Forecasting the Real Exchange Rate

This brief examines the historical relationship between exchange rates and relative inflation rates for a group of major industrial countries. It establishes the concept of the ‘real exchange rate’ and the ‘productivity-adjusted real exchange rate’ (PARE) as essential in understanding these relationships and projecting them into the future. It puts the discussion into the context of company decision making, as one important factor in the rate of return likely to accrue from different methods of supplying an overseas market. Differences in productivity between countries explain the divergences in prices of ‘non-traded goods’. To give a simple example, a haircut costs much more in New York than in Madrid since high US wages reflect high productivity which does not apply in many parts of the service sector. These differences rule out the acceptance of the over simple ‘purchasing power parity’ approach which assumes that exchange rates will settle at a point where all prices (in terms of a common currency) are the same everywhere, or move together. Even after account has been taken of differences in productivity growth, productivity-adjusted real exchange rates (PARE) - though reasonably stable - can still show some deviations, or ‘blips’. The ‘blip’ may occur because of rapid changes in the actual exchange rate or in domestic prices, in which case it is likely to prove temporary and the PARE rate will tend to adjust back to its normal level. But it may come from major structural changes, in which case PARE will be altered permanently within definable limits. A way of recognising the different categories of ‘blip’ is suggested in the brief. The PARE framework is then used to provide a guide to UK businesses who are concerned to calculate the future sterling value of foreign currency sales or, more generally, to estimate their competitiveness in supplying specific export markets. (The method used would apply equally well to other countries.) This is done by showing step-by-step the forecasting procedure to compute sterling's effective exchange rate to 1981 on assumptions concerning respective rates of inflation, monetary policy and the impact of North Sea oil. The computation shows that a sustained period of exchange rate stability is possible for the UK, even if UK inflation rates remain significantly above the world level for the next two years.     

What determines the long-term correlation between oil prices and exchange rates?

In this study, we obtain the long-term correlation between oil prices and exchange rates by employing the dynamic conditional correlation-mixed data sampling (DCC-MIDAS) model. We then identify the factors that influence the long-term correlation using panel data analysis. We find that the long-run correlations between oil prices and exchange rates are negative for all oil-exchange rate markets except Japan. We also find that both inflation and term spread have negative effects, while the risk-free interest rate has a positive effect on the long-term correlation between oil prices and exchange rates. Importantly, the empirical results show that an increase in inflation will significantly damage the real value of the currency itself.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

Carry-trades on the yen and the Swiss franc: are they different?

Using monthly data from 1986 to 2009 for 11 major currencies against the U.S. dollar (USD), we find that interest rate differentials between nine of these currencies are generally positive (sample mean of 0.86%) but are strongly negative for Japan (mean of ?2.78%) and for Switzerland (mean of ?2.22%). Investigating empirical models of nominal exchange rate changes we find for all panels that about 2% of real exchange rate misalignments are corrected in the following month. We also find important differences across samples and for the two carry-trade currencies the key results are as follows. First, interest rate differentials have a negative impact on exchange rates: higher paying currencies should appreciate, contrary to the ex-ante uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. We find that this result is very robust to money supply (M1) differentials serving as instrumental variables to inflation rates. In addition, these two currencies depreciate slightly when money supply (M1) differentials increase. Second, dummy variables for periods of market turmoil suggest a particularly strong appreciation of these currencies against the USD, consistent with the unwinding of carry-trade activities.     

Some empirical evidence on the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on cross exchange rates

This paper examines the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks on the cross exchange rates of sterling, yen and mark. The main finding of the paper is a ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern for all currency cross rates examined (sterling/yen, yen/mark and mark/sterling) following an unexpected U.S. monetary policy change, which in turn generates excess returns. We also provide evidence that the ‘delayed overshooting’ pattern in cross exchange rates is accompanied by asymmetric interventions by central banks in the foreign exchange markets under consideration triggered by a U.S. monetary policy shock.     

Nonlinear dynamics of interest rate and inflation

According to several empirical studies US inflation and nominal interest rates as well as the real interest rate can be described as unit root processes. These results imply that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move one‐for‐one in the long run, which is incongruent with theoretical models. In this paper we introduce a new nonlinear bivariate mixture autoregressive model that seems to fit quarterly US data (1953 : II–2004 : IV) reasonably well. It is found that the three‐month Treasury bill rate and inflation share a common nonlinear component that explains a large part of their persistence. The real interest rate is devoid of this component, indicating one‐for‐one movement of the nominal interest rate and inflation in the long run and, hence, stationarity of the real interest rate. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now 18 months old, suffered two major setbacks in May: heightened political tension in the Middle East and a crisis in financial markets following a rise in US interest rates. On the assumption that oil supplies are not disrupted, we forecast that industrial production in the OECD area will rise by 7per cent in 1984 compared with 1983 and that total GNP will be 4 per cent higher. The Fed3 decision to tighten monetary policy, and run the risks of a US banking crisis, underline its determination to prevent the re-emergence of high inflation in the US. Higher interest rates are expected to produce a pause in the US recovery later this year, but, by reining back the economy and dampening down inflationary expectations, they should avert both a return to high inflation and the need for a more pronounced US recession at a later date. Compared with the January forecast, therefore, in which we assumed that, for political and debt-crisis reasons, the US authorities would avoid a rise in interest rates, the present forecast embodies higher interest rates and an earlier pause in the American recovery but, in the medium term, lower inflation and steadier growth of output. For the European and Japanese economies, where policy has remained more restrictive throughout, we have not changed our view that inflation will continue either to remain low (West Germany, Japan) or to moderate (France, Italy), thereby underpinning a sustainable medium-term recovery.     

Forecast Summary

The outlook is conditioned by our assumption that sterling enters the ERM, probably in the autumn, at a central DM parity not very different from the current rate and that this exchange rate is held over the medium term. Fiscal and monetary policy have to be made consistent with a stable pound, which rules out tax cuts and restricts the fall in base rates to 12 per cent. The benefits of the ERM are to be seen in a reduction in the underlying rate of inflation to below 5 per cent by 1992. But ERM participation is not costless. The downside is four years of output growth averaging below 2 per cent and higher unemployment. The ERM offers the possibility of low inflation and steady growth in the second half of the 1990s: it is not a 'quick fix' for the current problems facing the UK economy.     

Economic Outlook 1991–1995: The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE CHANCELLOR'S ECONOMIC ADVICE

Within the last month the Chancellor has made two important speeches on macroeconomic policy. The first, to Surrey businessmen in June, pledged the UK to the French route to a ‘virtuous circle of low inflation, rising competitiveness and increasing market share’; the second, in July to the European Policy Forum, vigorously defended his present policy against the alternatives, which he dismissed as ‘illusory or destined to fail’, of devaluation or cutting interest rates. On both occasions Mr. Lamont placed the permanent conquest of inflation at the centre of his policy, arguing that holding sterling at its present central parity of DM 2.95 is the only way to achieve this objective. In his view the consequence of any of the alternative proposals would be ‘either higher interest rates, higher inflation, or most likely both’. In this Forecast Release we consider these claims and the economic advice on which it is based. On the latter we would surmise that the thrust of the advice which Mr. Lamont is receiving is that he has the opportunity to deliver a sustainably low inflation rate and that this requires a stable pound within the ERM. The alternatives involve a sterling devaluation which, no matter how obtained, would obstruct the goal of permanently low inflation in return for only transient benefits on output and unemployment. But the price of defeating inflation has been high and is not yet fully paid. Moreover the goalposts have been moved: to reach the French position on competitiveness, which underpins their gains in market share and which has taken the best part of a deeade to achieve, requires a still better inflation performance on the part of the UK and while this is being achieved, adjustment costs will persist. It is partly in defence of his own policies and partly in an attempt to moderate the already-high adjustment costs that Mr. Lamont has adopted a more combative stance. His advice is that to compete with Europe, we cannot award ourselves pay increases far in excess of European levels, indeed we need a period of below-average pay rises.     

资本管制有效性与中国汇率制度改革

本文在利率平价框架下考察了近十年中国资本管制的效力。我们采用比较类似金融工具在国内外市场的收益率、检验未抛补利率平价理论偏差的平稳性两种方法进行分析。研究表明,尽管资本管制的效力随时间推移有所下降,但境内外美元利差的持续存在以及未抛补利率平价理论偏差的非平稳性仍然足以证明中国的资本管制基本有效。资本管制的有效性在盯住制框架下确保了汇率稳定和一定的货币政策自主性,并且使未来汇率制度弹性化改革可以渐进地推进。     

BARGAINING FOR LOWER INFLATION

Industrialists are concerned about the high level of interest rates. The government is refusing to take deliberate steps to cut them, particularly at a time when the exchange rate has been falling in response to events in oil markets. However, the government has suggested that wage moderation offers the best chance of a fall in interest rates. Can this be interpreted as a promise of a reward for good behaviour? The idea of a policy bargain, whereby the authorities promise some kind of fiscal or monetary stimulus as a reward for moderation in wage settlements, is not new. An explicit bargain of this type was offered by Mr Healey in 1976 and again in 1977. In each year he offered tax cuts contingent on the negotiation of a new pay policy. Some have interpreted Mr. Lawson's comments at the recent NEDC meeting as offering a similar type of bargain on interest rates. As far as we can tell, that interpretation is incorrect; there are however interesting and important questions about whether policy should respond to lower inflation. We argue that, in general, lower inflation will itself produce favourable automatic responses for real demand within a nominal policy framework. The question of the effects of wage moderation is rather more complex. We believe that no policy adjustment is necessary. This also appears to be the government's view.     

The impact of VIX on China’s financial market: A new perspective based on high-dimensional and time-varying methods

Based on the new perspective of high-dimensional and time-varying methods, this paper analyzes the contagion effects of US financial market volatility on China’s nine financial sub-markets. The results show evidence of non-linear Granger causality from the US financial volatility (VIX) to the China’s financial markets. Increased US financial volatility has a negative next-day impact on the stock, bond, fund, interest rate, foreign exchange, industrial product and agricultural product markets, and a positive next-day impact on the gold and real estate markets. US financial volatility has the greatest impact on industrial product market, following by stock, agricultural product, fund, real estate, bond, gold, foreign exchange, and interest rates. Major risk events such as the global financial crisis can cause an enhanced contagion effect of US financial volatility to China's financial markets. This paper supports the achievements of China's actions to prevent and resolve major financial risks in the period of the COVID-19 epidemic.     

Uncovering uncovered interest parity during the classical gold standard era, 1888–1905

This paper examines the uncovered interest parity hypothesis using the dollar-sterling exchange rate during the gold standard era. This period is interesting because the exchange rate was seasonal, because transactions costs were high, and because occasions when uncovered interest rate speculation did not occur can be identified. The paper shows UIP speculation frequently did not occur, that speculation was most active in response to expected exchange rate changes not interest differentials when it did occur, and that profitability varied systematically with interest rate differentials. The estimated UIP equations are substantially improved by distinguishing occasions when sterling was borrowed not lent.     

Interest rate movements and US consumers’ inflation forecast errors: is there a link?

The Fisher effect maintains that movements in short-term interest rates largely reflect changes in expected inflation. Since expected inflation is subject to error, we ask whether interest rates move in response to over- and under-predictions of inflation. In answering, we measure expected inflation by the consumers’ forecast of inflation derived from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers (MSC). Our findings for 1978–2013 indicate that the MSC inflation forecasts were unbiased, efficient, and directionally accurate. For 1978–2007, (i) interest rates moved downward (upward) in response to MSC over-predictions (under-predictions) of inflation, and (ii) MSC inflation forecast errors had directional predictability for interest rates. However, no link between interest rate movements and MSC inflation forecast errors is detected for 2008–2013 when monetary policy kept short-term interest rates unusually low.     

The economics of diamond price movements

Diamonds are traditionally classified into three different market segments —industrial, jewellery and investment. The empirical findings support the argument that diamond prices of these three group types respond differently to business cycles. Industrial diamond prices, especially those of natural stones, have been found to be influenced by the level of economic activity in general and the volume of manufacturing production in partiular. However, the price of synthetic diamonds, especially in grit form, have declined irrespective of the business cycle as a result of technological developments and the expansion of the market which enabled producers to gait scale advantages. Prices of jewellery diamonds have been found to be most highly correlated with disposable income. As could be expected, these price have also been found to be positively correlated with inflation rates and negatively correlated with real interest rates. Prices of investment diamonds have been found to be particularly sensitive to real interest rates, to the value of the exchange rates of the US dollar and, like other gems, to disposable income. The paper also describes and discusses the activity in various diamond markets and the business policy of De Beers, the ‘king’ of the rough diamonds.     

THE 1987 BUDGET

Our pre-Budget forecast published last month correctly anticipated the main Budget measures (with the exception of the decision not to re-valorise excise duties) and is very close to the Treasury's own forecast. We have updated the forecast for the Budget measures and other new information. Compared with the February Economic Outlook, our post-Budget assessment has revised down slightly the short-term forecast for output, inflation and the current account deficit. Consequently we share the Treasury's view that output will rise 3 per cent this year, but we are a little more optimistic on the outlook for inflation and the current account.
In holding the PS BR to last year's expected outturn of £4bn, and more particularly in cutting the PSFD by £11/2zbn, the Budget represents a tightening in fiscal policy. Whether the overall policy stance is tightened depends on the response of the monetary authorities. Early indications are that the government will prevent interest rates from falling as far or as fast as they would otherwise do and that the exchange rate will be allowed to rise. This implies a tightening of policy in order to head off problems on inflation or the balance of payments. This argument is supported by the Treasury's own forecast, which is more pessimistic on both inflation and the current account than its predecessor in the Autumn Statement, and explains the Chancellor's decision not to re-valorise excise duties. The post-Budget forecast incorporates this change in policy. We now assume that the sterling index averages 70 this year and that base rates fall to 9 per cent by the end of the year.     

Forecast Summary

Monetary policy was tightened to defend the exchange rate earlier this year. Any adverse effects on activity have since been balanced by growing business confidence, restored by the successful rescue of sterling, falling interest rates and above all by the end of the miners' strike. We therefore still expect output to rise this year by 31/4–31/2 per cent and by over 2 per cent p.a. in the next three years. The recent acceleration in prices, the underlying reason for a tighter policy stance, is not expected to continue. We forecast a fall in inflation to 6 per cent or below by the end of the year and to under 5 per cent during 1986.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Budget embodies many of the recommendations that we have put forward over the last year -on personal savings and the appropriate stance of macroeconomic policy - but a void remains on the key issue of ERM entry. With inflation set to rise above 9 per cent in the short term, there is a danger that an inflation l sterling depreciation cycle becomes entrenched. In fiscal terms, the Budget was broadly neutral and the Chancellor con- firmed that the strategy is to rely on high interest rates to support the exchange rate and tame inflation. This year, with base rates of 15 per cent, we expect the pound to remain reasonably stable but in 1991-2, as interest rates fall -which they are bound to ahead of the election -the pound could well come under pressure, so putting the government's inflation objectives at risk. ERM entry would provide the obvious support and is consistent with the Treasury forecast. Without it, inflation is unlikely to fall below 5 per cent next year.     

Forecast Summary

As the Chancellor recognised in his Mansion House speech, sterling M3 is once again proving to be a wayward indicator, and it is the exchange rate which is currently the principal instrument of the government's policy to reduce inflation. The strength of sterling, reinforced by the Group of Five commitment to a lower dollar, is the main factor behind decelerating retail prices and we endorse the Chancellor's forecast that inflation will fall to under 4 per cent in the middle of next year. A strong exchange rate, however, hits UK competitiveness and results in a slower rate of growth in output next year. Output growth, over 3% per cent this year including the post-strike rebound, remains at 2% per cent in 1986 and comes down to an underlying 2 per cent in the medium term.     

The transmission of US economic policy uncertainty shocks to Asian and global financial markets

This paper proposes a novel approach to investigating the spillover effects of US economic policy uncertainty shocks on the global financial markets. Employing a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR), we model US economic policy uncertainty jointly with the latent factors extracted from equity prices, exchange rates, and commodity prices. We find that US economic policy uncertainty affects these factors significantly. A country-level analysis shows heterogeneous responses to an increase in US economic policy uncertainty. With regard to equities, US economic policy uncertainty adversely affects equity prices. However, its impact on the Chinese equity market is relatively small. As for foreign exchange markets, while many currencies depreciate in response to an increase in US economic policy uncertainty, the US dollar and the Japanese yen appreciate, reflecting their safe-haven status. The Chinese yuan, whose nominal exchange rate is closely linked to the US dollar, also appreciates in response to uncertainty shocks.