Cross-Generation Correlations of Union Status for Young People in Britain

This paper investigates whether young people whose fathers are union members are themselves more likely to join a union. We find that young people with unionized fathers are twice as likely to be unionized as those with non‐union fathers; this rises to three times higher for those whose fathers are active in the union. This supports the idea that socialization within the family plays a role in encouraging union membership. It is not the case that the cross‐generation correlations we observe are driven by common within‐family characteristics (like occupation, industry and political persuasion) that are strongly related to union membership.     

The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.     

Workplace Flexibilities,Job Satisfaction and Union Membership in the US Workforce

Using individual‐level data from the 2008 National Study of the Changing Workforce, we quantify how workers' job satisfaction levels correlate with five schedule‐based workplace flexibilities. The data permit us to control for numerous variables that might otherwise explain variation in the probability of job satisfaction, including, but not limited to, income, benefits, stress, depression, job control and individual preferences over flexibilities. Conditional on this control set, we find that workplace flexibilities correlate with an 8.1 per cent increase in job satisfaction. The relationship between job satisfaction and workplace flexibilities prevails through several sensitivity analyses, bias assessments and a propensity score matching analysis. We also explore how job satisfaction, union membership and workplace flexibilities intermix; we find that workplace flexibilities may function as a partial substitute for union membership.     

A Meta‐Analysis of the Union–Job Satisfaction Relationship

The purpose of this study is to provide a systematic and quantitative review of the existing empirical evidence on the effects of unionization on overall job satisfaction. We conducted a meta‐regression analysis (MRA) with results from a pool of 235 estimates from 59 studies published between 1978 and 2015. The accumulated evidence indicates that unionization is negatively related to job satisfaction but is far from being conclusive. When primary studies control for endogeneity of union membership, the results of the MRA indicate that the difference in job satisfaction between unionized and non‐unionized workers disappears. These results suggest that reverse causation (i.e. dissatisfied workers are more likely to join a union) and time‐varying endogenous effects play a key role in explaining the relationship between unionization and job satisfaction.     

Justice and Union Participation: An Extension and Test of Mobilization Theory

Heeding John Kelly's call to reorient the field of industrial relations towards the study of injustice, we employ mobilization, social exchange and organizational justice theories to specify and test a model of union participation. Using individual‐level survey data from public‐sector union members to test our model, we find that differences in worker perceptions of workplace injustice and union justice explain slightly more variation in members’ union participation than more traditional measures of job satisfaction and union instrumentality perceptions. The implications of our analysis for researchers and union practitioners are also discussed.     

The impact of membership in competing alliance constellations: Evidence on the operational performance of global airlines

Many industries have witnessed the formation of multiple‐partner alliances or constellations competing against each other for both clients and members. Using the global airline industry as an empirical setting, I evaluate the proposition that membership in airline constellations allows carriers to capture externalities from other firms in the form of direct or indirect traffic flow, thereby enhancing their operational performance. I also distinguish between two ways to demarcate the boundaries of constellations: explicitly or implicitly. Analyzing patterns of membership in explicit constellations involving formal, multilateral agreements (such as the Star Alliance, Oneworld, SkyTeam), I find that membership benefits are greatest in groups involving large aggregate traffic and for carriers contributing with a large portion of the group's capacity. I also evaluate patterns of membership in implicit constellations, corresponding to groups of firms showing relatively more ties to one another than to firms outside their group. I find that carriers bilaterally linked with key players of such groups are able to increase their operational performance even if they do not belong to any explicit constellation. Thus, results show that it is worth analyzing distinct patterns of membership simultaneously, because they are likely to have distinct implications for firm performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Union Membership Really Reduce Job Satisfaction?

We investigate the effect of union membership on job satisfaction. Using linked employer–employee data from the 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey, we analyse the relationship between the membership decision and overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with pay. In this paper we account for the endogenous selection induced by the sorting of workers into unionized jobs. Controlling for both individual and establishment heterogeneity and explicitly modelling the effect of union status, we find that the marked difference in job satisfaction between unionized and non‐unionized workers disappears, suggesting that a selection effect, rather than a causal effect, characterizes the relationship.     

Collective Bargaining and Faculty Job Satisfaction

Estimates of the impact of union membership on job satisfaction suffer from nonrandom self‐selection of employees into unions. In this paper, we circumvent this problem by examining the impact on satisfaction of collective bargaining representation, rather than of union membership. We use a two‐stage technique that controls for nonrandom selection of faculty into institutions, and apply that to a panel of faculty at repeatedly observed four‐year universities. We find that bargaining agreements increase satisfaction with compensation but reduce satisfaction with faculty workload. Bargaining has no statistically measurable impact on overall job satisfaction or on faculty's satisfaction with their authority to make decisions regarding their instructional duties.     

Dissatisfied Union Workers: Sorting Revisited

A substantial literature argues that the reported job dissatisfaction of union members is spurious. It reflects either the sorting of dissatisfied workers into union membership or the sorting of union recognition into worse jobs. We contribute by presenting the first panel data estimates that hold constant first worker fixed effects and then worker in job fixed effects. The estimates demonstrate that covered union members typically report greater dissatisfaction even when accounting for sorting in both dimensions. At the same time, cross‐sectional evidence of less satisfied covered non‐members and uncovered members vanishes when accounting for sorting.     

Supercenters,Unionized Labor,and Performance in Food Retail

This study examines the impact of unionized labor on supermarket performance, as measured by profit and sales, accounting for the competitive presence of supercenters. The results confirm prior research that shows that supercenters have negative effects on supermarket performance. Unionized supermarkets generally outperform nonunionized supermarkets. However this effect disappears when accounting for supercenters, largely because unionized stores are less likely to compete with supercenters. I find no evidence for a significant union effect on supermarket performance. The deleterious effects of supercenters are stronger for unionized stores. Unionized supermarkets utilize less full‐time labor and more labor‐saving technology than do nonunionized ones.     

Things Unions Do, Job Attributes, and Union Membership

Implications of the governance and rent-seeking models of unionism for the job characteristics-union membership relationship are developed. Specific training and membership are found to be positively related, consistent with arguments that specific training governance. Membership is less likely on jobs requiring more general education—where incumbents typically see greater returns to individual mobility. Some support is found for job characteristics associated with efficiency gains to a collectivized employment relationship.     

Does Strike Action Stimulate Trade Union Membership Growth?

Most of the literature on strikes has addressed one of four issues: causation, variation between sectors and countries, trends over time and the relationship between strikes and other forms of collective and individual protest. Very little research has addressed the equally important questions of strike outcomes and trade union membership despite the substantial body of research on the causes of trade union membership decline and strategies for membership growth. In this paper we reverse the usual sequence of trade union membership as a causal factor in the genesis of strikes and examine the impact of strikes on trade union membership levels. After setting out the relevant theory and hypotheses, we use a unique seven‐year dataset of trade union membership joiners and leavers from a major British trade union with a substantial record of strike activity. Controlling for other possible determinants of trade union membership, we find that months in which there is strike action, whether national or local, are associated with a significantly higher rate of membership growth, measured both by the number of joiners and by the ratio of joiners to leavers. Data from new union members suggest that perceived injustice and perceived union effectiveness both motivate the decision to join.     

Trade Unions,Union Learning Representatives and Employer‐Provided Training in Britain

This article provides an empirical assessment of the relationship between trade union recognition, union density, union learning representatives (ULRs) and employer‐provided training in British workplaces using linked employer–employee data from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. The results suggest that the relationship between union recognition and training is, at best, weak. We find no consistent relationship between union density and training or between the presence of ULRs and training. We do, however, find some evidence of greater equality in the distribution of training in ULR workplaces than in other workplaces.     

The Impact of Union Corruption on Union Membership

This paper examines the relationship between union corruption actions and union membership. State‐level data from the Office of Labor‐Management Standards, and other sources, are utilized over two study periods (1974–2000 and 2001–2008) to test three hypotheses, including the union corruption hypothesis, as possible explanations for the decline in union membership in the United States over time. Although our initial findings suggest a negative relationship exists between union corruption and membership, after removing the possibility of simultaneous equations bias, we find that changes in corruption do not influence changes in union membership in our sample.     

People and process,suits and innovators: the role of individuals in firm performance

Performance differences between firms are generally attributed to organizational factors rather than to differences among the individuals who make up firms. As a result, little is known about the part that individual firm members play in explaining the variance in performance among firms. This paper employs a multiple membership cross‐classified multilevel model to test the degree to which organizational or individual factors explain firm performance. The analysis also examines whether individual differences among middle managers or innovators best explain firm performance variation. The results indicate that variation among individuals matter far more in organizational performance than is generally assumed. Further, variation among middle managers has a particularly large impact on firm performance, much larger than that of those individuals who are assigned innovative roles. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Membership Participation and Centralized Control

The union faces severe economic and political problems: it is becoming increasingly expensive to perform important union functions, membership losses are difficult to replace, job mortality is high, firm size is small, membership income is modest, skill level is low, and the union has minority status in almost all of its industries. The policy response to financial pressure is to encourage members to volunteer to perform many union functions which the union can not otherwise afford. Policies supportive of this goal include supply of a broad array of services at union headquarters, insistence that members pay dues in person, insistence on meeting attendance, and emphasis on the steward and crew and the role of the experienced member. The political pressure is weakened union authority. Unusual heterogeneity among employers, occupations, and members, plus an unavoidably decentralized collective bargaining situation, present strong centrifugal tendencies. Major variations in occupation, skills, income level, union background, job security, and ethnic and cultural identification contribute to a diversity of interests and loyalties. A tendency for the membership to be clustered or differentiated by character of their employment also adds a potential threat of balkanization by local. The policy response to political pressure has been the effort to centralize authority and initiative. For example, the 1,000-member General Council has been granted almost unlimited governmental authority. The Council is the channel for downward communication flow; the related structuring, sequencing, and common agendas of all union meetings also keep initiative and authority at the Districtwide level. Additional centralizing aspects include the absence of constitutional restraints on leadership freedom of action; the lack of restraints from the international union; emphasis on crew and steward, rather than on local and local officer; the discouragement of electoral conflicts inherent in the application of the “majority rule”; the preferred ballot position of Districtwide candidates; the Districtwide vote required for the four “regional” leaders; and the offsetting of decentralized collective bargaining with an array of control devices. Meeting attendance, dues payments (without benefit of checkoff), and electoral participation are unusually high. However, volunteer offices are difficult to fill; experienced occupants are difficult to hold. There is little volunteer participation in organizing and collective bargaining and participation is way below the level prescribed by union policy pronouncements. Areas of inconsistency, if not conflict, exist between the two major strands of policy, i.e., encouragement of membership participation, on the one hand, and centralization of authority, on the other. Centralization makes it more difficult to involve members in union affairs. De-emphasis of the role of the local officer and organizer in favor of stewards and vice-presidents has minimized potential divisive influences, but at the cost of inhibiting volunteer leadership activity.     

The Impact of Union Experience on Job Satisfaction

The relationship between union status and job satisfaction is commonly estimated without recognizing the heterogeneity of non‐union members. Many non‐union workers have experienced union jobs in the past while others have not, suggesting past estimations of the impact of unions on job satisfaction may miss a critical distinction. After separating non‐union members into those workers with and without union experience, this article shows that job satisfaction increases significantly for first‐time union workers, but decreases as workers accumulate experience in the union. Finally, after leaving the union jobs, worker job satisfaction recovers but does so only as the time since unionization grows.     

What did unions do for union workers during the COVID-19 pandemic?

This research examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on labour market outcomes of union workers, based on nationally representative data. I employ the difference-in-difference estimation to identify the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the employment, labour earnings and other labour market outcomes of union workers, relative to non-union workers. I find that, compared to non-union workers, union workers experienced greater job security, and the pre-pandemic union wage premium remained largely unchanged during the pandemic. There exists a large heterogeneity in the union effect on employment and real wages by worker characteristic. I also find that union workers, compared to non-union workers, were less likely to work remotely but more likely to receive pay for hours not worked due to COVID-19. The results suggest that unions provided workers with employment stability and an economic buffer during the pandemic-led recession.     

Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions? The Rise in Never‐Membership in Britain

This paper tracks the rise in the percentage of employees who have never become union members (‘never‐member’) since the early 1980s and shows that it is the reduced likelihood of ever becoming a member, rather than the haemorrhaging of existing members, that is behind the decline in overall union membership in Britain. We estimate the determinants of ‘never‐membership’ and consider how much of the rise can be explained by structural change in the labour market and how much by change in preferences among employees.     

Bribery and investment: Firm‐level evidence from Africa and Latin America

Research summary : Using a unique database that measures firm‐level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short‐term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long‐term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than invest. Managerial summary : We ask whether, along with ethical issues, bribing affects the behavior and performance of firms in Africa and Latin America. Our statistical analysis shows that bribe payments do not reduce the short‐term performance of firms, but frustrate investments in fixed assets, which is the foundation of firms' long‐term growth. It is like seeking a job via nepotism or education. Nepotism makes it likely to find a job in the short term. However, the solid skills generated by education raise the odds of finding better jobs in the future. We rule out some common explanations for the trade‐off between bribing and investment (e.g., bribes drain resources to invest or that less efficient firms bribe and do not invest). Our analysis suggests that firms with short‐term orientations are more likely to bribe and firms with long‐term orientation are more likely to invest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.