制度互补与电力市场化改革

我国电力改革选择了从发电环节的改革开始，经重组国家电力公司、实行厂网分离，到实行电价改革的渐进式策略。这一策略虽然因其速度缓慢、终端用户无法分享改革利益而备受批评，但它使社会付出了较低的“无序成本”。随着供求关系的缓解．电力产业应强化制度互补作用，尽快改变改革在发电、输电、配电、售电各个环节之间进展不平衡的状况，着力实现配电和售电分离。在售电环节引入竞争机制．探索与市场化改革相适应的监管体制和交易方式，解决电源结构不合理、电力发电输电配电效率低、负外部性等深层次问题，最终建立有效监管的电力市场．使市场在电力资源的配置上发挥更大作用。     

天然气行业迎来改革历史节点

<正>根据通知要求,油、气、电等能源产品均会在"十三五"期间实现市场化改革,价格或将全面放开。"十三五"注定是国内全面深化改革的历史节点。根据2015年10月国务院下发的《关于推进价格机制改革的若干意见》,到2017年,竞争性领域和环节价格将基本放开,政府定价范围主要限定在重要公用事业、公益性服务、网络型自然垄断环节;到2020年,市场决定价格机制基本完善,科学、规范、透明的价格监管制度和反垄断执法体系基本建立,价格调控机制基本健全。根     

也谈石油行业的竞争与重组

判断垄断与否不能简单地根据企业规模和市场份额指标，市场效果最终要看企业行为对消费者利益的影响。石油行业是政府监管下的竞争性行业，是上下游一体化的大型跨国企业和小型专业企业并存的行业。我国石油天然气行业的市场组织特点是，资源和市场的区域性分割与局部过度竞争并存，主要原因是受政策和体制因素的影响。提高我国石油企业的竞争力要靠改进管理体制而不是扩大规模。石油石化企业进一步重组应明确几个问题：(1)做大不等于做强，重组应以效率为目标；(2)要首先将企业改革为真正的企业；(3)市场制度建设要先行；(4)下一轮重组应是企业市场行为而不是政府行政行为。健全石油工业管理体制和有序引入竞争应是今后石油天然气工业改革和重组的重点。政府要建立国家能源管理体制，实行石油战略管理；建立市场准入制度．严格执法；针对石油行业制定有关促进竞争和反垄断的政策；在自然垄断环节实行政府规制；进行石油市场供求信息服务；根据上下游各环节的技术经济特点，采取不同的监管机制。     

科技部部长朱丽兰表示我国积极支持高新企业上创业板

科技部部长朱丽兰日前指出，“十五”期间，我国将积极支持高技术企业进入股票市场、特别是创业板市场融资。 　　朱丽兰说，“十五”期间，要建立和完善风险投资机制，要健全中小科技企业贷款担保机制，鼓励金融部门加大对科技创新的持续投入，形成新的多元化的科技投融资机制。要进一步完善科研条件保障体系。政府应继续通过政策引导，使企业真正成为科技开发的主体。改革政府科技投资机制，提高科技经费的使用效率，用好已经成立或准备的各项基金；同时，要推进科技项目招投标和科技评估制度，继续改革科技成果鉴定办法，实行新的评估、…     

对水务公司进行经济监管的国际惯例

目前我国很多地方政府决定将一向由国有资本垄断的公用事业向外资和民营资本开放，这增加了公用事业的融资渠道，但同时也带来了监管的压力，本文探讨国际上对水务公司监管的理论，文中详细分析了监管的原因，市场结构，规则制定及机构的选择。     

激发内生活力

十八届三中全会的胜利召开，开启了我国全面深化改革的大幕。在新的历史起点上，中央经济工作会议提出“坚持稳中求进、改革创新”，保持经济合理增长区间，着力激发市场活力；全国城镇化工作会议提出“推进以人为核心的城镇化”，使城镇化成为一个顺势而为、水到渠成的发展过程；加快淘汰落后产能。大力培育战略性新兴产业；加快国有企业股权多元化改革，探索“以管资本为主加强国有资产监管”的新模式和新方法；推出不动产统一登记制度，进一步取消和下放审批事项，逐步向“负面清单”管理迈进，扩大民间投资领域，加快利率市场化步伐，打造中国经济“升级版”的一系列战略部署、提高发展“含金量”的一系列行动举措，都在不断释放着改革的红利。     

民资入电：雾里看花

背景：5月13日,中国政府网发布了《国务院关于鼓励和引导民间投资健康发展的若干意见》。意见鼓励和引导民间资本进入基础产业和基础设施、市政公用事业和政策性住房建设、社会事业、金融服务等领域。意见明确提出,规范设置投资准入门槛,创造公平竞争、平等准入的市场环境。意见提出,鼓励民间资本参与电力建设。鼓励民间资本参与风能、太阳能、地热能、生物质能等新能源产业建设。支持民间资本以独资、控股或参股形式参与水电站、火电站建设,参股建设核电站。进一步放开电力市场,积极推进电价改革。加快推行竞价上网,推行项目业主招标,完善电力监管制度,为民营发电企业平等参与竞争创造良好环境。     

垄断行业的准入与改革

2005年，国务院发布了“关于鼓励支持和引导个体私营等非公有制经济发展的若干意见”（以下简称“36条”），其中关于放开市场准入的问题，引起了广泛的关注。文件规定，允许非公有资本进入法律法规未规定不准进入的行业和领域，允许非公有资本进入电力、电信、铁路、民航、石油等垄断行业、参与公用事业和基础设施的投资，在加强立法、严格监管、有效防范金融风险的前提下，允许非公有资本进入金融服务业和按规定参与军工科研生产任务的竞争以及军工企业的改组改制等。     

创新工程造价监管

正本文围绕工程造价制度改革和市场监管主题,论述了推进工程造价制度改革、加强和改善市场监管是推进供给侧结构性改革、适应科技革命和产业变革新趋势的迫切需要,加强政府投资工程造价服务、开展工程造价信息监测、建立工程造价监测指数指标、规范计价软件市场是未来完善监管市场的重要手段。     

开源和节流并重:我国油气资源可持续发展战略思考

我国油气资源可持续发展的战略方针，应当是坚持开源与节流并重。其中，勘探开发战略应实行陆海并举，油气并举，“引进来”．“走出去”并举。在油气开发利用中要改“有水快流”为“有水长流”，推进结构调整和技术改造，建立合理开发和有效利用相结合的节；由型经济。国家在宏观调控上应从主要依靠行政手段转变为着力健全法律法规，加强依法监管和政策调控，建立起有效规范和引导全社会开源节流的宏观体制环境。     

The Australian antitrust law after 20 years — a stocktake

The Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 is a court-centered law of the American type. After 20 years it has much to its credit — the abandonment of cartelization and the achievement of a coherent body of antitrust law focused upon market power as the central concept. The law has some distinctive features: the approach to market definition; the possibility of authorization on grounds of public benefit; the treatment of verticals. The challenge now is to expose the exempt sectors to the Act and to design a compatible regime for the corporatized and privatized utilities.     

The Role of Competition in Natural Monopoly: Costs, Public Ownership, and Regulation

Conventional policy for industries with very high economies of scale is to permit monopoly but to subject it to regulation or public ownership. Since the latter may not result in cost minimization, however, it is possible that competition, by forcing firms to operate at the cost frontier, may be less costly despite sacrificing some scale economies. The paper sets out the relevant analytical considerations, estimates a cost function for electric distribution utilities in the U.S., and tests for the relative costs of monopoly and duopoly utilities. Among other notable findings, it concludes that competition does indeed lower net costs.     

Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation

Restructuring of wholesale electricity markets in the U.S. has brought new institutions known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Market Monitoring Institutions (MMI) that oversee competition in the energy markets that they operate. Both regulators and external observers have viewed MMIs as impartial observers intended to police these exchanges against the exercise of market power. The economics of regulation generally questions (but does not always reject) public interest interpretations on grounds that interest groups use politics and regulatory procedure to shape institutions to their advantage. MMIs in fact originated as a strategic move by California’s large utilities in connection with that state’s restructuring, intended to advantage them against competitors. The responses of MMIs to the economically efficient practice of “virtual bidding” in RTOs differed with the relative strengths of different interests in the governance of those organizations. As policy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should re-examine its endorsement of MMIs and consider centralizing their functions.     

Competition Policy under Laissez-Faireism: Market Power and its Treatment in Hong Kong

The paper describes the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong: how it came into existence, what business practices are prohibited, and how the enforcement system works. Recent cases in the telecommunications industry are used to illustrate the sectoral approach, a unique feature of Hong Kong's competition policy. We argue that a sectoral approach faces two fundamental drawbacks. First, due to having different ``rules of the game' for different sectors, the allocation of resources may be distorted in the long run. Second, since the relevant regulatory agencies perform dual roles both as competition policy enforcer and as traditional regulator of natural monopolies, the impartiality of their competition decisions may not be credibly conveyed to the public. We also address other specific problems associated with the sectoral approach, such as the exclusion of structural issues, narrow coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. We conclude that an overall competition law can better promote competition and economic efficiency in Hong Kong.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

放松规制后电力企业技术创新与制度激励研究

分析了在放松规制的环境下,电力企业进行技术创新所面临的市场及制度环境,并剖析了造成企业技术创新困境的制度原因。为了激励电力企业进行技术创新,实现企业绩效与社会福利的双赢,本文从促进市场化及加强规制者可信性承诺两方面提出了政策建议。     

市场结构范式的标准与构建措施

市场结构理论是整个经济学的构筑要件与基础。在熊彼特淋淳尽致地批驳了完全竞争模式的子虚乌有和容易感染经济萧条的霉菌的特点以后，各种市场结构模式的缺陷暴露无遗，经济研究进入了无所适从的艰难时期，经济实践也陷入了盲人瞎马的混乱局面和夜半临池的危险境地。所以，建设市场结构范式是经济学的当务之急。本文试图通过一系列的反垄断把垄断改造成为市场结构范式。     

War die Strommarkt-Liberalisierung in Deutschland bisher ein Flop?

By observing the last 10 years of power market reform in Germany, this paper challenges the public view that the first Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) from 1998 had less impact on market liberalization than the second EnWG from 2005. According to the author, the opposite is true, at least in the power sector, if traditional competition indicators such as efficiency of the sector, institutional changes and electricity prices are taken as reference. While the first EnWG had changed much in the direction of liberalization and competition, progress since 2005 is rather slow — with the exception of the number of supplier shifts on the retail level and the installation of a regulation authority. The discrepancies between reality and public perception claim for a sound theoretical analysis, from which conclusions can be drawn concerning the further direction of the electricity market regulation.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

美国的电力监管政策

在电力市场化改革进程中,美国的电力工业政策是引入竞争而不是放松管制,依靠竞争和监管来确保电力批发市场的公平和合理的价格。充裕的能源基础设施能够提供稳定的电力供给并且支持竞争性的电力市场。竞争与有效监管并行,能够为国家和社会公众带来最大的利益。美国联邦能源监管委员会通过利用国会赋予的更为广泛的监管手段确保电力批发市场运转良好。