The social media faces of major global financial service brands

With the advent of social media, brand management has become not only more difficult, but also increasingly critical to the credibility and reputation of firms. Moreover, consumer-generated content and its rapid diffusion takes control over advertising-intended messages away from brand managers. Financial services brand managers will not fully be able to control the destinies of their brands, but at the very least they need to be involved in the conversations that speak about their brand. This article suggests a powerful analytical tool Chernoff Faces, which can add to financial service brand managers’ arsenal.     

Should you take your brand to where the action is?

When markets turn hostile, it's no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically--that is, to take their brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but actually essential to survival--even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But beware: leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. In general, David Aaker recommends that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. Still, certain situations demand vertical extensions, and Aaker examines both the winners and the losers in the game. Managers may find themselves facing a situation that presents both an emerging opportunity and a strategic threat, and alternatives to vertical extensions may have even higher risks and costs. Furthermore, a number of brands have been extended vertically with complete success. If after assessing the risks and rewards you conclude that a vertical extension is on the horizon, proceed with caution. And keep in mind that your challenge will be to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.     

Three questions you need to ask about your brand

Traditionally, the people responsible for positioning brands have concentrated on the differences that set each brand apart from the competition. But emphasizing differences isn't enough to sustain a brand against competitors. Managers should also consider the frame of reference within which the brand works and the features the brand shares with other products. Asking three questions about your brand can help: HAVE WE ESTABLISHED A FRAME?: A frame of reference--for Coke, it might be as narrow as other colas or as broad as all thirst-quenching drinks--signals to consumers the goal they can expect to achieve by using a brand. Brand managers need to pay close attention to this issue, in some cases expanding their focus in order to preempt the competition. ARE WE LEVERAGING OUR POINTS OF PARITY?: Certain points of parity must be met if consumers are to perceive your product as a legitimate player within its frame of reference. For instance, consumers might not consider a bank truly a bank unless it offers checking and savings plans. ARE THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE COMPELLING?: A distinguishing characteristic that consumers find both relevant and believable can become a strong, favorable, unique brand association, capable of distinguishing the brand from others in the same frame of reference. Frames of reference, points of parity, and points of difference are moving targets. Maytag isn't the only dependable brand of appliance, Tide isn't the only detergent with whitening power, and BMWs aren't the only cars on the road with superior handling. The key questions you need to ask about your brand may not change, but their context certainly will. The saviest brand positioners are also the most vigilant.     

Brand value accounting: an international comparison of perceived managerial implications

Data concerned with the managerial implications of brand value accounting were collected from accountants and marketing managers working in strongly branded companies in New Zealand (N.Z.), the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.). Since the external reporting climate in the U.S. prohibits the inclusion of brand value as a separate asset in the published balance sheet, it was anticipated that U.S. managers would be the least positively disposed to the potential of beneficial managerial implications deriving from brand valuation. Contrary to this expectation, managers in the U.K are the least positively disposed to potential managerial implications associated with brand value accounting. This result is particularly interesting as brand value accounting has commanded considerable attention from the U.K. accounting profession since the late 1980s when several large U.K. companies elected to capitalize brand values in their external financial statements. In addition to the international differences noted, the degree of commonality of findings across the three countries is also noteworthy. The data reported provide strong support for the view that there is considerable potential for positive managerial implications from brand value accounting.     

Building brands without mass media

Costs, market fragmentation, and new media channels that let customers bypass advertisements seem to be in league against the old ways of marketing. Relying on mass media campaigns to build strong brands may be a thing of the past. Several companies in Europe, making a virtue of necessity, have come up with alternative brand-building approaches and are blazing a trail in the post-mass-media age. In England, Nestlé's Buitoni brand grew through programs that taught the English how to cook Italian food. The Body Shop garnered loyalty with its support of environmental and social causes. Cadbury funded a theme park tied to its history in the chocolate business. H?agen-Dazs opened posh ice-cream parlors and got itself featured by name on the menus of fine restaurants. Hugo Boss and Swatch backed athletic or cultural events that became associated with their brands. The various campaigns shared characteristics that could serve as guidelines for any company hoping to build a successful brand: senior managers were closely involved with brand-building efforts; the companies recognized the importance of clarifying their core brand identity; and they made sure that all their efforts to gain visibility were tied to that core identity. Studying the methods of companies outside one's own industry and country can be instructive for managers. Pilot testing and the use of a single and continuous measure of brand equity also help managers get the most out of novel approaches in their ever more competitive world.     

If brands are built over years, why are they managed over quarters?

Brands are on the wane. Many consumer-goods companies blame the big-box discount retailers, but the Wharton School's Leonard Lodish and the Fuqua School's Carl Mela have a different explanation. Their research suggests that companies have damaged their brands by investing too much in short-term price promotions and too little in long-term brand building. To rescue their brands and increase profitability, corporate managers must arm themselves with long-term measures of brand performance and use them to make smarter marketing decisions. Several factors explain the short-sightedness of brand management: the increased availability of weekly, or even hourly, scanner data, which show a clear link between discounts and immediate boosts in sales; the relative difficulty of measuring the effects of advertising, new-product development, and distribution--all of which can contribute to a brand's long-term health; the short tenure of most brand managers; and the near-term orientation of Wall Street analysts. Although discounts do increase sales in the short-term, they ultimately lower profit margins. If a product is often discounted, consumers learn to buy it only when it's on sale. Moreover, when one firm increases its discounts, others usually follow suit, lowering everyone's margins. Executives can monitor a brand's long-term performance by watching a dashboard of measures. Only after examining such measures, for example, did managers at Clorox discover that the company's heavy discounting and decreased advertising had caused a steady decline in overall bleach sales and profit margins. In response, Clorox reduced discounting and increased television advertising, moves that ultimately strengthened the brand and reversed the firm's downward trends.     

Customer-centered brand management

Most executives today agree that their efforts should be focused on growing the lifetime value of their customers. Yet few companies have come to terms with the implications of that idea for their marketing management. Oldsmobile, for example, enjoyed outstanding brand equity with many customers through the 1980s. But as the century wore further on, the people who loved the Olds got downright old. So why did General Motors spend so many years and so much money trying to reposition and refurbish the tired,tarnished brand? Why didn't GM managers instead move younger buyers along a path of less resistance, toward another of the brands in GM's stable--or even launch a wholly new brand geared to their tastes? Catering to new customers, even at the expense of the brand, would surely have been the path to profits. The reason, argue the authors, is that in large consumer-goods companies like General Motors, brands are the raison d'etre. They are the focus of decision making and the basis of accountability. But this overwhelming focus on growing brand equity is inconsistent with the goal of growing customer equity. Drawing on a wide range of current examples, the authors offer seven tactics that will put brands in the service of growing customer equity. These include replacing traditional brand managers with a new position--the customer segment manager; targeting brands to as narrow an audience as possible; developing the capability and the mind-set to hand off customers from one brand to another within the company; and changing the way brand equity is measured by basing calculations on individual, rather than average, customer data.     

Brand positioning in financial services: A longitudinal test to find the best brand position

Brand positioning is a core activity of most marketing departments. In this paper, the relationship between six different positions and customer vulnerability is tested over time in the business financial services market. Two particular attributes relating to fees and charges and relationship/service were found to have strong relationships with customer vulnerability, both across brands and over time. This research suggests that the ’better‘ brand positions, as defined here, can be common across brands. Therefore, marketing managers of financial services should perhaps not be striving for a unique position for the brand, but aim for distinctiveness in the way the position is communicated. Research techniques to identify ’better‘ positions should also not assume that these ’better‘ positions will be those that differentiate between brands.     

Building a Bridge between Marketing and Finance

Corporate finance executives are often frustrated by spending proposals from their marketing colleagues but cannot seem to be able to quantify the putative benefits. Similarly, the marketing staff is frustrated by the finance team's inability to convert soft marketing metrics, such as “awareness” and “customer satisfaction” into financial forecasts. The challenge is that neither marketers nor finance executives have been able to articulate a single analytical framework which both explains how and why brands come to flourish or flounder and how brand growth contributes to the business's short and long term bottom line. Lacking an effective way to do this now, most managers default to using the hard data they do have, namely how marketing investment is likely to impact sales this quarter and next. This reinforces the widespread focus on quarterly EPS and reduces the perceived value of the marketing department to their ability to hit three month sales targets. This degraded view of marketing's contribution and the inability to link “soft” marketing metrics to longer term financial returns impedes building long‐term brand value. This article focuses on how advances in behavioral science and financial analytics offer an effective way to bridge this gap between marketing and finance. Building that bridge requires better measures of brand health and financial performance to allocate capital and marketing resources. Undoubtedly, brand building is both an art and a science. But, the finance people can develop an evidence‐based framework explaining how some of the “softer” investments such as brand building, contribute to the value of the firm.     

The magic of branding: The role of ‘pledge’, ‘turn’ and ‘prestige’ in fostering consumer trust in financial services

The purpose of this article is to study the impact of brand image on consumer trust through empirical investigation in the context of the financial services sector. While trust helps to bind consumers to brands, a strong brand image works like magic in reducing consumers’ risk perception and promoting trust. This study analyses how brand image influences consumers’ trusting intention through operationalising an interdisciplinary brand-trust model. Constructs and measures were drawn from interdisciplinary brand and trust literature and tested through employing EFA, CFA and structural equation modelling. Data were collected through a quantitative survey of 300 financial services consumers. Using the analogy of a magic trick, the study unveils the key role of financial services branding in engendering consumer trust in the ‘pledge’ or ‘prestige’ parts of the trick but not in the ‘turn’. The research contributes to the convergent and mutually inclusive theories of trust and branding as well as services marketing literature. For managers and policymakers in the financial services sector the findings will help them to effectively manage brand image and foster consumers’ trusting intention.     

Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains or Scapegoats?

In this article, we provide evidence concerning the extent to which managers are to blame when their firms become bankrupt. We study a sample of firms that file for Chapter 11 and determine the actions taken by the firms' managers during the three-year period before the filing. We compare the sample with a control sample of firms that performed better. We suggest that the comparison provides evidence on the way managers act as their firms sink into financial trouble and whether financial distress is the result of incompetence or excessively self-serving managerial decisions or due to factors outside of management's control. We find that managers of the Chapter 11 firms and the control firms make very similar decisions and that, on average, neither set of managers is perceived to be taking value-reducing actions. These results do not change when we control for managerial turnover or managerial ownership. We also find that when managers are replaced in firms that eventually file for Chapter 11 protection, the market does not respond positively, regardless of whether the new managers are from inside or outside the firm. Our findings suggest that when managers are blamed for financial distress, they are serving as scapegoats.     

Independent financial adviser (IFA)-based brand equity pyramid

This paper aims to evaluate the applicability of the existing brand equity pyramid models in the context of independent financial advisers (IFAs) in the UK financial services sector. Nine in-depth interviews with IFAs and nine in-depth corroboration interviews with senior marketing managers and employees in one of the UK’s largest financial services providers were undertaken for the purpose of the study. The findings indicate that when applied in the context of IFAs, the existing brand equity pyramid models require modification. These findings lead to the development of an IFA-based brand equity pyramid. The new model can provide insight for financial services marketing academics and practitioners on how IFAs perceive and evaluate financial services brands to be recommended to their customers. Our findings will help financial services providers to develop strong brands in the mind of IFAs.

     

公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于A股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究

上市公司是否自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告,不仅取决于公司自身的披露动机,而且取决于审计师是否愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告。本文利用沪深两市上市公司在2008—2009年年报中自愿披露内部控制鉴证信息所带来的研究机会,实证考察了内部控制鉴证报告这一特殊的自愿信息披露行为的决定因素。研究发现,降低代理冲突和传递信号不仅是上市公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的主要动机,而且是其自愿提高鉴证信息披露质量(扩大鉴证范围和提高保证程度)的主要动机;审计师声誉越高,越不愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告和为公司的内部控制提供高程度保证;大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突以及内部控制质量会显著影响审计师对鉴证风险水平的评估,进而影响内部控制鉴证报告的鉴证范围和保证程度。     

Brand Equity and Firm Risk: An Empirical Investigation in an Emerging Market

The aim of this article is to investigate the relationship between brand equity and firm risk in Turkey using a sample of 254 firm-year observations for the period 2009–2014. Our findings suggest that brand equity is an important determinant of equity risk in addition to conventional firm-specific variables. In particular, after controlling for firm-specific variables, the results reveal that firms with high brand equity experience lower volatility in stock returns. We also find that enhancing brand equity is an important tool for firms in reducing unsystematic and downside systematic risk in their stock prices. Our findings are robust to different valuation models of domestic and global investors as well as different methods of estimations. The results are encouraging for both marketing managers and investors, particularly those in emerging markets where stock price volatility is relatively higher than in developed markets.     

Outcome effect, controllability and performance evaluation of managers: some field evidence from multi-outlet businesses

This field study provides evidence of the outcome effect in performance evaluations of managers in an organization. Specifically, in a retail chain, subjective evaluations of store managers by their supervisors were negatively impacted by unfavorable outcome knowledge. As expected, outcome determinants over which the managers have control influence their performance evaluations and environmental determinants of outcome over which they have no control do not influence their evaluations. However, unexpectedly, central management determinants of outcome over which the managers have no control also influence their evaluations. After these outcome determinants are considered, we find evidence of an outcome effect since failure of the store to meet its target outcome results in a more negative performance evaluation of the managers. Also, the extent to which store managers' evaluations are prone to the outcome effect is not contingent on the measure of the outcome used.     

The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors

We examine the selection and termination of investment management firms by 3,400 plan sponsors between 1994 and 2003. Plan sponsors hire investment managers after large positive excess returns but this return-chasing behavior does not deliver positive excess returns thereafter. Investment managers are terminated for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to underperformance. Excess returns after terminations are typically indistinguishable from zero but in some cases positive. In a sample of round-trip firing and hiring decisions, we find that if plan sponsors had stayed with fired investment managers, their excess returns would be no different from those delivered by newly hired managers. We uncover significant variation in pre- and post-hiring and firing returns that is related to plan sponsor characteristics.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

Saving your rookie managers from themselves

Most organizations promote employees into managerial positions based on their technical competence. But very often, that kind of competence does not translate into good managerial performance. Many rookie managers fail to grasp how their roles have changed: that their jobs are no longer about personal achievement but about enabling others to achieve, that sometimes driving the bus means taking a backseat, and that building a team is often more important than cutting a deal. Even the best employees have trouble adjusting to these new realities, and that trouble can be exacerbated by the normal insecurities that may make rookie managers hesitant to ask for help. The dynamic unfolds something like this: As rookie managers internalize their stress, their focus, too, becomes increasingly internal. They become insecure and self-focused and cannot properly support their teams. Invariably, trust breaks down, staff members become alienated, and productivity suffers. In this article, coach and management consultant Carol Walker, who works primarily with rookie managers and their supervisors, addresses the five problem areas that rookie managers typically face: delegating, getting support from senior staffers, projecting confidence, thinking strategically, and giving feedback. You may think these elements sound like Management 101, and you'd be right, Walker writes. But these basic elements are also what trip up most managers in the early stages of their careers (and even, she admits, throughout their careers). The bosses of rookie managers have a responsibility to anticipate and address these problems; not doing so will hurt the rookie, the boss, and the company overall.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Payout policy, capital structure, and compensation contracts when managers value control

The optimal contract between managers and investors is endogenouslyderived when managers have preferences for both monetary compensationand corporate resources under their control. When the optimalpayout is privately known to managers, they can be induced tomake payouts by linking their compensation to the payout. Publicequity is a claim on this discretionary payout. If investorscan obtain new information about the firm's optimal payout level,it can be utilized by transferring the control from managementto investors. The new information allows the firm to achievea more efficient allocation through recontracting. We show thatthe new information will be obtained if and only if the payoutfalls below a promised level