Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations

Franchisors capitalize on franchisee entrepreneurial capacity to grow. However, enabling franchisees to develop their ventures may damage system consistency. This dilemma makes conflict particularly prevalent in the field of franchising. Nevertheless, prior research has reported an incomplete picture of factors leading to serious disagreement and premature termination in franchise partnerships. We address this gap, first, by adding the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisees as a relevant but underexplored source of conflict and, second, by providing a more fine-grained analysis of franchisors’ versus franchisees’ drivers of termination. Specifically, we focus on the controversial issues of pricing and local advertising policies and analyze how expanding franchisees’ entrepreneurial autonomy in these decision areas is related to contract terminations depending on who ended the relationship (the franchisor or a franchisee). The study also highlights less controversial requirements and conditions (e.g., upfront investments, franchisor experience …) that may reduce early terminations. Our empirical objectives are met by using survey data from a sample of franchisor companies. The results show how the performance outcomes of entrepreneurial autonomy differ depending on the decision area in which it is exercised. Results also throw light on the consequences of various critical franchise policies that may be masked if both types of termination (franchisors vs. franchisees) are considered together.     

Toward a theory of conflict in the franchise system

A focused review of the literature is presented in support of a definition of franchising as an interorganizational form examined from the entrepreneurship perspective. Then, microeconomic and relational exchange theories provide guidance within a transaction-cost economics theoretical framework to begin the formulation of a theory of conflict in franchising. The analysis provided in this article involves business format franchising.We submit that the essential core and uniqueness of business format franchising is the relationship between the franchisee and franchisor. Our definition of franchising requires a review of individual franchisee and franchisor organizational structures. Therefore, our theoretical analysis begins with a fundamental look at the economic structural differences of the average franchisor and franchisee firms, using microeconomic theory. This review points to the potential for conflict in profit-maximizing behavior between franchisee and franchisor. The likelihood is that the differences in behavior will manifest in pricing, promotion, and new store development.Next, because most business format franchising is contractually based and long-term, we investigate the theoretical support for establishing and continuing a relationship with fundamental areas of conflict. Relational exchange theory is used for this analysis.Transaction-cost economics provides a perspective on the governance of the interorganizational form and guides us in the investigation of the ongoing state of the relationship. A key to transaction-cost analysis is shared assets in the relationship and the degree of transferability of those assets. Therefore, building and maintaining the franchise trademark becomes the theoretical focus for governance of the relationship. We propose that franchisor-provided services is the principal method of franchisor contract fulfillment and is the framework for informal governance of the relationship. The importance and adequacy of the transactions between the franchisee and franchisor affect the perceived value of the trademark and are key to continuing the franchise relationship.Finally, the conflict literature is briefly reviewed to provide a context for the discussion of conflict in franchising and to illustrate that conflict can have a positive or negative effect on the relationship.     

Valuing Exclusivity from Encroachment in Franchising

Conflict is created when business format franchisors penetrate existing markets with new outlets that increase system-wide sales, but negatively affect the sales and profits of existing franchisees. Territorial exclusivity contracts are used to manage channel conflict in such situations. We present a model to value territorial exclusivity from the perspective of both the franchisor and the franchisee. We show that under certain circumstances there is positive value to the franchisor by including the exclusivity clause in the contract and to the franchisee by purchasing this exclusivity. When this happens, the likelihood of franchisor-franchisee encroachment-related conflict is reduced.     

The organization of relational contracts: The allocation of rights in franchising

Franchising contracts are designed to bring together two kinds of entrepreneurs, the franchiser and the franchisee, and to maintain their relationship in the long run. In contrast to standard exchange contracts in law, which are specifically designed to bring about the completion of an exchange efficiently, franchise contracts are designed to make it possible for the entrepreneurs to initiate, to maintain, and to eventually terminate their relationship without dispute. The research reported in this article is an attempt to see how the dual purpose of franchising contracts are achieved. The article first describes the internal organization of franchise contracts (what we called the micro-contractual aspects) and how different kinds of rights and obligations are allocated to accomplish these multiple ends. The second part of the article provides an empirical examination of 30 franchise contracts to see if the internal organization of the contracts influence both the expansion of the franchise operations through new franchises and the amount of dispute between the two sides of franchise contracts.Every franchise contract includes a set of provisions that define the commencement, termination, and ongoing operations of franchise relations. The internal organization of franchise contracts specifies what kinds of rights and obligations are distributed to the parties and the nature of this allocation within each domain of provisions. We argue that the commencement and termination aspects of franchise contracts are usually written in order to make the relationship between the parties clear, and the contingencies specific. In these provisions, the contract is written in discrete terms in which each party's rights and duties are specifically delineated. The contractual provisions dealing with the ongoing operations and the conduct of the parties, on the other hand, cannot be made specific because it is impossible to define all the future contingencies and possible business opportunities. Under these conditions, the contract is usually written in relational terms in which each party's rights and obligations are defined in terms of powers and liabilities towards each other rather than in terms of specific duties and rights.One critical consequence of writing contracts that include powers and liabilities, however, is that it may lead to disputes and undesirable conflict that are detrimental to the success of the franchise. In order to deal with these conflicts among the parties, the contract needs to specify conflict resolution mechanisms that are an integral part of franchise contracts.These general arguments are tested with the use of 30 randomly selected franchise contracts from a diverse set of businesses. Our results show that, indeed, different parts of franchise contracts allocate rights and obligations differently and the more relational a contract becomes the more likely that it would include various dispute resolution mechanisms. We also found that the success of a franchise contract, which is measured by the number of legal disputes it generates and the growth of franchised units, is influenced by the existence of relational provisions and the explicit dispute resolution mechanisms included in the contract.We recommend that franchise contracts should be written to make the commencement and termination aspect of the relationship as discrete as possible. The operations and conduct provisions of the contract, on the other hand, should be written in relational terms to give the parties the ability to respond to changes in business conditions without renegotiating the contract.It is usually the tendency on the part of franchise lawyers to write discrete contracts that attempt to specify every conceivable contingency to avoid future disputes. We argue here that a better strategy is to limit the discrete aspects of the contract to the commencement and termination clauses and to concentrate more on the dispute resolution mechanisms that can become an integral part of the contract. Thus, we also recommend that various dispute resolution mechanisms, such as franchisee associations, franchisee councils, and third party arbitration should be set up within the contract to address the possible disputes early on rather than to wait for potentially very costly court proceedings for both parties.     

Combined effects of franchise management strategies and employee service performance on customer loyalty: a multilevel perspective

Although franchisee performance is likely to be influenced by franchisors’ management strategies, little is known about whether and how franchisors’ strategies affect franchisee employees’ performance. This study examines the combined effects of three franchisor management strategies, namely innovative culture, support services and autonomy on service performance of the franchisee store employees and the loyalty of their customers. Data were collected from a total of 38 employees and 679 customers of 25 franchisee stores. The study employs multilevel analysis on a nested data-set created by matching customer data with employee data for each store. The results reveal that customer loyalty of a franchisee store is positively influenced by the service performance of its employees and the support services received by the employees of the store from its franchisor. On the other hand, it has been found that franchisor management strategy such as innovative culture and autonomy negatively influence customer loyalty of the franchisee store. The paper discusses relevant theoretical and managerial implications of the findings.     

Standardisation versus Adaptation: Geographical Pressures to Deviate from Franchise Formats

There is a tension in business format franchising between, on the one hand, standardisation and uniformity and, on the other hand, geographical variations in market conditions and resource availability. Previous research has demonstrated in the case of independent small firms that local geographical conditions influence business strategy. This paper examines whether variations in the local geographical environment, notably in terms of demand and supply side conditions, affect format implementation and whether franchisors permit franchisees to make local adaptations of the format in response to local environmental conditions. The study is based on interviews with 40 UK-based franchisors, all of whom were at the later stages of roll-out or in the consolidation stage of network development. Local variations in the business environment do create a conflict with the need to maintain the uniformity of the franchise format. Adaptation was restricted to peripheral format components. No changes were made to the core format components. Most franchisors recognise that their franchisees are an important source of innovation. However, implementation of franchisee ideas across the system is found in only a minority of cases. These findings link to the franchisee control–autonomy debate, confirming other studies which suggest that franchisees enjoy considerable operational autonomy.     

Influence of franchisee selection criteria on outcomes desired by the franchisor

Agency theory suggests that an efficient contract between a franchisor (principal) and a franchisee (agent) could be established by the use of selection criteria that would screen prospective franchisees based on their likely future outcomes desired by their franchisors. Franchisors can use franchisee selection criteria as a key input control to enhance the outcomes of their future franchisees. This article examines the relationship between key franchisee selection criteria such as franchisees’ financial capability, experience and management skills, demographic characteristics, attitude toward business dimensions (perceived innovativeness, desire for personal development, seek work-related challenges, personal commitment to the business, and business risk-taking), and key measures of outcomes desired by franchisors (perceived cooperation, satisfaction with the business decision, and franchisee opportunism). The findings show that certain franchisee attitudes toward business can be used as an effective input control strategy by franchisors because they explain a substantial portion of the variance in franchisees’ outcome desired by franchisors.     

Capitalizing on Franchisee Autonomy: Relational Forms of Governance as Controls in Idiosyncratic Franchise Dyads*

Franchisee autonomy not only fosters system‐wide adaptability and outlet owners' satisfaction but also raises the costs from agency problems present in franchisee–franchisor dyads. Advancing upon the understanding of agency issues involved in franchising, we test the argument that chains counterbalance the loss in control inherent to autonomy with relational governance mechanisms. The empirical results provided strong support for this presumption. In addition, and most notably, we found that the more relational governance becomes important, the weaker agents' incentives are aligned with the interests of the entire network. The moderating effects of five franchisee characteristics influencing goal congruencies were considered: multiunit ownership, age of the relationship, geographic distance, franchisee success, and the level of perceived intra‐chain competition. Implications for chain management are provided.     

Entrepreneurial Failure: The Case of Franchisees*

The causes of failure are central to entrepreneurship research. This study extends agency and resource‐based logic to explain how established franchisors affect franchisee failure. Analysis of 88 restaurant chains shows that franchisors reduce franchisee failure through contract design and by building strategic resources. Thus, franchisors' resource management and contractual policies play a key role in franchisees' survival.     

When the Music Stops Playing: Post-litigation Relationship Dissolution in Franchising

Franchise relationships engender franchisor–franchisee conflicts and are prone to premature dissolution. Building on agency theory and institutional theory, this study examines what specific reasons – from both franchisors’ and franchisees’ perspectives – may cause post-litigation relationship dissolution (PLRD) and how franchise regulations moderate these relationships. We argue that both franchisor and franchisee may misrepresent themselves before their relationship begins (adverse selection) and behave opportunistically after the contract is signed (moral hazard), that is, ‘dual agency’. Based on 20-year archival records of franchisor–franchisee relationship histories gleaned from multiple data sources, we found that PLRD is likely to be caused by franchisors’ passive moral hazard and by franchisees’ active moral hazard. In addition, franchisor adverse selection has a greater impact on PLRD than franchisee adverse selection. With regards to regulatory influences, the presence of relationship law weakens the impact of franchisees’ passive moral hazard, but not their active moral hazard, on PLRD. Contrary to what we hypothesize, the presence of registration law amplifies the impact of franchisee adverse selection on PLRD. Ultimately, this study creates a better understanding of the antecedents and curbing mechanisms of PLRD in franchising.     

Identity in Franchise Systems: The Role of Franchisee Associations

Utilizing theories of identity this article presents findings from a qualitative study regarding the significant role independent franchisee associations play within franchise systems. The data reveal that successful franchisee associations help manage the inherent tension that exists between cooperation and conflict in franchise relationships. A distinctive adaptive organizational identity provides an association the capability necessary to reframe its relationship with the franchisor as either combative or cooperative in response to changes in a franchisor's identity. Challenging the views of both franchisor stability and the dyadic form that franchisee–franchisor relationships assume, behavioral insight is provided into the actual functioning of franchise systems and new avenues are suggested for theory building in franchising.     

Antecedents leading to perceived franchise support

Abstract

Franchising is an important part of the U.S. economy. According to the International Franchise Association (IFA), franchising provides 9.0 million jobs and pays out 351 billion dollars in wages and benefits annually (2016). This study examines franchise relationships in the context of building franchisees’ perceptions of support from the franchisor. The literature was examined to determine if and what support provided by the franchisor has a positive impact on the franchisee. We examine four dimensions of organizational climate (i.e., initiating structure, leadership consideration, autonomy, and reward orientation), brand value/recognition and franchisee’s perception of the quality of the franchisor’s advertising as predictors of perceived franchise support. This study indicates there is a positive and significant impact between three types of organizational climate (i.e., leadership consideration, autonomy, and reward orientation). In addition, a positive impact to brand value recognition on perceived franchise support and a negative effect on initiating structure.     

How Do Franchise Contracts Evolve? A Study of Three German SMEs*

Although contracts are crucial for franchisors in managing relationships with franchisees, franchising research has not adequately investigated whether and how franchisors learn about effective contracts. This paper explores the evolution of formal contracts used by three German chains from the restaurant, hotel, and retailing industries. We describe the nature of learning involved in designing contracts in the sampled chains, and suggest reasons why contracts change over time. Despite the fact that drafting contracts with independent entrepreneurs is one of the important tasks the franchisor is rewarded for, we found that franchisors remain boundedly rational and therefore are unable to completely anticipate undesirable franchisee behavior and to incorporate suitable safeguards. We develop propositions to suggest that: (1) learning explains contract design capability better than does foresight, (2) a new management and the pursuit of uniformity lead to contract changes, and (3) the presence of an active franchisee council promotes the efficiency of the contract change process. We offer implications of our findings for theory, practice, and research.     

An Empirical Analysis of Franchisee Value-in-Use, Investment Risk and Relational Satisfaction

An exchange perspective of franchising recognizes the important role that both the franchisor and franchisee assume in developing and maintaining sustainable relationships. However, should franchisees not perceive value in the quality of provided products or services, some incentive misalignment between agent and principal is likely (e.g. free riding, non-compliance with system standards), potentially resulting in greater perceptions of financial risk, diminished levels of franchisee satisfaction, reduced unit performance and conflict ( [Harmon and Griffiths, 2008] and [Kaufmann and Dant, 1998] ). A greater understanding of franchisee perceptions of value is very important if ongoing satisfaction in the franchising relationship is the goal. This paper, therefore, makes a significant contribution to such an understanding by empirically testing the dimensions of value that influence franchisee perceptions of risk and relationship satisfaction. Moreover, we make important comparisons across gender, the results of which provide rich information. In theoretical terms, we advance the literature in the context of value and franchising and, in practical terms, the results, by managing for performance (financial risk and relationship quality), assist franchisors in developing, delivering and managing what is of value to their franchisees. Furthermore, the findings of this study provide a solid platform for future research in this area.     

A model of trust and compliance in franchise relationships

Despite the danger of franchisee non-compliance as a severe impediment to overall franchise operation and performance, there is currently minimal understanding of the key factors that lead to these behaviors. Using a foundation of relational exchange theory, we construct and test a model that demonstrates how two distinct forms of trust, based upon perceptions of franchisor integrity and franchisor competence, are critical to explaining the roles that relational conflict and satisfaction play in influencing franchisee compliance. Implications of these findings are then demonstrated to have compelling relevance to the effective management of franchise systems.     

The Current Impact and Carryover of Advertising on Sales in the Restaurant Industry

ABSTRACT

A common source of conflict in the relationship between restaurant franchise and franchisee involves advertising fees. Conflict arises when the franchisee feels that he or she has not received an adequate return on his or her advertising investment. This paper reports the results of a study conducted on both the short-term and long-term effectiveness (duration) of advertising among restaurant chains. The findings suggest that only a small proportion of restaurant chains enjoy immediate, positive returns to their advertising fees. However, over half of all chains examined realized a significant carryover effect of advertising. Several explanations are offered as to why these results are found and recommendations are made as to how restaurant chains should react to these findings.     

Can there be a social contract with business?

Professor Donaldson in his book Corporations and Morality has attempted to use a social contract theory to develop moral principles for regulating corporate conduct. I argue in this paper that his attempt fails in large measure because what he refers to as a social contract theory is, in fact, a weak functionalist theory which provides no independent basis for evaluating business corporations. I further argue that given the nature of a morality based on contract and the nature of the modern corporation, it is highly unlikely that any plausible contract theory of business ethics can be developed.Dr. Hodapp is an associate professor of philosophy at The University of Northern Colorado where he teaches courses in business ethics and legal philosophy. He earned a doctorate at Washington University, St. Louis. Dr. Hodapp also has a law degree from The University of Denver and practices law with a Denver law firm specializing in management labor relations.     

心理契约违背、劳资冲突与员工离职意向关系的实证研究：整合型组织文化的调节作用

基于社会交换和社会情境理论，文章构建了心理契约违背、劳资冲突和离职意向之间的关系模型。通过跨层次分析方法，探讨心理契约违背对员工离职意向可能产生的影响及其影响机制。分别收集了189份企业高管与1366份员工问卷数据。研究结果显示：心理契约违背是影响员工离职意向的重要的前因变量；劳资冲突的三个维度在心理契约违背和离职意向之间都起到中介作用，并且中介效应存在显著差异；组织文化对权利冲突、情感冲突与离职意向之间的关系都起到调节作用，但对利益冲突与离职意向之间的调节作用不显著。对转型经济条件下，员工的心理契约、劳资冲突管理以及企业文化建设具有借鉴意义。     

The Autonomy of the Contracting Partners: An Argument for Heuristic Contractarian Business Ethics

Due to the domain characteristics of business ethics, a contractarian theory for business ethics will need to be essentially different from the contract model as it is applied to other domains. Much of the current criticism of contractarian business ethics (CBE) can be traced back to autonomy, one of its three boundary conditions. After explaining why autonomy is so important, this article considers the notion carefully vis à vis the contracting partners in the contractarian approaches in business ethics. Autonomy is too demanding a condition for the realm of CBE. But a less stringent version of the contract may be possible, a version which uses the contract as a heuristic device, which merely requires moral responsibility. Furthermore, it is argued that views of (human) agency and the moral subject should be made explicit in such a theory.     

Factors affecting international joint venture success: an empirical analysis of foreign–local partner relationships and performance in joint ventures in Turkey

This article discusses inter-partner relationships and their impact on joint venture performance. It explores the changes in the nature of relationships (conflict, commitment, co-operation, trust) which have important implications for the continuity and performance of partnerships. In doing so, it identifies the potential areas of co-operation and conflict, due to both partners' overlapping interests, and establishes constructs which help explain conflict, commitment and other soft dimensions of joint venture operations. Based on previous studies, this article develops a framework within which inter-partner relations (conflict, commitment, trust, co-operation, and autonomy) are empirically examined. The article also establishes performance constructs for joint venture organisations. Finally, it develops a dynamic model of inter-partner relations and performance which indicates the causal connections between conflict, commitment, control, inter-partner co-operation and performance.