公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险.选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异.研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱.     

Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance

Abstract:  We examine empirically the relationships amongst managerial entrenchment practices, social performance, and financial performance. We hypothesize that entrenched managers may collude with non-shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment strategy; this is particularly so in firms that have efficient internal control mechanisms. Moreover, we prove that the combination of entrenchment strategies and the implementation of socially responsible actions have particularly negative effects on financial performance. We test these contentions with a sample of 358 companies, from 22 different countries, for the period 2002–2005.     

Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study extends prior studies by examining how managerial ownership and external unrelated blockholdings affect the informativeness of earnings. The results are in contrast to prior studies. A non–linear relation exists between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness increases with managerial ownership at low levels but not at higher levels of managerial ownership where the entrenchment effect sets in. Consistent with the role of large shareholder monitoring, the evidence shows a strong positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings informativeness. These results are supported when income–increasing and absolute discretionary accruals are used to measure the extent of earnings management     

公司治理影响盈余管理的实证研究

尽管公司管理者有着各种各样的盈余管理动机,但是真正实施盈余管理行为会受到很多因素的影响,其中公司治理是最主要的影响因素。公司治理包括很多内容,本研究主要关注股权结构和董事会特征两方面与盈余管理之间的相关性。一般来讲,股权集中度与盈余管理呈正相关,董事会独立性与盈余管理呈负相关。本文在分析如何影响盈余管理的理论基础上,以2005至2009年我国上证180成分股为研究对象,提出研究假设并进行实证检验。结果显示,法人股比例、流通股比例与盈余管理呈现正相关关系,董事会特征则受制度影响,具有双重影响。文章最后,结合我国资本市场的实际提出相关建议。     

The Influence of Takeover Protection on Earnings Management

Abstract:  We examine the relationship between takeover protection and earnings management. Existing theories suggest two contradictory effects of takeover protection on opportunistic earnings management: entrenchment theory suggests an exacerbating effect, whereas both alignment theory and quiet life theory posit a mitigating effect. We find that takeover protection is associated with lower levels of abnormal working capital accruals, lower levels of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals and timelier recognition of losses. Further tests show that takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, which contradicts alignment theory but supports quiet life theory. The results suggest that takeover protection allows managers to enjoy the quiet life and thus mitigates earnings management.     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?

Abstract:   This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income‐increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. We also find that the chance of abnormal accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board members. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income‐decreasing abnormal accruals when pre‐managed earnings are high. We find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the extent of income‐increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds. Neither do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre‐managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.     

Ownership, Investor Protection and Earnings Expectations

Abstract:  This study examines the interactive influence of corporate ownership, corporate governance and investor protection on the incorporation of current value shocks in the accounting earnings of European companies. This influence is investigated not only by means of the association between current news and current earnings but also with respect to the association of the same news with expected future earnings, and its persistence. Consistent with the contractual explanation of accounting conservatism, it is shown that the accounting behaviour examined is a function of the demand created by shareholders, and that the institutional arrangements in force are of lesser significance in the presence of widely held ownership. On the other hand, greater separation between supervision and management and stronger investor protection are seen to be influential under close ownership, as these are shown to curb aggressive accounting in the form of a persistently lower recognition of bad news in earnings. Evidence is also provided that stricter corporate governance practices in Europe can substitute for weaknesses in investor protection provisions in law.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

What Causes Fraudulent Financial Reporting? Evidence Based on H Shares

This paper investigates fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) in the China-based companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (called H shares) in which Chinese government officials have a high degree of involvement and heavy impact on audit quality and corporate governance. It intends to find out the causes of FFR, the opportunities that make such reporting possible, and whether the presence of politically connected executives creates an environment that is conducive to FFR. The results show that the corporate environment most likely to lead to FFR is characterized by earnings management accounting practices.