Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short‐term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long‐term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade‐off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.     

Corporate Capital Budgeting Decisions and Information Sharing

Firms must overcome agency and information asymmetry problems to make efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions; this is particularly true for firms with multiple units dispersed across geographic locations. Internal communication and coordination may therefore be crucial in reducing information asymmetry and achieving efficient resource allocation. We examine the relationship between corporate capital budgeting decisions and the degree of internal information sharing using a dataset of 342 U.S. firms from 1993 to 2002. Information sharing is measured by the internal linkages observed in firms’ research and development activities worldwide. The efficiency of a firm's capital budgeting decisions is measured by the deviation of the firm's estimated marginal q from the theoretical tax‐adjusted benchmark. We observe a significant relationship between value‐enhancing capital budgeting decisions and stronger internal linkages. Specifically, corporate overinvestment is significantly reduced with better information sharing across units. All results are robust to firm‐ and industry‐level controls.     

High‐commitment HR practices,employee effort,and firm performance: Investigating the effects of HR practices across employee groups within professional services firms

In this study, the authors examine the relationship between high‐commitment HR practices and firm performance in professional services firms through the mediator of employee effort. In addition, they contribute to the debate in the field of strategic HRM on whether high‐commitment HR practices should be used across all employee groups within a firm. Their study's results show that high‐commitment HR practices positively relate to firm performance through employee effort for two employee groups within professional services firms. Further, they found that the relationship between effort and performance is contingent on the value of the employee group to firm competitive advantage, suggesting that companies may only want to expend the effort and resources on building a high‐commitment HR system for employee groups that are clearly tied to creating firm competitive advantage. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.     

A Note on Managerial Delegation with Asymmetric and Convex Costs

In this note, we investigate if the standard result by the managerial delegation literature, i.e., the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto‐optimal from the firms' viewpoint, still applies when asymmetric and convex costs are introduced into the analysis. In such a framework, the managerial delegation choice still represents a sub‐game Nash perfect equilibrium, but the more efficient firm may obtain higher profits provided that the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does corporate environmental responsibility engagement affect firm value? The mediating role of corporate innovation

This paper aims to construct a comprehensive corporate environmental responsibility (CER) engagement measurement to examine the relationship between CER engagement and firm value as well as explore the mediating effect of corporate innovation on this relationship based on a sample of 496 China's A‐share listed companies from 2008 to 2016. The results show that when firms start to adopt environmental regulations, CER would have a negative effect on firm value; however, at a specific level, CER would start to enhance firm value positively. In addition to this, corporate innovation plays a mediating role in the relationship between CER and firm value. Corporate innovation promotes firm value of firms with CER more than firms without CER. Overall, the findings of this paper are extremely relevant for the government, investors, and firm's managers and can be utilized for policy and investment decision making. Also, the findings encourage firms to enhance their sense of environmental responsibility in order to enhance their competitive advantages, enhance corporate innovation capabilities, and thus enhance firm value.     

Firm Productivity Moderated Link Between Human Capital and Compensation: The Significance of Task‐Specific Human Capital

The human capital of a firm as manifested by employee knowledge and experience represents a key resource of a firm's capabilities. Prior empirical studies have found that firms composed of high levels of human capital experience superior firm performance. Human capital theory proposes that an individual's general or firm‐specific human capital is positively related to compensation. However, empirical studies examining firm‐specific human capital's association with higher employee compensation have been inconclusive. The current study proposes that firm‐specific human capital be categorized as task‐specific and non‐task‐specific. Employees accumulate task‐specific human capital through duties conducted in their current position. Non‐task‐specific human capital represents experiences gained in prior positions to an employee's current job within the firm. Utilizing human capital data from 38,390 employees representing 76 firms in the IT sector, this study examines the association between forms of human capital and employee compensation at different levels of firm productivity. Results show that task‐specific human capital is associated with higher employee compensation. In addition, firm productivity moderates this association.     

The Value Relevance of Environmental Audits: Evidence from Japan

Environmental audits are implemented internally in order to monitor compliance with environmental laws, regulations and related accounting rules, and to develop recommendations for ways in which to improve environmental accounting processes and performance. In addition, external third‐party assurance on environmental information is used to verify whether firms’ disclosures on environmental information are in compliance with environmental accounting rules and regulations. We examine whether firms’ environmental audits positively affect their market values and whether third‐party assurance strengthens positive effects, using value relevance theory as a theoretical foundation. Our main tests are based on 266 Japanese manufacturing firms’ published environmental reports for the period 2010–2013. We find that the average market value of firms that implement environmental audits is 9 percent greater than those that do not. Further, we find that environmental audits positively affect firm value, largely through interaction with third‐party assurance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Are Related‐Party Sales Value‐Adding or Value‐Destroying? Evidence from China

Prior literature provides mixed and relatively little evidence on the economic consequences of related‐party transactions. We examine a hitherto underexplored issue of whether transactions among firms within the same business group increase or reduce firm value. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that related‐party sales increase firm value. However, this value enhancement disappears for firms with (i) large percentage of parent directors, (ii) high government ownership, or (iii) tax avoidance incentives that often couple with management's rent extraction activities. Although we find that intragroup sales improve firm value in general, we also find that corporate insiders use intragroup sales to deprive value from minority shareholders. Overall, our findings highlight the interplay between ownership structure and tax avoidance incentives in determining the economic consequences of related‐party transactions.     

Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts

This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why does eco‐innovation differ in service firms? Some insights from Spain

Although environmental innovation studies have traditionally focused on manufacturing firms, the distinctive features of eco‐innovation activities carried out by service firms require special attention. Using the Spanish Commumity Innovation Survey (CIS), this paper determines which are the main drivers of undertaking eco‐innovation and investigates the similarities and differences between service and manufacturing firms within the five sub‐groups of services (supplier dominated, scale intensive physical networks, scale intensive information networks, science‐based, and others). The results confirm that the main eco‐innovation triggers are similar—technological push factor orientation (internal R&D and persistence) and firm size—while the impact of market pull factors and public environmental legislation differ within the services sub‐groups. In addition, we find a high degree of heterogeneity within service firms. In contrast to traditional service firms, those in the groups involving R&D activities, information networks, and scale‐intensive physical networks exhibit intensive eco‐innovation performance and show a high level of green indicators.     

Do LGBT‐supportive corporate policies enhance firm performance?

Prior research provides evidence that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)‐supportive corporate policies are related to important human resource functions, such as enhanced recruitment and retention. In addition, prior research indicates that investors view the adoption of such policies positively. We examine the firm‐performance mechanisms underlying favorable stock‐market reactions based on an integration of perspectives from corporate social responsibility and the business case for diversity. Specifically, we estimate a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to account for the nested nature of our data (firms nested within states) and find that (1) the presence of LGBT‐supportive policies is associated with higher firm value, productivity, and profitability; (2) the firm‐value and profitability benefits associated with LGBT‐supportive policies are larger for companies engaged in research and development (R&D) activities; and (3) the firm‐value and profitability benefits of LGBT‐supportive policies persist in the presence of state antidiscrimination laws. In supplemental analyses, we find that firms implementing (discontinuing) LGBT‐supportive policies experience increases (decreases) in firm value, productivity, and profitability. We are among the first to link LGBT‐supportive policies specifically to financial performance outcomes as well as to develop and test a multilevel model of these relationships. Our results have important implications for theory and research on LGBT issues in organizations, human resource managers, and policymakers.     

Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

Effects of Information Technology Capabilities on Strategic Alliances: Implications for the Resource‐Based View

This paper adopts a contingency approach to the resource‐based view (RBV) of the firm and seeks to establish boundary conditions for the value of certain information technology (IT) capabilities. We first identify inter‐organizational alliances as a specific strategy context in which IT capabilities are particularly valuable. We then consider more detailed boundary conditions that can shape the value of these capabilities within the alliance context. Our study shows that firms with better IT capabilities can derive greater value from an alliance, yet this effect also varies across different types of alliances depending on an individual alliance's characteristics. Specifically, IT capabilities are more valuable for alliances with a non‐equity governance structure, as well as those involving a high degree of interdependence between partners. We highlight the implications of our findings for opportunities to advance the RBV.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

Foreign Equity Ownership and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Japan

Using a large sample of Japanese firms, we investigate whether the level of foreign ownership in a firm is inversely related to information asymmetry between firm (managers) and market (outside investors). Since information asymmetry is not directly observable and, thus, is difficult to measure empirically, our analysis focuses on the link between foreign shareholding and a measurable consequence of information asymmetry; that is, the timing and magnitude of intertemporal return‐earnings associations. The empirical results support our hypothesis, and subsequent tests based on residual foreign ownership show that the relation between foreign ownership and information asymmetry is robust to the addition of various control variables such as market capitalization and cross‐corporate holdings. We also show that foreign investors tend to avoid stocks with high cross‐corporate holdings. Overall, our results suggest that foreign (institutional) investors are likely to be efficient processors of public information and are attracted to Japanese firms with low information asymmetry.     

Managerial overconfidence,overinvestment, and R&D spillover

This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain

The ‘managerial’ and the ‘contractual’ theories of the firm imply different causes and consequences for the relationship between ownership and performance of firms. This paper provides a test of the two conflicting theories, using ownership and performance data from a sample of Spanish family- and non-family-controlled firms. We find evidence in support of the contractual theory of the firm, according to which firms choose their ownership structure maximizing economic value, net of contractual costs.