A Look Back at the Beginnings of EVA and Value‐Based Management

In this interview conducted five years ago, one of the pioneers of value‐based management discusses his life's work in converting principles of modern finance theory into performance evaluation and incentive compensation plans that have been adopted by many of the world's largest and most successful companies, including Coca‐Cola, SABMiller in London, Siemens in Germany, and the Godrej Group in India. The issues covered include the significance of dividend payouts (are dividends really necessary to support a company's stock price and, if so, why?) as well as the question of optimal capital structure (whether and why debt might be cheaper than equity). But the most important focus of the interview is corporate performance measurement and the use of executive pay to strengthen management incentives to increase efficiency and value. As Stern never tired of arguing, the widespread tendency of public companies to manage “for earnings”—or in accordance with what he refers to as “the accounting model of the firm”—often leads to value‐destroying decisions. As one example, the GAAP accounting principle that requires intangible investments like R&D and training to be written off in the year the money is spent is likely to cause significant underinvestment in such intangibles. At the same time, the failure of conventional income statements to reflect the cost of equity almost certainly encourages corporate overinvestment. Stern's solution to this problem was an executive incentive compensation plan whose rewards were tied to increases in a measure of economic profit called economic value added, or EVA, which research has shown to have a significance relation to changes both in share value and the premium of market value over book value. Moreover, by combining such a plan with a “bonus bank” that pays out annual awards over a multiyear period, boards could ensure that management will be rewarded not for good luck but for sustainable improvements in performance.     

A Look Back at 2008

To realize the value of one year： Ask a student who has failed a final exam.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

A Look Back at Modern Finance: Accomplishments and Limitations

In a conversation held in June 2016 between Nobel laureate Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago and Joel Stern, chairman and CEO of Stern Value Management, Professor Fama revisited some of the landmarks of “modern finance,” a movement that was launched in the early 1960s at Chicago and other leading business schools, and that gave rise to Efficient Markets Theory, the Modigliani‐Miller “irrelevance” propositions, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. These concepts and models are still taught at prestigious business schools, whose graduates continue to make use of them in corporations and investment firms throughout the world. But while acknowledging the staying power of “modern finance,” Fama also notes that, even after a half‐century of research and refinements, most asset‐pricing models have failed empirically. Estimating something as apparently simple as the cost of capital remains fraught with difficulty. He dismisses betas for individual stocks as “garbage,” and even industry betas are said to be unstable, “too dynamic through time.” What's more, the wide range of estimates for the market risk premium—anywhere from 2% to 10%—casts doubt on their reliability and practical usefulness. And as if to reaffirm the fundamental insight of the M&M “irrelevance” propositions—namely, that what companies do with the right‐hand sides of their balance sheets “doesn't matter”—Fama observes that “we still have no real resolution on the key questions of debt and taxes, or dividends and taxes.” But if he has reservations about much of modern finance, Professor Fama is even more skeptical about subfields now in vogue such as behavioral finance, which he describes as “mostly just dredging for anomalies,” with no underlying theory and no testable predictions. Although he does not dispute that a number of well‐documented traits from cognitive psychology show up in individual behavior, Fama says that behavioral economists have thus far failed to come up with a testable theory that links cognitive psychology to market prices. And he continues to defend the concept of “efficient markets” with which his name has long been closely associated, while noting that empirically based asset pricing models such as his (with Ken French) “three‐factor” CAPM have produced much better results than the standard CAPM.     

Value‐Added Per Share (VAPS): A Value‐Relevant Corporate Performance Metric

The authors introduce Value Added Per Share (VAPS) as a value‐relevant metric that is intended to complement earnings per share (EPS) in helping corporate managers and analysts understand and overcome the limitations of GAAP‐based reporting. VAPS discounts a firm's past and projected cash flows at its “cost of capital,” allowing companies to avoid the subjective accounting accrual process and other practices that often make EPS misleading. A company's VAPS is calculated in three main steps: (1) estimate the change in the capitalized value of after‐tax operating cash flow by taking the net change (plus or minus) of the firm's operating cash flow after taxes and dividing that number by the firm's cost of capital; (2) subtract total investment expenditures; and (3) divide by the number of shares outstanding. By capitalizing the change in after‐tax operating cash flow, one finds the net change in a firm's current operations value. By subtracting investment expenditures from that change in current operations value, the analyst gets a clearer picture of the benefit to shareholders net of the funds used to create that benefit. Consistent with basic theory, VAPS is positive when a company earns a return at least equal to its cost of capital and negative otherwise. Because of their fundamental differences, EPS and VAPS are likely to send different signals, and VAPS is expected to provide greater insight into stock price changes. The authors provide the findings of statistical tests showing the superior explanatory power of VAPS and recommend that companies publish statements of VAPS along with standard GAAP results, especially since the former can be readily calculated using the available income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement data.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

基于层次分析法的价值管理--"平衡记分卡"和"经济增加值"整合战略管理应用

以昆山信达电子公司为例,运用层次分析法(AHP),将经济增加值(EVA)和平衡记分卡(BSC)整合战略价值管理模型运用于其战略决策、战略执行和绩效评价的全过程,说明基于AHP的BSC和EVA整合战略价值管理能推动企业战略的成功实施.     

The Financial Crisis and the Value‐relevance of Recognised Deferred Tax Assets

The objective of this study is to consider if the value‐relevance of recognised deferred tax assets, which often represent unused tax losses, was affected by the financial crisis. A regression analysis of a sample of Australian and United Kingdom firms reveals that the value‐relevance of recognised deferred tax assets was affected by the financial crisis. However, the impact of the financial crisis differed between the sample countries. The study shows that a plausible explanation for this difference might be found in the tax law of the two countries. Findings of this paper will be of interest to regulators and standard setters, as they highlight how interaction between accounting requirements and tax law affects the relevance of accounting and tax information.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

The Impact of Recession on the Value‐relevance of Accounting Information

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, and the subsequent global economic downturn, has heightened the need for research on whether the value‐relevance of accounting information is impacted by periods of macroeconomic decline. In this study, we examine whether the occurrence of a recession impacts the value‐relevance of two key accounting constructs: book value of equity and earnings. Consistent with our priors, we find that controlling for recession significantly increases the value‐relevance of both the book value of equity and earnings. Our findings indicate the importance of controlling for recession in value‐relevance studies. Sample periods that include recession events, and that do not incorporate such conditioning, may be mis‐specified, with results difficult, if not impossible, to interpret.     

A New Look at the Monday Effect

It is well documented that expected stock returns vary with the day-of-the-week (the Monday or weekend effect). In this article we show that the well-known Monday effect occurs primarily in the last two weeks (fourth and fifth weeks) of the month. In addition, the mean Monday return of the first three weeks of the month is not significantly different from zero. This result holds for most of the subperiods during the 1962–1993 sampling period and for various stock return indexes. The monthly effect reported by Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) cannot fully explain this phenomenon.     

The Great Crash of 1929: A Look Back After 90 Years

The Great Crash of 1929 ranks among the climactic events of the last century, apparently heralding the beginning of the Great Depression. This event raises at least four questions that are relevant today:

• Why did the “Roaring 20s” roar? Some prominent contemporaries held that the decade roared because of consumerism, credit growth, and the Jazz Age. However, recent research suggests an alternative explanation: a revolution in manufacturing and technology that amplified economic growth and volatility in markets.
• Was the boom in equities a “bubble?” Both the authors’ research and other studies show surprisingly weak evidence of a bubble. The boom probably reflected the technology shock of the ‘20s. If there was a bubble, it was limited in time, breadth, and impact.
• What caused the Crash? The onset of an ordinary recession, surprising changes in monetary policy by the Fed, growing regulation, and rising protectionism all help to explain a sharp and sudden change in investor sentiment.
• Did the Crash cause the Great Depression, as popular opinion has long maintained? No. The cycle of economic contraction had begun well before the crash. Furthermore, the wealth effect of the Crash was limited. The pivot from recession into Great Depression reflected the abandonment of the Gold Exchange Standard, a wave of bank panics and collapse of credit, protectionism, and a number of maladroit public policies. But if the Crash did not cause the Depression, it probably amplified the effects of forces already at work.

Answers to these questions, illuminated by careful research, remind decision‐makers in business and government that the first explanations for historical events are not always the best, that complex systems have unintended consequences, and that gaps in information make the Great Crash a difficult standard by which to assess future events. The use of historical precedent warrants caution and great humility in the makers of public policy.     

ESG as a Value‐Creation Tool for Active Investors: A Profile of Inherent Group

A growing number of investment managers claim to integrate environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment strategy and processes, but few have described how they do so in depth. Even fewer reinforce the importance of sustainability within their own firms by becoming a certified ‘B Corporation.’ This article offers a rare, inside look at how one such value‐oriented manager uses ESG as a tool for differentiated investment sourcing, underwriting, and corporate engagement with the aim of achieving superior risk‐adjusted returns. One of the main arguments of the article—and a key principle of the firm's investment approach—is that ESG, as applied to both corporate strategy and operations, is an important factor in determining a company's cost of capital. The authors present specific examples of their investment process at work, highlighting how active engagement with management on ESG issues can catalyze progress that becomes valued by the capital markets.     

Investment Irreversibility,Cash Flow Risk,and Value‐Growth Stock Return Effects

We simulate results from a simple real options model to provide insight into the value‐growth stock return anomaly. In our model, firms possess either single (“value” firm) or multiple (“growth” firm) investment opportunities. Our model predicts that growth firms: (1) invest sooner, (2) exhibit greater continuity in capital expenditure over time, (3) have lower book‐to‐market ratios, and (4) generate lower rates of return than value firms.     

Fair Value‐related Information in Analysts’ Decision Processes: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

We use a sample of conference calls and analyst research reports from international banks to examine how financial analysts request and communicate fair value‐related information in their valuation process. We find that analysts devote considerable attention to fair value‐related topics. Most of the conference call questions and references in research reports pertain to fair value reclassifications and fair value changes of liabilities resulting from banks’ own credit risk. The accounting impact of these one‐time effects during the financial crisis and a lack of corresponding firm disclosures help to explain the prevalence of these two topics. The content of the questions and references suggests that analysts have different motives for their interest in fair value‐related information. While some analysts adjust reported earnings for unrecognised fair value changes of reclassified assets, most of the observed analysts exclude banks’ own credit risk effects from reported earnings. Thus, the use of fair value‐related information varies substantially across analysts and across instruments.     

BSC与EVA相结合的企业绩效评价研究——基于GP企业集团的案例分析

随着我国市场经济体制的完善和国有企业改革的推进,我国国有企业所面临的内外部环境发生了巨大变化,企业绩效管理模式也在改变。GP企业集团是一个有50多年历史的国有施工企业,在一定程度上体现了我国国有企业的绩效管理现状,本文通过对该企业集团的绩效考核现状进行分析,归纳了GP企业集团现行绩效管理体系存在的问题,并针对其不足,重新构建了基于BSC与EVA相结合的绩效评价指标体系,并对新旧指标体系的考核结果进行了对比分析,为我国类似国有企业集团提供绩效评价改进的新思路。     

基于EVA的商业银行经济资本管理与价值创造研究

只有为企业带来超过资本最低回报要求的业务,才真正为企业创造了价值,而那些创造收益水平低于资本最低回报要求的业务,实际上是在消耗企业的价值,因而价值最大化是银行经营最终目标。银行经济资本管理可以为银行创造价值。以EVA作为价值创造能力衡量指标,经济资本管理为银行创造价值路径有四个:绩效考评、战略制定、产品定价和资产组合选择。     

The Value‐relevance of Equity Accounted Carrying Amounts and Disclosed Fair Values of Listed Associates

Equity accounting is a controversial accounting treatment. Although fair value measurement represents a potential alternative measurement base, information content may be lost under a pure fair value measurement approach. This study investigates the value‐relevance of equity accounted carrying amounts and disclosed fair values of listed associates, using a sample of the largest firms listed in South Africa, Australia and the UK. The main finding is that the alternative measurement bases are incrementally value‐relevant during the sample period of 31 December 2005 to 31 December 2011, implying that equity investors do not blindly accept either measurement base. Rather, investors include their own assessment of the intrinsic value of an entity's listed associates in their valuations.