Do REITs Manipulate Their Financial Results Around Seasoned Equity Offerings? Evidence from US Equity REITs

This study addresses two questions: Is there earnings management in the REIT industry around seasoned equity offerings (SEO)? How is earnings management affected by financial and governance factors? Discretionary accruals methods are used to measure earnings management. In addition, the difference between actual and calculated FFO is used to capture the potential FFO manipulation. We examine how these manipulation measures change in the five quarters around SEOs. Moreover, we investigate how a REIT’s earnings management decision is affected by its financial structure, operating style, external auditor and corporate governance. We find clear evidence of FFO manipulation around SEOs, but the extent of earnings management is relatively weaker. We find that REITs issuing SEOs more often are more aggressive in manipulating FFO than earnings. Moreover, there is a notable difference between these two types of financial results manipulation. A mean-reversion trend is found in discretionary accruals, but not for FFO manipulation. Manipulation in financial results is influenced by various factors. A diminished capability to generate cash flow, high leverage, volatile cash flow, frequent SEOs and slack corporate governance are all the features of REITs more likely to manipulate financial results.     

Are you in with the in crowd?

At the core of your company, there is a group of people who seem to call the shots--or, rather, all the shots seem to be called for their benefit. This core group can't be found on any organization chart. It exists in people's hearts and minds. It comprises the people whose perceived interests and needs are taken into account as decisions are made throughout the organization. In most companies, talking explicitly about this group is taboo; its existence seems to contradict the vital corporate premise that we all have a common stake in the firm's success. In the best organizations, the core group can be a resource: Members represent the unique values and knowledge that distinguish their companies. When core groups display independence, creativity, and power, the rest of the company follows. Such behavior on the part of the company, in turn, creates value for shareholders, especially over the long term. But because of the core group's enormous power, members need to make themselves aware of the signals they send, both intended and unintended. For better and for worse, the core group reinforces whatever it pays attention to. A core group member who casually mentions a product might well discover three weeks later that someone has spent $1 million introducing it. If you do not know who constitutes the core group in your organization, or what the members stand for, you may find that leading will be extremely difficult--even if you are ostensibly the person in charge. If you want to move the organization in a new direction, you may need to explicitly challenge the core group. Otherwise the rest of the organization will not go along.     

Are Initial Returns and Underwriting Spreads in Equity Issues Complements or Substitutes?

The objective of this paper is to analyze the joint behavior of underwriting spreads and initial returns on equity issues for a large sample of issues over a 21-year period. Traditional empirical approaches to the determination of these direct and indirect issuing costs view them as independent. Using a three-stage least squares approach, we find these costs to be positively and significantly related. In the case of seasoned equity offerings, our results are robust to replacing initial returns with the offer price discount. We also find that low quality issuers are charged higher underwriting spreads and initial returns when compared to high quality issuers.     

Are Too Many Private Equity Funds Top Quartile?

Assessing investment performance for private equity is inherently difficult due in large part to the nature of illiquid assets. Compounding this problem, investors and researchers alike are bedeviled by the existing lack of comprehensive, high‐quality data. The current state of affairs obscures answers to basic practical questions, leads to lack of standardization, and creates confusion. This paper examines measurements of “top quartile” performance, a status widely prized in the industry, especially in light of past research showing return persistence by funds raised by the same general partner. Using three popular data sources and applying metrics typically adopted in the industry, the authors demonstrate that even modest variations in methods can result in half of all funds being able to claim “top quartile” results. Sources of variation include methods of categorizing funds, definitions of vintage year, choice of the data source, specification of performance metrics, and treatment of geography and currencies.     

Are Financial Markets Overly Optimistic about the Prospects of Firms That Issue Equity? Evidence from Voluntary versus Involuntary Equity Issuances by Banks

This paper examines firm performance around announcements of common stock issues. We study the banking industry in which some stock issues are made voluntarily by managers, and other issues are involuntary. We find that banks that voluntarily issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted operating performance following the issue, a significant drop in benchmark firms' adjusted stock prices following the issue, and systematically negative market reactions to post-issue quarterly earnings announcements. Banks that issue common stock involuntarily experience values for these measures that are not significantly different from those of the benchmark firm(s).     

How Much Are Car Purchases Driven by Home Equity Withdrawal?

Previous research indicates that changes in housing wealth affect consumer spending on cars. We find that home equity extraction plays only a small role in this relationship. Consumers rarely use funds from equity extraction to purchase a car directly, even during the mid‐2000s’ housing boom; this finding holds across three nationally representative household surveys. We find in credit bureau data that equity extraction does lead to a statistically significant increase in auto loan originations, consistent with equity extraction easing borrowing constraints in the auto loan market. This channel, though, accounts for only a tiny share of overall car purchases.     

Dose Executives’ Equity Ratio Affect the EVA Assessment in Central Enterprises?

Since 2010, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter SASAC) started the full implementation of the EVA evaluation system in central enterprises. Our research finds out that the central enterprises have obvious acted to meet the EVA assessment, that is, executives intentionally regulate major EVA adjustments to gain a higher EVA performance. We also find that the factor of shareholding rate of executives may in some extent weaken the effect of the EVA assessment and there shows a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relation between shareholding rate and each adjustment indicator.     

Do Convertible Bond Issuers Cater to Investor Demand?

We examine the impact of fluctuations in investor demand for convertible securities on convertible bond issue volumes, pricing, and design. We find evidence of a positive impact of investor demand proxies on convertible bond issue volumes. We also document significantly lower convertible bond underpricing in periods with higher investor demand. The results hold in a variety of specifications, and are robust to controlling for firm‐specific and macroeconomic financing cost proxies. However, we obtain only limited evidence that issuers adjust the design of their convertible bond offerings in response to investor demand.     

Demand collapse or credit crunch to firms? Evidence from the World Bank's financial crisis survey in Eastern Europe

This paper assesses whether the primary effect of the global crisis on Eastern European firms took the form of an adverse demand shock or a credit crunch. Using a unique firm survey conducted by the World Bank in six Eastern European countries during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the paper shows that the drop in demand for firms' products and services was overwhelmingly reported as the most damaging adverse effect of the crisis. Other “usual suspects”, such as rising debt or reduced access to credit, were reported as minor. The paper also finds that the changes in firms' sales and installed capacity are significantly and robustly correlated with different demand sensitivity measures of the sector in which the firms operate. However, they are not robustly correlated with various proxies for firms' credit needs.     

Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms' disclosurepolicy and of their financial analysts' coverage on stock priceabnormal reactions to the publication of the annual reports.It first shows that, after controlling for the number of analysts,the absolute abnormal returns are significantly and positivelyaffected by the rating measure used as a proxy of the informationalquality of annual reports. It furthermore emphasises asymmetryin the relationship between stock price abnormal reactions andtwo informational variables, namely the quality of the firm'sdisclosure policy and its financial analysts' coverage. It appearsthat while positive abnormal returns are significantly and positivelyrelated to the rating variable, negative abnormal returns areonly affected by the number of financial analysts. The inverserelationship between abnormal negative returns and the financialanalysts' coverage supports the fact that competition amonganalysts reduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally,the study evidences a non-linear relationship between ratingand positive abnormal returns which is meaningful for the "good"and "very good type" firms and thus emphasises the signalingrole played by a firm's financial disclosure policy.     

Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds

Private equity funds are important to the economy, yet there is little analysis explaining their financial structure. In our model the financial structure minimizes agency conflicts between fund managers and investors. Relative to financing each deal separately, raising a fund where the manager receives a fraction of aggregate excess returns reduces incentives to make bad investments. Efficiency is further improved by requiring funds to also use deal-by-deal debt financing, which becomes unavailable in states where internal discipline fails. Private equity investment becomes highly sensitive to aggregate credit conditions and investments in bad states outperform investments in good states.     

Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms'disclosure policy and of their financial analysts'coverage on stock price abnormal reactions to thepublication of the annual reports. It first showsthat, after controlling for the number of analysts,the absolute abnormal returns are significantly andpositively affected by the rating measure used as aproxy of the informational quality of annual reports.It furthermore emphasises asymmetry in therelationship between stock price abnormal reactionsand two informational variables, namely the quality ofthe firm's disclosure policy and its financialanalysts' coverage. It appears that while positiveabnormal returns are significantly and positivelyrelated to the rating variable, negative abnormalreturns are only affected by the number of financialanalysts. The inverse relationship between abnormalnegative returns and the financial analysts' coveragesupports the fact that competition among analystsreduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally,the study evidences a non-linear relationship betweenrating and positive abnormal returns which ismeaningful for the ``good' and ``very good type' firmsand thus emphasises the signaling role played by afirm's financial disclosure policy.     

Are regime-shift sources of risk priced in the market?

In this paper we develop a discrete-time pricing model for European options where the log-return of the underlying asset is subject to discontinuous regime shifts in its mean and/or volatility which follow a Markov chain. The model allows for multiple regime shifts whose risk cannot be hedge out and thus must be priced in option market. The paper provides estimates of the price of regime-shift risk coefficients based on a joint estimation procedure of the Markov regime-switching process of the underlying stock and the suggested option pricing model. The results of the paper indicate that bull-to-bear and bear-to-crash regime shifts carry substantial prices of risk. Risk averse investors in the markets price these regime shifts by assigning higher transition (switching) probabilities to them under the risk neutral probability measure than under the physical. Ignoring these sources of risk will lead to substantial option pricing errors. In addition, the paper shows that investors also price reverse regime shifts, like the crash-to-bear and bear-to-bull ones, by assigning smaller transition probabilities under the risk neutral measure than the physical. Finally, the paper evaluates the pricing performance of the model and indicates that it can be successfully employed, in practice, to price European options.     

Trading the forward bias: Are there limits to speculation?

In this paper we investigate whether trading the forward bias allows for economically significant excess returns. We find that bias-trading strategies can be viewed as attractive investment opportunities per se, useful diversification devices, and promising portfolio extensions for active fund managers trying to beat their benchmarks. The empirical results, which also mirror the problems arising in attempts to explain the puzzle by risk-premia, are consistent with market evidence that the bias is traded in practice. Overall, our findings suggest that limits to speculation are unlikely to provide a (stand-alone) explanation for the persistence of the forward bias.     

Are capital controls in the foreign exchange market effective?

One of the reasons for governments to employ capital controls is to obtain some degree of monetary independence. In this paper we test whether capital controls can reduce the link between exchange rates fluctuations and cross border interest differentials. Recent capital control proxies are used in order to determine the date of capital account liberalization for a panel of Western European and emerging countries. Results show that capital controls have a very limited effect on observed deviations from interest parities, even when accounting for the political risk associated with capital controls.     

Are Stocks Really Less Volatile in the Long Run?

According to conventional wisdom, annualized volatility of stock returns is lower over long horizons than over short horizons, due to mean reversion induced by return predictability. In contrast, we find that stocks are substantially more volatile over long horizons from an investor's perspective. This perspective recognizes that parameters are uncertain, even with two centuries of data, and that observable predictors imperfectly deliver the conditional expected return. Mean reversion contributes strongly to reducing long‐horizon variance but is more than offset by various uncertainties faced by the investor. The same uncertainties reduce desired stock allocations of long‐horizon investors contemplating target‐date funds.     

Are the bankrupt skies the friendliest?

We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether firms that are under bankruptcy protection, as well as these firm's product market rivals, change the quality of the products they offer. We measure the quality of the services offered by a carrier using flight cancelations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We find that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. We also find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to permanently reduce the age of their fleet. We do not find evidence of statistically and economically significant changes by the airline's competitors along any of the dimensions above.     

Are there arbitrage gaps in the UK gilt strips market?

Evidence in financial markets of an opportunity for pure arbitrage, and therefore a violation of the law of one price, is considered an anomaly to be noted. This paper reports an apparent violation of the law of one price between UK government gilts and their separately traded principal and coupon strips over a sample period of nearly 14 years. There are persistent price differences, and hence opportunities for arbitrage, after allowance for the bid-ask spread; the strips package tends to be overpriced in relation to the corresponding gilt. The price differences may, in part, be due to a lack of liquidity and stale prices in the strips market.     

Are idiosyncratic volatility and MAX priced in the Canadian market?

The negative relationship between realized idiosyncratic volatility (RIvol) and future returns uncovered by Ang et al. (2006) for the U.S. market has been attributed to return reversals. For the Canadian market where return reversals are considerably less important, we find that RIvol is positively related to future returns, even after controlling for risk loadings, illiquidity and reversals. Unlike the findings of Bali et al. (2001) for the U.S. market, we find that the relationship between extreme positive returns (MAX) and future returns for the Canadian market is positive and that idiosyncratic volatility continues to be consistently positively related to future returns after controlling for MAX. We find evidence that suggests that reversals for stocks with extreme daily returns are confined to (typically small) stocks with low institutional holdings.     

Are extreme returns priced in the stock market? European evidence

This paper revisits some recently found evidence in the literature on the cross-section of stock returns for a carefully constructed dataset of euro area stocks. First, we confirm recent results for US data and find evidence of a negative cross-sectional relation between extreme positive returns and average returns after controlling for characteristics such as momentum, book-to-market, size, liquidity and short term return reversal. We argue that this is the case because these stocks have lottery-like characteristics, which is attractive to certain investors. Also, these stocks tend to be very volatile so that arbitrageurs are discouraged from correcting potential mispricing. As a consequence, these stocks are often overpriced and hence face lower expected returns. Second, when we control for extreme returns, the recently found negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and future returns is less robust. In our models, after adding maximum returns, the relationship is insignificant and sometimes even positive. We also find that idiosyncratic skewness and coskewness play an important role for asset pricing, as predicted by several theoretical models.