从经济理性到有限理性:经济学研究理性假设的演变

"经济理性"是经济学的传统研究假设,却因背离现实而受到质疑.基于行为人稀缺的心理资源和系统固有的不确定性而产生的"有限理性"正逐步取代"经济理性"成为经济学研究的理性假设.不同的理性观点可以从决策的视角得到系统地解释和比较.并且,随着理性假设的演变,经济行为的决策标准也相应从单一静态最优向多元动态平衡转变.     

有限理性与自我主体意识

经济学界至今还没有对有限理性的成因找到一个公认的正确答案.通过实验,本文证明了经济主体的有限理性不是由于人脑计算能力的约束,也不是由于道德或社会规范的约束,而是因为受到其不愿尊重客体的自我主体意识的影响.本文还证实,自我主体意识是禀赋效应、现状偏爱现象、沉没成本谬误、占便宜悖论、Ellsberg悖论和分离效应等异常现象产生的真正原因.     

A simplified test for preference rationality of two-commodity choice

We provide a simplified test to determine if choice data from a two-commodity consumption set satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), and thus the preference or utility maximization hypothesis. We construct an algorithm for this test and illustrate its application on experimental choice data. JEL Classification C91, D11, D12 An erratum to this article is available at .     

Two-tier rationality and reflexivity: an examination of the foundations of economic reason

This paper develops a two-tier concept of rationality which broadens the orthodox notion of instrumental rationality in economics. In the first section, I conceive the idea of “background rationality” to consist in the ability to act normally, i.e., according to social conventions appropriate to the context. Background rationality is a necessary condition for the exercise of its instrumental counterpart. Implications and applications of this for economic phenomena are investigated in Section II. The third section draws parallels between the approach to rationality developed in this paper and Thorstein Veblen's notion “habits of thought”. I argue that a viable concept of rationality must itself be subject to explanatory scrutiny and justification and not merely posited as given.     

Testing for rationality: the case of discrete choice data

When working with micro data on consumer demand, there are many different situations where decisions involve only discrete choices. In this context, conditions under which an underlying rational preference structure exists are derived. Moreover, by introducing flexibility into the model, it is possible to identify nonrational behavior in the sample.     

A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types

We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.     

A note on the rationality of survey inflation expectations in the United Kingdom

When actual and expected inflation rates are integrated process, the rational expectations assumption involves a particular cointegrating relationship between them. This makes it possible to test the rationality hypothesis using error-correction formulations. By using these cointegration- and error-correction techniques, unbiasedness and weak-form efficiency cannot be rejected on survey inflation expectations from British Manufacturing Industries.     

Rationing and rationality

This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with different trades and different excess demands) the refined notion of uniformly perfect equilibria yields uniqueness. Interestingly, the unique solution implies excess demands differing from previously discussed suggestions. Accordingly, the amount of involuntary unemployment may here be different from those in former models even though transactions are the same. In principle, the model provides a reasonable basis to interpret the magnitude of excess demands, what seems important since excess demands serve as signals not only for markets but also for policy makers.     

A note on mergers and relocation

Posada and Straume (J Econ 83:243?C265, 2004) analyze a three-firm model of a circular city where two of the firms merge and may choose to relocate. They propose an equilibrium with relocation where taking part in the merger yields higher profits than staying outside, i.e., relocation may solve the so-called merger paradox. In this note, it is shown that the equilibrium candidate considered is not an equilibrium.     

Sraffa numeraire and reswitching: A note A note

The paper demonstrates that changing the numeraire from Hicks' to Sraffa's does not affect the location and, a fortiori, the number of switch points between two given techniques. This negates some recent claims to the contrary, and supports the earlier general position that the choice of numeraire has no bearing on reswitching, even though it does have a bearing on capital reversal. In the process the paper shows that the rate of growth of the economy and the marginal propensity to save also do not affect the switch points, which may thus be regarded as depending essentially on technical factors alone.     

The Mind of the Social Individual: A Comment on Sherman and Hodgson

In the Spring 1998 (56(1): 47-57) and Fall 1998 (56(3): 295-306, 307-310) issues of this review, Howard Sherman and Geoffrey Hodgson debated, inter alia , the extent to which Veblen-Ayres institutionalism is compatible with Marx and recent Marxist work. This paper argues that the differences between Hodgson and Sherman"s positions do not rely on assumptions of "illogical" behavior, individualist arguments or structural conceptions of the individual. Instead, the debate turns on the authors' respective conceptions of the formation and role of the human mind in what it is to be a social individual.     

Crime and social norms

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime. It is shown that law and norms are substitutes in achieving a stable equilibrium. Here we offer a new interpretation of different theories of social norms in the context of crime and deterrence. The law and economics theory is presented as an opportunism-limiting approach to norms whereas the evolutionary theory is presented as an opportunity cost approach.Received: January 2003, Accepted: July 2003, JEL Classification: D59, K14, K42Paper presented at the 3rd annual meeting of SPIE Portuguese Association for Research in Economics, June 22-23, 1998, Braga and at the 15th annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, September 24-26, 1998, Utrecht. I am grateful to two referees and the editor for helpful comments that much improved the paper, and to Dorothea Kübler, Eric Posner, Dieter Schmidtchen, and Stergios Skaperdas for suggestions that much improved this paper, and to Kelly Markva for research assistantship. The author acknowledges the financial support of FCT, Lisbon, Portugal. Part of this paper was written while the author visited Stanford Law School. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Conservative belief and rationality

Playersʼ beliefs may be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0. One way to block incompatibility is to assume a common prior. We consider here a different approach: we require playersʼ beliefs to be conservative, in the sense that all players must ascribe the actual world positive probability. We show that common conservative belief of rationality (CCBR) characterizes strategies in the support of a subjective correlated equilibrium where all playersʼ beliefs have common support. We also define a notion of strong rationalizability, and show that it is characterized by CCBR.     

A note on representativeness and household finance

Previous research has shown that social households have a higher probability of owning risky assets. Using a representative sample of the German population, we demonstrate that the sociability effect is much stronger among people younger than 50.     

A note on linear utility

Summary We show that any complete, lower-semicontinuous, and translation-invariant preorder defined on a topological vector space admits a linear and continuous utility representation.Thanks are given to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable suggestions and comments.     

A note on an anniversary

ASSA Paper. ASA Session on Schumpeter