A perspective on regulatory paradigms: The case of IRS and Sarbanes-Oxley approaches to executive compensation-related regulation

In this paper we explore two regulatory paradigms, with an emphasis on the regulation of executive compensation. An example of the traditional rule-based paradigm is Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) in which a tax-deductible cap was passed into law to limit executive compensation. We demonstrate that this approach yielded mixed results. While stronger pay/performance sensitivity has been documented, Section 162(m) appears to have actually exacerbated the level of executive compensation. We contrast the rules-based paradigm with an alternative paradigm illustrated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in which the US Congress introduced a series of corporate governance initiatives into federal securities law. The transformation of the mode of regulatory intervention as reflected by SOX is shown to be fully consistent with recent changes in the generally accepted conceptual framework for financial reporting.     

Employee stock options with performance conditions: do commonly used valuation heuristics work?

Valuation heuristics are widely used to value traditional time vesting option plans. This study analyses if these heuristics also qualify for valuing performance vesting plans. We examine performance conditions tied to the underlying stock, the stock's performance relative to a stock index, and an earnings measure. The differences between the approximated option values and the values assuming optimal exercise are overall smaller with the performance conditions than without them. In particular, this result holds when the heuristic exercise assumptions are based on the case without performance conditions, which is a considerable simplification in practice.     

The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.     

Index Option Pricing Models with Stochastic Volatility and Stochastic Interest Rates

This paper specifies a multivariate stochasticvolatility (SV) model for the S & P500 index and spot interest rateprocesses. We first estimate the multivariate SV model via theefficient method of moments (EMM) technique based on observations ofunderlying state variables, and then investigate the respective effects of stochastic interest rates, stochastic volatility, and asymmetric S & P500 index returns on option prices. We compute option prices using both reprojected underlying historical volatilities and the implied risk premiumof stochastic volatility to gauge each model's performance through direct comparison with observed market option prices on the index. Our major empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, while allowing for stochastic volatility can reduce the pricing errors and allowing for asymmetric volatility or leverage effect does help to explain the skewness of the volatility smile, allowing for stochastic interest rates has minimal impact on option prices in our case. Second, similar to Melino and Turnbull (1990), our empirical findings strongly suggest the existence of a non-zero risk premium for stochastic volatility of asset returns. Based on the implied volatility risk premium, the SV models can largely reduce the option pricing errors, suggesting the importance of incorporating the information from the options market in pricing options. Finally, both the model diagnostics and option pricing errors in our study suggest that the Gaussian SV model is not sufficientin modeling short-term kurtosis of asset returns, an SV model withfatter-tailed noise or jump component may have better explanatory power.     

The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation

Since SOX 404 disclosures are informative about earnings, and due to the widespread practice of using earnings-based measures in executive compensation, this study examines whether reports of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) under SOX 404 influence firms' reliance on earnings in tying executive pay to performance. Using 391 (366) firm-year observations with reported ICMW and 3648 (3138) firm-year observations for CEOs (CFOs) reporting NOMW under SOX 404, we find a decreased strength in the association between earnings and executives' (CEO and CFO) compensation when the firm reports an ICMW, and as the number of reported ICMW increases. In addition, we find this decreased weight on earnings for the more severe Company-Level than Account- Specific material weaknesses. Our study suggests that the ICMW report under SOX 404 provides incremental information for executive compensation beyond that contained in reported earnings.