考虑网络外部性的信息产品定价与政府反盗版政策研究

网络外部性是信息产品的重要特性.从消费者效用函数出发,通过建立两阶段博弈模型分析了网络效应对信息产品垄断市场上正版厂商、盗版厂商、消费者及政府政策的影响.研究表明,网络外部性不改变正版厂商和盗版厂商的均衡定价,但提高了厂商的市场覆盖率,使厂商利润和社会福利增加.研究还表明,网络外部性会影响政府反盗版监管政策的实施效果,使反盗版的难度增加、成本上升,并加大了使盗版厂商退出市场所需的最小监管力度.政府在制定反盗版政策时应考虑网络效应对市场及政策实施的影响.     

竞争盗版市场下的信息产品定价与盗版防御策略研究

以竞争的信息产品盗版市场为研究背景,从消费者效用函数出发,通过建立两阶段博弈模型分析了正版厂商的反盗版努力和政府的知识产权保护状况对正版厂商的定价策略和盗版防御策略选择的影响.研究表明:反映政府知识产权保护程度的盗版成本系数和盗版质量是影响正版厂商定价与盗版防范策略的重要因素.关于取不同的数值区间时,正版厂商的盗版防范策略各不相同.     

进入管制与产品质量

本文分析了政府进入管制对厂商最优质量水平及市场平均质量水平的影响。在模型中 ,消费者对产品质量的主观推断存在误差 ,而产品需求在短期内保持稳定。财政收入最大化政府设置行政性进入壁垒并对非法进入者进行惩罚。因而 ,非法进入者虽然可以以冒牌的方式进入行业或市场 ,但有面临被处罚的可能性。分析结果表明 ,政府一定有动力实施管制 ,且将查处的力度确定如此水平 ,使得冒牌厂商“打而不死” ;此时 ,市场平均质量水平则低于或等于无管制情形。本文的分析还表明 ,在位厂商和非法进入者的均衡质量水平均与管制力度呈负相关关系。     

消费者与仿冒侵权产品关系的商业伦理分析

本研究发现,消费者对于仿冒侵权的态度、伦理信念与仿冒品购买意向显著相关,关系品质对消费者仿冒侵权的态度、消费伦理信念与仿冒品购买意向有调节作用。本文丰富了从消费者伦理角度研究商业伦理的议题,增强了政府、企业与反仿冒团体干预消费者购买仿冒品意向的能力。     

基于战略性进入壁垒的企业应对策略研究

进入壁垒使得新进入市场的厂商必须承担一些在位厂商并不承担的成本。在位厂商有意识地利用低价格、过度生产能力设计、“抢占”手段等战略行为来构筑战略性进入壁垒。应对战略性进入壁垒,我国企业可采取协同竞争策略、产品差别化策略、利用“搭便车”效应和垂直约束策略。     

以博弈论观点看汽车市场价格管理

中国加入WTO后，汽车行业的竞争日趋激烈，各大汽车厂商面对竞争在汽车市场销售方面采取的价格策略各不相同，经销商之间的价格竞争也越演越烈。拟从经济学中的博弈论观点阐述如何进行有效的汽车市场价格管理。     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

风险资本契约价格与市场均衡理论研究

文章从风险资本价格机制的研究角度,依据契约理论提出了风险资本契约价格概念,并进一步探讨了风险资本市场均衡过程中价格的微观作用机制(价格从非均衡趋向均衡过程中,参与主体的博弈)和宏观作用机制(不同均衡价格水平下,市场总收益的变动趋势).为参与主体面临市场现行价格采取主动应对策略及政府面对市场不同博弈状态制定旨在提高市场总体收益水平和资源配置效率的有效政策制定了具体操作原则.     

企业差异化战略对价格和质量竞争博弈均衡解的影响研究

消费者在购买商品时不仅考虑商品价格而且还要考虑商品质量水平的需求市场,如果存在两寡头企业提供某商品,必然会导致价格和质量的竞争博弈。本文研究表明:为了达到纳什均衡状态,两企业必须采取一定的差异化策略。而且在均衡状态下,如果市场是价格敏感市场,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者都越有利;如果市场是质量敏感市场,当敏感程度相对很低时,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者也都越有利;当敏感程度一般时企业可选择适当的差异化程度使得企业和消费者同时达到最大的均衡利润;但当敏感度非常高,企业差异化程度越高对企业的均衡利润越大,可对消费者的均衡利润却越小。     

反倾销政策工具下市场均衡价格分析

成本优势是获取垄断利润的主要因素,政府政策介入会改变企业的成本优势,从而改变市场的均衡价格。不同的反倾销和补贴政策影响市场均衡价格和均衡利润的变化,反倾销税和价格承诺能削弱外国企业成本优势,降低对进口产品的需求,导致市场均衡价格上升;反倾销税使外国出口企业利润水平降低,一定程度会引致外国企业直接投资,价格承诺使外国企业完全保留了因提高价格所带来的利润;生产补贴降低了国内企业的边际成本,导致市场均衡价格下降,提高了国内企业的利润,但却减少了政府收入。采取适度的反倾销政策和补贴政策可以使国内外厂商的利润保持在竞争性利润水平上,进口国的利益目标应该是对本国消费者提供更低价格商品的基础上保护本国企业的利益。     

Inequality,public good provision and the composition of trade

This paper investigates the effect of trade liberalization on the provision of public goods and shows that inequality also plays a vital role here. Public goods help enhance the productivity of firms, lower prices and raise profitability. The provision of public goods has different effects in closed and open economies. In an open economy, the impact of productive spending on increasing profit is stronger. Consequently, the opening up of the economy shifts the benefits of productive public goods from consumers to firms. As the median voters’, share of the firm’s profit rises, public goods become more appealing and flourish. Consequently, the manufacturing export is boosted by a rise in productivity.     

Chinese competition and product variety of Indian firms

Using detailed firm-product-year data across manufacturing industries in India, and exploiting the exogenous nature of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, we investigate the link between the impact of import penetration from China on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. We find: (i) robust and significant effects of product drop, with the effect coming only from competitive pressure in the domestic market; (ii) robust evidence of product drop or ‘creative destruction’ only for firms belonging to the lower-half of the size distribution; (iii) firms drop their peripheral/marginal products and concentrate on the core ones; and (iv) the result is strongest for firms producing intermediate goods. For an average Indian manufacturing firm, a 10 percentage point increase in India’s Chinese share of imports in the domestic market reduces the product scope of firms by 1.7–4.4%. In contrast, we find positive effects on product scope when firms are importing intermediate goods. We also find evidence of significant productivity effects and within-firm factor reallocation. Our results are consistent to a battery of robustness checks and IV estimation.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

跨国公司全球化生产模式的理论分析——基于行业的视角

本文在迪克希特-斯蒂格里茨(D-S)垄断竞争模型的基础上,建立了一个3×2×2模型,分析了不同行业特性对跨国公司生产模式的影响.结果表明,跨国公司的生产模式和其自身行业特性有很大关系,某一生产环节投资的固定成本越低,跨国公司越倾向于将其转移到低成本国家;东道国市场规模越大,越有利于吸引跨国公司投资;成品的交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向于采取本地组装的生产模式;中间品交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向一体化的生产模式,将中间品和组装放在一起,分散在多国生产.该模型的分析结果和现实情况基本吻合,对分析跨国公司如何在全球组织其生产活动具有很好的解释力.     

MIGRATION AND AGGLOMERATION WITH KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS*

In this paper, a Grossman–Helpman–Romer‐type endogenous growth model is developed that incorporates two regions and mobile workers. While the linkage between final goods firms and intermediate goods firms is strong, the linkage between innovation activities and manufacturing activities is weak in our paper. It is possible for the economy to reach either full agglomeration, partial agglomeration, or segmented agglomeration. We find that mobile workers acquire the highest welfare under full agglomeration. However, under segmented agglomeration, the welfare of skilled workers is not necessarily the lowest.     

要素市场扭曲、资源错置与生产率

要素市场政策扭曲会降低全要素生产率。本文在一个随机动态一般均衡模型框架下,定量考察我国偏向国有企业政策的效率损失。理论模型引入了垄断竞争的中间产品生产企业与内生化的进入退出选择,用不同的全要素生产率增长随机过程,刻画了要素市场面临政策扭曲的国有与私有企业。为了全面反映产业特征,本文用制造业企业微观数据,来校准企业全要素生产率随机增长。通过校准,定量模型表明,源于政策扭曲的资源错置,导致了非常高昂的效率损失。     

Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed

We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality. An MQS restricts the firms׳ quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods. This fuels competition and may therefore deter entry. A certification policy, which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold, does not restrict the firms׳ quality choice. In contrast to an MQS, certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits. We find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small. In that case, certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

公共品供给中的政府责任

在公共品供给中,政府责任是提供它需要并且能够提供的公共品。需要提供的公共品是指在现有的资源技术条件下,达到社会效用最大化所需提供的公共品。能够提供的公共品是指征到拉弗曲线隐含的最大税收量所能提供的公共品。需要并且能够提供的公共品是指需要提供的公共品与能够提供的公共品中量较小的一方。通过比较政府实际提供的公共品与需要并且能够提供的公共品,可以评价政府在这一领域称职与否。     

Does government paternalistic care promote entrepreneurship in China? Evidence from the China Employer-Employee Survey

ABSTRACT

This article examines whether government paternalistic care exerts positive effects on entrepreneurship in China, and the channels through which paternalistic care affects entrepreneurship, using data from the 2015 baseline of the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES). The data suggests that over 70% of manufacturing firms received at least one type of government paternalistic care, though the distributions are different depending on the firm’s size, ownership, industry, firm and entrepreneur’s age. The empirical analysis indicates that government paternalistic care negatively affects entrepreneurship by diminishing innovation capability. Human capital and imported intermediate goods should be the driving forces for a firm’s development, but government paternalistic care has a counterproductive effect on those two factors, thereby impeding entrepreneurship. The results show that those good intentions have gone awry. The government should gradually terminate its paternalistic policies for firms, and firms need to promote their own solid innovation capability.

Abbreviations: CEES: China Employer-Employee Survey SOE: State-owned enterprise