Nationality preferences for labour in the international football industry

This paper tests consumer and co-worker nationalistic preferences by measuring the effect of team nationality composition on fan attendance and overall team quality using professional football teams in the world's five largest football leagues. Little evidence is found to support the hypothesis that fans or co-workers discriminate based upon the player's nationality. Thus, the under-representation of various nationalities can be concluded to originate from a club's ownership and/or management. These results are similar to the racial bias revealed by English club owners as found by Szymanski and Preston.     

Racial discrimination and professional basketball salaries in the 1990s

Racial differences in professional basketball player salaries are examined to determine whether the 20% premium paid to whites in the mid-1980s has persisted into the 1990s. OLS and tobit regressions indicate no difference between white and black salaries, controlling for player and team characteristics for the 1994 - 95 season. However, censored quantile regressions show substantial racial differences at certain points in the salary distribution. Whites earn less than blacks at the lower end of the distribution, although the difference is not statistically significant, and varies with minutes played. In contrast, whites receive a significant premium (18%) at the upper end of the salary distribution. These findings are consistent with a form of consumer discrimination in which sports fans prefer to see white star players, all else equal.     

Foreign players,team production,and technical efficiency: Evidence from European soccer

As on-field success is nowadays the main objective of European soccer clubs, good management needs to extract the highest sport success from the squad talent at hand. Because teams differ in their quality, performance needs to be compared with the best practice of comparable units. One remarkable source of heterogeneity across teams is the squad composition, which can produce gains from diversity together with communication costs. The paper studies the efficiency in sporting performance of soccer teams, paying attention to how the number of foreign players relates to productive inefficiency. Using data for 146 teams in the top 5 European leagues during 10 seasons, we estimate a double heteroskedastic True Random Effects Stochastic Frontier team production function. We find that (i) the number of passes, ball recoveries, and shots from the penalty area improve team efficiency, and (ii) a higher number of foreign players increase inefficiency. Our findings suggest that gains from squad diversity might be offset by communication costs.     

What shapes player performance in soccer? Empirical findings from a panel analysis

In this article, we investigate the pay–performance relationship of soccer players using individual data from eight seasons of the German soccer league Bundesliga. We find a nonlinear pay–performance relationship, indicating that salary does indeed affect individual performance. The results further show that player performance is affected not only by absolute income level but also by relative income position. An additional analysis of the performance impact of team effects provides evidence of a direct impact of team-mate attributes on individual player performance.     

An industry test for ethnic discrimination in major league soccer

This paper tests for salary discrimination based on player ethnicity in Major League Soccer (MLS) by making innovative use of player movements in a unique setting. The discriminating team investigated is Club Deportivo Chivas USA, which had a preference for employing Hispanic players. Evidence of discrimination is found by analyzing how other teams valued the former players of Chivas USA differently across ethnicity after the team was disbanded by the league. The nature of MLS player contracts and drafting rules allow for a simple and unique test for salary discrimination that has not previously been possible to implement.     

Customer preferences,attendance and the racial structure of professional basketball teams

This paper examines the importance of customer-based discrimiantion in professional basketball over the 1980–81 to 1985–86 seasons. Empirical rsesults offer strong support of the hypothesis that, if fans prefer to see players of their own race, teams will be influenced in their selection of players by the racial composition of their market area. By the same token, attendance is found to be positively related to the extent to which the racial composition of the team matches that of the corresponding market area.     

Soccer transfers,team efficiency and the sports cycle in the most valued European soccer leagues – have European soccer teams been efficient in trading players?

The sale of soccer players is a serious issue for the sustainability of professional teams. This article discusses the efficiency of the values that 183 European soccer teams have received for the sales of their players since 2007. We estimated stochastic frontiers for these soccer teams using stochastic frontier analysis. We found that teams with higher numbers of titles, with huge past acquisitions of players, and achieving good rankings in the previous season tend to receive more transfer inflows. The efficiency of these inflows can be significantly influenced if the team exhibits a long sports history or if the team participates in the Champions League or in the Europa League.     

Labour Markets in Professional Sports

Important elements of supply and demand are starkly observable in professional athletics. Demand affects how pay varies with personal productivity, racial discrimination, the nature of factor substitutions, and player mobility. Property rights affect the supply of athletic talent, arms races and incentives to restrict competition. In sports, excess incentives to win can create negative externalities. Collective agreements such as reverse-order drafts, payroll caps and revenue sharing constrain these forces, but redistribute rents from talented players to owners because they punish success. The European approach–promoting better-performing teams and relegating those with the poorest records–punish failure.     

Put me in,Coach, I’m ready to play

This paper explores the connection between discrimination and entrepreneurship. To pursue this inquiry we focus on the integration of black players in Major League Baseball (MLB). MLB team owners, acting as entrepreneurs, had to weigh the benefits of integrating versus the costs of alienating consumers who had a taste for discrimination against hiring blacks. We find that the owners whose teams could profit by contending for the league pennant with the addition of black players were the ones who were willing to take the risk of integrating, although integration often stood in contrast to revealed consumer preferences. In addition to illuminating the mechanism through which integration took place, we offer a general understanding of how the costs and benefits associated with consumers’ taste for discrimination can change via entrepreneurial activities.

SALARY INEQUALITY,TEAM SUCCESS,LEAGUE POLICIES,AND THE SUPERSTAR EFFECT

Using a simple model of a team's salary distribution and data from the recent Collective Bargaining Agreement between players and owners in the National Hockey League, I examine the relationship between a team's salary distribution and its winning percentage. I find that teams with higher relative payrolls and lower salary inequality have higher winning percentages. I also find evidence of a superstar effect, in that teams with a higher maximum player salary have higher winning percentages. The results are sensitive, however, to the particular measure of salary inequality used as well as the endogeneity of the salary distribution. (JEL Z22, L83, J52, C33, C26)     

DOES EXPERIENCE MATTER? SALARY DISPERSION,COACHING, AND TEAM PERFORMANCE

Using Major League Soccer as a unique dataset, this study examines the direct and indirect role of coaches' experience in determining team performance. Inspired by labor market studies, we applied traditional indicators of team salary structure and, unlike previous studies, empirically test the hypothesis that coach experience affects the way in which team salary distribution influences performance. Our results suggest that coaches with experience as professional soccer players improve team performance directly but worsen the negative effect of a skewed salary distribution. Moreover, experience as a player is more important than coaching experience. (JEL D3, J3, M5)     

DO SOCCER ASSOCIATIONS REALLY SPEND ON A GOOD THING? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HETEROGENEITY IN THE CONSUMER RESPONSE TO MATCH UNCERTAINTY OF OUTCOME

The purpose of this study is to analyze whether previous results describing the effect of uncertainty of outcome on match attendance in team sports have been driven by heterogeneity in fan demand. We apply censored quantile regression methods and place particular emphasis on the relationship between match uncertainty and attendance demand, as previous results are highly ambiguous. This is more surprising, as each season association and league officials continue to spend millions on enhancing this uncertainty. We also control for season ticket holders, who are unlikely to be influenced by match specificities. Based on data from German soccer, our results indicate that fan demand shows heterogeneity across quantiles and that increasing match uncertainty of outcome exclusively benefits teams who already face strong attendance demand. ( JEL D12, C14, C24, L83)     

Racial discrimination in umpire voting: an (arguably) unexpected result

Using data from an official most valuable player award in professional sport, we test for the presence of discrimination by match officials (umpires), who are responsible for ranking the top three players within each match. These umpires are found to award significantly more votes to (and have a higher probability of voting for) players identified as (Australian) Indigenous, after controlling for within-match production. The result offers further evidence on racial discrimination, and runs counter to numerous analogous studies both in sport, as well as in labour and other socio-economic outcomes in general.     

Changing rewards in contests: Has the three-point rule brought more offense to soccer?

In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule) may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular, we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively, and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams. Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis. First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001     

Are there too few trades during the NFL draft?

College football players are initially assigned to teams in the National Football League (NFL) through the league’s draft selection process. At each team’s turn to pick, the team has the option of exercising the pick itself or trading it to another team. If gains from trade are exhausted, draft picks should be exercised by the team with the highest expected value. That is, the expected player contribution garnered from a given pick should not be dependent on whether the pick was traded or retained. Regression results, however, indicate that controlling for a player’s draft position, when a team trades up to acquire a player, that player is more likely to have greater on-field success. This suggests that there are too few draft day trades. Plausible reasons are high transaction costs or the fear of media scrutiny that draft trades can engender.     

Is racial salary discrimination disappearing in the NBA? evidence from data during 1985–2015

This study re-examines the racial salary gap of National Basketball Association players by constructing a long unbalanced panel covering the 1985–1986 to 2015–2016 seasons. Contrary to the results of previous studies, we find that non-white players are paid equally to white players with similar characteristics in the 1980s and 1990s, but that white players started to be paid about 20% more than non-white players in the last 10 years. Our results are robust to all specification checks, such as quantile regressions, controlling sample selection, different contract types, and player nationality. We find that neither employer preference nor income gap of white and black residents explains this increasing salary gap.     

All out,all the time? Evidence of dynamic effort in major league baseball

This paper presents evidence that effort varies according to players’ positions in the contract cycle using 2007 through 2011 data on Major League Baseball (MLB) non-pitchers eligible for free agency. While controlling for time-invariant player traits, fixed-effect regression modelling produces evidence that MLB players exhibit contract-year increases in adjusted on-base-plus-slugging percentage (OPS+) in the final years of contracts and declines in OPS+ in the initial years of long-term contracts. The estimated contract-year boost is driven disproportionately by the best offensive performances, while estimated shirking effects are concentrated among the weakest. The results are not driven by the hitting performance of defensive specialists, nor do the results change when the econometric model accounts for players who change teams. OPS+ offers advantages over some other offensive statistics (such as RBI) because it depends less on teammate performance and adjusts for differences among home ball parks and the American and National Leagues.     

The minority game unpacked:

We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team composed of three subjects. Each team can freely discuss its strategies in the game and decisions must be made via majority rule. Team discussions are recorded and their content analyzed to detect evidence of strategy co-evolution among teams playing together. Our main results show no evidence supporting the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, and provide evidence more consistent with reinforcement learning models than with belief-based models. Exhibiting level-2 rationality (i.e., reasoning about others’ beliefs) is positively and significantly correlated with higher than average earnings in the game. In addition, teams that are more successful tend to become more self-centered over time, paying more attention to their own past successes than to the behavior of other teams. Finally, we find evidence of mutual adaptation over time, as teams that are more strategic induce competing teams to be more self-centered instead. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co-evolution of decision rules. In addition, they provide support at the decision process level to the validity of modeling behavior using reinforcement learning models.     

Working under pressure: Evidence from the impacts of soccer fans on players’ performance

In this paper we study how pressure affects individual’s behavior. For this purpose we use sports data, where the attendance is a proxy for pressure, to investigate if the number of fans in the stadium affects the performance of the players. We overcome the reverse causality problem by proposing an instrument variable: a promotion in Brazil during which low cost tickets were assigned to random soccer matches. In contrast to previous literature, our results suggest that pressure does not significantly affect players’ behavior.     

INTEGRATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICAN PLAYERS IN JAPAN'S PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUES

Teams in Japan's two professional baseball leagues began to add foreign players in the early 1950s, with the average number per team reaching 5.79 in 2004. This was primarily because foreign hitters outperformed Japanese hitters. Hazard analysis shows that a poorly performing team was more likely to hire its first Caucasian and African American players earlier than a successful team. Econometric analysis of team use of foreign players over 45 seasons (1960–2004) shows that losing Central League teams used foreign players more often in following season(s), whereas past success of Pacific League teams did not affect their use of foreign players.