The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics in a Mature Industry: Entry,Exit, and Growth of Big‐Box Grocery Retailers

This paper measures market dynamics within the U.S. grocery industry (defined as supermarket, supercenter, and club retailers). We find that despite being a mature industry, the grocery industry is remarkably dynamic. Each year retailers open or close roughly 7% of U.S. stores. We also find significant changes in the size of firms’ operations within markets over time. These changes in relative size are largely the result of expansion or contraction by incumbents rather than the result of firm entry or exit. In fact, entry and exit are quite rare, except by small firms. Moreover, only in small markets do new entrants gain substantial market share.     

Joint ventures for entry deterrence

The literature of joint ventures has not discussed whether joint ventures may be used to deter entry. This paper then addresses how joint ventures may be used strategically for this purpose. Under the assumptions of linear demand and linear cost, as well as Stackelberg–Cournot interactions between incumbents and their joint venture firms, it is found that the incumbents can deter entry by creating independent joint ventures. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal number of the joint ventures for the deterrence and the optimal deterrence strategies are functions of the number of potential entrants. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monitoring costs and trade credit

This paper addresses the question of why nonfinancial firms engage in lending to their business partners. Such lending or trade credit is modeled as a second layer of financial intermediation. It is shown that when it is costly for a bank to inspect the borrower’s revenue but not for the borrower’s business partner, then saving in monitoring costs due to the business partner’s informational advantage may lead to trade credit. The trade off is between monitoring fewer firms and monitoring larger firms that may entail an adverse scale effect. The results are consistent with the existing empirical evidence on bankruptcy costs and on the incidence of trade credit. Welfare analysis in terms of total surplus shows that the equilibrium lending arrangement is not necessarily optimal.     

Entrepreneurial optimism and creative destruction

Using textual analysis of annual reports of US-listed firms, we provide empirical evidence that uncertainty (rather than risk) and optimism are distinctive characteristics of high-impact entrepreneurial firms (recently listed firms) relative to old incumbent firms. We construct an entrepreneurial entry predation model with uncertainty based on this evidence. We show that optimistic entrepreneurs may enter markets that otherwise would be blocked from entry by incumbents’ predatory threats. Thus entrepreneurial optimism may be to the benefit of consumers. Entrepreneurial optimism can also create a strategic advantage for entrepreneurs since incumbents may react by being less aggressive in product market interactions, which will benefit the profitability of the entrepreneur’s venture and consumers via lower prices.     

The Who,Where, What,How and When of Market Entry

This introductory, along with the eight articles contained within this Special Issue, highlights and brings greater clarity to entrant‐incumbent interactions and to firm movement – when entrants traverse market territories for the creation and/or delivery of offerings, where ‘markets’ include service or product categories, technology or resource spaces, industries, sectors and/or geographies. Collectively, this Special Issues explains that firm movement across market boundaries is highly consequential, influencing resource‐capability mixes inside firms, interfirm relations, market logic and industry value chains, and of course, people, communities and even nations. Specifically, we develop a field‐wide perspective of market entry by expanding on the framework of market entry that Zachary and his colleagues developed (Zachary et al., 2015) – i.e., the who (players such as incumbents, entrants, suppliers, etc.), when (the timing and sequence of entry), how (the strategy, resources, capabilities, etc.), where (the space of entry) and what (product, service, business model, etc.) – to include two additional categories: complements (networks, platforms, ecosystems) and non‐market elements (government, political, social and cultural arrangements). We also summarize the eight highly diverse and insightful articles that make this Special Issue, and conclude with a discussion to highlight foundational questions that point to new directions in future research in this field. In sum, we hope to inspire scholars to go beyond counting outcomes (e.g., entry/exit rates, or profiling successful versus unsuccessful entrants), to consider contexts, processes and contingencies (e.g., cost, time, collaboration, competition, interfirm relations, etc.) and to discover boundary conditions that inform a theory of market entry.     

Lasting lending relationships and technical efficiency. Evidence on European SMEs

Linking the theoretical predictions of the research on lending relationships with those of the literature on managerial incentives, we investigate whether the duration of credit relationships impacts on SMEs’ technical efficiency. Our hypothesis is that the balance between costs and benefits of enduring banking relationships might have heterogeneous effects on managers’ incentives depending on the level of firms’ indebtedness. Using a large sample of European SMEs, observed in the period 2001–2008, and adopting both parametric and non-parametric measures of efficiency, we find that the positive impact of longer lending relationships on efficiency decreases as indebtedness increases, suggesting that moral hazard problems may endanger firms’ technical efficiency.     

Asymmetric information,foreign entry and multi-period credit competition in banking industry

In a credit market, a low-cost foreign entrant is likely less informed than a domestic bank with information endowments. We present a steady-state model in an infinite-period framework, and analyze how the informational asymmetry affects the lending equilibrium and the foreign banks’ entry modes. Firstly, we show that the domestic bank's initial informational advantage from its relatively large market share at the beginning of competition is not enough to hinder the entry of a low-cost foreign bank. In addition, the foreign bank is more likely to be the winner in the steady state of an infinite-period game than that in a static game. Secondly, the comparative static analysis show that the likelihood of foreign bank becoming the winning party increases with borrower quality, project payoff and the growth rate of potential new borrowers. Thirdly, when the foreign bank wins game in the steady state, its market share is decreasing in project payoff and the growth rate of new borrowers, while changes non-monotonically with borrower quality. Finally, we extend our model to characterize the domestic bank's sustainable advantage in being relatively familiar with new market, and provide valuable explanations for the observed entry modes of foreign banks in China.     

Do Prior Experiences of Top Executives Enable or Hinder Product Market Entry?

How firms achieve entry into new‐to‐the‐firm product markets is an important but overlooked topic. Some aspiring entrants fail during product development, and they miss the opportunity to enter. In such contexts, firms often take action to de‐risk entry, for example, by drawing upon the experience of top executives with market‐specific expertise obtained in prior jobs. However, the empirical evidence from this study shows that beyond a narrow threshold, greater prior experience in the top executive team was associated with a greater likelihood of failed entry attempts among the firms that I tracked over two decades in the biotechnology industry. This result held across product markets with low and high degrees of dynamism. Based on the literature on dynamic managerial capabilities, where entry into new markets indicates managers’ ability to reconfigure organizational resources and adapt to a changing environment, this study’s main contribution is to illustrate how and why experience matters for entry.     

Do Firms Increase Productivity in Order to Become Exporters?*

Recent studies find that exporters are more productive than non‐exporters and that entry into exporting does not increase firms’ productivity. Thus, firms self‐select into foreign markets. This paper examines productivity before entry into exporting. Using Chilean plant‐level data, we find that productivity and investment increase before plants begin to export. Moreover, productivity of entrants to exporting, but not that of non‐exporters and exporters, increases in response to increases in foreign income, before entry but not after that. The results suggest that the productivity advantage of future exporters may be the result of firms increasing their productivity in order to export.     

Lending attitude as a financial accelerator in a credit network economy

In existing literature, commercial banks are often considered mere financial intermediaries that facilitate the flow of credit in an imperfect credit market. However, as demonstrated in the history of financial instability, the behavior of financial institutions plays an important role. This paper examines how lenders’ attitudes affect macroeconomic performance. In our analysis, the economy is composed of multiple borrowers (firms) and one lender (bank). Each borrower is directly connected to the lender through its credit contract. At the same time, each borrower is indirectly connected to all the other borrowers within the credit network. Using this model, we execute computer simulations to examine the economic consequences of lending attitudes. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the bank’s lending attitude functions as a financial accelerator; that is, it significantly affects the dynamics of the economic system through the credit network. Consequently, the same level of exogenous shock generates completely different outcomes depending on the different lending attitudes. The results also show that there exists an optimal lending attitude that leads to high economic growth and a stable growth path.     

Does capital structure differently affect incumbents' responses to entry threat and actual entry?

Some theories predict that firms with higher financial leverage compete more aggressively in product markets than firms with lower financial leverage, whereas others predict that lower‐leverage firms compete more aggressively than higher‐leverage firms. This paper studies how incumbent airlines' capital structure affects their responses to Southwest Airlines' entry threat and actual entry. The results indicate that, when responding to entry threat, lower‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than higher‐leverage incumbents; in contrast, when responding to actual entry, higher‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than lower‐leverage incumbents.     

Searching for big data: How incumbents explore a possible adoption of big data technologies

Big data is often described as a new frontier of IT-enabled competitive advantage. A limited number of exemplary firms have been used recurrently in the big data debate to serve as successful illustrations of what big data technologies can offer. These firms are well-known, data-driven organizations that often, but not always, are born digital companies. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the challenges that many incumbent organizations face when they try to explore a possible adoption of such technologies. This study investigates how incumbents handle such an exploration and what challenges they face. Drawing on a four-year qualitative field study of four large Scandinavian firms, we are able to develop a typology of how incumbents handle the exploration of and resistance to adopting big data technologies. Directly affecting the incumbents’ exploration are two aspects that separate the adoption of big data technologies from that of other technologies. First, being an elusive concept, big data technologies can mean different things to different organizations. This makes the technologies difficult to explain before an investing body, while it simultaneously opens up possibilities for creative definitions. Second, big data technologies have a transformative effect on the organization of work in firms. This transformative capability will make managers wary as it might threaten their position in the firm, and it will create ripple effects, transforming other systems besides those directly connected to the technology.     

News shock,firm dynamics and business cycles: Evidence and theory

The literature of expectation-driven business cycles has overlooked the role played by endogenous entry. This paper documents empirically news shock as a major source of fluctuations in firm dynamics and comovement between firm entry and GDP using structural vector auto-regressions. We then develop a tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the propagation mechanism assuming fixed operating costs for incumbents and decreasing survival rates for entrants. Our quantitative prediction closely matches the positive comovement between firm entries and core macroeconomic indicators upon news shock. These results remain robust at the sectoral level when the baseline model is extended to a two-sector setup.     

Market microstructure,banks’ behaviour and interbank spreads: evidence after the crisis

We present a study of the European electronic interbank market of overnight lending (e-MID) before and after the beginning of the financial crisis. The main goal of the paper is to explain the structural changes of lending/borrowing features due to the liquidity turmoil. Unlike previous contributions that focused on banks’ dependent and macro information as explanatory variables, we address the role of banks’ behaviour and market microstructure as determinants of the credit spreads. We show that all banks experienced significant variations in their liquidity costs due to the sensitivity of interbank rates to the timing and side of trades. We argue that, while larger banks did experience better funding conditions after the crisis, this was not just a consequence of the “too big to fail” perception of the market. Larger banks have been able to play more strategically when managing their liquidity by taking advantage of the changing market microstructure.

     

Sequential Investment, Firm Motives, and Agglomeration of Japanese Electronics Firms in the United States

Recent research finds that firms investing abroad tend to agglomerate with other foreign entrants. Yet firms often invest multiple times within the same host country, which raises the question of whether firms agglomerate with their competitors' or their own prior investments. Collocation's attractiveness also may vary as a firm's entry motives evolve. The activities of prior and present investments often differ—initial investment may be for distribution while later ones might be for manufacturing. For Japanese investment into the United States in the electronics sector from 1980 to 1998, we find that firms tend to collocate only with their own prior investments. The exception is firms with little of their own experience, who tend to collocate with competitors. These results demonstrate the importance of firm heterogeneity in determining agglomeration behavior.     

Patent Settlements as a Barrier to Entry

We formulate a model of entry with two incumbent firms—a patent holder and an infringer—and a potential entrant, with asymmetric information about the validity of the infringed patent (patent strength) between incumbent firms and the entrant. Within this framework we show that patent settlements between the incumbent firms can be mutually beneficial even when the cost of trial is zero and the settlement agreement takes the form of a simple fixed license fee. For patents of intermediate strength, settlements are a tool for entry deterrence. The two parties agree on a high settlement amount which sends a credible signal to “outsiders” that the patent is not weak and therefore entry will not be profitable. This provides a novel explanation for the role of settlements and to the recent observation of high license fees negotiated in settlement agreements. It suggests that firms should disclose the settlement amount if they want to keep out further entrants. We also show that even nonreverse settlements that entail only a fixed fee can be anticompetitive because they are used to block entry.     

Firm entry, credit availability and monetary policy

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates firm entry under credit rationing. Goods-producing firms in this model are bank dependent in the sense that they have no choice but to borrow funds from banks to cover labor wages that must be paid in advance of production. The results show that a cut in the policy rate enhances firm entry by mitigating the severity of credit rationing. This policy transmission is different from the conventional balance sheet channel in that a change in the policy rate directly affects borrowers' credit availability. I also show that a sudden stop in the credit supply to new firms is most likely to occur shortly after a credit boom. This is because endogenous downward wage rigidity prohibits the credit risk of prospective firms from decreasing enough to re-equilibrate the loan market.     

Patterns of business creation,survival and growth: Evidence from Africa

We study firm dynamics using a novel database of all formally registered firms in Cote d'Ivoire from 1977 to 1997, which account for about 60% of GDP. First, we examine entry and exit patterns and the role of new and exiting firms versus incumbents in job creation and destruction. We find that while the rate of job creation at new firms is quiet high – at 8% on average – the numbers of jobs added by new firms is small in absolute terms. Next, we examine survival rates and find that the probability of survival increases monotonically with firm size, but that manufacturing and foreign-owned firms face higher likelihoods of exit compared to service oriented and domestically-owned firms. We find that higher GDP growth increases the probability of firm survival, but this is a broad impact with no firm size disproportionately affected. In robustness checks we find that post-1987, size is no longer a significant determinant of firm survival for new entrants, suggesting that the operating environment for firms changed. Finally, we find that trade and fiscal reform episodes raised the probability of firm exit and attenuated the survival disadvantages faced by smaller firms, but exchange rate revaluation and pro-private sector reforms did not significantly lower the likelihood of exit.     

Stability or restructuring? Macroeconomic dynamics under soft budget constraint problems

In this paper, we examine how a decrease in firms’ productivity or the degree of financial market imperfection affects macroeconomic dynamics when the bank has an incentive to misallocate its credit. We develop a model that incorporates a soft budget constraint into a simplified version of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) environment and show that soft budget constraint problems may arise if the economy becomes less productive or the financial market is less developed. Because of this shift in firms’ productivity, not only do more bad projects survive, but profitable new entrants are crowded out, so that, as in transition economies and Japan in the 1990s, the recession is not only prolonged, but also becomes more severe in the long term.