TESTING FOR STATIONARITY IN HETEROGENEOUS PANEL DATA IN THE CASE OF MODEL MISSPECIFICATION

This paper investigates the performance of the tests proposed by Hadri and by Hadri and Larsson for testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data under model misspecification. The panel tests are based on the well known KPSS test (cf. Kwiatkowski et al.) which considers two models: stationarity around a deterministic level and stationarity around a deterministic trend. There is no study, as far as we know, on the statistical properties of the test when the wrong model is used. We also consider the case of the simultaneous presence of the two types of models in a panel. We employ two asymptotics: joint asymptotic, T, N →∞ simultaneously, and T fixed and N allowed to grow indefinitely. We use Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the effects of misspecification in sample sizes usually used in practice. The results indicate that the assumption that T is fixed rather than asymptotic leads to tests that have less size distortions, particularly for relatively small T with large N panels (micro‐panels) than the tests derived under the joint asymptotics. We also find that choosing a deterministic trend when a deterministic level is true does not significantly affect the properties of the test. But, choosing a deterministic level when a deterministic trend is true leads to extreme over‐rejections. Therefore, when unsure about which model has generated the data, it is suggested to use the model with a trend. We also propose a new statistic for testing for stationarity in mixed panel data where the mixture is known. The performance of this new test is very good for both cases of T asymptotic and T fixed. The statistic for T asymptotic is slightly undersized when T is very small (≤10).     

TESTING FOR STATIONARITY WITH A BREAK IN PANELS WHERE THE TIME DIMENSION IS FINITE

In this paper, we consider the case of finite time dimension in the panel stationarity tests with structural breaks. By fixing T, the finite sample properties of the tests for both micro (T small and N large) and macro (both T and N large) panel data are generally greatly improved. More importantly, the derivation of the tests for finite T and , as opposed to joint asymptotic where N and simultaneously, avoids the imposition of the rate condition making the test valid for any (T, N) blend. Four models corresponding to the usual combination of breaks are considered. The asymptotic distributions of the test are derived under the null hypothesis and are shown to be normally distributed. Their moments for T fixed are derived analytically employing Ghazal’s corollary 1. The case with unknown breaks is also considered. The proposed tests have generally empirical sizes that are very close to the nominal size. The Monte Carlo simulations show that the power of the test statistics increases substantially with N and T.     

Public Good Contributions Between Communities

The four fundamental determinants of voluntary contributions to public goods are taste, community size, wealth, and wealth distribution. This paper argues that for policy purposes it is important to discriminate between the four hypotheses. To do this, it is necessary to consider the comparative static effects of the above determinants not only on total contribution, but also on per capita contribution and the participation rate. Furthermore, just as members of a smaller community would contribute more than their identical counterparts in a larger community, we show that members of a community that has more poor members would also contribute more than their identical counterparts in a community that has more rich members.     

Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments

Consider a principal who hires heterogeneous agents to work for him over T periods, without prior knowledge of their skills, and intends to promote one of them at the end. In each period the agents choose effort levels that influence their outputs, and are fully informed of the past history of outputs. The principal's major objective is to maximize the expected total output, but he may also put some weight on detecting the higher-skilled agent for promotion. To this end, he randomly samples n out of the T periods and promotes the agent who produces more on the sample. This determines an extensive form game Γ(T,n), which we analyze for its subgame perfect equilibria in behavioral strategies. We show that the principal will do best to always choose a small sample size n. More precisely, if η(T) is the maximal optimal sample size, then η(T)/T→0 as T→∞.     

Perfect versus Imperfect Observability—An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result

In a seminal paper Bagwell ((1995). Games Econom. Behav.8, 271–280) claims that the first mover advantage, i.e., the strategic benefit of committing oneself to an action before others can, vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers. In our paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction. We implement four versions of a game similar to an example given by Bagwell, each time varying the quality of the signal which informs the second mover. For experienced players we do not find empirical support for Bagwell's result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Lexicographic composition of simple games

Certain voting bodies can be modeled as a simple game where a coalition's winning depends on whether it wins, blocks or loses in two smaller simple games. There are essentially five such ways to combine two proper games into a proper game. The most decisive is the lexicographic rule, where a coalition must either win in G₁, or block in G₁ and win in G₂. When two isomorphic games are combined lexicographically, a given role for a player confers equal or more power when held in the first game than the second, if power is assessed by any semi-value. A game is lexicographically separable when the players of the two components partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not separable, and games of two or more players with identical roles are separable only if decisive. Some separable games are egalitarian in that they give players identical roles.     

Endogenous cost asymmetry and insufficient entry in the absence of scale economies

The paper by Ghosh and Saha (Econ Theory 30:575–586, 2007) shows that entry can be socially excessive even if there are no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if the slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high.     

Can individuals’ beliefs help us understand nonadherence to malaria test results? Evidence from rural Kenya

In malaria‐endemic countries about a quarter of test‐negative individuals take antimalarials (artemisinin‐based combination therapies [ACTs]). ACT overuse depletes scarce resources for subsidies and contributes to parasite resistance. As part of an experiment in Kenya that provided subsidies for rapid diagnostic test and/or for ACTs conditionally on being positive, we studied the association between beliefs on malaria status (prior and posterior the intervention) and decisions to get tested and to purchase ACTs. We find that prior beliefs do not explain the decision of getting tested (conditional on the price) and nonadherence to a negative test. However, test‐negative individuals who purchase ACTs report higher posterior beliefs than those who do not, consistent with a framework in which the formers revise beliefs upward, while the latters do not change or revise downward. We also do not find evidence that prior beliefs on ACT effectiveness and trust in test results play any major role in explaining testing or treatment behavior. Further research is needed to improve adherence to malaria‐negative test results.     

Epistemic conditions for rationalizability

In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states where the set Z of action profiles is played, everyone is rational and it is mutual knowledge that the action profiles played are in Z, then the actions played at the actual world are rationalizable actions. Alternatively, if at the actual world the support of the conjecture of player i is Dⁱ, there is mutual knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are rational, and (iii) that for every i the support of the conjecture of player i is contained in Dⁱ, then every strategy in the support of the conjectures is rationalizable. The results do not require common knowledge of anything and are valid for games with any number of players.     

Calendar effects in structural time series models with trend and season

Calendar effects are analysed in the class of structural time series models one of the two main model based approaches in time series decomposition. While Bell and Hillmer (1983) modeled calendar variation in the ARIMA model based approach, we represent structural models in the generalized regression form which allows to apply classical estimation and test procedures. It turns out that the expected high computaional complexity 0(T ³) in the generalized regression model can be reduced to 0(T). As all parameters are estimated by maximizing the likelihood the Likelihood Ratio statistics can be used to test effects of the calendar composition.     

Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations

We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert is required to submit a date T by which he will have learned enough to deliver a sharp, testable prediction about future frequencies. We show that this test passes an expert who knows the data-generating process and cannot be manipulated by a uninformed one. Such a test is not possible if the theory is unrestricted.     

Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions

We study house allocation problems introduced by L. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974, J. Math. Econ.1, 23–28). We prove that a mechanism (a social choice function) is individually rational, anonymous, strategy-proof, and nonbossy (but not necessarily Pareto efficient) if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no-trade mechanism, where the no-trade mechanism is the one that selects the initial allocation for each profile of preferences. This result confirms the intuition that even if we are willing to accept inefficiency, there exists no interesting strategy-proof mechanism other than the core mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.     

Forecasting the real output using fractionally integrated techniques

The annual structure of the real GDP in the UK, France, Germany and Italy is examined by means of fractionally integrated techniques. Using a version of a testing procedure due to Robinson (Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84, –37, 1994), it is shown that the series can be specified in terms of I(d?) statistical models with d higher than 1. Thus, the series are nonstationary and non-mean-reverting. The forecasting properties of the selected models for each country are also examined.     

Remarks on the application of statistical games to technological development forecasting

This work presents the probability of determining a quantitative forecast of technological development S(t) defined by a set m of parameters S⁽¹⁾(t),S⁽²⁾(t),…,S^(m)(t), based on statistical game theory. Assuming that the coordinates S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) (i = 1, 2,…,m) of a forecasted vector S(t) are stochastic processes with given probabilistic characteristics, a formula of a function forecasting the value of a coordinate S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) of this vector can be obtained. This formula permits to determine a vector of forecasts _τT(x) of technological development S(t) at a given moment t = τ+T.     

Monopolistic Screening with Boundedly Rational Consumers*

In this paper, I revisit the monopolistic screening problem with two types assuming that consumers are boundedly rational. Bounded rationality implies that the revelation principle does not apply and the choice of the selling mechanism entails a loss of generality. I show that if the monopolist restricts attention to the mechanisms that offer menus of two choices, the profits are lower than in the case of fully rational consumers by the term of order ln λ/λ, where λ is the degree of rationality of the consumers. The monopolist, however, can approximate the profits earned when consumers are fully rational by using a more elaborate message game.     

A spatially filtered mixture of <Emphasis Type="Italic">β</Emphasis>-convergence regressions for EU regions, 1980–2002

Assessing regional growth and convergence across Europe is a matter of primary relevance. Empirical models that do not account for structural heterogeneities and spatial effects may face serious misspecification problems. In this work, a mixture regression approach is applied to the β-convergence model, in order to produce an endogenous selection of regional growth patterns. A priori choices, such as North–South or centre-periphery divisions, are avoided. In addition to this, we deal with the spatial dependence existing in the data, applying a local filter to the data. The results indicate that spatial effects matter, and either absolute, conditional, or club convergence, if extended to the whole sample, might be restrictive assumptions. Excluding a small number of regions that behave as outliers, only a few regions show an appreciable rate of convergence. The majority of data show slow convergence, or no convergence at all. Furthermore, a dualistic phenomenon seems to be present inside some States, reinforcing the “diverging-convergence” paradox. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Do Subjects Separate (or Are They Sophisticated)?

In many experiments, particularly individual choice experiments, experimenters ask many questions to the subjects and use the random lottery incentive mechanism to give an incentive to the subjects. That is, the experimenter, at the end of the experiment, picks just one of the questions, plays out that question, and pays the subject on the basis of this one question. The idea is that subjects should separate the various questions and reply to each as if it were a separate question—in isolation from all the other questions in the experiment. This procedure is methodologically sound if the subjects behave in accordance with Expected Utility (EU) theory, since this theory says that the best procedure for the subjects is to separate the various questions. However, if there is any doubt as to whether the subjects obey EU theory, and particularly if the experiment is designed to test whether the behaviour of the subjects is in accordance with EU, this incentive mechanism is open to criticism. Indeed many referees use this argument against the research. The response that the subjects may not respect EU, yet still separate the various questions, is obviously open to objection and generally it is not clear whether this response is valid or not. There have been two direct tests of this separation hypothesis (by Starmer and Sugden (1991) and by Cubitt et al. (1998), which suggest that it is valid, but further evidence is required. This paper provides a further, stronger, test of this hypothesis: we confront the two stories—(1) that the subjects answer the various questions separately, and (2) that the subjects respond to the experiment as a whole—using experimental data from an experiment in which the random lottery incentive mechanism was used. Our analysis shows that it would appear that subjects do answer as if they were separating the questions. This should be considered reassuring for those experimenters who use the random lottery incentive mechanism.     

Do young women trade jobs for marriage? A skeptical view

This paper takes a skeptical view of the theory that the slight decline in young women's labor-force participation from 1985 to 1990 can be explained by the fact that there are fewer women now in their early twenties than there are men in their late twenties so that women currently have more bargaining power in the marriage market than men do.The paper argues that the assumption behind this theory, that for women marriage and employment are substitutes, is outmoded. It also contends that the theory leaves out the importance of full-time schooling as an activity alternative to employment and that in fact the increase in full-time schooling among young women has been much greater than the slight decrease in their labor-force participation.Several questions are raised about the statistical test of the theory and also about the reasons why the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page article on the slight decline in young women's labor-force participation and featured the marriage market theory as an explanation for this purported new trend.     

Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow–Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31–58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.     

Are cadre offspring in the fast lane? Evidence from the labour market for college graduates in China

This paper studies the impact of having a cadre parent on the labour market performance and channels of the intergenerational transference. Using a recent data set, we find that college graduates with a cadre parent earn a wage premium of 4.46% more than those who do not. They also demonstrate advantages in obtaining a household registration (hukou), entering high-level occupations, and achieving job satisfaction. In the discussion on channels, we first show that aggressive self-investment serves as one potential channel but can only explain limited amount of the premiums. To test the other channel – interpersonal network (guanxi), we provide evidence that cadre offspring demonstrate more extensive family network resource and information advantage when searching for jobs. This channel is also supported by the finding that working closer to parents geographically or institutionally would enhance the effect of having a cadre parent.