Gender Bias in Education: the Role of Inter-household Externality, Dowry and other Social Institutions

We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two‐period model where women become part of extended families of their in‐laws. Each family decides how many sons and daughters are sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to internalize inter‐household externalities. “Groom‐specific” dowry worsens the situation. Under “bride‐specific” dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory “food‐for‐education” policy is shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment.     

Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?

Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices. We show that, although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent's incentive to pander, in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse. Furthermore, in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a “yes man”—suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice. We explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters' tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent, based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies.     

Local perfection

We investigate solution concepts for normal-form games with large strategy spaces. “Trembling hand” perfection (THP) is extended to games with compact metric strategy sets. A Nash equilibrium is THP if it is the limit of equilibria in which agents face vanishingly small uncertainty. We refine THP by imposing some structure on the kind of uncertainty that agents face: a THP equilibrium is locally perfect if the uncertainty is “predominantly local” in nature, i.e., if agents' probability assessments assign, in the limit, an overwhelmingly lage proportion of the total probability mass to events “in the vicinity of the truth.”     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.     

Natural disasters and electoral outcomes

Natural disasters are good examples of catastrophic events that may affect vote decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of earthquakes changes voters' behavior at municipal elections and which channels drive this change, focusing in particular on the role of media exposure. We exploit data from 13,338 municipal electoral cycles where incumbents seek reelection between 1993 and 2015 in Italy. We apply a difference-in-difference strategy with time and cities fixed effect to the probability of reelection and vote share using three different control groups: the universe of municipalities, a sub-sample of neighboring municipalities, and a sub-sample of municipalities identified by a one-to-one nearest-neighbor propensity score matching procedure. We find that the occurrence of destructive earthquakes significantly increases the incumbent mayors’ chance of being reelected and their vote share. We argue that this result is driven by the incumbent mayor advantage in offering recovery from disaster damages combined with a higher visibility on the media in the aftermath of the disaster. Thus, the mediatic relevance of earthquake occurrence may bias voters towards the incumbent.     

Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values

Hypothetical bias is a long‐standing issue in stated preference and contingent valuation studies—people tend to overstate their preferences when they do not experience the real monetary consequences of their decision. This view, however, has been challenged by recent evidence based on the elicitation of induced values (IV) in the lab and homegrown (HG) demand function from different countries. This paper uses an experimental design to assess the extent and relevance of hypothetical bias in demand elicitation exercises for both induced (IV) and homegrown (HG) values. For testbed purpose, we use a classic second‐price auction to elicit preferences. Comparing the demand curve we elicit in both, hypothetical bias unambiguously (i) vanishes in an IV, private good context and (ii) persists in HG values elicitation context. This suggests hypothetical bias in preference elicitation appears to be driven by “preference formation” rather than “preference elicitation.” In addition, companion treatments highlight two sources of the discrepancy observed in the HG setting: the hypothetical context leads bidders to underestimate the constraints imposed by their budget limitations, whereas the real context creates pressure leading them to bid “zero” to opt out from the elicitation mechanism. As a result, there is a need for a demand elicitation procedure that helps subjects take the valuation exercise sincerely, but without putting extra pressure on them.     

Home bias in divestment decisions of multinational corporations in the EU

We empirically investigate the claim that multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from a “home bias” in divestment decisions: MNCs prefer to divest from foreign subsidiaries because the “emotional involvement” and the commitment in divesting from domestic subsidiaries is larger. This issue has not been yet empirically explored in the economic literature, although it is quite recurrent in the political debate on MNCs and FDI. Using detailed company‐level data on the EU corporate groups during the economic crisis (2008–2014), we show that, in spite of prima facie empirical evidence of a home bias, the bias disappears when firm‐, country‐, and sector‐specific factors are accounted for.     

新兴市场国家国际资本流动“突然停止”的影响因素分析--基于金融脆弱性的视角

在金融全球化的背景下,脆弱的国内金融体系会波及国际资本市场,导致国际资本流动发生剧烈波动甚至“突然停止”。运用面板Probit模型考察1976-2012年22个新兴市场国家国际资本流动“突然停止”的影响因素,着重探讨一国金融脆弱性对国际资本流动“突然停止”的影响。实证研究结果表明：一国的金融脆弱性对国际资本流动“突然停止”具有显著的负影响;金融开放会放大一国的金融脆弱程度,进一步提高国际资本流动“突然停止”的发生概率。     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

A TEST BETWEEN STOCK‐FLOW MATCHING AND THE RANDOM MATCHING FUNCTION APPROACH*

This article tests between the standard “random matching function” approach and “stock‐flow” matching while controlling for temporal aggregation bias. Consistent with previous empirical work, the random matching function fits the matching data reasonably well. But match flows are more highly correlated with vacancy inflows than is consistent with the random matching approach. Instead the data support stock‐flow matching, where unemployed workers match directly with suitable new vacancies as such vacancies come on to the market.     

Origin of FDI and Intra‐Industry Domestic Spillovers: The Case of Greek and European FDI in Bulgaria

This paper uses firm‐level data to assess the horizontal impact of foreign firm ownership on domestic productivity in Bulgaria. We identify a theoretical tradeoff between technological distance (of domestic versus foreign firms) and internalization capacity (of spillovers) and examine the extent to which this is reflected in the impact on the domestic economy of different types and origins of FDI. Emphasis is placed upon the effects of Greek FDI, which is known to be of a distinctively “regional” character. We find that Greek FDI produces significantly larger positive spillovers, which appear more suitable for the Bulgarian context of transition and economic restructuring. We also unveil some notable “hysteresis” and “technology bias” effects for FDI spillovers of all origins, as well as some country‐specific ownership‐structure and threshold effects.     

Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation*

This paper examines if international trade can reduce total welfare in an international oligopoly with differentiated goods. We show that intra‐industry trade, i.e. “reciprocal dumping,” can result in lower total surplus than autarky in a Cournot model for any degree of product differentiation. Moreover, trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. Otherwise it unambiguously increases welfare.     

MEASURING THE ATTRIBUTES OF POVERTY AND ITS PERSISTENCE: A CASE STUDY OF ERITREA

This paper tries to identify the correlates of poverty in urban Eritrea using an estimation technique (the DOGEV model) that also allows for the inclusion of a measure of “persistence” in poverty levels from cross‐sectional estimation. The results suggest that 17 percent of the probability of being moderately poor and 22 percent of the probability of being extremely poor in Eritrea was attributable to this “persistence”—a predisposition toward poverty likely due to latent attributes related to past experience of poverty itself. The results also suggest that, in the post‐war economy of the mid‐1990s, those with vocational training fared best among all education groups. Being a war veteran also had a strong negative association with the poverty—reflecting successful attempts to support that group. The receipt of remittances also reduced the likelihood of poverty; though receipts from outside Eritrea had a much stronger effect than receipts from within Eritrea.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.     

Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly

This paper analyzes how a reduction in trade costs influences the possibility for firms to engage in international cartels, and hence how trade liberalization affects the degree of competition. We consider a particular intra‐industry trade model amended to allow for firms producing differentiated products. Our main finding is that trade liberalization may have an anti‐competitive effect. We find that there is no unique relation between a reduction in trade costs and the degree of competition. When products are differentiated, a lowering of trade costs is pro‐competitive if trade costs are initially high, but anti‐competitive if trade costs initially are low. Hence, trade policy is not necessarily a substitute for competition policy.     

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas**

This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.     

Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance

We analyze a symmetric model of an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is desirable for them. Each voter must incur some cost to acquire information about the alternatives. We show that by focusing on unbiased voting strategies, general symmetric signal structures can be degenerated to a two‐signal model. In addition, we show that for any sequence of unbiased voting equilibria, if the second‐order derivative of the information cost function at no information is zero, then the probability of electing the desirable alternative converges to one, that is, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is valid. Otherwise, this probability converges to some value less than one; that is, the “rational ignorance” hypothesis is valid.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Long‐Run PPP under the Presence of Near‐to‐Unit Roots: The Case of the British Pound–US Dollar Rate*

Empirical tests typically provide evidence that the British pound–US dollar exchange rate and the relative wholesale price index contain exact unit roots and exhibit cointegration. However, the cointegrating vector is significantly different from [1, ?1], thus raising doubts on the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis. Following Elliott (1998 ), we show that if the exchange rate and relative price series contain near‐to‐unit roots in the context of a bivariate system, then any inference on the “cointegrating” vector and consequently on PPP, which is based on standard cointegration estimation methods, will be misleading. We then argue that the existing evidence against the PPP hypothesis in the British pound–US dollar market can be attributed to the finite sample bias of the standard cointegration estimators, arising from an endogenous and “nearly” nonstationary regressor. We also show that when robust procedures are employed the evidence favors the PPP hypothesis.