DEMOCRATIC AID AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF RECIPIENTS

We investigate whether democratic aid flows, which are directed toward the democratization of recipients by covering democracy‐related programs and government and civil society activities, affect the future political regime of recipient countries. We introduce a multinomial multivariate logit model and we use 5‐yr averaged data covering the period 1972–2004 for 59 democracy aid‐recipient countries categorized into three broad classes according to the prevalent political regime. We find strong evidence that democratic aid flows are positively associated with the likelihood of observing a partly democratic or a fully democratic political regime in democratic aid‐recipient countries and that this result is robust to the potential endogeneity of democratic assistance.(JEL D70, F35, C25)     

Rethinking the aid–growth relationship: A network approach

Over 40 years of conventional economic analysis has not reached consensus on the effect of foreign aid on recipient country growth. We provide new insight into this relationship by using a network approach to characterize the topological properties of the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) foreign aid network. Viewing the OECD foreign aid community as an interdependent and complex system, we characterize not only the amount of aid but also the position of both donor and recipient within the network. We find that the degree centrality of the recipient, with an edge inclusion threshold that sets a minimum share of a donor’s aid to a particular recipient, is significantly correlated with the growth impact of that donor’s aid. Contrarily, aid is uncorrelated with growth with a recipient‐side filter on the importance of the donor to the recipient. These results suggest that the importance of a recipient within the donor’s network, rather than the volume of aid alone, is associated with the growth impact of bilateral aid. We explore mechanisms for these findings that include the complementarity of aid from multiple attentive donors. Our findings speak to the aid–growth puzzle and suggest that network metrics may illuminate non‐obvious channels of aid impact.     

Do elites benefit from democracy and foreign aid in developing countries?

A popular argument for the absence of any beneficial effects of foreign aid is that it is skimmed by political elites in recipient countries. However, studies also suggest that aid may be more effective in relatively democratic developing countries. By exploring data on income quintiles derived from the World Income Inequality Database for 88 developing countries, a set of results indicate that foreign aid and democracy in conjunction are associated with a higher share of income held by the upper quintile. It thus appears that foreign aid, contrary to popular beliefs, leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing countries while the effects are negligible in autocratic countries. The paper closes with a discussion of potential mechanisms generating this perverse effect.     

Foreign aid and the quality of economic institutions

Identification of the causal effect that foreign aid has on the quality of institutions in recipient countries has been elusive in the aid effectiveness literature. The main reason is that aid is endogenous with respect to the development of institutions. Our paper examines the impact of foreign aid on economic freedom in the recipient countries at a disaggregated level using an innovative identifying strategy. To do so, we use recently innovated instruments for aid, exploiting the long lags between loan approval and disbursements by official creditors to developing countries. Using plausibly exogenous variations in predicted loan disbursements as instruments for actual aid, we find that foreign aid has a significant positive effect on the quality of economic institutions in recipient countries. The results are robust to alternative specifications and samples. By establishing the existence of a strong link between aid and the quality of economic institutions, we identify the main channel through which aid affects economic growth and development.     

When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination

Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we cover the 1967-2002 period. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a recipient country. This effect is sensitive to economic and social conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of recipients.     

Equal opportunity and poverty reduction: How should aid be allocated?

This paper analyzes a model of aid allocation equalizing the opportunity between recipient countries to reach a common poverty reduction goal. We propose a fair and efficient aid allocation based on a multicriteria principle. The model considers structural handicaps in recipient countries in terms of lack of human capital and economic vulnerability, their initial poverty, and the natural gap between the growth rate required to reach a development goal and the observed one. We show that our proposed aid allocation favors poor and vulnerable countries with our multicriteria principle. It substantially differs from the observed allocation. Analyses also shed light on the impact of the donors' aversion to the low natural growth gap in recipient countries on the optimal aid allocation and the marginal efficiency of aid.     

Does Aid Effectiveness Differ per Political Ideologies?

Despite the extensive empirical literature on aid effectiveness, existing studies have not addressed directly how political ideology affects the use of foreign aid in the recipient country. This study, therefore, uses a unique dataset of 12 democratic countries in Africa to investigate the impact of political ideologies on aid effectiveness. Our results indicate that each political party uses aid differently in peruse of their political, ideological orientation. Further analyses suggest that rightist capitalist parties are likely to use aid to improve the private sector environment. Leftist socialist on the other hand, use aid effectively on pro-poor projects such as short-term poverty reduction, mass education and health services. Our additional analysis on the lines of colonialisation shows that the difference in the use of aid by political parties is much stronger in French colonies than Britain colonies. The study provides insight on how the recipient government are likely to use foreign aid.     

Are Aid Flows Excessive or Insufficient? Estimating the Growth Impact of Aid in Threshold Regressions

Existing empirical studies and policy reports provide ambiguous results on the growth effect of foreign aid flows in the recipient countries. The present paper examines whether there exists an aid threshold that determines the growth impact of foreign aid. We use a threshold regression methodology to estimate growth specifications and the associated aid thresholds in a sample of 42 aid recipients covering the period 1970–2000. Our findings indicate that there is a threshold level of aid, above which the growth impact of aid becomes positive.     

The curse of aid

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using panel data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960–1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on institutions. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of 5 years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.5 and almost one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. We find that aid is a bigger curse than oil.     

AID, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND GROWTH

Foreign aid has often been intended by donors to entice recipient nations into policy and institutional reforms favorable to private sector economic development. In this study, we investigate the relationship between aid and changes to economic freedom in recipient nations over the 1990–2000 decade. The evidence is mixed. In general, we find that foreign aid has no significant effect on economic freedom overall. However, using a hedonic approach on the different categories of economic freedom, we find that aid has still managed to contribute toward a policy and institutional environment favorable to growth, as the different categories of economic freedom improved by aid more than offset those which are harmed by aid, in terms of their impact on growth . ( JEL 010, 019)     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Aid effectiveness,governance and public investment

In this paper, we develop a growth model in which aid finances infrastructure investment and pro-poor spending in order to analyze ways through which aid can be made more effective. We assume that the recipient countries are aid-dependent in the early phase of development and that they ultimately become independent. In the model, donors can accelerate a recipient's independence from aid by investing in infrastructure. We demonstrate that even a small increase in aid can improve aid effectiveness and that aid effectiveness depends more on the growth rate than on the efficiency of the government.     

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics are important questions. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Using cross‐country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are that in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking.     

Need,Merit, or Self‐Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?

Previous studies of aid allocation have concluded that foreign aid is allocated not only according to development needs but also according to donor self‐interest. We revisit this topic and allow for donor‐ as well as recipient‐specific effects in our analysis. In addition to comments on the statistical significance of our results we assess the relative economic importance of recipient need, merit, and donor self‐interest. Our results indicate that all bilateral donors allocate aid according to their self‐interest and recipient need. However, most bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit. Less than 1% of the variance of aid is accounted for by merit, ceteris paribus. The UK and Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy scores, and fewer human rights abuses.     

Bilateral foreign aid: how important is aid effectiveness to people for choosing countries to support?

We conduct a discrete choice experiment to determine how important aid effectiveness is to people relative to other criteria for choosing countries to support with bilateral foreign aid. We find that aid effectiveness is important, on a par with recipient-country need as proxied by the level of hunger and malnutrition. Both criteria are more important than others.     

Donor ideology and types of foreign aid

We examine how donor government ideology influences the composition of foreign aid flows. We use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2009 and distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid, grants and loans, recipient characteristics such as income and political institutions, tied and untied aid, and aid by sector. The results show that leftist governments increased the growth of bilateral grant aid, and more specifically grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. Our findings confirm partisan politics hypotheses because grants are closely analogous to domestic social welfare transfer payments, and poverty and inequality are of greatest concern for less developed recipient countries.     

Financing Public Investment through Foreign Aid: Consequences for Economic Growth and Welfare*

The paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the mechanism through which foreign aid affects macroeconomic performance. The authors find that the long‐run impact of an aid program and the nature of the transitional dynamics it generates depend crucially on (i) the elasticity of substitution in production, (ii) whether the aid flow is tied to investment activity or not, (iii) how the recipient government chooses to react to the flow of external assistance, and (iv) whether the aid program is permanent or temporary. Structural characteristics of the recipient are important in determining the extent to which external assistance can aid growth and welfare.     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?

Many countries since 1990 have adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which are often considered to be problematic, primarily because of the potential for conflict between the assembly-supported government and the popularly elected president. Such conflicts are said to lead to unstable governments, policy paralysis and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime. Using data for all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1946 and 2006, we examine the effect of semi-presidential constitutions on the duration of prime ministers’ tenure in office, government accountability with respect to economic outcomes, and democratic survival. We also examine (for a smaller sample of post-communist countries) the impact of these constitutions on the progress of structural reforms. We find that the observed higher instability of prime ministers in semi-presidential democracies is more due to the electoral system than to the presence of a popularly elected president. We also find that semi-presidential constitutions have little impact on the government’s accountability to economic outcomes and on the survival of democratic regimes. Finally, we find that neither a weak president nor a weak government is optimal for the progress of economic reforms in post-communist countries. Regarding economic reforms, the optimal allocation of constitutional powers between the president and the government grants both significant powers.     

Do remittances and foreign aid augment the gross savings: Bangladesh,India and Philippines perspective?

Savings is considered to be a principal determinant to achieve long-run economic growth. Remittances and foreign aid are two important foreign capital inflows to meet the savings deficiency of developing nations. The objective of this study is to investigate the long-run impact of remittance to stimulate savings in remittance recipient countries. This paper contributes to the macroeconomic impact of remittance through a comparative study on Bangladesh, India and Philippines that positioned among the top ten largest remittance recipient countries from 2008 and onwards. The analysis makes use of an annual time series data over the period of 1980–2015. The Johansen cointegration test suggested long-run cointegrating relationship of remittance and foreign aid on gross savings. The test result suggests positive effect of remittances on gross savings for Bangladesh and Philippines although an insignificant negative effect for India. However, foreign aid has significant negative long-run impact in all the three cases. Government policy should focus on leveraging remittance flows to facilitate savings and investment for capital accumulation.