Compensation schemes,liquidity provision,and asset prices: an experimental analysis

In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

过度自信、流动性和资产定价

本文研究了过度自信的投资者在一个多阶段金融市场中是如何影响均衡价格和投资者要求的期望收益的.结论表明,由于投资者过度自信,容易低估风险,从而在一段时期内会使得价格急剧上升.投资者人数实际上是股票市场流动性的一个表征,我们的结论表明,由于过度自信的投资者的存在,他们实际上充当了流动性提供者的角色,从而使得一段时期内即使对理性投资者来说,依然导致了风险的暂时降低,他们也会接受比较高的资产价格,要求相对比较低的期望收益.     

Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets

We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a “clientele’’ equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical-payoff counterpart. The clientele equilibrium dominates the one where all investor types split equally across assets, implying that the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable.     

Imperfect financial integration and asymmetric information: competing explanations of the home bias puzzle?

Abstract This paper shows that imperfect financial integration and informational asymmetries are not competing theories but rather complementary ideas to a single explanation of the home bias puzzle. We develop a rational expectations model of asset prices with investors that face informational constraints and find that informational advantages arise endogenously as a response to small financial frictions. We also present empirical evidence that (i) international financial frictions are correlated to observed patterns of US investors’ attention and that (ii) the attention US investors allocate to foreign stocks helps explain home bias towards those countries, even after controlling for financial integration levels.     

A novel measure of liquidity premium: application to the Korean stock market

This study proposes a novel measure for an asset’s liquidity premium. Applying Brownian first-passage time distribution properties, we derive an explicit form of liquidity premium embedded in the asset price. Our liquidity premium measure is intuitive because it assesses the extent to which the value of the asset should be increased from the current market price if investors were allowed to retain the asset until they achieve an investment goal. This measure is readily available for assessing an asset’s liquidity because it does not require information on the asset’s transactional characteristics. Our empirical experiment using Korean stock market data suggests that the liquidity premium in this study is inversely related to Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, which is commonly used to measure stocks’ illiquidity.     

Inventory investment and financial constraints in the Italian manufacturing industry: A panel data GMM approach

Three large unbalanced panels of Italian manufacturing firms observed over the period 1991–2009 are employed to assess, by means of a dynamic GMM approach, whether the existence of financial frictions is suitable to explain deviations of inventories from their long-run path. A negative response of inventory investment to the presence of financial burdens might provide evidence of a significant role played by the financial framework in conditioning the real side of the economy, especially during recession years, when liquidity problems arise. The negative effect is found over the entire analyzed period, with firms' dimensional aspects accounting more than risk characteristics to explain the phenomenon, but the inclusion of recessionary dummies into the model leads to controversial and puzzling results. A significant recessionary effect is found during the Nineties, accounting for inventories being more sensitive to financial frictions during the main recessionary peaks, 1993 and 1996. The result is not confirmed by the most recent estimates, especially the ones referring to the 2008–2009 recessionary shock, whose effects are investigated for the first time by a paper addressing the inventory investment–financial constraints subject. Alternative hypothesis for the proposed results have been tested on data. Firms were found to rely on inventory decumulation to a lesser extent compared to the past, to generate internal financing. More specifically, disinvestments in financial assets were found to represent, as a matter of fact, one of the main drivers adopted to ease liquidity tensions: a negative and strongly significant relationship with inventory investment was detected, after controlling for short-run liquidity constraints at firm level. By contrast, only a weak negative relationship was established with fixed capital during the same recessionary biennium.     

过度自信、有限参与和资产价格泡沫

当存在模型不确定性且有限市场参与内生时,过度自信的投资者和理性投资者参与股票市场的程度有着不同的行为模式。本文给出的模型分析了两种投资者在不同情况下对股票市场的参与情况,借此解释有限市场参与、超额进入和资产定价之间的关系。模型在流动性溢价、投资者结构和风险溢价的关系等方面具有明显的实证含义。模型表明,理性投资者有更大的投资区域,但是非理性投资者在其投资区域内更为激进。进而,在不同情形下,模型给出了资产均衡价格与投资者结构之间对应关系。     

Over-the-counter loans,adverse selection,and stigma in the interbank market

We study a model of interbank credit where physical and informational frictions limit the opportunities for intertemporal trade among banks and outside investors. Banks obtain loans in an over-the-counter market (involving search, bilateral matching, and negotiations over the terms of the loan) and hold assets of heterogeneous quality that in turn determine their ability to repay those loans. When asset quality is not observable by outside investors, information about the actions taken by a bank in the loan market may influence prices in the asset market. In particular, under some conditions, borrowing from the central bank can be regarded as a negative signal about the quality of the borrower?s assets and banks may be willing to borrow in the market at rates higher than the one offered by the central bank.     

Hangovers

This paper analyzes a process by which a market boom brought on by a temporary increase in the flow of buyers, can subsequently lead to a collapse of liquidity (speed of sale), prices and production to levels lower than before the onset of the boom. I consider a general model of markets subject to search frictions in the matching of buyers and sellers, where the entry of buyers and sellers (through production) are subject to adjustment costs. The resulting co-movement between unemployment, inventories and sales with the production cycle matches the stylized facts.     

Search,Dealers, and the Terms of Trade

I study a search-theoretic model with pairwise meetings where dealers arise endogenously. The extent of intermediation depends on its cost, trade frictions, and the dealers' ability to negotiate favorable terms of trade. Under Nash bargaining, there is a unique equilibrium where dealers buy and hold the low-storage-cost good and, depending on their relative bargaining power, resell it at a premium or a discount. The distribution of the terms of trade is nondegenerate unless storage cost and frictions vanish. Due to an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if dealers can charge a positive markup.     

Financial crises and liquidity shocks a bank-run perspective

In contrast with the financial multiplier literature, this note explores a case in which the shock triggering a financial crisis stems from the financial sector itself; it is not a shock stemming from the real sector which gets amplified by, say, agency problems. The basic intuition is provided by the bank-run literature of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) variety. Financial development is modeled as a mechanism that endows real assets (e.g., land and capital) with liquidity. However, liquidity can be impaired by shocks that are equivalent to a bank run. Liquidity creation enhances real asset prices, while a liquidity crunch generates asset price collapse. This bubble-looking episode is not driven by standard fundamentals, although it is fully in line with rationality. In this context, devoid of other frictions like price stickiness, the note examines the effect of monetary policy in the absence of nominal rigidities. It shows that preventing price deflation is not enough to offset relative (to output) asset price meltdown, but lower policy interest rates increase relative asset prices and steady-state output. Moreover, in the neighborhood of a first-best capital allocation, an increase in the liquidity of capital may lower the welfare of the representative individual, even if the higher liquidity of capital is sustainable and, hence, not destroyed by future crash – illustrating the possibility of “excessive” financial innovation. An extension of the basic model supports the conjecture that low policy interest rates may have given further incentives to the development of “shadow banking.”     

基于可获供给的资产价格动态

通过引入疏忽投资者,本文初步探讨可获资产供给引起的价格波动,对比经典资产价格理论,结果显示市场积极参与度及入场时机引发的交易廷迟都将导致价格波动,而具有更高流动性的市场,其产品供给更丰富,价格也相对更低。     

Monetary–fiscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions

I develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand monetary–fiscal interactions with liquidity frictions. Agents face idiosyncratic investment risks and meet financial intermediaries in competitive search markets. Asset liquidity is determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the financial intermediaries, and it drives the financing constraints of entrepreneurs (those who have investment projects) and their ability to invest. In contrast to private assets, government bonds are fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest. A higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs׳ portfolios and raises investment. However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures: a higher level of distortionary taxation and/or a higher real interest rate. A long-run optimal supply of government debt emerges. I also show that a proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies can avoid a deep financial recession.     

Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited

We derive conditions such that optimal liquidity provisions through a demand deposit scheme can be sustainably implemented in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the assumption that renegade investors have free access to ex post asset markets. As our qualitative main finding we demonstrate that such sustainability is more likely for ‘poor’ than for ‘rich’ scheme participants in terms of future income. By establishing sustainability for low future income populations, our formal analysis therefore offers an important qualification of Jacklin's (1987) influential claim that an optimal demand deposit scheme is not sustainable whenever there exists the possibility of an ex post asset market.     

THE RISK OF FIRE SALES IN THE TRI‐PARTY REPO MARKET

This paper studies the risk of “fire sales” in the tri‐party repo market, a large and important market where securities dealers find short‐term funding for a substantial portion of their own and their clients' assets. We distinguish between fire sales of assets by a dealer who, facing a run that could lead to default, sells securities to generate liquidity, and fire sales of assets by repo investors after a dealer's default has occurred. While fire sales do cause damage no matter how they arise, the tools available to lessen the harm from the two types of fire sales are different. We find that limited tools are available to mitigate the risk of predefault fire sales and that no established tools currently exist to mitigate the risk of postdefault sales. (JEL G01, G18)     

Distance and beyond: What drives financial flows to emerging economies?

A major theme in the empirical literature is whether country-specific ‘pull’ or external ‘push’ factors drive international capital flows. In this paper we show that pull-push interactions matter: the response of international investors to country-specific developments depends on global volatility/liquidity stress conditions. We model asset-trade behaviour of investors: with limited information, strong institutional quality ‘pulls’ asset demand; mounting tensions in global markets amplify portfolio adjustments. We derive an empirically testable equation for cross-border bank flows to emerging economies (EMEs) and focus on pull-push interactions that trigger financial vulnerabilities. We find that global volatility amplifies demand for institutional quality, prior to the recent crisis, implying that EMEs with weak institutional settings are exposed to sharp capital retrenchments. In the aftermath of the crisis, the liquidity easing in advanced economies drives down concerns for EMEs' developments, boosting flows and challenging EMEs' ability to use capital controls to mitigate unbridled flows.     

流动性约束下机构投资者的资产配置——以保险公司为例

流动性是机构投资者资产配置必须考虑的问题之一。本文以保险公司为例,研究流动性不足对保险公司最优资产配置策略和交易策略的影响。使用遗传算法的模拟结果表明,面对流动性不足,保险公司应采取现金流匹配的交易策略以最优化其资产,即首先采用现金支付索赔;当现金资产耗尽时,在变现股票资产以尽量减少大规模销售导致的股票价格临时性和永久性波动的同时,保险公司还应多样化其资产组合,保证能够实现完全交易以减少流动性不足的影响。     

Are stocks desirable in tax-deferred accounts?

Existing literature suggests that, in order to maximize the tax benefit of retirement accounts, investors should follow a “pecking order” location rule of placing highly taxed assets (e.g., bonds) in a tax-deferred account and lightly taxed assets (e.g., stocks) in a taxable account. Empirical evidence, however, documents that a large number of investors violate this rule. In this paper, we show that such violations can be optimal for risk-averse investors who face portfolio constraints. In particular, while the strategy of placing bonds in the tax-deferred account maximizes the expected level of tax benefit, it may lead to volatile benefits under different realizations of stock returns. By holding a similar portfolio in both accounts, investors can achieve a more balanced growth in the two accounts, minimize the likelihood of violating the constraints in the future and hence “smooth” the volatility of the tax benefit. For some risk-averse investors, this smoothing motive can lead to the observed violation of the pecking order location rule. Our model predicts that such violations are more likely when future tax benefits are more volatile, which can occur, for example, when: (i) the tax rate differential across assets increases over time due either to tax law changes or to tax bracket changes for investors; (ii) asset returns are more volatile; and (iii) investors anticipate large future liquidity needs.     

Search and the market for ideas

We study a market where innovators, who are good at coming up with ideas, can sell them to entrepreneurs, who might be better at implementing them. The market is decentralized, with random matching and bargaining. Ideas are characterized by five salient features: they are indivisible; partially nonrival; intermediate inputs; subject to informational frictions; and difficult to collateralize. This last feature gives rise to a demand by entrepreneurs for liquidity. We determine which ideas get traded in equilibrium and compare this to the efficient outcome, emphasizing the impact of bargaining and liquidity considerations. Among other applications, we study how outcomes in the idea market affect the labor market.