A note on stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.'s model.     

Constraining Leviathan

This article commemorates James M. Buchanan and his contributions to public choice and constitutional political economy. It focuses on what Buchanan had to say about constraining the State, or as he often referred to it, Leviathan. It concentrates on a handful of his major works that I think capture important elements of his thinking. It discusses Buchanan’s writings on public debt and government deficits; the size of the state; federalism; and taxation, among other things. It is argued that the main emphasis in Buchanan’s work as it pertained to constraining the State was to include provisions in the constitution that could achieve this end. These included a balanced budget amendment, rules governing the expansion of the money supply, constraints on the types of taxes that could be levied, linking expenditure proposals to the taxes that would finance them, earmarked taxes, and a generality principle, which would avoid a majority coalition’s exploitation of a minority. The article also includes a discussion of the current constitutional crisis in the United States.     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.     

Yardstick competition to tame the Leviathan

This papers analyzes the disciplining role of elections under asymmetric information, when voters can rely on relative performance evaluation to tame a Leviathan. When elections are held in different regions, voters are able to reduce political rents below the Leviathan level by retrospective voting strategies. The paper compares a multi-candidate model with a two-party system with either independent or coordinated policies in the various jurisdictions. In general, voters prefer the multi-candidate system. However, the disciplining ability of voters under the two-party system is strengthened if each party has a uniform leadership that determines policies in all regions.     

Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker?

We argue that the Hobbesian assumption of glory-seeking behavior, especially when applied to holders of high office, is both more realistic and has greater predictive power than Brennan and Buchanan's hypothesis of revenue-maximization. Whereas traditional public finance theory sees the sovereign as a benign agent without an objective of his own and Brennan and Buchanan endow him with the objective of revenue maximization, Hobbes's political construct envisages a sovereign-principal who devises rules and incentives to induce his subjects-agents to contribute to his own preservation and glory. We examine the implications of this Copernican revolution in public finance theory by referring to Brennan and Buchanan's key claim that the Leviathan ought to be constrained by a fiscal constitution. We argue that the interplay of the pursuit glory and the concern for self-preservation implies that the government cannot be bound by rules set by citizens.     

Choosing between imperfect proxies for a corrective tax

Choices are sometimes distorted by internalities or externalities. This paper considers a setting in which the distortion cannot be taxed directly, and asks how a policymaker should choose a proxy variable to tax instead. We derive a criterion for when one proxy should be preferred to another, and consider a range of factors with implications for this criterion. These factors are (i) sensitivity to the tax rate, (ii) how accurately the taxed variable approximates the distorted variable, (iii) susceptibility to offsetting behavior, and (iv) consumer heterogeneity. Our analysis is illustrated with a comparison between ad valorem and volumetric taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages.     

Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan

An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.      

Towards a Strategy for Knowledge Management

Knowledge management is emerging as a significant organizational and management challenge. The pressures of the emergence of the global knowledge economy, and recognition of knowledge as a key and intangible asset are making the effective management of knowledge a priority. This surge of interest has paid relatively little attention to the object of management-knowledge. Epistemologists and sociologists have produced a variety of definitions and classifications, but there is no consensus. However, with the growth in IT capability, a clear operational distinction can be drawn between information and knowledge. The former can be captured, stored and transmitted in digital form. The latter can only exist in an intelligent system. This distinction is used to develop models of the interaction between knowledge and information, and of the appropriate balance between the two in different situations. On the basis of this model, the challenges of 'knowledge management' are: Establishing and optimizing the information-knowledge balance appropriate to (or providing a competitive advantage) a company or industry; Implementing IT-based productivity improvements in information management; Implementing people- and socially-based mechanisms to enhance knowledge management; Explicitly addressing the knowledge-information interface and mechanisms for improving the processes of transition from information to knowledge, and from knowledge to information; Identifying and maintaining the core knowledge of an organization.     

Building a computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy

In this paper, we develop a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy allowing for a number of fiscal tools. We illustrate the methodology for modelling and accommodating the full range of direct and indirect taxes into the national general equilibrium model. In particular, we build a commodity tax matrix by commodity, source, user and tax type; and a production tax matrix by industry and tax type. We also put a special emphasis on the institutional sector accounts, incorporating a detailed system of equations. Our model provides a powerful tool for acquiring new insights in fiscal policy analysis, through the assessment of tailored tax reforms, which can consist of either changes in tax rates and tax bases for indirect and direct taxes. Finally, to validate the model we perform an equalizing Value-Added-Tax rates reform. We find that a budget-neutral uniform tax rate reform would be GDP and welfare improving. However, results across agents and sectors vary.     

Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations

This paper analyzes a simple model of taxation in a federal system within which policymakers are revenue–maximizing Leviathans and fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, across the "states," but also vertically between levels of government. Such an economy is characterized by excessively high taxation in the noncooperative equilibrium. Intensifying horizontal competition, by increasing the number of states, unambiguously increases revenues (contrary to the Leviathan wisdom) but nevertheless enhances consumer welfare (consistent with the Leviathan wisdom). Revenue sharing arrangements between policymakers are shown to be—contrary to the Leviathan wisdom—Pareto improving.     

Leviathan for Sale: The Fallacy of Trusting in People Instead of Institutions

We experimentally test Hume’s hypothesis that people underappreciate the value of cooperation-enforcing institutions in impersonal interactions by relying on personal trust. Subjects played a game in groups of two or six. Each subject could defect at any time, leaving the others with zero payoff by unilaterally appropriating an amount of money that grew over a period of 5 ​minutes. All players received the maximum payoff only if nobody defected. Before the game, subjects could purchase a cooperation-enforcing institution. Their willingness to pay for this institution fell short of the loss caused by failed cooperation under institution-free play. This was even true for the best-off subject in an institution-free society. In the absence of learning, people indeed fell prey to the atavistic fallacy of trusting in people instead of institutions. Understanding this bias might help people in complex societies to acknowledge the value of institutions intellectually.     

The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments

This paper assesses the consequences of a high degree of international capital mobility for the behavior of governments. It is argued that countries can be seen as clubs where the government as club management acts as an entrepreneur attempting to attract internationally mobile resources. Within this stylized model it is shown that competition induces the government of a small democratic country to implement policy reforms that increase the welfare of domestic residents if it wants to be reelected. This result suggests that international openness may be a substitute for more overt attempts to contain a government's Leviathan tendencies such as constitutional amendments. Finally, the case against competition among governments is analyzed from the perspective of the club model developed in the paper. An earlier version of this paper appeared as Kiel Working Paper No. 458. The author would like to thank Hartmut Kliemt, Werner Pommerehne, Helmut Reisen, Pierre Salmon, Horst Siebert, Viktor Vanberg as well as seminar participants at the University of Munich, the Free University of Berlin, the OECD Development Centre in Paris and at the 1991 meeting of the European Public Choice Society in Beaune for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.     

Towards a multidimensional poverty index for Germany

This paper proposes a more comprehensive multidimensional poverty index for an advanced economy like Germany. Drawing on the capability approach as conceptual framework, I apply the Alkire–Foster method to the German context. Special attention is paid to the conceptual integration. Specifically, I argue for including material deprivation and employment as important dimensions, but against using an additional lack-of-income indicator. The results are consistent with previous findings and also offer new insights. In particular, I find specific poverty profiles (e.g., for the elderly), but also that gaps in poverty between subpopulations change over time. Importantly, the results suggest that genuine multidimensional measures add unique insights, which neither a single indicator, nor a dashboard approach can offer. Finally, the analysis reveals multidimensional and income-poverty measures to disagree on who is poor. The subsequent analysis of this mismatch lends empirical support to abandon a lack-of-income dimension.     

Towards a framework for dynamic technology strategy

This paper attempts to set up a framework for formulating a dynamic technology strategy. Competitive enviroments are increasingly dynamic, and this makes traditional methodologies and approaches to the strategy obsolete or inadequate. Empirical research has been conducted on the technology strategy process of three large companies operating in highly dynamic and technology-intensive environments. On the basis of the results of this, the authors attempte to put forward a framework which should help firms to conceive their technology strategy.     

Towards a consistent approach for ecosystem accounting

In spite of an increasing interest in environmental economic accounting, there is still very limited experience with the integration of ecosystem services and ecosystem capital in national accounts. This paper identifies four key methodological challenges in developing ecosystem accounts: the definition of ecosystem services in the context of accounting, their allocation to institutional sectors; the treatment of degradation and rehabilitation, and valuing ecosystem services consistent with SNA principles. We analyze the different perspectives taken on these challenges and present a number of proposals to deal with the challenges in developing ecosystem accounts. These proposals comprise several novel aspects, including (i) presenting an accounting approach that recognizes that most ecosystems are strongly influenced by people and that ecosystem services depend on natural processes as well as human ecosystem management; and, (ii) recording ecosystem services as either contributions of a private land owner or as generated by a sector ’Ecosystems’ depending on the type of ecosystem service. We also present a consistent approach for recording degradation, and for applying monetary valuation approaches in the context of accounting.