Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

A Look Back at 2008

To realize the value of one year： Ask a student who has failed a final exam.     

Value‐Added Per Share (VAPS): A Value‐Relevant Corporate Performance Metric

The authors introduce Value Added Per Share (VAPS) as a value‐relevant metric that is intended to complement earnings per share (EPS) in helping corporate managers and analysts understand and overcome the limitations of GAAP‐based reporting. VAPS discounts a firm's past and projected cash flows at its “cost of capital,” allowing companies to avoid the subjective accounting accrual process and other practices that often make EPS misleading. A company's VAPS is calculated in three main steps: (1) estimate the change in the capitalized value of after‐tax operating cash flow by taking the net change (plus or minus) of the firm's operating cash flow after taxes and dividing that number by the firm's cost of capital; (2) subtract total investment expenditures; and (3) divide by the number of shares outstanding. By capitalizing the change in after‐tax operating cash flow, one finds the net change in a firm's current operations value. By subtracting investment expenditures from that change in current operations value, the analyst gets a clearer picture of the benefit to shareholders net of the funds used to create that benefit. Consistent with basic theory, VAPS is positive when a company earns a return at least equal to its cost of capital and negative otherwise. Because of their fundamental differences, EPS and VAPS are likely to send different signals, and VAPS is expected to provide greater insight into stock price changes. The authors provide the findings of statistical tests showing the superior explanatory power of VAPS and recommend that companies publish statements of VAPS along with standard GAAP results, especially since the former can be readily calculated using the available income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement data.     

A Look Back at Modern Finance: Accomplishments and Limitations

In a conversation held in June 2016 between Nobel laureate Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago and Joel Stern, chairman and CEO of Stern Value Management, Professor Fama revisited some of the landmarks of “modern finance,” a movement that was launched in the early 1960s at Chicago and other leading business schools, and that gave rise to Efficient Markets Theory, the Modigliani‐Miller “irrelevance” propositions, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. These concepts and models are still taught at prestigious business schools, whose graduates continue to make use of them in corporations and investment firms throughout the world. But while acknowledging the staying power of “modern finance,” Fama also notes that, even after a half‐century of research and refinements, most asset‐pricing models have failed empirically. Estimating something as apparently simple as the cost of capital remains fraught with difficulty. He dismisses betas for individual stocks as “garbage,” and even industry betas are said to be unstable, “too dynamic through time.” What's more, the wide range of estimates for the market risk premium—anywhere from 2% to 10%—casts doubt on their reliability and practical usefulness. And as if to reaffirm the fundamental insight of the M&M “irrelevance” propositions—namely, that what companies do with the right‐hand sides of their balance sheets “doesn't matter”—Fama observes that “we still have no real resolution on the key questions of debt and taxes, or dividends and taxes.” But if he has reservations about much of modern finance, Professor Fama is even more skeptical about subfields now in vogue such as behavioral finance, which he describes as “mostly just dredging for anomalies,” with no underlying theory and no testable predictions. Although he does not dispute that a number of well‐documented traits from cognitive psychology show up in individual behavior, Fama says that behavioral economists have thus far failed to come up with a testable theory that links cognitive psychology to market prices. And he continues to defend the concept of “efficient markets” with which his name has long been closely associated, while noting that empirically based asset pricing models such as his (with Ken French) “three‐factor” CAPM have produced much better results than the standard CAPM.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

基于层次分析法的价值管理--"平衡记分卡"和"经济增加值"整合战略管理应用

以昆山信达电子公司为例,运用层次分析法(AHP),将经济增加值(EVA)和平衡记分卡(BSC)整合战略价值管理模型运用于其战略决策、战略执行和绩效评价的全过程,说明基于AHP的BSC和EVA整合战略价值管理能推动企业战略的成功实施.     

ESG as a Value‐Creation Tool for Active Investors: A Profile of Inherent Group

A growing number of investment managers claim to integrate environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment strategy and processes, but few have described how they do so in depth. Even fewer reinforce the importance of sustainability within their own firms by becoming a certified ‘B Corporation.’ This article offers a rare, inside look at how one such value‐oriented manager uses ESG as a tool for differentiated investment sourcing, underwriting, and corporate engagement with the aim of achieving superior risk‐adjusted returns. One of the main arguments of the article—and a key principle of the firm's investment approach—is that ESG, as applied to both corporate strategy and operations, is an important factor in determining a company's cost of capital. The authors present specific examples of their investment process at work, highlighting how active engagement with management on ESG issues can catalyze progress that becomes valued by the capital markets.     

The Great Crash of 1929: A Look Back After 90 Years

The Great Crash of 1929 ranks among the climactic events of the last century, apparently heralding the beginning of the Great Depression. This event raises at least four questions that are relevant today:

• Why did the “Roaring 20s” roar? Some prominent contemporaries held that the decade roared because of consumerism, credit growth, and the Jazz Age. However, recent research suggests an alternative explanation: a revolution in manufacturing and technology that amplified economic growth and volatility in markets.
• Was the boom in equities a “bubble?” Both the authors’ research and other studies show surprisingly weak evidence of a bubble. The boom probably reflected the technology shock of the ‘20s. If there was a bubble, it was limited in time, breadth, and impact.
• What caused the Crash? The onset of an ordinary recession, surprising changes in monetary policy by the Fed, growing regulation, and rising protectionism all help to explain a sharp and sudden change in investor sentiment.
• Did the Crash cause the Great Depression, as popular opinion has long maintained? No. The cycle of economic contraction had begun well before the crash. Furthermore, the wealth effect of the Crash was limited. The pivot from recession into Great Depression reflected the abandonment of the Gold Exchange Standard, a wave of bank panics and collapse of credit, protectionism, and a number of maladroit public policies. But if the Crash did not cause the Depression, it probably amplified the effects of forces already at work.

Answers to these questions, illuminated by careful research, remind decision‐makers in business and government that the first explanations for historical events are not always the best, that complex systems have unintended consequences, and that gaps in information make the Great Crash a difficult standard by which to assess future events. The use of historical precedent warrants caution and great humility in the makers of public policy.     

BSC与EVA相结合的企业绩效评价研究——基于GP企业集团的案例分析

随着我国市场经济体制的完善和国有企业改革的推进,我国国有企业所面临的内外部环境发生了巨大变化,企业绩效管理模式也在改变。GP企业集团是一个有50多年历史的国有施工企业,在一定程度上体现了我国国有企业的绩效管理现状,本文通过对该企业集团的绩效考核现状进行分析,归纳了GP企业集团现行绩效管理体系存在的问题,并针对其不足,重新构建了基于BSC与EVA相结合的绩效评价指标体系,并对新旧指标体系的考核结果进行了对比分析,为我国类似国有企业集团提供绩效评价改进的新思路。     

基于EVA的商业银行经济资本管理与价值创造研究

只有为企业带来超过资本最低回报要求的业务,才真正为企业创造了价值,而那些创造收益水平低于资本最低回报要求的业务,实际上是在消耗企业的价值,因而价值最大化是银行经营最终目标。银行经济资本管理可以为银行创造价值。以EVA作为价值创造能力衡量指标,经济资本管理为银行创造价值路径有四个:绩效考评、战略制定、产品定价和资产组合选择。     

EVA实战报告——美国波士顿商学院访华课题汇报之一

袁利群说在美的,内部说得最多的一句话就是‘唯一不变的就是变’。美的这些年发展的有多快,袁利群是最清楚的人之一。她1992年加入美的集团,任电机事业部财务     

A Dynamic Model of Characteristic‐Based Return Predictability

We present a dynamic model that links characteristic‐based return predictability to systematic factors that determine the evolution of firm fundamentals. In the model, an economy‐wide disruption process reallocates profits from existing businesses to new projects and thus generates a source of systematic risk for portfolios of firms sorted on value, profitability, and asset growth. If investors are overconfident about their ability to evaluate the disruption climate, these characteristic‐sorted portfolios exhibit persistent mispricing. The model generates predictions about the conditional predictability of characteristic‐sorted portfolio returns and illustrates how return persistence increases the likelihood of observing characteristic‐based anomalies.     

Earnings Management and the Post‐earnings Announcement Drift

We posit that the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is related to earnings management. Accordingly, we find that firms with large negative (positive) changes in operating cash flows manage accruals upward (downward). Most importantly, we find that PEAD is concentrated largely among those firms that are most likely to have smoothed their reported earnings and is generally associated with discretionary accruals as opposed to nondiscretionary accruals. There is no evidence of a positive (negative) PEAD for those firms with large positive (negative) earnings changes that are least likely to have managed earnings downward (upward).     

Why Is Long‐Horizon Equity Less Risky? A Duration‐Based Explanation of the Value Premium

We propose a dynamic risk‐based model that captures the value premium. Firms are modeled as long‐lived assets distinguished by the timing of cash flows. The stochastic discount factor is specified so that shocks to aggregate dividends are priced, but shocks to the discount rate are not. The model implies that growth firms covary more with the discount rate than do value firms, which covary more with cash flows. When calibrated to explain aggregate stock market behavior, the model accounts for the observed value premium, the high Sharpe ratios on value firms, and the poor performance of the CAPM.