贷款转让对道德风险监督的影响研究

贷款转让是银行可规避诸多监管而获得低成本流动性的一种有效途径。本文以控制借款人道德风险为目的,采用效用函数分析了不同贷款转让情景下银行监督水平的最优选择。研究结果表明,贷款转让比例越高,边际收益递减阻碍了银行监督水平,可能扩大借款人的道德风险。投资者承担合理监督成本是激励银行实施最优监督水平的一条有效措施。除了承担合理监督成本外,贷款投资者对贷款的合理定价也是激励银行监督借款人的一个重要积极因素。     

资本监管、风险承担与货币政策传导机制——研究综述与展望

频频爆发的银行危机暴露了以资本监管为核心的巴塞尔协议的内在缺陷,学术界就资本监管的微观效应和宏观效应展开了激烈的讨论.从文献研究的角度,通过回顾和分析理论界关于资本监管、银行风险承担和货币政策传导机制三者之间复杂关系的研究,可以看出,在微观意义上,关于资本监管对银行风险承担行为影响的研究忽视了对资本监管框架效应的分析;在宏观意义上,资本监管的强化给货币政策传导机制带来了新的渠道,即银行资本渠道和风险承担渠道.这两种新的传导机制在后金融危机时代,是研究宏观审慎监管框架下货币政策效应的核心命题.     

内部监督、监管替代与银行价值

本文以银行内部监督为例,通过建立一个简单模型并进行实证检验,深入研究了监管对内部治理机制的替代关系及其对银行价值的影响。研究结果表明,监管确实改变了银行内部监督机制,产生了监管替代。监管对内部监督进而对银行价值的影响较为复杂,不同监管措施的影响存在差异。事前严格的监管降低了内部监督强度,对银行价值产生负面影响;事中监管监督的影响取决于对内部监督的替代程度,当替代效应大时会降低银行价值,反之,当替代效应小时则会提高银行价值。监管替代的存在表明良好的银行公司治理有赖于恰当的监管政策。为减少监管过度替代带来的问题,我国现行由监管部门主导银行改革的监管政策需要作出调整。     

An Analysis of Bank Charter Value and Its Risk-Constraining Incentives

Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions.     

A development bank’s choice of private equity partner: a behavioural game-theoretic approach*

ABSTRACT

We develop a formal game-theoretic analysis of the economic (value-adding abilities) and behavioural factors (empathy, emotional excitement, passion) affecting a development bank’s choice of private-equity partner when investing into emerging market entrepreneurship. Triple-sided moral hazard (TSMH) problems occur in the form of effort-shirking, since the bank, the PE-manager, and the entrepreneur all contribute to value-creation. The bank’s investment choices are crucially affected by a) the relative abilities and the potential level of empathy, excitement and passion that may be generated between a PE-manager and an entrepreneur, and b) the personal emotional attachment that the bank develops towards a PE. The severity of TSMH increases inefficiencies in decision-making. Finally, we consider, in addition to political risk mitigation, an additional impact that the bank may have on PE/E value-creation: the bank may have a coaching/mentoring role. Our analysis has implications for academics and practitioners alike.     

银行监管的理论研究

银行体系自身具有内在的脆弱性;自然垄断、外部效应和信息不对称等问题又导致金融市场的失灵;银行业在经营中必然存在一定的道德风险。上述原因使得银行监管成为一种必要,有效的监管有利于防范金融风险的发生。     

存款保险法律制度利弊之研究

存款保险法律制度是直接针对银行挤兑和破产倒闭而设计的,目的在于保护存款人的利益,增强公众对银行体系的信心,减少挤兑的可能性。我国建立该制度,将有利于维护金融安全,营造公平竞争的市场环境,完善银行的退出机制,从而提高金融业的效率。     

我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险治理研究

道德风险普遍存在于商业银行经营管理之中,严重影响银行的稳健经营和持续发展。本文回顾了道德风险治理的基本理论,探讨了我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险的主要表现、治理经验和监管新原则。文章认为,产权主体缺位、激励机制不当、政府隐性担保以及社会信用缺失是诱发我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险的主要因素。最后文章结合我国实际,从完善公司治理、实施激励相容监管、强化市场约束和文化建设等方面,提出了我国国有(控股)商业银行道德风险治理的建议,以提高防范和控制银行道德风险的能力和水平。     

Dividend policy under conditions of capital market and signaling equilibria

This article develops a generalized capital asset pricing model with dividend signaling under the assumption of asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outside investors. The generalized capital asset pricing model is derived under reasonably plausible conditions that are sufficient for the existence of dividends. The model provides a theoretical framework for testing the effect of dividends on equity price and returns. Further, if dividends serve as a credible signal and the cost of signaling is positive, paying higher dividends results in higher systematic risk.     

Does Branch Religiosity Influence Bank Risk‐Taking?

Using branch‐level data on public and private US banking institutions, we investigate the importance of branch religiosity in shaping bank risk‐taking behavior. Our results show robust evidence that branch religiosity is negatively related to bank risk‐taking. This effect persists after controlling for several bank‐level and county‐level variables that might correlate with religiosity. Moreover, this result is robust to controlling for headquarter religiosity, suggesting that the effect of branch religiosity is additive and not washed out by headquarter religiosity. Overall, our findings document that headquarter religiosity does not capture the full effect of religiosity on bank behavior, as claimed by previous research, but that the religiosity of the geographic area in which the bank operates significantly influences bank behavior.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。     

Risk aversion vs. individualism: what drives risk taking in household finance?

Despite a considerable premium on equity with respect to risk-free assets, many households do not own stocks. We ask why the prevalence of stockholding is so limited. We focus on individuals’ attitudes toward risk and identify relevant factors that affect the willingness to take financial risks. Our empirical evidence contradicts standard portfolio theory, as it does not indicate a significant relationship between risk aversion and financial risk taking. However, our analysis supports the behavioral view that psychological factors rooted in national culture affect portfolio choice. Individualism, which is linked to overconfidence and overoptimism, has a significantly positive effect on financial risk taking. In microdata from Germany and Singapore, as well as in cross-country data, we find evidence consistent with low levels of individualism being an important factor in explaining the limited participation puzzle.     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。