Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium

Summary. In this paper, I develop an applied general equilibrium environment with peer group effects. The application I consider is schooling. The framework used here is general equilibrium with clubs. I establish the existence of equilibrium for the economy with a finite number of school types. This result is then extended to the case where the set of school types is a continuum. The two welfare theorems are shown to hold for both economies. To compute the equilibrium, I construct a Negishi mapping from the set of weights on individual type's utility to the set of transfers that support the corresponding Pareto allocations as competitive equilibria with transfers. Because this mapping is a correspondence, a version of Scarf's algorithm is used to find a competitive equilibrium. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000     

General equilibrium and resource economics

Summary. For a number of reasons a large class of general equilibrium models from the field of resource economics does not allow for an equilibrium analysis along the lines of the theory of infinite dimensional commodity spaces. The reasons concern the choice of the commodity space and the applicability of properness assumptions with respect to preferences and the technology. This paper illustrates the difficulties and shows for a prototype model how the problems can successfully be tackled by the use of a limit argument on equilibria in the truncated economies. Received: May 2, 1996; revised version: May 13, 1998     

Mending the family tree a reconciliation of the linearization and levels schools of AGE modelling

This paper offers a critical comparison between the North American levels school of applied general equilibrium modelling, and the Norwegian/Australian school of linearizers. The paper develops both the levels and linearized representations of a neoclassical multiregion trade model. This is used as a vehicle for focusing attention on similarities and differences between the two schools. The main conclusions are: (i) that both the levels and linearized versions of non-linear AGE model offer a valid starting point for obtaining accurate solutions to the non-linear equilibrium problem; (ii) when update formulae are not employed, linearized representations are particularly prone to erroneous welfare conclusions; (iii) the levels representation offers a more natural starting point for expressing accounting conditions, whereas behavioural relationships are relatively more easily expressed in a linearized representation. Recent software developments now make both approaches to the representation and solution of non-linear AGE models convenient to implement. Thus the choice of which approach to use will depend on the special needs and preferences of the economist implementing the model. The two traditions of AGE modelling have a great deal in common and both would benefit from greater cooperation.     

Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments

Summary Jackson [1] and Yamato [12] constructed game forms which implement social choice correspondences in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria simultaneously in exchange economies. In this paper, I deal with social choice environments and construct a game form which implements social choice correspondences satisfying monotonicity, no veto power and having at least three agents in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under the existence of an alternative called a holocaust. The game form constructed in this paper includes an integer game but satisfies the boundedness condition introduced by Jackson [1].I am grateful to Professors Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Stephen Turnbull, and to an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. However all remaining errors are mine. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics at Hokkaido University.After this paper was submitted toEconomic Theory I became aware of the work of Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [2] who have obtained a similar result to mine as a by-product of their main result.     

Can We—and Should We—Measure Well-Being?

In this article, I argue that recent criticisms of happiness research in economics can be extended to any conception of well-being used for scientific or policymaking purposes. These criticisms are both practical and ethical: well-being is not only impossible to define, measure, or implement, but its use also offends human dignity through unjust distribution of harm and value substitution. On this basis, I recommend the abandonment of welfare economics and urge social economists to propose new approaches to addressing social problems that are more focused and respect the dignity of persons.     

Towards a synthesis of theories of State failure

This paper examines the three main categories of State intervention. Before approaching the analysis of intervention, I attempt to shed light on the forming of social choices and the decisions of State rulers. I show how market process and property rights solve problems pertaining to social choice, which in turn stems from the application of the majority rule in a democratic society. Along these lines I view how the State fails to regulate externalities, stabilize the economy and redistribute income. For this purpose the following research applies the theory of property rights, the theory of rational expectations and the theory of public choice respectively to each of the above problems. The conclusion points to a synthesis of these theories, offering a highly demonstrative categorical framework of critique against State intervention. The argument claims that independent non-collective institutions work better than State intervention. (JEL: P16, D72, H23)     

Computable general equilibrium with financial markets

Summary. There are a wide variety of theoretical general equilibrium models with incomplete security markets. In this paper we give a general recipe for using homotopy algorithm to compute equilibria in these models. In many models, taxes, transaction-costs or other market frictions introduce the additional difficulty that equilibrium prices or choices (but not equilibrium allocations) may be undetermined. In order to demonstrate how these difficulties can be dealt with, we develop a globally convergent algorithm to compute equilibria in a model with cash-in-advance constraints, several goods and incomplete financial markets. Furthermore we describe how to implement the algorithm using a publicly available suite of subroutines for homotopy-pathfollowing. Received: October 1, 1999; revised version: December 16, 2000     

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

Summary This note is to inform about a mistake in my paper (Serizawa, 1996). In that paper, I characterized strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy social choice functions for economies with one public good and one private good. I established as Theorem 3 (page 507) that a social choice function is strategy-proof, individually rational with respect to endowment, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy if and only if it is a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing determined by the minimum demand principle. I also exposed one example (Example 2, page 507) in order to emphasize that non-bossiness is indispensable for this characterization. I claimed that the social choice function in that example satisfies the above axioms except for non-bossiness, and is not a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing. However, the social choice function in the example is actually not strategy-proof, as shown in the simple discussion below. Therefore it is an open question whether or not a similar characterization theorem holds without non-bossiness.I thank Professor Rajat Deb, who kindly pointed out my mistake.     

A note on asymmetric and mixed strategy equilibria in the search-theoretic model of fiat money

Summary. The simple search-theoretic model of fiat money has three symmetric Nash equilibria: all agents accept money with probability 1; all agents accept money with probability 0; and all agents accept money with probability y in (0,1). Here I construct an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, payoff-equivalent to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where a fraction N in (0,1) of agents always accept money and 1-N never accept money. Counter to what has been conjectured previously, I find N > y. I also introduce evolutionary dynamics, and show that the economy converges to monetary exchange iff the initial proportion of agents accepting money exceeds N. Received: September 10, 1997; revised version: April 24, 1998     

Optimal formation rules for patent pools

Patent pools in the framework of Lerner and Tirole (Am Econ Rev 94:691–711, 2004) may enhance or reduce social welfare. This paper presents a pool formation mechanism which prevents welfare decreasing pool equilibria to emerge, and which encourages welfare enhancing pools to form. In order to destabilize welfare decreasing pools, forcing coalitions members to offer individual licenses in parallel to the pool has been suggested. I show that in general, this mechanism is not an efficient antitrust tool. However, the mechanism combined with exclusive pool membership avoids stability problems of welfare enhancing pools, while it creates instability of welfare decreasing pools. I am grateful for comments from the Editor, an anonymous referee, and Georg von Graevenitz.     

An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains

Summary. We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence.Received: 29 August 2003, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D70, D71, D72.Biung-Ghi Ju: I am grateful to William Thomson and Jianbo Zhang for their helpful comments and discussions. I also thank Brandon Dupont, the participants in seminars at Iowa State University, University of Kansas, and the Midwest Theory Meeting at University of Notre Dame. I thank an anonymous referee for detailed comments and suggestions that were very helpful in simplifying the proof of Theorem 1 and in revising the paper.     

On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture

The universally beneficial manipulation conjecture of Campbell and Kelly states that for a social choice rule, if everyone gains as a result of any optimal manipulation, then the rule satisfies universally beneficial manipulation, i.e., everyone gains as a result of any manipulation, optimal or not. We prove the conjecture for three alternatives and any number of individuals. We also construct a counterexample in a general form with more than three alternatives and at least two individuals.     

Principles of political economy

As a guide to efficient social organization, neo-classical economics is deficient in two major ways. First, it uses simplifying assumptions about the decision-environment which destroy its possible relevance to an understanding of decision situations in the real world: notably in its inability to embrace the unknowability of the future and the subjectivity of human decisions. Second, it specifies the nature of policy-relevant choice in too restrictive a fashion to explain the major (constitutional and political) choice-situations inherent in any system of social organization. A more satisfactory intellectual construct can be derived from a political economy-public choice model. This follows broadly the contractarian-liberal model developed notably by Buchanan and Brennan, but envisages a much more thoroughgoing rejection of neo-classical (Paretian) concepts. Thenew political economy would identifyefficiency with the ability of the citizen to constrain government-as-leviathan in a context of multi-level choice. The opportunity-cost situation of citizens-as-choosers is specified by reference to their ongoing possibilities of usingvoice to change unsatisfactory institutional constraints orexit to escape their consequences. The model is used to appraise the constitutional characteristics of fiscal federalism. I am indebted to the Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University and the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University, for the provision of facilities. Colleagues at both institutions also provided valuable advice and comment.     

Ecological Dumping under Monopolistic Competition

The competitive choice of emission taxes by two governments is analysed in a model of monopolostic competition with capital mobility where pollution externalities are regional. Assuming that governments have no other policy instrument apart from emission taxes at their disposal, I show that governments choose inefficiently low (high) taxes if the importance of emissions in production is small (large) relative to transport costs and the mark-up. In contrast to the previous literature, the marginal disutility of pollution is not among the parameters which separate the non-cooperative choice of emission taxes from the social planner's choice.
JEL classification : F 1; H 7; Q 2     

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust.     

Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments

We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition calledposterior reversalis given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-telling and deception). We exploit this feature to implement social choice rules.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D78, D82.     

Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

Summary. By a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice correspondences to be Nash implementable by awards. Hence our framework paves the way to the Nash implementation of social choice rules which otherwise fail to be Nash implementable. In particular, the Pareto social choice rule, the majority rule and the strong core are almost monotonic (hence Nash implementable by awards) while they are not Maskin monotonic (hence fail to be Nash implementable in the standard framework).Received: 12 April 2004, Revised: 18 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D 79.I thank François Maniquet, Efe Ok and Ipek Ozkal-Sanver for their valuable contributions. The paper is part of a project on Electoral System Design supported by Bilgi University Research Fund.     

转轨时期我国民营企业与银行紧密型银企关系的构建

我国民营企业与银行之间的松散割裂型银企关系现状使得民营企业面临严重的融资难问题.在转轨经济时期,民营企业与银行构建新型紧密型银企关系是最适合的选择.民营大企业可以和银行建立关系型合作关系.民营中小企业可以实施主办银行制度.民营企业与银行紧密型银企关系的建立离不开银行和企业各自的改革和努力,也离不开信用制度的完善和政府政策的支持.     

Freedom of Choice and Poverty Alleviation

The Capability Approach (henceforth CA) views poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon that is not only characterised by lows levels of achievement in the various dimensions but also by a restricted opportunity to choose among different ways of life. The CA thus puts a lot of emphasis on (limited) freedom of choice as a crucial aspect of poverty. If poverty is seen in this way there are two ways to improve the situation of the poor: by broadening the set of opportunities open to them or by strengthening their ability to choose. The paper concentrates on the latter. Although the CA discusses several possibilities for strengthening the ability to choose it does not explicitly consider the role of enhancing the capability of choosing as a means of poverty alleviation. The paper summarizes which circumstances are seen in the CA as suitable for strengthening freedom of choice. Namely, the paper discusses the market as an institution that trains the ability to choose, democracy as a political institution that is based on freedom of choice and participatory methods as an attempt to build explicitly on freedom of choice of the participants. Two shortcomings in the theoretical conceptualization of freedom of choice in the CA are identified by discussing these institutions and circumstances: first, the interplay between social structures and individual agency is not modelled in much detail within the CA. Second, the CA does not provide an explicitly temporal model of agency. The paper takes a closer look at these shortcomings from a sociological perspective since the questions they raise are core questions of sociology. The problems are intertwined. In order to tackle the problem of social embedding in the CA one needs to introduce time and processes as well. Sociological approaches show how social structures evolve from the interaction of individuals. The paper gives an example of how sociological concepts of this interaction can be used for drawing a model of social work for strengthening the agency of the poor. The paper proceeds as follows: first the view of poverty as capability deprivation is presented. The second section gives an overview of the areas in which the CA discusses the strengthening of individual choice: the market, democracy and participatory projects. The third section elaborates on the shortcomings of the CA identified in the preceding section from a sociological perspective and introduces a concept of social work developed in a similar theoretical context. The conclusion summarizes the lessons and outlines further lines of research.