expansions. The evidence indicates that international business cycle models are misspecified unless they feature endogenous productivity mechanisms.Received: June 2001, Accepted: December 2001, JEL Classification: E5, F4Correspondence to: Charles L. EvansFor their helpful comments, we thank Mario Crucini, Patricia Reynolds, and Steve Strongin. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.     

Monetary policy and real wage cyclicality

This article points to the potential role of monetary policy in affecting the degree of real wage cyclicality. We show that the degree and direction of real wage cyclicality is determined by the interaction of (i) the returns to scale in production, (ii) the nature of aggregate shocks and (iii) monetary policy. Given that production technology is fairly constant in the short run, we suggest that variations in the real wage – output covariance depend largely on the combination of the latter two. Identifying well-documented monetary policy phases in six major Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and accounting for both aggregate demand and supply shocks, we provide empirical evidence to support our main theoretical claim.     

Monetary Policy with Parameter Uncertainty in Small-Open Economy

This paper computes optimal robust monetary policy in a new Keynesian small-open economy model with Knightian uncertainty about the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Due to the simple model structure used in the paper, I can derive analytical results for the min–max solution under discretion and assess how a robust optimal Taylor rule must be set in small-open economy. I find that, in an optimal robust discretionary equilibrium, the central bank should assume that the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods take on their highest numerical values. In terms of interest rate setting, if the optimal discretionary robust equilibrium is implemented with a Taylor rule, the policy rate should react to inflation in a less aggressive way than in the case of complete information.     

Endogenous Growth Cycles in Continuous Time

The endogenous dynamics of a closed constant returns multi-market economy are examined in which agents face downward sloping demand. The trigger for growth in this model is a technological change that warrants costly adjustment in input quantities by agents. In the resulting dynamic game, relative prices within markets remain constant. Consequently, all own price elasticities are constant. In markets characterized by lower cost of capital the unique outcome is collusion in which agents do not incur adjustment cost and there is no adoption of new technology. But in other markets a unique non-cooperative equilibrium exists in which agents do incur the cost of adopting the new technology. Only three specifications of adjustment costs are feasible. Output increases along an S-shaped time path with or without a non-explosive cyclical component.     

MCIs研究概述及对我国货币政策操作的启示

汇率在经济运行中作用的凸显,推动了学术界对货币状况指数(MCIs)研究的不断深入.以功能研究、缺陷研究、应用研究为线索,对MCIs的研究脉络作了系统分析,并试图通过分析,对MCIs在我国货币政策操作中的运用提供一些借鉴.     

略论中国货币政策有效性

在界定货币政策有效性的概念基础上对中国的货币政策效果进行实证分析,进而提出提高中国货币政策有效性的对策建议。货币政策目标的实现程度是衡量货币政策有效性的标志。货币政策有效性的内涵就是货币政策具有真实效应,能够对真实经济变量产生影响。货币政策有效性就是货币政策能够在保持物价稳定、国际收支平衡的前提下促进经济增长和降低失业。     

Non-stationary Interest Rate Differentials and the Role of Monetary Policy

Abstract

The present work deals with a frequently detected failure of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) – the absence of bivariate cointegration between domestic and foreign interest rates. We explain the non-stationarity of the interest differential via central bank reactions to exchange rate variations. Thereby, the exchange rate in levels introduces an additional stochastic trend into the system. Trivariate cointegration between the interest rates and the exchange rate accounts for the missing stationarity property of the interest differential. We apply the concept to the case of Turkey and Europe, where we can validate the theoretical considerations by multivariate time series techniques.     

货币需求稳定性、货币目标制与中国货币政策框架改革

稳定的货币需求是货币目标制有效发挥作用的前提条件。文章首先从理论上阐述了货币需求与货币目标制的内在关联。其次,基于协整理论与误差修正模型,利用1996-2011年季度数据实证检验了中国货币需求函数的稳定性。实证研究结果表明,中国长期货币需求函数和短期货币需求函数的系数都缺乏稳定性。货币需求函数的不稳定势必增加中国以货币供应量为中间目标的货币政策操作难度,从而导致现行货币目标制的有效性和适宜性不断降低。最后提出为提高货币政策框架的有效性,中国应择机引入通胀目标制。     

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin–Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.