Information asymmetry of fair value accounting during the financial crisis

We examine whether US banks’ fair value net assets, measured according to the three-level hierarchy introduced in SFAS 157, are associated with information asymmetry during the 2008 financial crisis. Our results show that bid–ask spread, a proxy for information asymmetry, is positively associated with fair value net assets, and the degree of association is contingent upon the three-level hierarchy, with bid–ask spreads being lowest for Level 1 (the most transparent valuation inputs) and highest for Level 3 (the least observable). Also, there is some evidence that SFAS 157 led to a reduction in bid–ask spread, and we find that quarterly changes in Level 1 and Level 2 fair value net assets are significantly associated with changes in bid–ask spread in 2008 when the spread was rapidly rising, but not in 2009 when it was falling. Our findings suggest that the three-level hierarchy under SFAS 157 provides investors with useful information, and fair value is associated with uncertainty, as measured by bid–ask spread, before and during the financial crisis.     

Measurement Model or Asset Type: Evidence from an Evaluation of the Relevance of Financial Assets

This study focuses on the operation of the Level 1, 2, and 3 measurement uncertainty hierarchy embedded in the SFAS 157 accounting for financial assets. Prior studies conclude the SFAS 157 fair value measurement model and prevailing financial market conditions are causal factors for the lower value relevance of the Level 3 financial assets. The contribution of our paper is to provide evidence on an additional, hitherto undocumented source of measurement uncertainty impacting the relevance of SFAS 157 financial assets to investors: the type of asset appearing in Level 3 financial assets as a result of asset securitizations and SFAS 140 securitization accounting. The paper also presents evidence that suggests the SFAS 166 amendments were unable to fully address informational transparency for financial assets arising from securitizations. The key contribution is evidentiary insights suggesting the prescribed measurement model has a relatively lower impact on measurement uncertainty and relevance of financial assets compared to the effects of the asset type.     

What Do FAS 157 “Fair Values” Really Measure: Value Or Risk?

FAS 157, the U.S. accounting standard that prescribes how fair values of assets and liabilities are to be measured when other U.S. GAAP standards require fair valuation, stipulates that fair values be measured as the exit values of assets and liabilities—the proceeds for assets hypothetically sold on the date of the financial report, and, correspondingly, the amount required to settle liabilities on the date of the financial report. This conceptual article argues that exit values do not reflect the value of the net assets of the firm to shareholders, which is best reflected by discounted cash flows to maturity. Moreover, exit values—biasing fair values downward when markets are illiquid—have a pernicious, systemic risk effect; specifically, they give rise to write‐downs that in turn cause contagion: prices of equities and other financial instruments of peers react negatively, leading to further write‐downs by those peers. This may have aggravated the recent financial crisis. However, while exit values are not proper measures of value to shareholders, they are useful measures of downside risk when prospects turn sour for a firm. Thus, both exit values and discounted cash flows should be presented in financial statements.     

Voluntary fair value disclosures beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates

Some firms voluntarily make disclosures about the controls and processes in place to ensure the reliability of fair value estimates. Consistent with these disclosures being driven by investors’ concerns about the reliability of their SFAS 157 estimates, we find that firms with more opaque estimates are more likely to provide such disclosures. We then examine whether these disclosures improve investors’ perception about the reliability of fair value estimates. We find that they are associated with higher market pricing and lower information risk for Level 3 estimates. Further analyses of the disclosures reveal that the following types of information are particularly important to investors: discussion of the external and independent pricing of fair value estimates and their proper classification according to the SFAS 157 hierarchy. Overall, our results suggest that the voluntary reliability disclosures that firms provide beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates help reduce investors’ uncertainty toward the more opaque fair value estimates.     

The relative and incremental value relevance of goodwill before and after SFAS No. 142

We explore the value relevance of goodwill against two benchmarks: other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets. Prior research suggests that fair value estimates for goodwill must be inferred from other available information because of the nature of goodwill, including its intangibility. Such inferences are highly discretionary and may limit the usefulness of reported goodwill estimates. Because Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142 relies exclusively on fair value estimates to subsequently measure goodwill, reported values considering management’s increased discretion may be less reliable and less value relevant when presented in conjunction with other accounting information. However, the subsequent accounting measurement for goodwill is not dissimilar from the subsequent measurement for long-lived tangible assets, which are also subject to impairment. In general, impairment measurement is subjective; management may have greater insight, even in the presence of management incentives and other accounting information, that may help confirm or disconfirm investors’ own goodwill estimates. Using other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets as benchmarks for the value relevance of goodwill, we find that reported goodwill provides greater value relevance relative to other accounting information after SFAS 142 and that the difference between the value relevance of goodwill and other long-lived tangible assets is also significantly greater following SFAS 142.     

The association between firm characteristics and CFO's opinions on the fair value option for non-financial assets

SFAS 157 provides a common definition for fair value while SFAS 159 expands the applicability of the fair value option. This paper analyzes the responses of 209 CFOs of U.S. firms to a survey asking whether they would choose the fair value option for non-financial assets (FVONFA) and investigates the determinants of CFOs' responses to the option. One of our results suggests that CFOs in the U.S. are resistant to the FVONFA, consistent with prior studies based on firms in Europe and Australia. Our results also suggest that firm size, leverage, the amount of non-financial assets, and expertise in fair value measurements all positively affect the CFOs' responses to the FVONFA.     

The Relationship between Fair Value,Market Value,and Efficient Markets*

This paper proposes that an assumption of reasonable market efficiency is at the essence of the relevance of fair value for financial reporting purposes. The paper's examination of this proposal begins with a review of recent academic literature on market efficiency, and on evidence of inefficiencies and their implications for the ability of the efficient market hypothesis to explain what market prices represent. It concludes that there is wide acceptance in this literature that a reasonable level of efficiency can generally be presumed to exist in active, well‐regulated capital markets. The paper examines the essential attributes of a reasonably efficient market for fair value measurement purposes, and some basic implications for its reliable estimation. This is done in comparison with the provisions of the fair value measurement standard of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards [SFAS] No. 157). It is concluded that the concept of reasonable market efficiency could provide a sound conceptual framework for defining fair value that is founded in real, observable market prices. It is demonstrated that, in contrast, SFAS No. 157 does not provide a clear, unequivocal concept of fair value, and that it permits estimates of fair value that have no demonstrable basis in real, observable market prices. Nevertheless, it appears that arguments typically put forward by the International Accounting Standards Board and the FASB for the relevance of fair value for financial reporting purposes do imply a presumption of reasonably efficient markets.     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

Fair Value Accounting and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Adoption of SFAS 159

We examine how fair value accounting affects debt contract design, specifically the use and definition of financial covenants in private loan contracts. Using SFAS 159 adoption as our setting, we find that a small but significant proportion of loans (14.5%) modify covenant definitions to exclude the effects of SFAS 159 fair values. Only a limited number of these modifications exclude assets elected at fair value (less than 7%), while all exclude liabilities elected at fair value. Notably, we document that covenant definition modification is unassociated with ex ante fair value elections. We find that covenant definition modification positively varies with common incentive problems attributed to fair value accounting and negatively varies with benefits attributed to fair value accounting. Our results suggest that fair value accounting is not uniformly detrimental for debt contracting and fair value adjustments are included when they are most likely to improve performance measurement.     

Asset reliability and security prices: evidence from credit markets

We assess the relation between asset reliability and security prices. Concerns about asset reliability are increasing with the move to fair value accounting in general purpose financial reports. We provide pertinent evidence from credit markets. A key benefit of using credit market data to explore the capital market implications of asset reliability is the theoretical basis of Duffie and Lando (Econometrica 69(3):633–664, 2001). They show that asset reliability (measurement) concerns should be concentrated in short-term credit spreads. Thus a focus on credit term structure can facilitate a cleaner identification of the impact of asset reliability on security prices. We find that asset reliability issues, attributable to SFAS 157 disclosures of Level 2 and, especially, Level 3 financial assets for a set of US financial institutions over the period of August 2007 to March 2009, are a significant determinant of short-term credit spreads and the shape of the general credit term structure. Our findings are robust to a variety of control variables and research design choices.     

公允价值计量问题的国际进展及其在中国应用的思考

本文通过阐述美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)2006年9月发布的《财务会计准则公告第157号》(FASB第157号公告)中关于公允价值定义、确定公允价值的级次等方面的规定,以及国际财务报告准则(IF-RS)中有关公允价值计量的规定和国际会计准则理事会(IASB)对第157号公告主要规定的看法,结合中国兼具新兴市场经济和转型经济国家的经济环境,提出国际上公允价值计量的新发展在中国应用可能存在的问题及建议。     

美国公允价值计量准则评介

"公允价值计量"是一个国际性的财务报告难题。2006年9月FASB发布"公允价值计量准则"(SFAS157),制定了新的公允价值定义和计量指南。本文介绍SFAS157的主要理论:脱手价计量目标、市场参与者观和公允价值级次,分析这些理论的形成背景和现实意义,归纳SFAS157的主要特征并探讨它对改进我国新准则公允价值计量应用的借鉴作用。     

The change in the value relevance of accounting information after mergers and acquisitions: evidence from the adoption of SFAS 141(R)

This study examines how and why investors change the use of their information sources in valuation between book value and earnings after mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in both pre- and post-SFAS 141(R) periods. We find that investors generally put less weight on earnings but more weight on book value after M&A than before M&A, and that such a change is particularly strong after the adoption of SFAS 141(R). By looking at goodwill, other intangible assets and other balance sheet accounts that SFAS 141(R) amended, we further find that SFAS 141(R) improves the value relevance of book value components after M&A.     

Overreaction of index futures in Hong Kong

In this paper we show that the pricing error of index futures relative to its fair value can be used to identify investors' overreaction in index futures market. Specifically, when investors are overly pessimistic (optimistic), the prices of index futures are well below (above) their fair values. When the excess pessimism (optimism) is gone, the prices of index futures revert to catch up with their fair values. After taking into consideration transaction cost, execution time lag, and risk adjustment, profitable strategies can be developed to exploit this overreaction. We find that overreaction exists during intraday trading and market closing.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

Fair value disclosures and crash risk

In response to the public criticism of the inadequate disclosures mandated by SFAS No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, the FASB issued ASU (Accounting Standards Update) 2010–06, Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements, and ASU 2011–04, Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements, in an effort to increase the reporting transparency. We examine whether the increased fair value disclosures required by these two updates effectively decrease crash risk, defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. In support of the hypothesis, we find that increased transparency from these updates reduces crash risk among U.S. banking firms and that the reduction is greater in banks that have a higher level of Level 3 financial assets.     

Have SFAS 166 and SFAS 167 improved the financial reporting for securitizations?

Critics have alleged that securitization accounting prior to 2010 was among the causes of the recent financial crisis. In response to this criticism, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) implemented two new accounting standards, SFAS 166 and SFAS 167, to improve the financial reporting for securitizations. Bank regulators have stated their belief that SFAS 166/167 will result in a consolidated balance sheet (and risk-based capital ratios based thereupon) that better reflects a bank's exposure to risk related to securitized assets. We document that, by ceding retained power or influence through the servicing/special servicing functions to third parties, SFAS 166/167 resulted in real effects to the extent that banks (particularly those that were weakly capitalized) achieved their accounting objectives in the post-SFAS 166/167 period through legitimate transaction structuring in line with the intent of the new rules. Further, we use capital market participants’ assessments of risk retention by sponsoring banks as a benchmark, and provide evidence consistent with bank regulators’ beliefs. In particular, following SFAS 166/167, equity investors of sponsoring banks do not consider (consider) as risk relevant securitized assets that receive off-balance sheet (on-balance sheet) treatment. Securitized assets that are consolidated under SFAS 166/167 exhibit the same risk relevance as assets that are not securitized, despite contractual provisions that would seem to imply substantial risk transfer.     

The Value Relevance of Financial Institutions' Fair Value Disclosures: A Study in the Difficulty of Linking Unrealized Gains and Losses to Equity Values

This article provides a residual-income valuation framework for assessing whether fair value disclosures required by SFAS 119, Disclosures About Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Values of Financial Instruments , are value-relevant. The primary theoretical and empirical result is that when using a residual-income valuation model, the estimated relation between variables measuring fair value-book value differences for financial instruments and security prices may be contrary to what one would have expected. Specifically, the greater the firm's return on invested capital and growth rate relative to its cost of capital, the more negative the estimated relation between fair value-book value differences for financial instruments and security prices. A generalization of this result is that tests linking equity values to various types of unrecognized gains and losses are, in many cases, unlikely to generate the hypothesized positive relation between equity values and the unrecognized gains and losses.     

Financial instruments,financial reporting,and financial stability

I review new empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis on the relation between financial reporting and financial stability. I draw the following conclusions: First, there is still no evidence that fair value accounting caused widespread fire sales of asset or contagion. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that accounting and regulation might have contributed to the crisis by allowing several banks to delay actions. Third, even if share prices reacted positively to the relaxation of fair value accounting rules during the crisis, the origin of the problem might be lax rules that allowed banks to run into financial and regulatory problems. Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until maturity if that bank strongly relies on short-term financing. Fifth, the recognition of fair values is no substitute for information that allows investors to judge a bank's risk exposure and the validity of reported fair values.     

Good disclosure doesn't cure bad accounting—Or does it?: Evaluating the case for SFAS 158

This paper investigates whether the newly required recognition of the funded status of defined benefit (DB) plans under SFAS 158 is incrementally value relevant in its adoption year (2006) relative to the corresponding amounts which were previously disclosed from both equity investor and credit rating perspectives. In equity valuation models, we use a sample of 878 firms (1756 firm years) offering DB plans in 2005 (disclosure year) and 2006 (recognition year), and find no incrementally significant association with market prices of newly recognized amounts under SFAS 158 over the same information that was disclosed pre-SFAS 158. Our credit rating tests, using a sample of 428 DB firms (856 firm years) for 2005 and 2006 also show no differential impact of recognition over disclosure. Overall, we find that equity investors price the SFAS 158-imposed pension differential while credit rating agencies do not, regardless of whether such information is recognized or disclosed in the financial statements. Our results are consistent with efficiency in both equity and credit markets with respect to pension information and suggest that SFAS 158 has not changed the way market participants in aggregate use pension-related financial statement information.