The benefits and costs of ethanol: an evaluation of the government’s analysis

Ethanol production in the United States has been steadily growing and is expected to continue growing. Many politicians see increased ethanol use as a way to promote environmental goals, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and energy security goals. This paper provides a benefit-cost analysis of increasing ethanol use based on an analysis by the Environmental Protection Agency. We find that the cost of increasing ethanol production to almost ten billion gallons a year is likely to exceed the benefits by about three billion dollars annually. We also suggest that earlier attempts aimed at promoting ethanol would have likely failed a benefit-cost test, and that Congress should consider repealing ethanol incentive programs, such as the ethanol tariff and tax credit.      

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.     

Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study

We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.     

Harnessing the political economy of environmental policy: David Pearce’s contribution to OECD

During 34 years, David Pearce made major contribution to OECD work on environmental economic issues, with a particular focus on cost–benefit analysis, economic instruments, biodiversity and distributive issues. This article provides a brief review of David Pearce’s contributions. This work was particularly useful in enhancing the political economy of environmental policy which is at the core of OECD work. The opinions expressed in this paper reflect the author’s perception of this long history of the development of environmental economics at OECD; it does not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD and its member countries. Many thanks to Jonathan Fisher, Nick Johnstone and Michel Potier for their comments on an earlier draft.     

Efficiency, equity, and sustainability in a water quantity-quality optimization model in the Rio Grande basin

Integrated hydrologic and economic optimization models at the basin scale provide a framework for policy design, implementation, and evaluation in water-stressed basins. Despite the considerable potential that basin scale analysis offers, few basin-wide studies have examined tradeoffs among efficiency, equity, and sustainability when analyzing the design of water resource programs. This paper develops a basin scale framework to identify hydrologic and economic impacts of alternative water pricing programs that comply with environmental regulations for protecting water quality. Key issues are examined that confront integrated hydroeconomic basin models: linking water and economics, spatial and temporal scale integration, and quantity-quality relationships. Economic efficiency is defined and measured for each of two urban water pricing arrangements that comply with urban water quality protection regulations. Alternative measures of equity are analyzed in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Sustainability is evaluated physically for protecting the water supply and financially for long-term revenue viability. The approach is illustrated from results of a dynamic nonlinear programming optimization model of water use in North America's Rio Grande basin. The model optimizes the net present value of the basin's total economic benefits subject to constraints on equity, sustainability, hydrology, and institutions. It is applied to assess impacts of a two-tiered pricing program that complies with recently implemented drinking water quality standards for the basin's two largest U.S. cities: Albuquerque, New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas. Results suggest that two-tiered pricing of urban water supply has considerable potential to perform well in meeting the aims of efficiency, equity, and sustainability. Findings provide a general framework for designing water pricing programs that comply with environmental regulations.     

Water markets design and evidence from experimental economics

Market mechanisms are gaining increasing acceptance all over the world as a way of making more efficient use of scarce water resources. Designing regulatory frameworks that ensure both inter- and intra-temporal efficient allocations is a daunting task, especially if supply is stochastic and there is ample storage capacity. In addition to defining tradable rights, specific provisions must regulate the use of reservoirs. Commonly, water statutes include provisions that establish asymmetries regarding the allocation of water, and market restrictions that ban water trading across different users. In this article, we use data collected in a laboratory to test two specific market regulations included in the 1999 Water reform in Spain. First, junior right holders are not allowed to buy water from senior users. Second, the law does not explicitly define water rights over units left in reservoirs for the following season. Results suggest that trading restrictions among water right holders lead to welfare losses for senior users. It is shown that removing this restriction would increase senior right holders’ benefits, without reducing those of junior users. Results show that defining water rights over saved units across periods would increase the average stock levels of reservoirs, and reduce market price instability. The lessons learned from the Spanish experience are applicable to settings characterized by unstable natural water supply and the availability of large storage facilities.      

Valuing environmental factors in cost-benefit analysis using data envelopment analysis

Environmental cost-benefit analysis (ECBA) is used for the social evaluation of investment projects and policies that involve significant environmental impacts. Economic valuation of environmental impacts forms one of the critical steps of ECBA. We develop a new method for this purpose, which does not require price estimation for environmental impacts using stated or revealed preference methods. Our approach is based on data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is modified to ECBA by using absolute shadow prices instead of relative prices. We also discuss how the method can be used for sensitive analysis in ECBA. We illustrate the method by means of a hypothetical numerical example.     

Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to raise prices above the competitive levels. PMG are introduced both as a market rule (the selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a business strategy (subjects decide whether or not to offer them). Our results show that PMG lead to a clear collusive outcome as markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PMG are imposed as a market rule. Whenever subjects are allowed to decide whether to adopt PMG or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt them and prices get very close to the collusive ones.      

Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis

We study an experimental market in which some sellers are prone to moral hazard, and in which a private-order contract enforcement institution exists that can mediate trade and prevent sellers from reneging on their contractual obligations. Using the institution to resolve the moral-hazard problem is costly. We demonstrate that in this market, the utilization of the private-order contract enforcement institution may make public and private market signals uninformative and inhibit learning. We study whether this potential information externality can limit adaptation away from the private-order institution when it is efficient to do so. Consistent with theory, we find inefficient persistence when the institution is used, but by contrast, efficient adaptation in other situations. Providing information to individuals who are using the private-order institution allows them to partially adapt.     

Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [Ferejohn, J., Krehbiel, K., 1987. The budget process and the size of the budget, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 31, 296–320] showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level.     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: an experimental approach

Summary We design and analyze experimental versions of monetary overlapping generations economies under alternative policy regimes. Economies with a constant level of real deficit financed through seignorage, economies in which the level of deficit is adapted in order to follow a monetary policy with a target rate of inflation, and economies with preannounced changes in deficit levels are reported here. We also examine the behavior of an economy with no stationary competitive equilibrium. Our time series are compared to rational expectations equilibrium paths and to adaptive learning dynamics.Financial support for our work from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, the National Science Foundation (SES-8912552), Richard M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds, and the Ministry of Education of Spain is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Javier Diaz-Giménez, Jean Michael Grandmont, Robert Lucas, Albert Marcet, Charles Plott, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Michael Woodford for commenting on our work. We also thank Vijay Rajan for developing the software for the computerized experimental environment, and Jackie Cuccaro and Dhananjay Gode for their research assistance.     

Toward an Evolutionary and Moral Science

Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British institutional economist John A. Hobson — who was an acquaintance of Veblen — foreshadowed this approach.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

How efficient are national environmental standards? A benefit-cost analysis of the United States experience

This paper summarizes the results of the first systematic, geographically-specific efficiency assessment of the U.S. experience with national environmental standards and with alternative approaches to establishing those standards. This ex-post evaluation assessed the net benefits that resulted from EPA's regulation of conventional air and water pollutants from the pulp and paper industry between 1973 and 1984. The paper compares the benefit-cost efficiencies of the three dominant regulatory approaches: technology, ambient, and benefits. Unlike previous studies, which assessed benefits and costs on a national basis, the study estimates both costs and benefits on a facility-by-facility basis. The analysis shows how the efficiency of national environmental regulations can vary dramatically at local levels. The authors conclude that the technology-based standards for water pollution management failed as an efficient environmental strategy. The costs clearly exceeded the benefits in the aggregate, as well as in the specific in most situations. Benefits exceeded costs at only 11 of the 68 mills investigated. The ambient based standards for air pollution management succeeded as an environmental strategy in the aggregate, but succeeded in the specific for only one-third of the mills (22 of 60 mills). The benefits-based standards for air pollution management also succeeded in the aggregate as well as in the specific for about one-half of the mills. Benefits exceeded costs at 29 of the 60 mills investigated. The results of the study point to two major conclusions. First, a regulatory policy that is based on some measure of environmental results, either ambient-based or benefits-based, will be more efficient than a policy that ignores environmental results. Second, truly efficient policies for reducing environmental risks require pollution mitigation decisions that take into account local conditions. These include not only the changes in local ambient conditions, but also the number of people who will benefit from pollution reduction decisions. This latter conclusion suggests that national environmental standards per se may be inefficient.Dr. Luken is currently Senior Environmental Advisor to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna, Austria. He is on leave from the U.S. EPA where he was Chief of the Economic Analysis and Research Branch of the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE). Mr. Clark is President of Environmental Economics Associates of Traverse City, Michigan. He was formerly Chief of EPA's Cost and Economic Impact Analysis Branch in OPPE. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.     

Inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity: results of an experiment with small businessmen

We investigate inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity by having subjects from distinct ethnic origins play the trust game [Games Econom. Behav. 10 (1995) 122]. The participants in the experiment are male small businessmen of Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin, all of whom have a business in the same city (Ghent, Belgium). Our main finding is that the average levels of trust and reciprocity are independent of ethnic origin and, moreover, independent of the ethnic origin of the opposite party.     

Experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises

Corsetti et al. (2004) demonstrate that the presence of a large speculator in the foreign exchange market makes the remaining traders more aggressive in their speculative attacks. We conduct an experiment designed to test their theoretical predictions and also use the experiment to analyze an additional aspect that has not been previously covered in the literature: namely, whether the entry of a large speculator and the exit of the same speculator have the same effect in magnitude on the probability of a successful speculative attack. We obtain two main findings. First, the results support the main conclusion of Corsetti et al. (2004) that the presence of a large speculator makes other small speculators more aggressive. Second, the results suggest that the effect of the entry of a large speculator on the probability of successful speculative attacks is larger than that of the exit of the same speculator.     

Designing, testing and implementing a trial dryland salinity credit trade scheme

This article describes implementation and outcomes of a credit trading trial focussed on dryland salinity in Victoria, Australia. In lieu of extant specified property rights, participants were invited to agree to obligations to provide groundwater recharge credits in exchange for pecuniary compensation. Participants were able to meet their obligations to supply groundwater recharge credits through land management actions resulting in monitored outcomes consistent with contractual obligations to reduce recharge. Alternatively, those in deficit were provided the option to obtain sufficient credits through market exchange. Surplus transferable recharge credits were produced by those participants who exceeded their own contractual obligations through improved land management. The paper describes the process of contract design and implementation. The trial involved a design and testing phase and an on-ground implementation phase. We describe composite methodologies deployed in the design and testing of alternative policy instruments and institutional arrangements, conducted prior to implementation. These involved community consultation, an attitudinal and behavioural survey, experimental economics and the development of a transparent and credible monitoring protocol. The conclusions drawn as a result of this analysis provided an empirical basis to implement the on-ground trial phase. Results of on-ground implementation are described. Finally, the methods and results of a Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) of the on-ground trial implementation are outlined. The BCA accounted for salinity damage reduction, forgone river flow, carbon sequestration, production benefits and costs. The result of BCA was an estimated net benefit.     

A matter of opinion—How ecological and neoclassical environmental economists and think about sustainability and economics

The differing paradigms of ecological and neoclassical environmental economics have been described in various articles and books and are also embedded in different professional associations. However, we cannot take for granted that the paradigm debates described in the literature are actually mirrored in exactly the same way in the perceptions and opinions of researchers looking at sustainability from an economic perspective. This paper presents empirical results from a German case study on how economists and others involved in sustainability research from different schools of thought think about the issues of sustainability and economics, how they group around these issues, how they feel about the current scientific divide, and what they expect to be future topics of sustainability research.We analyze the data using cluster analysis. Based on a literature survey, we generated forty sustainability economics-related statements and asked 196 sustainability researchers about their degree of agreement or disagreement with these statements. In evaluating our survey results, we discuss to what extent the clusters that we identified do—or do not—represent the two schools of thought of ecological and neoclassical environmental economics. We also propose some fields of research that can help to bridge the gaps amongst sustainability economics researchers while clearly marking others that are more suitable for a scientific ‘competition of ideas’. Key results of the study are: We identify two primary scientific clusters, one clearly confirming the existence of the ecological-economics school of thought, and the other largely capturing the neoclassical environmental view. Yet, there are some surprising exceptions: Both schools of thought share a conceptual definition of sustainability that is integrative in considering ecological, societal and economic dimensions (‘three pillar concept’) and is geared at preserving the development potentials of society. We also find a shared critique of ‘pure economic growth’ strategies in our sample. These shared opinions may provide bridging concepts between the schools of thought. Also both clusters agree with respect to a wide range of future fields of sustainability economics research. Yet, the research agenda of the ecological-economics cluster contains a large number of additional topics, primarily related to social, distributional and evolutionary aspects of sustainable development. Strong divides between the clusters that seem to be more suitable for a scientific competition of ideas are primarily related to the question of how to achieve sustainability, including appropriate environmental policies.