Innovation Strategy and Entry Deterrence

We model an incumbent’s decision to pursue radical or incremental innovation when facing a rival entrant. The radical innovation may yield lucrative financial returns but entails significant technological and market‐related uncertainties. It is also particularly attractive to the rival entrant: if the market for it pans out, such an innovation obsoletes the existing technology and any incremental improvements to it. Each firm has its own assessment of the market potential for the radical innovation, and the reliability of these market forecasts can differ. We show that when the entrant’s market‐assessment capability is weak, the incumbent will pursue incremental innovation and postpone its plans to develop radical innovation even when it thinks highly of the market potential for the radical innovation. The incumbent does so to avoid validating the high market potential to the entrant, who may otherwise be encouraged to invest aggressively. The incumbent thus prefers to look “soft” with respect to its innovation strategy in order to discourage entry. Even if its innovation strategy is not observable, we show that an incumbent that assesses the commercial potential for a radical innovation favorably may pursue an incremental path and communicate its plans publicly; this strategy serves to reduce entry by affecting the entrant’s beliefs about the market potential of the innovation. Finally, we extend the model to investigate the entrant’s decision to communicate its innovation intentions. We find that the entrant communicates its plans to aggressively pursue radical innovation only if the incumbent’s market‐assessment capabilities are strong. In doing so, the entrant acts preemptively to discourage the incumbent from pursuing the radical innovation, and is less concerned with validating market potential.     

Venture Capital Exit Rights

We investigate when and how venture capital contracts use exit rights such as drag‐along and tag‐along rights. Utilizing a data set of venture capital contracts from Germany, we find that almost all contracts allocate exit rights to the venture capitalist (VC) rather than to the entrepreneur. In our data set, the vast majority of exit rights deal with the sale of the entire company to a strategic investors rather than with initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that venture capital contracts include exit rights to mitigate potential hold‐up problems of the VC in the case of exit.     

Exit problems in regime-switching models

This paper provides a general framework for pricing of perpetual American and real options in regime-switching Lévy models. In each state of the Markov chain, which determines switches from one Lévy process to another, the payoff stream is a monotone function of the Lévy process labeled by the state. This allows for additional switching within each state of the Markov chain (payoffs can be different in different regions of the real line). The pricing procedure is efficient even if the number of states is large provided the transition rates are not very large w.r.t. the riskless rates. The payoffs and riskless rates may depend on a state. Special cases are stochastic volatility models and models with stochastic interest rate; both must be modeled as finite-state Markov chains. As an application, we solve exit problems for a price-taking firm, and study the dependence of the exit threshold on the interest rate uncertainty.     

浅析经济适用房退出机制

经济适用房是国家建设的保障性住房,是解决中低收入者住房困难的有效办法,但是目前的经济适用房的退出机制不完善。本文首先解读经济适用房政策,分析经济适用房退出机制不健全使得住房保障资源缺乏累计倍增效应,最后得出必须建立政府优先回购经济适用房政策实行内循环。     

The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic Buying to Prevent Seller Exit

We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first‐period purchase decision not only depends on current period preferences and prices, but also on the potential effect that their behavior has on the probability of seller survival. Specifically, some buyers may choose to purchase from the seller with the lower survival probability even though they like the other seller's product better, a behavior that we call “strategic buying.” We analyze how the incidence of strategic buying depends on parameters and also the implications of the strategic buying motive for sellers' first‐period pricing decisions.     

Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets

Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions.     

The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.     

Opting-Out: the Constitutional Economics of Exit

The central aspect, which makes markets operate differently than governments, is the ability of market actors to "exit" from future interactions. This point is applied to constitutional analysis, with an emphasis on the constitutional possibility of individuals or groups in a society "exiting," wholly or partly, from the political community or from specific institutions within such. Hobbesian and Lockean states-of-nature are sketched using a common framework of some simple games, and the Lockean solution to the danger of tyranny is formalized. This solution is compared to the typical interaction in a market economy, where the possibility of "exit" from future interactions with disagreeable parties introduces severe restrictions on the possible exploitation. This analysis is extended to the political sphere, and it is argued in general terms that a constitutional set-up utilizing a semi-Lockean right to "exit" (e.g., federal structures with rights of secession, voucher systems, etc.) could be an efficient guarantee against sub-optimal solutions and function so as to reduce redistributive conflicts and make welfare-increasing transactions possible.     

Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals

I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.     

Exit and the Epistemic Quality of Voice

Debates over the relationship between exit and voice in politics have focused on the quantity of citizen voice and its effectiveness in influencing public decisions. The epistemic quality of voice, on the other hand, has received much less attention. This article uses rational choice theory to argue that public sector exit options can lead to more informed and less biased expressions of voice. Whereas voters have weak incentives to gather and process information, exit options provide sharper epistemic incentives to produce knowledge which can spill over into voting decisions. Exit can thus improve democratic competence.     

Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility

This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a ‘payment satisfaction’ effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge. RID="*" ID="*" Acknowledgments: We are indebted to Johann Graf Lambsdorff for calling our attention to Fujimori's gender policy and to Ernst Fehr, Bruno Frey, Alireza Jay Naghavi, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Authorware中返回控制与退出控制的实现

近年来，Authorware凭借着其强大的功能和友好的用户界面，日益被广泛应用到多媒体教学课件的开发与应用中，它不仅支持多种媒体信息，如文字、图像、动画、声音、视频等，而且具备强大的交互功能，使多媒体课件具有良好的人机交互界面，文章讨论在Authorware中，如何实现返回控制与程序的跳转和退出控制的设计与实现。     

新国美 寻找下一个出口

11月16日上午9点30分,中国永乐(0503.HK)在香港资本市场停止了买卖,其股价定格在2.19港元,市值为51.6亿港元,预计将于2007年1月底前退市。不难想象陈晓当时的心情。一周后,11月22日,国美永乐合并而成的新国美电器集团正式成立。在气氛隆重热烈的国美永乐合并庆典上,陈晓第一次正式以新国美集团总裁的身份出现在众人面前。此时的他身着国美统一的黑色西装,看上去与其他的国美人并无二致。从老板到经理人,陈晓遭遇了一次痛苦的转型。和陈晓一样,随着新国美的正式成立,不光是企业中的个人,包括新成立的国美电器集团本身都正在经历一场意义深远…     

Applying Game Options in a Loan Exit Model

This study explores market exit decisions of financial institutions into a duopolistic loan in the evaluation concept. A game options approach is used to analyze how uncertainty influences loan decisions. Suppose that the loan market only contains two financial institutions (the leader and follower), and these two roles can be chosen freely. The financial effect for outside shock follows the Poisson downward jump process, and the leader and follower exit the thresholds and are compared to the loan market in the continuous time diffusion process. This study obtains the following results: In the exiting model, the exit costs for the leader are influenced by those of the follower. If the ratio of the leader to follower exit costs is stable, the first-in-first-out or last-in-first-out optimal evaluation models are derived during two financial institutions exiting the loan market.     

Authorware中返回控制与退出控制的实现

近年来,Authorware凭借着其强大的功能和友好的用户界面,日益被广泛应用到多媒体教学课件的开发与应用中.它不仅支持多种媒体信息,如文字、图像、动画、声音、视频等,而且具备强大的交互功能,使多媒体课件具有良好的人机交互界面.,文章讨论在Authorware中,如何实现返回控制与程序的跳转和退出控制的设计与实现.     

基于相互威慑模型的国际工程索赔谈判博弈研究

随着我国世界经济地位的不断提升,国家地位差异对我国对外承包工程项目索赔谈判的影响变得越来越显著。在发生工期延误后,业主与承包商总会在工期索赔和费用索赔等方面产生冲突,解决冲突最好的方法就是协商谈判。论文通过对相互威慑模型和博弈论在索赔谈判中的应用分析,解析不对等经济地位下承包商与业主索赔的谈判过程,为双方在索赔谈判中作出科学合理的决策提供依据。     

Exit, selection, and the value of firms

This paper studies a competitive dynamic model with firm level uncertainty and derives implications for the distribution of firm values and Tobin's q. Allowing for entry and exit, the model determines endogenously the degree of selection. A consequence of this selection is that average industry q values are biased above one. As parameters describing the technology and firm level uncertainty are changed, the equilibrium distribution for q values changes. This comparative statics is developed in the paper.     

构建公共租赁住房退出循环机制的研究

在目前公共租赁住房政策框架体系下,公共租赁住房的退出循环机制的理论研究仍然比较匮乏。通过对南京、重庆、北京、郑州、深圳等省市当前公共租赁住房退出循环机制梳理分析,指出公共租赁住房退出机制设计的核心内容是:在要素制度设计上,从顶层设计的理念出发,构建多层次住房保障体系,在退出机制上,制定出一套规范的、可操作的退出程序,在约束机制上,就不同的违规行为采取不同手段的监督管理和罚则。     

环管型燃烧室出口温度场调试

燃烧室在完成设计定型前,要对其出口的温度分布情况进行评估,以判定是否满足涡轮部件的要求。如果未达到标准要求就需要对燃烧室的部件进行调整,这种调整主要集中在火焰筒和喷嘴的相关结构参数上,调整的幅度应控制在一定范围内,以避免影响燃烧室的其它性能指标。