共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Anna Elsilä 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2015,42(9-10):1188-1215
In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit. 相似文献
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We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs. 相似文献
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Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions. 相似文献
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This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability. 相似文献
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Hui Liang James 《Review of Financial Economics》2020,38(2):275-299
This study investigates the association between CEO age and corporate tax planning. Using a sample of 11,537 firm‐year observations from the fiscal year 1997–2013, I find CEO age exerts an economically significant influence on firms’ tax policies, incremental to economic determinants identified in prior research. Specifically, CEO age is positively related to cash and GAAP effective tax rates, and negatively related to permanent book‐tax difference, suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to take actions to lower tax burden. The results hold across different model specifications and robustness tests to address potential bias arising from endogeneity, sample selection issue, and the confounding effect of CEO tenure. 相似文献
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Yangyang Chen Cameron Truong Madhu Veeraraghavan 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2015,42(7-8):915-946
In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices (deltas) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility (vegas) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation. 相似文献
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We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare. 相似文献
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Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)‐backed initial public offering companies, we examine how a third‐party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower's PE firm enables the lead bank to retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE‐bank relationship also attracts greater foreign bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank's relationship with a large equity holder of the borrower facilitates information production in lending. 相似文献
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本文认为我国中小企业信贷市场上市场机制与竞争机制在运行中存在着缺陷,这是造成中小企业贷款难的一个本质原因,从而建议在中小企业贷款的设计中,从借贷两方引入合作机制,即贷款辛迪加和借款者联盟。以这种战略联盟的方式解决信息不对称,并起到节约交易成本的作用,在现有条件下弥补竞争机制运行中的缺陷,突破中小企业信贷的瓶颈。 相似文献
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Tu Nguyen 《The Financial Review》2018,53(2):255-300
Using scaled wealth‐performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross‐sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long‐term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three‐stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options‐based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long‐term economic benefits. 相似文献
13.
Elizabeth Webb 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(1):5-20
This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using
a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance
sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from
competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance
and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure
by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.
相似文献
Elizabeth WebbEmail: |
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The literature on the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk‐taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk‐shifting. 相似文献
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MANTHOS D. DELIS IFTEKHAR HASAN NIKOLAOS MYLONIDIS 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2017,49(1):187-213
To study the presence of a risk‐taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk‐taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply‐side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk‐taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk‐taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations. 相似文献
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Roshanthi Dias 《Accounting & Finance》2021,61(1):847-884
This study investigates the link between capital regulation and bank risk‐taking. Using a sample of over 1,800 banks in 135 countries, I find that the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk‐taking (measured by z‐score) is an inverse ‘U’ shape. That is, as capital ratios increase, a bank will take less risk initially, then more risk. These results are robust to numerous additional tests, including estimation methods. I also find that more stringent regulations mitigate the effect of higher capital on lowering bank risk‐taking. Increased capital requirements, even when risk‐based, induce risk‐taking at higher levels, irrespective of whether banks are well‐ or under‐capitalised. 相似文献
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This study investigates the corporate risk‐taking and the performance consequences at different stages of the firm life cycle. We find that risk‐taking is higher in the introduction and decline stages of the life cycle, but lower in the growth and mature stages. We also find that risk‐taking during introduction and decline stage (growth and maturity stage) affects future performance adversely (positively). We also document that managerial risk‐taking propensities increase during periods of high investor sentiment and firms in different life cycle stages respond to sentiment differently. Collectively, these results suggest that the firm life cycle has explanatory power for corporate risk‐taking behaviour. 相似文献
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We examine the determinants of high‐interest entrusted loans in China from the perspective of corporate risk‐taking. The results of a baseline model illustrate that the propensity to offer high‐interest entrusted loans increases with loose monetary policies, corporate cash holdings and firm age, and it decreases with firm size and growth opportunity. These findings support the claim that firms offer high‐interest entrusted loans mainly for short‐term profits. Other determining factors include CEO behavior traits, market imperfections and the intensity of corporate governance. Specifically, market imperfections create an opportunity for risk‐taking while CEO behavior and the intensity of corporate governance affect a firm's tendency to take risk and engage in high‐interest entrusted loans. 相似文献
20.
The financial intermediation literature on small business lending focuses on the determinants and costs to credit access.
There is, however, little research examining the repayment behavior of small firms that actually receive loans. In this paper,
we address this shortcoming in the literature by examining the default behavior of a sample of Small Business Administration
7(a) guaranteed loans with three distinct maturity structures. We employ a discrete-time hazard approach and show that SBA
defaults are time-dependent and that the factors impacting default behavior, as well as its timing, are maturity specific.
Specifically, we show the importance of loan maturity, seasoning, economic conditions, and other firm-specific factors in
predicting the likelihood of SBA loan defaults.
JEL classification: G21 相似文献