财政支出和经济增长的关系——对山东省16市面板数据的实证分析

本文在对财政支出对经济增长影响的文献综述分析基础上,构建一个解释经济增长的理论框架,建立2个计量模型,通过对山东省16市从2000年-2006年的面板数据进行实证分析,研究了规模以上固定资产投资总额、人均年消费性支出以及净出口等因素尤其是财政支出对经济增长的影响。得出在经济转型时期,人均消费和财政的购买性支出对经济增长的贡献突出,而转移性支出作用比较不明显。由此,提出应加强财政制度的建设,同时重视并发挥好财政支出中转移性支出功能的建议。     

香河县财政集中支付中心对预算单位的财会管理

河北省香河县财政集中支付中心近年来对县直属单位实行财政集中支付,在运作过程中,坚持“三个不予支付”的原则,即:凡支出的内容、款项与预算不符者不予支付,从而强化了预算约束;凡不符合政策规定的开支不予支付,从而堵塞了各种漏洞;凡票据不规范的不予支付,对减少和控制财政支出漏洞、源头预防治理腐败,提高财政支出的使用效益起到了积极的作用。     

腐败侵蚀与财政支出扭曲

采用1995—2006年中国大陆省级面板数据,实证检验腐败对中国财政支出规模和结构的影响。研究发现:腐败激励了财政支出规模的膨胀,促使支出结构变形;腐败显著地推高了经济建设支出的比重,但降低了社会文教支出的比重。     

香河县财政集中支付中心对预算单位的财会管理

河北省香河县财政集中支付中心近年来对县直属单位实行财政集中支付，在运作过程中，坚持“三个不予支付”的原则，即：凡支出的内容、款项与预算不符者不予支付，从而强化了预算约束；凡不符合政策规定的开支不予支付，从而堵塞了各种漏洞；凡票据不规范的不予支付，对减少和控制财政支出漏洞、源头预防治理腐败，提高财政支出的使用效益起到了积极的作用。     

浅谈国库集中支付制度存在的问题和对策

国库集中支付制度改革不仅是我国财政支出管理制度改革的重要内容,也是我国建立公共财政框架的重要组成部分。在收入增长一定规模的前提下,国库集中支付制度在我国的经济改革和发展中正起着越来越大的作用,所以说加强支出体制方面的改革显得尤为重要。当前财政支出体制滞后,存在预算编制方法不规范、预算执行不严肃、资金使用监督不力等问题,推行国库集中支付制度改革是解决当前支出管理问题的一项关键措施。     

均等化转移支付与地方财政行为激励初探

中国目前地区财力的巨大差异,客观上要求稳步提高均等化财政转移支付规模,而现行财政预算体制对地方政府的财政行为约束相对有限.本文在地方政府内生化财政选择背景下考察了均等化转移支付制度对地方财政行为的激励效应.研究发现,转移支付总体上对提高落后地区人均财力有积极作用,但在一定程度上也降低了地方的征税积极性,另外,转移支付规模扩大可能助长了地方财政支出更加偏向于行政性支出.本文认为政府间财政分配体制的可持续发展,需要完善对地方征税行为和地方公共品供给结构优化的激励机制.     

财政支出与收入分配相关问题浅析

改革开放以来，我国经济实现了前所未有的持续高速增长，但同时也出现了严重的收入不均问题。从收入与分配的视角看，虽然公共支出也出现了大幅的增长，但公共支出的收入分配调节职能并没有得到很好的发挥。根据我国目前的实际情况，可以将现有单一的纵向转移支付模式改为以纵向为主、横向为辅的纵横交错的转移支付模式。这种做法既有利于实现国家宏观调控的目标，又有利于解决落后地区财力不足，从而促进落后地区与发达地区的交流和共同发展。     

国库集中支付改革实践与探索

国库集中支付制度改革是我国财政支出管理制度改革的重要内容,是我国建立公共财政框架的重要组成部分。国库集中支付制度改革的推行,明显提高了财政资金支付管理水平。一是畅通了资金支付信息反馈渠道,增强了资金支出透明度,从源头上减少了腐败行为的发生;二是促进了预算单位严格"按预算用款,按计划办事",增强了预算的约束力。三是减少了资金支付环节、缩短了资金支付时间,提高了资金运行效率;四是缓减了财政资金周转困难和压力,提高了财政资金使用效率。     

财政支出效益评价的理论与实践研究

财政支出是以国家为主体,以财政的事权为依据进行的一种财政资金分配活动,集中反映了国家的职能活动范围及其所造成的耗费。凡是财政部门为行使职能所支付的一切支出以及具有满足公共需要性质的支出．都属于财政支出范畴。据此,财政支出效益的评价不仅要关注预算内支出,还应关注大量的“准财政活动”领域中形成的财政支出。     

加强国库集中支付审核的思考与建议

资金审核是国库集中支付的重要环节，是财政支出监督的重要关口，是确保财政资金安全、高效运行的重要保障，加强支出审核，杜绝不合理地支出，让财政资金走在阳光下。本文主要就是针对日常工作中审核环节存在的主要问题提出了完善的建议。     

New perspectives on corruption contagion

Is corruption within one country affected by corruption within another? Few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. I use a cross-country panel data-set spanning 1995–2014 to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the culture of corruption amongst a country's regional neighbors. I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool of exploitable funds. My results suggest that corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world.     

The good,the bad,and the ugly: Technology transfer competence,rent-seeking,and bargaining power

In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.     

经济转型研究的政治视角：寻租与政府职能的转换

东欧剧变和苏联解体后,各转型国家的寻租问题开始迅速增多,已经对经济绩效造成了严重影响,这一结果是新自由主义指导下的华盛顿共识所不曾预料的。经济转型是一个综合的政治经济过程,在某些条件下政治约束在转型过程中已经扮演了主要的角色,因此从政治视角来审视转型有助于我们突破原有的局限,更好地理解转型路径的演化过程。     

Government Intervention,Perceived Benefit,and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption.     

Mises, Hayek and Corruption

Using the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent-seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens, any legal reform establishing and enforcement of private ownership also solves the corruption problem.     

Mass incarceration and consumer financial harm: Critique of rent-seeking by the carceral state

Mass incarceration is an approach to managing public safety that emphasizes detention over other means. It is also neoliberalism's quintessential political and economic project because it mobilizes a prison industrial complex to generate revenue. We highlight rent-seeking, the pursuit of extra-budgetary revenues by carceral agencies, because it inflicts financial harm on incarcerated consumers and their supporters. Carceral agencies leverage government's authority to set the conditions of detention. However, when they also leverage government's market-making authority to seek rents from incarcerated persons we characterize that as a government failure. To understand it, we depart from a focus on corruption by specific actors to highlight features of institutions that enable unethical behavior. We join activists and elected officials who call for an end to mass incarceration, but we also highlight more immediate reforms that can help restrain rent-seeking and enable greater public scrutiny of the carceral state.     

Does Corruption Have Social Roots? The Role of Culture and Social Capital

The aim of this work is to analyse the influence of sociocultural factors on corruption levels. Taking as starting point Husted (J Int Bus Studies 30:339–359, 1999) and Graeff (In: Lambsdorff J, Taube M, Schramm M (eds) The new institutional economics of corruption. Routledge, London, 2005) proposals, we consider both the interrelation between cultural dimensions and the diverse expressions of social capital with corruption. According to our results, the universalistic trust (linking and bridging social capital) constitutes a positive social capital that is negatively linked to corruption. In contrast, the particularistic levels of trust (bonding) can constitute a negative social capital directly related to corruption levels. Furthermore, cultures which are favourable to the legitimation of dependency relations and the formation of closed particularistic groups (power-distance and community factors) create a breeding ground for the development of these amoral rent-seeking structures.     

财政转移支付与地方政府支出行为——基于中国地市面板数据的实证分析

本文运用一个简单的理论框架分析了转移支付对地方政府财政支出行为的影响效应,并实证检验了省以下政府间财政转移支付对地方政府财政支出行为的影响效应。分析结果表明：一般性转移支付与地方财政支出之间存在显著的替代效应,而专项转移支付与地方政府财政支出之间存在着显著的互补效应,并且地方政府并不存在反应过度问题。本文的政策建议是：从短期来看,中央政府通过一般性转移支付方式可以有效降低基层政府的财政债务负担,通过专项转移支付可以有效提高基层政府公共服务的供给数量和质量;从长期来看,应进一步完善分税格局,给予地方政府（特别是基层政府）更多与其事权相匹配的税权能力。     

区域间产业转移及承接研究

我国东部发达地区传统产业出现了向欠发达地区转移的态势。产业区际转移的规模取决于产业转移的动力与阻力的对比。当前发达地区产业向欠发达地区转移的阻力大于动力,产业的区际转移尚未形成规模。要加快产业转移速度,实现区域经济协调发展,就必须采取措施提高产业转移的动力,降低产业转移的阻力。