Tax Deferral and Mutual Fund Inflows: Evidence from a Quasi‐Natural Experiment

We propose a new method to identify the impact of a change in the tax burden on mutual fund inflows. We use quasi‐experimental data from Italy where, starting from July 2011, the tax regime for domestic mutual funds was changed from an accruals basis to a realisation basis, while the taxation of foreign funds remained on a realisation basis. We find that the reform has had a positive effect on net inflows of Italian funds (the treated group) with respect to foreign funds (the control group). The effect is both economically and statistically significant. Moreover, there is no evidence that the increase in the demand for Italian funds came at the expense of foreign funds.     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

We examine how U.S. individuals respond to regulation intended to reduce offshore tax evasion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires foreign financial institutions to report information to the U.S. government regarding U.S. account holders. We first document an average $7.8 billion to $15.3 billion decrease in equity foreign portfolio investment to the United States from tax-haven countries after FATCA implementation, consistent with a decrease in “round-tripping” investments attributable to U.S. investors’ offshore tax evasion. When testing total worldwide investment out of financial accounts in tax havens post-FATCA, we find an average decline of $56.6 billion to $78.0 billion. We next provide evidence of other important consequences of this regulation, including increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and greater investment in alternative assets not subject to FATCA reporting, such as residential real estate and artwork. Our study contributes to both the academic literature and policy analysis on regulation, tax evasion, and crime.     

Anticipating Tax Changes: Evidence from the Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform of 2005*

Using register‐based panel data covering all Finnish firms from 1999 to 2004, we examine how corporations anticipated the 2005 dividend tax increase via changes in their dividend and investment policies. The Finnish capital and corporate income tax reform of 2005 creates a useful opportunity to measure this behaviour, since it involves exogenous variation in the tax treatment of different types of firms. The estimation results reveal that those firms that anticipated a dividend tax hike increased their dividend payouts in a statistically significant way. This increase was not accompanied by a reduction in investment activities, but rather was associated with increased indebtedness in non‐listed firms. The results also suggest that the timing of dividend distributions probably offsets much of the potential for increased dividend tax revenue following the reform.     

Information system and corporate income tax enforcement: Evidence from China

This paper adds the literature by investigating the effect of information system on corporate income tax (CIT) enforcement. We exploit the regional variations generated by the implementation in 2013 of the third stage of the China Tax Administration Information System (CTAIS-3) pilot. The CTAIS-3 is a nationally unified information system that significantly reduces information asymmetry between different tax authorities across regions. We find that the CTAIS-3 pilot significantly reduced firms’ conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance. The enhanced tax enforcement is particularly prominent if a firm is of a smaller size, or is administrated by the State Administration of Taxation, or is a non-state-owned enterprises, or locates in cities with a higher level of local fiscal pressure. Furthermore, we show that the CTAIS-3 improved the CIT enforcement by deterring firms from underreporting accounts receivable, as well as over-reporting accounts payable, inventory and the number of employees. In general, it would be more difficult for firms to hide profits from tax authorities under the CTAIS-3.     

When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information,Peer Effects and Tax Compliance

In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their ‘neighbours’, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this ‘neighbour’ information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.     

Attitudes towards Tax Levels: A Multi‐Tax Comparison*

We analyse Swedes' opinions about the levels of 11 different taxes to see which taxes people are most averse to and why. The most unpopular tax is the real estate tax, while the corporate tax is the least unpopular. We find a strong self‐interest effect in tax attitudes and that knowledge and education increase support for corrective taxes.     

论我国税收强制执行制度之完善

税收强制执行是税收征管程序中最为严厉的程序,是税收强制性特征最突出的表现,是保证税收得以实现的最后的但是又行之有效的措施,在各国的税收征收法律制度中均有明确的规定。然而税收强制执行直接关系到纳税人的利益,因此在对进行的税收强制执行规定中应当充分考虑国家利益与纳税人利益。我国《税收征管法》中虽然也建立了税收强制执行制度,但是在实践中该制度存在许多困惑,本文试图通过比较研究,探讨税收强制执行制度的进一步完善。     

Tax Evasion,Investment Shocks,and the Consumption Puzzle: A DSGE Analysis with Financial Frictions

Recent studies identify Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) shocks as important drivers of the business cycle. However, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models struggle to explain macroeconomic comovements between consumption and the key real variables after a MEI shock. Moreover, engaging in tax evasion practices is often an answer to financial constraints, which have been recognized as important determinants of cyclical fluctuations as well. We use a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model, that combines tax evasion with financial frictions, to simulate a MEI shock. We show that entrepreneurial tax evasion can solve the comovement problem to a fair extent.     

Multi‐Factor Effective Corporate Taxation,Firms’ Mark‐Ups and Tax Incidence: Evidence from OECD Countries

This paper provides novel evidence on the multi‐factor effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for a sample of 17 OECD countries and 11 manufacturing sectors. We use a single framework encompassing capital, labour and energy taxes. Our cross‐country/cross‐sector approach allows us to analyse the contributions of these input factors to the effective tax borne by firms, taking explicitly into account their degree of substitution, their tax incidence and the role of mark‐ups. We find that the labour tax plays a particularly important role in the overall level of the EMTR and that the presence of mark‐ups can significantly alter the levels of the multi‐factor EMTR, although without significantly altering the ranking of countries. We also find that the bulk of the variation in EMTRs is across countries, rather than across sectors (within countries).     

The Distributional Implications of Income Under‐Reporting in Hungary*

The ability and inclination of specific social groups to evade tax vary widely, and this leads to considerable variation in the actual tax burden on individuals with similar levels of income. Thus, ignoring tax evasion can be seriously misleading in terms of the distributive and fiscal effects of the tax system. This paper estimates the distributional implications of income tax evasion in Hungary, based on a random sample of the administrative tax records of nearly 230,000 individuals. Gross incomes declared in the administrative tax returns are compared with incomes stated in a nationally representative household budget survey. Our estimates show that the average rate of underreporting is 9–13 per cent, though this conceals a big difference between the self‐employed (who hide the greater part of their income) and employees. The estimates are likely to be lower bounds. These rates are used in a tax– benefit microsimulation model to calculate the fiscal and distributional implications of under‐reporting. Tax evasion reduces households' personal income tax payments by about 16–20 per cent. While the poverty rate increases only slightly, income inequality rises significantly, suggesting that high‐income households tend to evade tax proportionately more. Finally, we find that tax evasion largely reduces the progressivity of the tax system.     

The Effect of Financial Incentives on Labour Supply: Evidence for Lone Parents from Microsimulation and Quasi‐Experimental Evaluation*

The aim of this paper is to analyse the work incentive effects of a change in the Australian tax and transfer system on lone parents in July 2000. To evaluate the effect of the total change only, microsimulation can be used; but for a subgroup of lone parents, a few components of this policy change can be analysed through two alternative approaches — microsimulation and quasi‐experimental evaluation. Both approaches examine the effects on the probability of employment and on average working hours. The results from microsimulation show that the combined changes introduced in July 2000 — involving reduced withdrawl rates, changed family payments and lower income tax rates — have increased labour supply for lone parents to a moderate extent. The estimated effect on average working hours when using microsimulation is very close to the effect estimated in a quasi‐experimental approach using matching techniques to control for alternative influences.     

Measuring the Cost‐Effectiveness of an R&D Tax Credit for the UK

This paper investigates the economic impact of the government's proposed new UK R&D tax credit. We measure the benefit of the credit by the effect on value added in the short and long runs. This is simulated from existing econometric estimates of the tax‐price elasticity of research and development (R&D) and the effect of R&D on productivity. For the latter, we allow R&D to have an effect on technology transfer (catching up with the technological frontier) as well as innovation (pushing the frontier forward). We then compare the increase in value added to the likely exchequer costs of the programme under a number of scenarios. In the long run, the increase in GDP far outweighs the costs of the tax credit. The short‐run effect is far smaller, with value added only exceeding cost if R&D grows at or below the rate of inflation.     

The Effectiveness of White‐Collar Crime Enforcement: Evidence from the War on Terror

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in regulatory priorities and resource allocation on criminal enforcement of white‐collar criminal activities. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a shock to the FBI's priorities and allocation of investigative resources, as well as variation in the Muslim population in the United States, I examine whether prioritization of counterterrorism investigations after 9/11 is associated with weaker enforcement of laws targeting white‐collar crime. I then use a difference‐in‐differences estimation to study the magnitude of any increase in white‐collar crime resulting from reduced oversight. I find a significantly greater reduction in white‐collar criminal cases referred by FBI field offices that shifted more of their investigative focus away from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism. Further, geographic areas in the jurisdictions of FBI field offices with greater shifts in attention from white‐collar crime to counterterrorism experienced greater increases in wire fraud, illegal insider‐trading activities, and fraud within financial institutions.     

Tax avoidance in government-owned firms: Evidence from Italy

This paper studies whether and why government-owned firms avoid taxation to a greater extent than wholly privately-owned firms do. By considering a sample of Italian listed corporations for the period between 2006 and 2011, it was found that government ownership had a systematically negative effect on corporate effective tax rate, with a prevalence of tax-planning policies focused on the long term. Managers of local government-owned firms focused on minimizing costs, even if this was to the detriment of national tax-revenue collection.     

Deductio’ ad absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations

I study large charitable stock gifts by Chairmen and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of public companies. These gifts, which are not subject to insider trading law, often occur just before sharp declines in their companies’ share prices. This timing is more pronounced when executives donate their own shares to their own family foundations. Evidence related to reporting delays and seasonal patterns suggests that some CEOs fraudulently backdate stock gifts to increase personal income tax benefits. CEOs’ family foundations hold donated stock for long periods rather than diversifying, permitting CEOs to continue voting the shares.     

Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations

We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.     

Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues

Using a new measure of financial constraints based on firms’ qualitative disclosures, we find that financially constrained firms—firms that use more negative words in their annual reports—pursue more aggressive tax planning strategies as evidenced by: (1) higher current and future unrecognized tax benefits, (2) lower short‐ and long‐run current and future effective tax rates, (3) increase in tax haven usage for their material operations, and (4) higher proposed audit adjustments from the Internal Revenue Service. We exploit the unexpected closures of local banks as exogenous liquidity shocks to show that firms’ external financial constraints affect their tax avoidance strategies. Overall, the linguistic cues in firms’ qualitative disclosures provide incremental information beyond traditional accounting variables or commonly used effective tax rates to reveal and predict tax aggressiveness, both contemporaneously and in the future.     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Institutional Environments,and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from a Subnational Comparison in China

We examine the association between mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and economic contribution (tax payments) in China, where we expect this association to be affected by a region's institutional attributes. Exploiting a dataset that shows cross-regional variations in institutions, we find that in regions with lower institutional quality, firms claiming to be socially responsible actually avoid taxes, whereas CSR disclosure in other regions is more aligned with the social responsibility aspect of tax compliance. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that in the absence of proper institutions, CSR disclosure is likely to remain a form of window dressing.