THE SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROMOTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE LIBERALISED POWER INDUSTRY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper compares the social efficiency of the two main regulatory instruments used to promote renewable energy sources in electricity generation (RES-E), taking into consideration their role in promoting the preservation of the climate. They are based on a purchase obligation and act either by price (feed-in tariffs) or by quantity (RES-E quotas). In their reference design, the instruments show different performances in several dimensions: market incentives intensity, control of the cost for consumers, safeguards of RES-E investments, and conformity with the new market regime of the electricity industry. The comparison shows that neither instrument offers an optimal solution in each of these dimensions. In particular, the intrinsic qualities of the quotas instrument that are put forward to mandate its adoption by the EU members are overestimated. A government will thus select an instrument in accordance with the relative importance of its objectives: environmental policy versus cost control by market pressure.     

Subsidies for renewable energies in the presence of learning effects and market power

We study the impact of learning by doing, learning spill-overs, and imperfect competition in a model with two types of electricity producers, an oligopolistic sector of polluting fossil-fuel utilities and a competitive fringe of non-polluting generators of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Furthermore we consider an upstream industry of RES-E equipment producers engaged in learning by doing. We show that a first-best policy requires two instruments, a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers. We then study second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs that are paid to the generators of RES-E. By means of simulations we calculate the welfare loss of a second-best-optimal feed-in-tariff policy and analyze how market structure impacts on second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs.     

Can Technology-Specific Deployment Policies Be Cost-Effective? The Case of Renewable Energy Support Schemes

While there is relatively limited disagreement on the general need for supporting the deployment of renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E), there are diverging views on whether the granted support levels should be technology-neutral or technology-specific. In this review paper we question the frequently stressed argument that technology-neutral schemes will promote RES-E deployment cost-effectively. We use a simple partial equilibrium model of the electricity sector with one representative investor as a vehicle to synthesize the existing literature, and review potential rationales for technology-specific RES-E support. The analysis addresses market failures associated with technological development, long-term risk taking, path dependencies as well as various external costs, all of which drive a wedge between the private and the social costs of RES-E deployment. Based on analytical insight and a review of empirical literature, we conclude that the relevance of these market failures is typically heterogeneous across different RES-E technologies. The paper also discusses a number of possible caveats to implementing cost-effective technology-specific support schemes in practice, including the role of various informational and politico-economic constraints. While these considerations involve important challenges, neither of them suggests an unambiguous plea for technology-neutral RES-E support policies either. We close by highlighting principles for careful RES-E policy design, and by outlining four important avenues for future research.     

Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation

We investigate conditions that amplify market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that ‘small’ market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a ‘lock-in’ into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies including subsidies, quotas, and taxes with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.     

The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

The need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made, as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market, to analyze the North’s incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement. Technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement, but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus. The only impacts are distributional, technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS*

This paper analyses export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander‐Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine welfare‐enhancing policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity value of the slope of the inverse demand curve and the market share. It is also shown that for policy makers, export quotas are superior to export subsidies under certain conditions.     

公共政策的经济学分析

任何一项公共政策的制定和实施都需要付出一定的代价,关键在于这种代价能不能承受,值不值得承受。经济学与公共政策有着密切的联系,即使是一些看起来与经济问题无关的公共政策,如果细心分析总是可以发现其中的经济学逻辑。这一逻辑告诉我们,公共政策是通过比较其成本和收益而产生的,公共政策存在的理由在于它的社会成本小于以市场和企业自行解决的方式来解决问题。     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Government incentive strategies and private capital participation in China’s Shale gas development

Shale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in China. Flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages. This study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework. A social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy. By considering the efficiency factor, we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives: tax cuts and production subsidies, to implement incentive targets. The results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government’s choice of incentive strategy. We also find that the optimal level of incentives, either tax cuts or production subsidies, are independent of current market demand and future market uncertainty under the delayed incentive strategy, but which affect the optimal level of incentives under the instant motivation strategy, and ignoring the negative influence of unpredictable random events on future market demand might lead to insufficient government incentives in this case.     

Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies

This article discusses the application of transaction cost economics(TCE) to the specification of antitrust legal rules and antitrustremedies and explains why the application of TCE analysis maylead to very different legal rules and remedies from approachesthat ignore TCE considerations. Antitrust legal rules must besensitive to the attributes of the institutions we rely uponto enforce antitrust policies, the information and analyticalcapabilities these institutions possess, the uncertainties theymust confront in the diagnosis and mitigation of anticompetitivebehavior and market structures, and the associated costs oftype I and type II errors implied by alternative legal rulesand remedies. Modern imperfect competition theory that failsto take TCE principles into account is likely to lead to poorlegal rules and remedies. These conclusions are supported bya discussion of the Kodak case and its progeny and of the proposeddivestiture remedies approved by the District Court's decisionin the Microsoft case.     

市场结构及市场效率的实验经济学综述

实验经济学对于市场效率和市场结构的研究最早在1948年由Chamberline开创。经济学家经过大量实验发现,不但市场前提假设关系到市场均衡结果及效率,交易制度也会对均衡产生重大影响。并且,不符合完全竞争市场假设的市场结构也有可能实现资源有效配置。本文对实验经济学关于市场结构及市场效率的相关研究进行了回顾与综述,并重点阐述其对完全竞争市场的研究,以揭示交易制度及市场前提对市场效率的综合影响。本文得到的结论显示：即使没有达到完全竞争市场的严格假设,也可能达到完全竞争市场的均衡状态,因而达到最优的配置效率。并且,对于市场结构——完全竞争、垄断和寡头垄断市场的实验研究也表明,并不是如传统古典经济学模型所言：只有完全竞争的市场结构才能够达到资源的有效配置,垄断市场效率也并不是完全与模型所言一致。而且不同于古典经济学,实验经济学将交易制度看作外生变量,认为其对最终市场效率也会产生很大影响。     

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

Bolivia’s Institutional Transformation: Contact Zones,Social Movements,and the Emergence of an Ethnic Class Consciousness

Over the past two decades, development economics has experienced a shift in focus from standard neoclassical analysis to institutions. While studying economic institutions is indeed important, evaluating their transformation and embeddedness is equally crucial for understanding and improving human wellbeing, especially in countries where market institutions are not fully developed. With that perspective in mind, we consider the importance of culture in the evolution of institutions in Bolivia by combining the concept of contact zones with old institutional economics (OIE). Contact zones refer to daily interactions in social spaces where culture and class meet and negotiate with each other. The contact zone between Bolivians and post-WWII development policies surfaced as an Andean collective memory, allowing for a possibility of social and political autonomy through the creation of an alternative to development, El Buen Vivir.     

价值现象学视野中的新制度经济学

新制度经济学突破了新古典经济学的范式,引入了交易费用分析范式。运用价值现象学的方法可以对新制度经济学的理论基础进行分析,新制度经济学由于忽视交易费用赖以存在的条件,所以在研究过程中经常会颠倒事物之间的因果关系,这与新制度经济学的社会心理基础有关。怨恨构造了现代社会的精神气质,新制度经济学与这种精神气质是一致的。新制度经济学对制度起源及变迁的关注都与怨恨所造成的价值假象密切相关。     

Confucian economics: how is Chinese thinking different?

The Chinese have their economics. Not yet acknowledged, it is contained in the Confucian thought. Called by me ‘Confucian economics’, it sharply differs from the Western ‘Liberal economics’. Individuals seek posterity through offspring, rather than ‘instant gratification’. Resources are not seen as scarce but as abundant. Rather than take resources from others, people work to make a living. The work ethics and not the profit margin is a key motive. Individuals work not for themselves but for their family. The family is a source of moral sentiment, understood as responsibility for others. This is why the main institution is family and not market. To Confucians, the key principle is equality, which precedes efficiency. Inequality upsets ‘social peace’, as a precondition for growth. Built on Liberal principles, the Western capitalist system is a market one. The Chinese system, which I call ‘Confucian system’, is also market-based. The former is a ‘free market’ animated by individuals, the latter is a ‘familial market’ built around households. Both approaches advocate ‘minimal state’, but for Liberals the state is a ‘night watchman’ to ensure the security of resources, while for Confucians, the state is a moral guide to enable social harmony. As a theory, Confucian economics is a form of ethics and the Liberal is not. China has never abandoned Confucianism. The recent reforms are not about rolling back the Soviet model to establish a capitalist system. Relying on Confucian economics, China is reviving Confucian system. Paradoxically, the ancient Confucian economics has become the engine of China’s modernity. This is a key reason for China’s ‘longest boom’. To extend it, China needs to refocus its policies from ‘capital formation’ to the ‘moral cultivation’, along the Confucian principles.     

Growth and conflict in the developing world: Neo-liberal narratives and social-economy alternatives

The last quarter of the 20th century saw an increase in violent conflicts across the globe. With connections between growth, poverty and conflict increasingly difficult to ignore, research has begun examining economic dimensions of conflict. This paper reviews and critiques this new research, much of it conducted by the World Bank. The research argues that war results from poverty, and poverty from misguided economic policies, so that reducing conflict requires redoubling efforts to promote growth via neo-liberal reforms. I criticize the conceptual underpinnings of this argument, including its overemphasis on individual incentives and its claim that social and economic injustices do not contribute to violent conflicts. Instead I argue that social economics provides valuable alternative perspectives on conflict that take seriously its social dimensions, especially problems of economic justice and the common good.     

FOUR REVOLUTIONS IN ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY

Demand prospects for electricity are being altered profoundly by four synergistic types of revolutionary change: new technologies for improved end-use efficiency, new ways to finance and deliver those technologies to customers, cultural change within utilities, and regulatory reforms to reward efficient behavior. Dramatic energy savings achieved so far have been largely in direct fuels and not in electricity, mainly due to price distortions and unique market failures. Resulting inefficient use of electricity is misallocating some $60 billion a year to unnecessary expansions of U.S. electric supply. Yet the best technologies now on the market could save about 92 percent of U.S. lighting energy, about half of motor energy, and much of the electricity used for other purposes. Complete retrofit could deliver equal or better services with only a fourth of the electricity now used. The levelized cost of that quadrupled end-use efficiency averages about 0.6 cents/kWh– well below short-run marginal cost. Analogous oil-saving potential from the best demonstrated technologies is about 80 percent of present oil consumption at an average cost below $3/bbl, partly because two of the 9–10 prototype cars already tested at 67–138 miles per gallon are said to cost nothing extra to make. Many utilities already save large amounts of electricity very quickly and cheaply by financing customers' efficiency improvements through loans, gifts, rebates, or leases. Even more promising is an emerging “negawatt market” making saved electricity a fungible commodity subject to competitive bidding, arbitrage, derivative instruments, secondary markets, etc. Utilities can make more money selling less electricity and more efficiency. They can earn a spread on the difference in discount rates between themselves and their customers. They can save operating and capital costs while avoiding the associated risks and, under emerging regulatory reforms, can even keep as extra profit part of what they save. They also can generate tradeable emissions rights under the new Clean Air Act. Some utilities now properly ignore sunk costs and seek to minimize marginal variable costs. These utilities, driven by economic– not accounting–principles, find this approach both profitable and operationally advantageous.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

In the wake of austerity: social impact bonds and the financialisation of the welfare state in Britain

This paper provides an analysis of the financialisation of the British welfare state. In a continuation of neo-liberal privatisation and labour market activation, the financialised welfare state pursues a policy of welfare retrenchment, while engaging in forms of social engineering aimed at producing self-responsibilised individuals and communities who are financially literate, ‘investment-ready’ and economically productive. New financial instruments such as social impact bonds are deployed to these ends, both to ‘solve social problems’ and enable cost saving. Through the use of such financial instruments, the implementation of regulatory infrastructures and tax incentives, the financialised welfare state becomes a vehicle for the transfer of wealth from the public to private investors, while subjecting the domain of social policy to the vicissitudes of global financial markets. This paper offers a critique of these developments, situating the case of Britain within the broader global context and with regard to the implications for understanding the current political economy of the welfare state.     

关于创建与发展中国经济学的若干思考

理论经济学可划分为马克思主义经济学、西方经济学和中国经济学。发展社会主义市场经济是一个全新的课题,在马克思主义经济学和西方经济学中都找不到现成答案。中国经济学应在经济学研究已取得的成果的基础上,扎根于本土,深入系统地研究现实社会主义初级阶段的生产关系,通过对社会主义市场经济运行和发展的分析,揭示社会主义初级阶段市场经济运动的规律。