公共产品的提供：一个市场经济的视角

一般认为,私人产品只能由私人提供,公共产品只能由政府提供,这一分析结论所包含的政策含义往往导致公共产品供给决策绝对化和“一刀切”的倾向,把许多行业和商品纳入公共产品范畴由政府垄断性供给,由此导致资源配置效率和使用效率较低。文章对公共产品的界定及提供的理论进行了分析列举,从市场经济的视角讨论公共产品的提供问题,认为公共产品应该引入市场机制进行提供,方能更有效地配置资源。     

基于个人利益视角的美国消防服务供给模式分析

公共产品理论认为公共产品与服务应该由政府垄断提供。但是公共选择学派在理论上的创新以及欧美国家私有化改革实践都证明了公共产品私人供给的可能性。19世纪中期美国消防服务供给模式向市政化演进，是私人利益所致，市政化对包括消防员、保险公司和政治家在内的利益集团都有益处。对中国公共产品供给政策的借鉴和启示：引导社会组织参与公共物品的提供；明确划分各级政府事权范围，并以法律形式确定下来；完善政治决策程序，提高政府服务效率。     

关于农村公共产品问题的研究综述

从消费特性看，农村公共产品的可分为纯公共产品和准公共产品。纯农村公共产品是指在消费过程中具有完全的排他性和非竞争性的产品。如农业基础性研究、重大高新技术研究、大江大河治理、农村生态环境保护、农村基层政府服务等，由于存在消费的非竞争性、非排他性和外溢性，如果通过市场提供就会不可避免地产生“搭便车”或导致“公地的悲剧”，出现市场失灵。所以，这一类纯农村公共产品私人提供往往缺乏效率，应由政府供给。     

我国农村公共产品供给研究观点综述

农村公共产品供给问题是涉及农民增收、农业增产的重大问题。近些年来,我国学者从不同的角度对此问题进行了研究。本文对这些观点综述如下。一、农村公共产品供给制度的变迁改革开放以来,我国农村公共产品供给制度发生了相应变化。张军、何寒熙(1996)认为,农村制度的变迁在为促进农业生产高速增长提供了很强激励的同时,也引致了农村公共产品供给制度的变迁,即由国家财政承担、动员并组织群众以劳代资的供给模式,转变为政府与私人共同承担的农村公共产品供给模式,且私人参与的程度与经济发展水平、农民受教育程度和地方政府参与程度呈正相关…     

试探公共产品最优供给规模及效率的模型与方法——在测度政府层级条件下

借用分级条件下政府供给公共产品最优规模的模型和政府供给公共产品的数据包络分析（DEA）模型，为量化政府供给公共产品的效率提供理论依据；同时，根据IMD测度政府效率的指标体系和国内相关的研究和实践，政府供给公共产品效率分析应采用DEA的方法。     

财政在抗击“非典”中的作用

一、政府抗击“非典”的经济学分析 按照经济学理论,政府和市场调节经济运行的边界划分是,政府提供公共产品,市场提供私人产品。相对于私人产品而言,公共产品特性有三:效用的不可分割性、消费的非竞争性和受益的非排他性。上述三个特性可以满足“纯粹公共产品”概念。对于“纯粹公共产品”,诸如国防、外交等,不能通过市场有效供给,应由政府部门通     

农村公共产品供给问题及其对农业的影响

1．供给总量严重不足。公共产品的非竞争性，非排他性和效用的小可分割性决定了公共产品只能由政府通过财政手段来提供。但由于受到我国纶济发展水平的限制，政府用于提供公共产品的资金十分有限。长期以来，我国又一直实行着重工轻农的政策，形成了城乡分割的二元经济结构。与此相对应，在公共产品供给上义形成了城乡独立的二元供给结构。     

政府公共产品供给能力研究

公共产品是一个与私人产品相对应的概念.公共产品供给作为我国政府的一项基本职能,政府必须帮助公众提供需要的公共产品.建设成为服务型政府是我国政府高效提供公共产品的途径之一.     

论非纯公共产品供给的充分性和公平性

非纯公共产品供给制度的完善既要解决充分供给，又要解决公平分配。充分供给需要在非纯公共产品供给领域引入非政府资本，需要市场力量进入。在这里，私人追求效率的市场性行为必须得到政府追求公平的公共性行为的引导，由此可能既满足公共需求，又能实现社会和谐。     

建立与完善农村公共产品供给机制的政策建议

一、改革地方政府对农村公共产品供给的投融资体制,构建有效的市场化竞争机制。1.在农村公共产品投资领域,地方政府应实行不同的供给机制,对供给领域进行竞争性环节和非竞争性环节的划分。对于竞争性环节,应该引入竞争机制;对于非竞争环节,应该以公共财政(财力)为基础,实行价格听证制度、招投标制度、合同出租等多种方式,由市场形成价格和竞争机制,逐步形成政府机制和市场机制的复合调节、公共部门和私人部门的混合生产,提高公共产品的资源配置效率。2.形成多样化的农村公共产品筹资机制,引入市场经济运行的法则为公共产品筹资提供丰富的选…     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

Consumer welfare from publicly supplemented private goods: age and income effects on demand for health care

In spite of major advances in the theoretical, positive and normative, literature analysing the welfare implications of public provision of private goods, empirical investigation is often limited to contingent valuation studies, for example, of health care programmes. In this article we argue that when a market for a (subsidised or free of charge) publicly provided good exists, a consumer demand approach can be used to construct a money metric of welfare corresponding to the consumption of public provision. We illustrate this approach in investigating age and income effects on household demand for health care in Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and those entitled to it often resort to private supplementation. Our findings suggest that the money metric of welfare, which consumers attach to free access to publicly provided health care, varies with age and to a lesser extent with household income.     

On the private provision of fiat currency

This paper considers whether fiat money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential. Two questions arise concerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for fiat currency is suboptimal.     

融资激励和融资约束对PPP模式下公共产品提供效率的影响——基于不完全契约理论的一般均衡分析

通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。     

Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

Group size paradox and public goods

In an economy with voluntarily provided public goods and private product varieties, and a general class of CES preferences, it is shown that aggregate public good contribution follows an inverted-U pattern with respect to group size when private and public goods are substitutable in preferences. With complementarity, however, aggregate provision grows monotonically with group size.     

Does Government Expenditure Crowd Out Private Consumption in Italy? Evidence from a Microeconomic Model

An abnormal expansion of the public sector may create serious problems to the market economy, as the literature suggests. This issue is quite important in countries such as Italy where the size of the public sector and of its debt are quite relevant. In this paper a model, in the microeconomic tradition, is developed and applied to the italian economy using a quite general utility function to represent consumer's behaviour. The aim of the article is to set up a methological framework in which to test for the hypothesis that the provision of public and impure public goods crowds out private consumption. The main result of the analysis is that, in Italy, traditional public goods play a neutral role in expenditure decisions while impure public goods crowd out private consumption. This crowding out is created by over-production of these services; merit goods are direct complements to a wide range of private goods, but this beneficial effect is more than offset by the negative income effect related to their financing.     

Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government consumption

In this paper, we investigate the relation between public and private consumption, by constructing a general government spending data set, by function, for 12 European countries. In particular, we split government consumption into two categories. The first category—“public goods”—includes defence, public order, and justice. The second category—“merit goods”—includes health, education, and other services that could have been provided privately. Equations from a relatively general permanent income model are estimated by GMM. The estimates are fairly robust in showing that public goods substitute while merit goods complement private consumption. However, the relation between merit goods and private goods turns out to be stronger than that between public goods and private goods. Thus, in the aggregate government and private consumption are complements.