Effects of Unit-Based Garbage Pricing: A Differences-in-Differences Approach

Using a unique 10-year dataset of all 458 Dutch municipalities, we apply a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of unit-based pricing on household waste quantities and recycling. Community-level studies of unit-based pricing typically do not include fixed effects at the local level. We find that failure to do so may substantially inflate the estimated price effect. We also find that unit-based pricing may be endogenous, and use instrumental variables to account for this. Our analysis shows that user fees depend on user fees in neighboring jurisdictions (policy interaction). Our estimate of the garbage reduction per $1 user fee is lower than any previous estimate bar one. The price effect depends on the pricing system: weight-based systems reduce garbage quantities more than volume-based systems. User fees increase recycling, especially of paper, but not nearly as much as they reduce garbage quantities. We find no evidence for waste tourism or illegal dumping.     

ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

PRICE AND SUBSTITUTION IN RESIDENTIAL SOLID WASTE

Many per-unit curbside recycling and garbage collection pricing systems were implemented in the 1990s. A detailed data set is used to estimate the effect of an increase in the per-unit price change for a long-running pricing system across time in one city. A fixed-effects regression controls for collection district and explanatory variables including weather, time, and employment changes. The elasticity estimate is within the range of previous work but with a higher cross-price elasticity to recycling. This shift to recycling results in significant financial benefits to the city and a small decrease in social welfare. ( JEL Q5, Q53)     

Recycling and Waste Diversion Effectiveness: Evidence from Canada

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between recycling policy options and recycling behavior to study the most effective methods of diverting post-consumer waste from landfills. We employ data from a unique, micro-data set collected from households in communities across Ontario, Canada. We estimate the relationships between several commonly recycled materials (newsprint, glass, plastics, aluminum cans, tin cans, cardboard, and toxic chemicals) and individual household characteristics, recycling program attributes, and garbage collection financing methods. We find that user fees on garbage collection have significant impacts on recycling levels for all materials except toxic chemicals, and mandatory recycling programs on particular items have significant effects on recycling for almost all materials. Limits on the amount of garbage that can be placed at the curb, and providing free units under user fee systems, however, generally have a negligible or detrimental impact on recycling.JEL classification: D10, H23, Q28     

Differential Provision of Solid Waste Collection Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Households

A model of household refuse production is presented in which individuals differ in their distaste for the waste stock and the supply of waste collection services is continuous in pick-up frequency. The inclusion of pick-up frequency into household solid waste management analyses has already been shown to have policy implications. In fact, even in the absence of the waste stock externality, a system of uniform consumption taxes and legal (or curbside) disposal and recycling subsidies has been found to be necessary (and sufficient) to induce households to socially optimally allocate their resources when illegal disposal (or simply dumping) incentives exist but a per unit punishment system for dumping is lacking. This policy is here concluded to be no longer feasible; instead, a system of differential consumption taxes and recycling subsidies and uniform legal disposal subsidies is found to be optimal (but possibly nonimplementable). In the presence of heterogeneous households, which are however identifiable on the basis of their relative location to the landfill site, an optimal and implementable policy is then shown to require a differential provision of collection services.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

ACCOUNTING FOR NONMARKET HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION WITHIN A NATIONAL ACCOUNTS FRAMEWORK

The satellite accounts illustrated in this paper reflect the household's role as a producer and an investor in durables as well as a consumer by modifying the NIPA's to (1) incorporate the value of nonmarket (unpaid) household work into GDP; and (2) treat expenditures on consumer durables as investment and measure the value of the services those durables provide. Additionally, an Input–Output (I–O) model highlights the household's functions as a producer and investor in much greater detail for the year 1992 by incorporating a household industry for each time-use activity and by showing the inputs to and outputs from each household industry's production.     

An EU Recycling Target: What Does the Dutch Evidence Tell Us?

The European Union (EU) advocates a household waste recycling rate of more than 65 %. Although the Netherlands has already invested heavily in recycling policies, this is still a big challenge as nowadays this rate is approximately 50 % on average and very few no municipalities have a rate above 65 %. Given this practice, it is possible to learn from the Dutch experience which policies are effective in increasing recycling rates. Based on a large panel data set for the Netherlands, we show that unit-based pricing, avoiding a duo-bin for unsorted and compostable waste, and reducing the frequency of collecting unsorted and compostable waste at the curbside are effective in raising the recycling rate. However, only a bag-based pricing system has a substantial effect, but this policy can have some adverse effects. Other unit-based pricing systems have effects of less than 10 % points. In nearly all cases, changing the frequency of collection of recyclables has no or very small effects. Moreover, the complementarity between unit-based pricing and curbside service is low. Overall, it seems very difficult to reach the EU goal of 65 % with the policies applied.     

Wasting Time? Recycling Incentives in Urban Taiwan and Japan

What makes recycling work? We study the factors driving household waste disposal and recycling in 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan in order to understand the impact of alternative waste management incentives. We show that this depends on the effect of distinct policies on the relative costs of the main alternative disposal methods: recycling, disposal to landfill and illegal dumping. The willingness both to recycle and to dispose to landfill depends on the relative costs of the waste collection regime, and these are dominated by the time cost of alternative disposal methods. The higher the frequency of waste collection, the less recycling and the more disposal to landfill there will be. This is because frequent collection reduces the marginal time-cost of disposal to landfill. Curbside collection of recyclable material, and the frequency of that collection, has a similar effect on the recycling rate. Although direct incentives, such as unit pricing are important in the waste disposal decision, recycling depends primarily on management of the time-costs it involves.     

THE SENSITIVITY OF INCOME INEQUALITY TO CHOICE OF EQUIVALENCE SCALES

To account for the fact that a household's needs depend on its size and composition most studies on income inequality adjust the observed household incomes by equivalence scales. However, since the rationale for choosing a specific scale is rather vague the importance of testing the sensitivity of income inequality estimates to choice of equivalence scales has long been acknowledged. The sensitivity studies in the literature are restricted to equivalence scales that do not depend on the income level of the reference household which means that the effect of a rise in the household size on the scale rate does not depend on whether the household is poor or rich. By using Norwegian micro-data it is shown that the introduction of an income-dependent scale produces results that are in conflict with the widespread view of robustness of results to choice of equivalence scales.     

Willingness-to-pay for urban ecosystem services provision under objective and subjective uncertainty

There is growing concern that failure to acknowledge the risk and uncertainty surrounding ecosystem services (ES) delivery could have adverse effects on support for ES policy intervention in the long run. However, acknowledging risk may reduce support for policy interventions in the short term. In this paper, we sought to determine whether willingness-to-pay (WTP) for urban forest ES in Southampton, UK is affected by objective and subjective uncertainty surrounding ES delivery. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with a split sample design: one with a scenario specifying risky ES outcomes and one where zero risk was implied. Respondents’ subjective certainty surrounding the provision of ES was determined before and after the choice questions. Despite respondents’ risk aversion, introducing an objective likelihood attribute did not reduce WTP compared to the scenario with implied certain ES outcomes. Furthermore, whilst WTP for the overall scheme was found to be adversely affected by the presence of risk around ES outcomes, subjective uncertainty seemed to reduce WTP more than objective probabilities. Our results therefore support the idea that both objective probabilities and subjective uncertainty should be explicitly incorporated in the design of stated preference studies for ES valuation.     

Time-saving innovations, time allocation, and energy use: Evidence from Canadian households

Time and energy are major inputs into the production of household goods and services. As a result, the market penetration of time-saving technologies for general household use is expected to affect both a household's (i) allocation of time across home production and leisure activities; and (ii) energy use. For example, with a household's adoption of a microwave or a dishwasher, cooking food and washing dishes will require less time, and therefore in-home meal preparation may increase. Households with microwaves or dishwashers may also opt to spend more time undertaking other production activities, inside or outside the home, or engage in more leisure (watching TV, reading, exercising). To the extent that time is reallocated from less to more energy-intensive activities in the home, residential energy use will increase as households adopt appliances that embody time-saving technology. Furthermore, an adoption of time-saving technologies for basic household chores, such as meal preparation and laundry, can impact energy use due to the fact that many time-saving technologies are more energy intensive than alternative technologies that require larger time commitments. In this paper, we use the Canadian Survey of Household Energy Use data from 2003 to examine the extent to which ownership of products that embody time-saving innovations affects time allocation and energy use at the household level.     

农户消费决定因素:基于有序probit模型

本文以问卷调查数据为基础,利用有序Probit模型建立农户消费需求模型,分析微观因素对农户消费的影响.模型的计量经济分析表明:(1)农户家庭的经济状况对农户的消费有重要的影响.低收入家庭消费意愿明显高于高收入家庭;(2)户主个人因素对农户消费意愿有重要影响.户主受教育水平的提高以及户主主业的非农化对农户消费有积极的影响;(3)农村金融发展和农村保险体系完善与农户的消费意愿呈正相关;(4)农村居民消费环境对农户消费意愿有重要影响.并据此提出了相应对策.     

Modelling the Non-market Environmental Costs and Benefits of Biodiversity Projects Using Contingent Valuation Data

CV studies rarely ask willingness to accept (WTA)questions, yet there are a range of environmentalprojects where there are likely to be potential losersas well as gainers. This paper presents evidence fromsix biodiversity projects that the inclusion ofcontingent compensation payments from thoserespondents who preferred the status quo cansubstantially reduce net project benefits, even whenthe proportion of losers is relatively small. Astatistical model for estimating the mean welfaremeasure from dichotomous choice data which allows forboth positive WTP, zero WTP, and WTA is described. Asmany environmental projects are likely to create bothgainers and losers, we recommend that CV analysts giveserious consideration to the collection and analysisof WTA data otherwise they risk generating biasedestimates of project benefits.     

Public-good valuation and intra-family allocation

I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured alternatively by household member i’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the household, WTP _i (H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains over private and common household goods. WTP _i (H) is then defined by trade-offs between the public good and the household good, and WTP(C) by trade-offs of between the public good and private goods. WTP _i (H) is found to be higher (lower) than WTP(C) when member i has a relatively high (low) marginal valuation of the public good, but tends on average to equal WTP(C). As a consequence, individuals tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household’s WTP for a public good, even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully. Adding all members’ WTP answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting. Pure and paternalistic altruism (the latter attached to consumption of the public good) move each member’s WTP on behalf of the household closer to the true sum of individual WTP, but only paternalistic altruism raises this sum.      

Public support for reducing US reliance on fossil fuels: Investigating household willingness-to-pay for energy research and development

In order to reduce future dependence on foreign oil and emissions of CO₂, how much would US households be willing to pay annually to support increased energy research and development (R&D) activities designed to replace fossil fuels? Does it matter whether the R&D includes nuclear energy options? We explore these questions using data from a unique set of national telephone and Internet surveys. Using a national advisory referendum format, the contingent valuation method is applied to estimate annual household willingness-to-pay (WTP) for US household support of a national Energy Research and Development Fund (ERDF) for investments in energy sources not reliant on fossil fuels. While accounting for the level of (un)certainty in voting responses, the WTP modeling includes a comparison of both classic maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Bayesian analysis. Evidence indicates that MLE and Bayesian analysis achieve similar statistical inference, while the Bayesian analysis provides a narrower confidence interval around estimated WTP.     

Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods?

The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households, it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions, and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a test between samples that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit may overestimate aggregate WTP. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design and further research in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test.

---

     

Does garbage pricing increase the immoral disposal of household waste?

Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the mechanism of illegal dumping by examining the degree to which per-bag pricing plays a role. However, previous research on the behaviour of avoiding paying a charge for waste collection has tended to neglect so-called ‘immoral disposal,’ which is less risky than illegal dumping because there is no legal penalty. In this study, we define immoral disposal as the dumping of waste in a manner that is immoral but not illegal. To detect the existence of immoral disposal, we apply a spatial econometric approach, namely an extended panel spatial Durbin model, to identify the actual spillover effect of garbage pricing in neighbouring municipalities on immoral disposal from the total waste. A major finding of this study is that immoral disposal exists in unit-based pricing, two-tiered pricing, and fixed pricing.     

Consistency and construction in stated WTP for health risk reductions: A novel scope-sensitivity test

A contingent valuation study is conducted to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for reducing skin cancer risks. A split sample design contrasts dichotomous choice (DC) with open-ended (OE) methods for eliciting WTP. A novel scope test varies the remit of risk reductions from just the individual respondent to their entire household allowing us to examine both the statistical significance and scale of scope sensitivity. While OE responses fail such tests, DC responses pass both forms of testing. We conclude that conformity of the size of scope effects with prior expectations should form a focus for future validity testing.     

Household Waste Management in a Swedish Municipality: Determinants of Waste Disposal, Recycling and Composting

This paper analyzes waste disposal, recycling and composting in a municipality in southwest Sweden. In 1994, Varberg introduced a weight-based billing system for household waste charging 1 kr/kg of waste and at the same time recycling centers were set up and a green shopping campaign was launched. This led to a significant reduction in waste collected and increased recycling. This study had access to actual measured data on waste disposal at the household level for a residential area called Tvååker, in addition to survey data for the same households. This makes it possible to carry out a more reliable and more detailed analysis than has been previously possible, particularly with respect to attitudinal variables. The most important determinants of each individual household's waste were composting of kitchen waste, living area, age and attitudes concerning the difficulty of recycling various materials. Separate sections look at composting behaviour, at willingness to pay for sound waste management and for the sake of comparison three other municipalities are also studied. The main finding is that economic incentives, although important, are not the only driving force behind the observed reduction in municipal waste: Given the proper infrastructure that facilitates recycling, people are willing to invest more time than can be motivated purely by savings on their waste management bill.