Performance measures and short‐termism: An exploratory study

We examine the relationship between performance measurement systems and short‐termism. Hypotheses are tested on a sample of senior managers drawn from a major telecommunications company to determine the extent to which the diagnostic and interactive uses of financial and non‐financial measures give rise to short‐termism. We find no evidence to suggest that the use of financial measures, either diagnostically or interactively, leads to short‐term behaviour. In contrast, we find a significant association between the use of non‐financial measures and short‐termism. Results suggest that the diagnostic use of non‐financial measures leads managers to make inter‐temporal trade‐off choices that prioritise the short term to the detriment of the long term, while we find interactive use is negatively associated with short‐termism. We find an imbalance in favour of the diagnostic use over the interactive use of non‐financial performance measures is associated with short‐termism. Overall, findings highlight the importance of considering the specific use of performance measures in determining the causes of short‐termism.     

Duration of Executive Compensation

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.     

The Role of Short‐Termism in Financial Market Crises

The purpose of this paper is to examine the contribution short‐termist behaviours have had in various financial market crises. The early warning signs and drivers of short‐termism are investigated, as well as ways to mitigate short‐termist behaviour and consequences in the future. Short‐termism as defined for the purposes of this paper is the excessive focus on short‐term performance, earnings and other metrics at the expense of attention being given to the development of a long‐term strategy that promotes sustainable long‐term value creation.     

Moments of multivariate regime switching with application to risk-return trade-off

We use a Fourier transform to derive multivariate conditional and unconditional moments of multi-horizon returns under a regime-switching model. These moments are applied to examine the relevance of risk horizon and regimes for buy-and-hold investors. We analyze the impact of time-varying expected returns and risk (variance and covariance) on portfolio allocations' “term structure”—portfolio allocations as a function of the investment horizon. Using monthly observations on S&P composite index and 10-year Government Bond, we find that the term structure of the optimal allocations depends on market conditions measured by the probability of being in bull state. At short horizons and when this probability is low, buy-and-hold investors decrease their holdings of risky assets. We also find that the conditional optimal portfolio performs quite well at short and intermediate horizons and less at long horizons.     

Overcoming Short‐Termism: Mental Time Travel,Delayed Gratification and How Not to Discount the Future

Short‐termism has been identified as a characteristic of individuals, companies, stock markets, governance structures and policies, and has been linked to inadequate saving for retirement, reduced investment returns, greater market instability and destruction of long‐term value. As a construct, short‐termism is complex and multidimensional. Accordingly, this paper draws upon current theory and research from a range of fields including behavioural economics, psychology and the cognitive sciences to uncover both explanations of the phenomenon and implications for countering an overly short‐term focus. Possible strategies for achieving the latter are discussed.     

The Predictive Ability of Dividend and Earnings Yields for Long-Term Stock Returns

We use empirical models to examine the predictive ability of dividend and earnings yields for long‐term stock returns. Results show that dividend and earnings yields share a similar predictive power for future stock returns and growth. We find that the predictive power of dividend yields increases with the return horizon, but that yields forecast future returns and growth over a much longer horizon. Finally, dividend and earnings yields exhibit high autocorrelation and strong contemporaneous relations.     

CEO Horizon,Optimal Pay Duration,and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This generates an endogenous horizon problem whereby managers intensify performance manipulation in their final years in office. Contracts are designed to encourage effort while minimizing the adverse effects of manipulation. We characterize the optimal mix of short‐ and long‐term compensation along the manager's tenure, the optimal vesting period of incentive pay, and the dynamics of short‐termism over the CEO's tenure.     

Columbia Law School Roundtable on A Governance Research Agenda for the Academy

Since Jensen and Meckling's formulation of the theory of “agency costs” in 1976, corporate finance and governance scholars have produced a large body of research that attempts to identify the most important features and practices of effective corporate governance systems. But for all the research that has been done in the past 40 years, many practitioners continue to see a disconnect between theory and practice, between the questions researched and the questions that need to be answered. In this roundtable, Martijn Cremers begins by challenging the conventional view that limiting “agency costs” is the main challenge confronted by boards of directors in representing shareholder interests and, hence, the proper focus of most governance scholarship. Especially in today's economy, with the high values assigned to growth companies, the most important function of corporate governance may instead be to overcome the problem of American “short termism” that he attributes to “inadequate shareholder commitment to long‐term cooperation.” And he buttresses his argument with the findings of his own recent research suggesting that obstacles to the workings of the corporate control market like staggered boards and supermajority voting requirements may actually improve long‐run corporate performance by lengthening the decision‐making horizon of boards and the managements they supervise. Vik Khanna discusses Indian Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending and its effects in light of a recent law requiring Indian companies of a certain size to devote at least 2% of their after‐tax profit to CSR initiatives. One unintended effect of this mandate, which took effect in 2010, was that all Indian companies that were spending more than the prescribed 2% of profits cut their expenditure back to that minimum, suggesting that CSR and advertising are substitutes to some extent, and that such legal mandates can discourage CSR spending by early adapters or “leaders.” Nevertheless, Khanna also found evidence of social norms developing in support of CSR, including a spreading perception that such spending can help some companies achieve strategic goals. Jeff Gordon closes by arguing that, to the extent investors are short‐sighted, their short‐sightedness is likely to be justified by their recognition that public company directors have neither the information nor the incentives to do an effective job of monitoring corporate managements. The best solution to the problems with U.S. corporate governance is to replace today's “thinly informed” directors with “activist” directors who more closely resemble the directors of private‐equity owned firms. Such directors would spend far more time with, and be much more knowledgeable about, corporate management and operations—and they would have much more of their personal wealth at stake in the form of company stock.     

Distinguishing Between Rationales for Short‐Horizon Predictability of Stock Returns

In this paper, we shed light on short‐horizon return reversals. We show theoretically that a risk‐based rationale for reversals implies a relation between returns and past order flow, whereas a reversion in beliefs of biased agents does not do so. The empirical results indicate that returns are more strongly related to own‐return lags than to lagged order imbalances. Thus, the evidence suggests that monthly reversals are not completely captured by inventory effects and may be driven, in part, by belief reversion. We do find that returns are cross‐sectionally related to lagged imbalance innovations at horizons longer than a month.     

Corporate Debt Maturity and Acquisition Decisions

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of corporate debt maturity on firms’ acquisition decisions using a large sample of acquisitions from 1991 to 2010. We find that firms with shorter debt maturity are less likely to undertake acquisitions. If they do, they are more likely to undertake smaller deals, take more time to complete, are less likely to make all cash offers, and tend to use less cash in the payment. These results support the predictions of the increased liquidity risk hypothesis. We also find that acquirers with shorter debt maturity realize higher announcement returns and experience better long‐term stock returns and operating performance. These results suggest that short debt maturity improves the efficiency of capital allocation through acquisition decisions.     

Institutional Shareholder Investment Horizons and Seasoned Equity Offerings

Firms with more short‐term institutional shareholders experience significantly more negative abnormal returns at the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. This effect is strong for primary offerings (only firms receive proceeds), but is not present for secondary offerings (firms do not receive any proceeds). Furthermore, a shorter institutional shareholder investment horizon predicts poorer postissue abnormal operating performance and the negative effect of a shorter shareholder horizon is mitigated by higher managerial ownership. My results are consistent with the argument that long‐term shareholders more carefully monitor managerial activities and prevent misuse of the cash flow provided by equity issues.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

Time Diversification: Empirical Tests

This paper investigates the relationship between the performance of equity and the length of the investment horizon used by investors. We examine optimal portfolio time diversification and two definitions of ex ante time diversification. Using almost two centuries of US and UK data we find some support for the hypothesis that equity represents a significantly better investment over long investment horizons than over short investment horizons. Where this result holds, the likely explanation is mean-aversion in fixed-income asset returns. However, these results are sensitive to changes in investor risk preference, changes in utility function specification, changes in the sample period used, changes in investor constraints, and the definition of time diversification adopted. They also differ between the US and UK markets.     

The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Short- and Long-run Response to Cash Distributions

We examine both the short‐run and long‐run responses to the following corporate cash flow transactions: dividend increases and decreases, dividend initiations, and tender offer repurchases. Our focus is the short‐run and long‐run effects of managerial ownership. We hypothesize that ownership plays an important role in explaining the announcement effects for these events, owing to signaling effects and the reduction of agency problems. Our short‐run results accord well with the earlier work on announcement effects for these events and show that firms with high insider ownership exhibit higher excess returns. Our long‐term results indicate a drift over a three‐year period following the announcement, with the excess returns for the high insider‐ownership group becoming more pronounced.     

The Puzzle of Financial Reporting and Corporate Short‐Termism: A Universal Ownership Perspective

This study considers the controversy surrounding financial reporting and corporate short‐termism as a puzzle. The question remains as to why corporate managers and investors persist in exhibiting behaviours that trade off long‐term value creation for meeting short‐term financial targets. Using inter‐temporal choice theory, the myopia characterising decision‐making is entirely rational, given the set of incentives faced. This study views the puzzle through the prism of universal owners (pension and superannuation funds), arguing that the investment policies or ‘mandates’ implemented by these financial behemoths is the source of the myopic behaviour. The paper explores a range of policies that universal owners may consider implementing to ensure that the payoffs to corporate managers and investors are optimised through the pursuit of long‐termism.     

Investment Horizons and Information

We examine the relation between institutions' investment horizons on firms' financing and investment decisions. Firms with larger short‐term institutional ownership use less debt financing and invest more in corporate liquidity. In contrast, firms with larger long‐term institutional ownership use more internal funds, less external equity financing, and preserve investments in long‐term assets. These results are primarily driven by the variation in informational preferences of different institutions. We argue that short‐term (long‐term) institutions collect and use value‐neutral (value‐enhancing) information.     

IPO Failure Risk

We explore the factors associated with historical IPO failures by developing an IPO failure prediction model that includes accounting information as well as proxies for the role of information intermediaries and other IPO deal–related characteristics. We document statistically significant differences in failure models applicable to nontech versus high tech IPOs, and these structural differences are largely driven by accounting‐based proxies for firms' investments in intangible assets, operating performance, and financial leverage. We also develop parsimonious, predominantly accounting‐based, strictly out‐of‐sample (i.e., no hindsight) IPO failure forecasting models for each of the two sectors. We find that our forecasts are negatively associated with one‐year post‐IPO abnormal returns. A pseudo‐hedge strategy of going short (long) in high (low) failure risk portfolios yields returns of economically significant magnitudes over the one‐year horizon, and is robust to alternative returns methodologies. Further results suggest that IPO long‐run returns anomalies may persist, but they take different forms for high‐tech and nontech IPOs.     

Currency Returns, Intrinsic Value, and Institutional-Investor Flows

We decompose currency returns into (permanent) intrinsic‐value shocks and (transitory) expected‐return shocks. We explore interactions between these shocks, currency returns, and institutional‐investor currency flows. Intrinsic‐value shocks are: dwarfed by expected‐return shocks (yet currency returns overreact to them); unrelated to flows (although expected‐return shocks correlate with flows); and related positively to forecasted cumulated‐interest differentials. These results suggest flows are related to short‐term currency returns, while fundamentals better explain long‐term returns and values. They also rationalize the long‐observed poor performance of exchange‐rate models: by ignoring the distinction between permanent and transitory exchange‐rate changes, prior tests obscure the connection between currencies and fundamentals.     

LABOR MARKET CONSEQUENCES FOR BUSY DIRECTORS: EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

Using 13,233 acquisitions from 57 countries, we examine merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions made by busy boards. We find that few busy acquirers originate from emerging markets and that they tend to undertake cross‐border mergers, favor public targets, finance with cash and equity, pursue nondiversifying mergers, avoid targets with multiple bidders, and long‐term underperform relative to nonbusy acquirers. Importantly, we discover a nonlinear relation between an acquirer's board busyness and merger announcement returns. We find that the labor market penalizes directors who approve bad acquisitions but does not reward them for good mergers. We find a similar nonlinear relation between an acquirer's board busyness and its long‐term performance along with a suggestion of an optimal board busyness.     

Bank Corporate Governance,Beyond the Global Banking Crisis

Following up on the publication of the Walker Report ( 2009 ) in the United Kingdom, international organizations such as the Basel Committee ( 2010 ), the OECD ( 2010 ), and the European Union ( 2010 ) have proposed guidelines to improve bank corporate governance and, more specifically, risk governance. These international reports vary widely on what the prime objective of bank corporate governance should be, with one group recommending a shareholder‐based approach, and the other a stakeholder‐based one. Moreover, the focus of these reports is exclusively on risk avoidance, with little guidance as to how an acceptable level of risk should be defined. Drawing on insights from economics and finance, this paper is intended to contribute to the debate on bank corporate governance. Our four main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the debate on bank governance should concern not only the boards but also the governance of banking supervision with clearly identified accountability principles. Secondly, since biases for short‐term profit maximization are numerous in banking, boards of banks should focus on long‐term value creation. Thirdly, board members and banking supervisors should pay special attention to cognitive biases in risk identification and measurement. Fourthly, a value‐based approach to risk taking must take into account the probability of stress scenarios and the associated costs of financial distress. Mitigation of these costs should be addressed explicitly in the design of bank strategy.