The tax (dis)advantage of a firm issuing options on its own stock

It is common for firms to issue or purchase options on the firm's own stock. Examples include convertible bonds, warrants, call options as employee compensation, and the sale of put options as part of share repurchase programs. This paper shows that option positions with implicit borrowing—such as put sales and call purchases—are tax-disadvantaged relative to the equivalent synthetic option with explicit borrowing. Conversely, option positions with implicit lending—such as warrants—are tax-advantaged. I also show that firms are better off from a tax perspective issuing bifurcated convertible bonds—bonds plus warrants—rather than an otherwise equivalent standard convertible.     

COMPETITIVE LONG RUN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND FACTOR-PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

In this paper we have considered competitive long run industry equilibrium with factor-price uncertainty. We discussed the long run equilibrium output of firms with risk neutrality, output price and their responses to changes in uncertainty, factor price and industry demand. In the first part of this paper we have derived a result that, given risk neutrality, the firms operate at proper capacity, i.e. where expected long run marginal cost is equal to expected long run average cost, as shown in the case of output-price uncertainty. This result is, however, different from that obtained from Sheshinski and Dréze (1976). From the comparative static analysis we first discovered that even under risk neutrality factor-price uncertainty affects the long run industry equilibrium: that is, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty leads firm's to enter the industry, because they can decrease expected long run costs as the variability of factor price increases. Consequently, output price goes down. In contrast, firm size is kept invariable in response to its increase as long as the cost function is separable, i.e. the separability of the cost function holds when production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and CES types used commonly in empirical work, although firm size might, generally, be affected by the increase. It is an interesting fact that firm size and industry size will express different responses to a change in risk. The result that the long run industry equilibrium with cost uncertainty is explicitly affected is a sharp contrast to the result under output-price uncertainty and provides a new aspect for understanding about the behaviour of the industry with uncertainty. Secondly, increased factor-price causes the number of firms in the industry to decline and output price to rise. In addition, firm's size will expand with its increase if that factor is inferior, while the effect on firm size is ambiguous if it is normal. The firm's output, i.e. firm size, is, however, kept constant if the cost function is separable. Thirdly, the long run equilibrium output of the firm remains intact but the number of firms increases as industry demand rises. This result holds, regardless of the firm's attitude towards risk. Finally, we find throughout the paper that the functional form of the cost function plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of the industry with factor-price uncertainty.     

ARDL bounds tests and robust inference for the long run relationship between real stock returns and inflation in Australia

This paper conducts an empirical investigation into the long run relationship between real stock returns and inflation in Australia by employing the ARDL bounds tests. There exists a stock return–inflation long run relationship, and the long run parameters are non-linear functions of those of the conditional error correction model. The OLS estimates of the latter model constitute the long run parameter estimates and their standard errors are estimated by delta methods. The long run model estimates so constructed can be biassed and inconsistent, and the delta method is derived assuming asymptotic normality, which does not hold in this investigation. In this paper, to overcome these limitations of the traditional methods, we employ the bias-corrected bootstrap method. As a consequence, the robust and reliable statistical inference can be made on the long run return–inflation relationship. The empirical results show that the expected inflation had no significant effect on real stock returns, while the observed inflation had a significant and negative effect. Furthermore, the data generating process of the returns–inflation relationship was not affected by the change in monetary policy regime in the early 1990s. These findings imply that Australian stocks have been very effective instruments for hedging against expected inflation. Because of the resilience of Australian economy to the current global financial and economic crisis, this finding has implications for long term domestic and foreign investors in Australia.     

Capitalism's growth imperative

A capitalist firm operating in a competitive market is subjectto a growth imperative, because uncertainty about the profitrate under a no-growth policy makes the firm's prospects highlyunattractive in finite time and bankruptcy practically certainin the long run. A no-growth policy determines consumption andinvestment so that they and capital would remain constant overtime if the latter's expected return were realised with certainty.Simulation is used to arrive at the probability of bankruptcyby the end of t periods and the expected values of capital andmoney, for relevant combinations of time and uncertainty undersuccessively more realistic models of a no-growth firm in acompetitive market. The sensitivity of the results to variationin the parameters in each of the models is evaluated. Finally,we establish that a plausible growth policy may achieve growth,but the problem of bankruptcy is not resolved.     

Morphogenesis Of Social Networks And Coexistence Of Technologies ∗

The aim of the article is to relate the formation of influence networks to the coexistence of technologies in the long run. In the spirit of Plouraboue et al. (1998), we postulate that potential adopters of a technology are situated in a social network. In our model, initial relations are partly negative and all the expected utilities are revised in parallel. In the case of an exogenous network, opinions can fluctuate endlessly. When agents reallocate their relationships, this reinforces trust in agents whose opinion is close to theirs. As a result of this process, the network stabilizes in the long run, generating diversity in expected utilities.     

Pricing the Cost of Expropriation Risk

The paper examines a firm's cost of expropriation risk in a framework that links it to the government's incentive to expropriate. The author develops a pricing model for the firm's cost of expropriation risk that includes the positions of both government and firm. The government's decision to expropriate is modeled as an American-style call option. The cost of expropriation risk is modeled as the value of an insurance policy that pays off all losses resulting from expropriation. The firm's cost of expropriation risk is determined by the government acting to optimize the value of its option to expropriate. The author identifies the parameters that link the government's option to expropriate to the firm's cost of expropriation risk, and shows how the model can be used in capital budgeting decisions and the ongoing management of expropriation risk.     

我国上市公司的投资行为研究:基于新古典理论的检验

从新古典投资理论出发,通过研究我国上市公司投资行为对资本成本的响应程度以及企业投资规模与利润水平的关联程度,笔者发现:(1)我国上市公司的投资行为总体上符合新古典经济理论所期望的利润最大化目标下的企业投资行为范式;(2)由于存在较大的资本存量调整成本,新古典经济理论倡导的干预投资的经济政策对我国企业的投资行为在长期内会发生调节作用,但短期内的作用非常有限。     

产业共性技术研发政府支持合同

建立了产业共性技术研发三阶段博弈模型,基于政府视角研究了以企业研发投入最大化为目标的共性技术支持合同的最优设计问题,并分析了合同性质。研究结果表明:足够多的政府预算是共性技术研发最优合同存在的前提,企业的最优研发投入随着政府预算的增加而增加,且其增长速度比政府支持投入的增长速度更快;企业的最优研发投入与共性技术市场化预期收益、企业及政府投入对共性技术研发成功的影响系数正相关,与双方单位投入成本系数负相关。     

Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.     

The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions

When the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the effects of corruption on efficiency, bidders’ welfare and expected revenue. Our results apply as well to the situation—unrelated to corruption—where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal.     

The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes

This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.     

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

Environmental policies often set “relative” or “intensity” emission caps, i.e. emission limits proportional to the polluting firm's output. One of the arguments put forth in favour of relative caps is based on the uncertainty on business-as-usual output: if the firm's production level is higher than expected, so will be business-as-usual emissions, hence reaching a given level of emissions will be more costly than expected. As a consequence, it is argued, a higher emission level should be allowed if the production level is more important than expected. We assess this argument with a stochastic analytical model featuring two random variables: the business-as-usual emission level, proportional to output, and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. We compare the relative cap to an absolute cap and to a price instrument, in terms of welfare impact. It turns out that in most plausible cases, either a price instrument or an absolute cap yields a higher expected welfare than a relative cap. Quantitatively, the difference in expected welfare is typically very small between the absolute and the relative cap but may be significant between the relative cap and the price instrument.     

Forward-looking monetary policy and anticipated shocks to inflation

This paper extends a standard New Keynesian model to describe the effects of anticipated shocks to inflation and forward-looking monetary policy. Using the data generated from this modified model suggests that overlooking these two factors in the standard Cholesky structural vector autoregressive identification scheme will generate a price puzzle. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that failing to account for these two factors may result in significant estimates of two other explanations of the price puzzle—the cost channel of transmission of monetary policy and indeterminacy due to violation of the Taylor principle—even though neither features in the data generating process.     

Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth

This paper presents a trade model with firm‐level productivity differences and R&D‐driven growth. Trade liberalization causes the least productive firms to exit but also slows the development of new products. The overall effect on productivity growth depends on the size of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in R&D. When these spillovers are relatively weak, then trade liberalization promotes productivity growth in the short run and makes consumers better off in the long run. However, when these spillovers are relatively strong, then trade liberalization retards productivity growth in the short run and makes consumers worse off in the long run.     

Industrial cogeneration and regulatory policy

The 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) fostered decentralized generation of electricity, particularly in the form of cogeneration. A model of a firms' decision to cogenerate is developed that illustrates both the interface between the firm and an electric utility, and the firm's internal interface between its primary product and cogeneration technologies. The model is used to show that the firm may operate inefficiently in both the short run and long run owing to the fixed-proportions technology of cogeneration and PURPA mandated operating procedures, respectively. Cogenerating firms that dump heat into the atmosphere may signal inefficient behavior; therefore, monitoring heat dumping may be important in measuring the success of cogeneration.     

Wage Inequality,Increased Competition,and Trade Liberalization: Short Run vs Long Run

This paper examines the impact of increased competition and trade liberalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the short run as well as the long run. It is shown that an increase in the number of firms in the producer services sector increases wage inequality in the short run even if the income shares of capital in the industrial and agricultural sectors were identical. A decrease in the services sector's fixed cost decreases wage inequality in the short run if the income share of capital in the agricultural sector is relatively large. Owing to the presence of external economies, a decrease in the services sector's fixed cost increases wage inequality in the long run. A decrease in import duty on the agricultural good increases wage inequality in the short as well as the long run but its effect in the long run is stronger due to the presence of external economies in the industrial sector.     

Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving?: Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking

We investigate the Hartwick rule for saving of a nation necessary to sustain a constant level of private consumption for a small open economy with an exhaustible stock of natural resources. The amount by which a country saves and invests less than the marginal resource rents equals the expected capital gains on reserves of natural resources plus the expected increase in interest income on net foreign assets plus the expected fall in the cost of resource extraction due to expected improvements in extraction technology. Effectively, depletion is then postponed until better times. This suggests that it is not necessarily sub-optimal for resource-rich countries to have negative genuine saving. However, in countries with different groups with imperfectly defined property rights on natural resources, political distortions induce faster resource depletion than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Fractionalised societies with imperfect property rights build up more foreign assets than their marginal resource rents, but in the long run accumulate less foreign assets than homogenous societies. Hence, such societies end up with lower sustainable consumption and are worse off, especially if seepage is strong, the number of rival groups is large and the country does not enjoy much monopoly power on the resource market. Genuine saving is zero in such societies. However, World Bank genuine saving figures based on market rather than accounting prices will be negative, albeit less so in more fractionalised societies with less secure property rights.     

SHORT‐RUN AND LONG‐RUN IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Opposing theoretical arguments exist regarding the effect of environmental regulation on financial performance. Some studies argue that environmental regulation constrains firms' abilities to exploit revenue‐enhancing or cost‐reducing opportunities. Other studies, representing the Porter hypothesis, argue that environmental regulation motivates firms to innovate, which ultimately improves financial performance. Although much of the debate focuses on long‐run effects, there are also important short‐run effects. This study provides empirical evidence regarding the short‐run and long‐run effects of Clean Water Act regulation on financial performance. To generate this evidence, we examine the effect of permitted wastewater discharge limits, on the return on sales, using panel data on publicly owned firms in the chemical manufacturing industries. We find that Clean Water Act regulation improves financial performance in both the short run and the long run with a stronger effect in the long run. These results suggest that some net benefits may be realized during a short‐run transition to comply with a tighter permitted discharge limit, with additional benefits accruing to the firm in the long run because the firm has more time to innovate. (JEL K23, L25, L51, L65, Q52)     

New functionality development through follower substitution for a leader in open innovation

There has been a paradigm shift to a knowledge-oriented economy in the 21st century. Consequently, there has also been a shift in where innovation typically occurs. This shift has been from the production site toward the process of product diffusion. That is, innovation occurs more frequently at the point at which a product or service is moved into the marketplace where it is immediately modified through customer interaction. In this process, new “functionality” — services, the delivery method or even product changes occur in the diffusion process. Given the need to constantly create new value through new product “functionality” or new “functionality development”, firm strategy must address the issue of how to enhance innovation at this new locus — the diffusion process. Sustainable new functionality development over time has become crucial to a firm's competitiveness. In this context, firms have to develop new functionality as early and quickly as possible; leveraging whatever innovation exists in the marketplace. According to theory, the early emergence of functionality development in this context depends on a dynamic system in which the imitator (follower) is constantly substituting for the innovator (leader). This substitution corresponds to the dynamics observed in the process referred to as “open innovation”. According to this theory, functionality development through follower substitution for a leader would be critical for a firm's competitiveness in the open innovation environment. Furthermore, open innovation could be a process for sustaining the ongoing creation of new value through functionality development maximizing limited resources. This paper attempts to demonstrate this hypothesis through an empirical analysis of this process of substitution in major innovative goods and services in Japan.