Japan's New Foreign Economic Policy: A Shift Toward a Strategic and Activist Model?*

This article analyzes key departures in Japanese foreign economic policy: the development of an extensive network of free trade agreements thereby abandoning the exclusive focus on the multilateral system as the vehicle for trade liberalization, and the revamping of the official development assistance (ODA) program by slashing its budget, emphasizing national interests in aid giving, and phasing out yen loans to China. We argue that the remarkable degree of policy activism in both trade and ODA represents the Japanese government's attempt to respond strategically to common challenges: domestically the economic recession, internationally the pressure for policy convergence and competition with China. However, in both issue areas the ability of the government to embark on swift policy changes has been compromised by domestic politics: opposition from vested interests and politicization of policy‐making, bureaucratic sectionalism, and weak executive leadership. We conclude with some policy recommendations to improve the coherence of foreign economic policy formulation in Japan.     

Privatization and the Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy

This article considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk-averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political-economic equilibrium. Privatization of state-owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.     

Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight

We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer's desire to affect the executive's reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences

Understanding the formation of individual trade policy preferences is a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes. Surprisingly, past studies have found mixed evidence that various labor market and industry attributes of workers affect their trade policy preferences, even though recent studies have found that trade policy can have substantial impacts on workers' incomes. This paper provides the first analysis of the extent to which task routineness affects trade policy preferences using survey data from the American National Election Studies. We find significant evidence that greater task routineness leads workers to be much more supportive of import restrictions, consistent with recent evidence on how trade openness puts downward pressure on employment and wages for workers whose occupations involve routine tasks. In fact, other than education levels, task routineness is the only labor market attribute that displays a robust correlation with individuals' stated trade policy preferences. We also provide evidence that there are some interactions between the economic and non‐economic factors in our study. For example, women's trade policy views are much more invariant to their labor market attributes than men, suggesting that women's views on this issue are driven more by personal and ideological beliefs than men.     

Trade Policy and Global Uncertainties: How to Promote an Open Trade Agenda

EU trade policy initiatives since 1995 offer better products at lower prices with estimated annual savings of up to €60 billion annually, which is especially beneficial for low‐income households who spend a larger share of income on basic commodities. If trade is so beneficial, why is there so much discontent? The paper argues that a convincing communication strategy in support of trade policy is key for trade policy legitimacy and gives the example of the European Commission's #FTAcomes2town platform based on firm‐level data. Politicians can zoom in across all EU members to find examples of small companies in their constituency exporting and creating jobs due to a trade measure.     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Trade policy and productivity

Previous studies on the determinants of productivity emphasized the role of trade and institutions but omitted trade policy due to endogeneity concerns. This paper considers the role of one important element of trade policy: free trade agreements (FTAs). Based on recent work on the determinants of FTAs, we suggest an instrument which is based on the propensity to enter an FTA due to (exogenous) geographical characteristics. We find that differences in institutional quality and trade, due to variations in geography and trade policy, have a sizeable effect on productivity and can explain the huge variation in per capita income across countries.     

The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach

This paper analyzes the setting of labor market reforms in the European Monetary Union (EMU), as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of business interests and trade unions. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we model the impact of distorted and non-distorted Central Bank monetary policy on EMU member state incentives to reform its labor market. Paradoxically, a majority of citizens who do not support the reform can lead to an optimal level of reform. We also show that, in a context of EMU enlargement, inflationary policy generates a status quo if there is a majority of non-supporters. Surprisingly, inflationary policy enhances the reform if the share of non-supporters over supporters increases, and weakens it if this share decreases.     

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a “protectionist drift” owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of protectionist drift that we call the “abstention effect”. Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this abstention effect there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter's most preferred candidate. We extend the analysis allowing two-candidate equilibria and the possibility that there are costs and benefits of holding office.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND COMPENSATION*

Liberalization harms some groups while generating aggregate benefits. We consider various labor market policies that might be used to compensate those who lose from freer trade. Our goal is to find the policy that compensates each group of losers at the lowest cost to the economy. We argue that wage subsidies should be used to compensate those who bear the adjustment costs triggered by liberalization whereas employment subsidies should be used to compensate those who remain trapped in the previously protected sector. Our analysis indicates that the cost of compensation is low, provided that the right policy is used.     

A Behavioral Model of Unemployment,Sociotropic Concerns,and the Political Economy of Trade Policy

We present a behavioral model in which agents are concerned about the scarring effects from unemployment for themselves and others and explore the manner in which unemployment matters for trade policy. We derive three policy implications: the government has an incentive to increase employment in sectors characterized by “good jobs,” where the good job/bad job characterization depends on an industry's job creation and destruction rates; the government has an incentive to pursue this policy in a gradual fashion by channeling new and unemployed workers into the appropriate sector; and opposition to trade liberalization can be reduced by welfare state policies.     

ON THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF BARRIERS TO TRADE*

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher–Ohlin trade model into an optimal‐growth framework. The model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity. Furthermore, there is a “selective development trap” to which countries may or may not converge, depending on policy. Income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase. Hence, cross‐country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per capita income observed across countries. The effects are quantified, and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of TFP and long‐run income differentials across countries.     

Relative Responsiveness of Trade Flows to a Change in Prices and Exchange Rate

A country can restrict her imports by imposing tariffs and stimulating her exports by providing subsidies. The same goal could be achieved through devaluation. One policy question that we face is the time it takes for either policy to affect the trade flows. We investigate here the relative responsiveness of the trade flows to a change in relative prices versus to a change in exchange rate. After estimating an error-correction version of import and export demand functions for nine industrial countries, unlike earlier studies that employed non-stationary data, our findings indicate that there is no specific answer and trade flows of different countries react differently.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

"新新贸易理论"的思想脉络及其发展

新新贸易理论将企业异质性成功的引入到国际贸易模型中,从微观层面解释了贸易的发生及影响,从而开拓了国际贸易研究的新领域。新新贸易理论解释了为什么好的企业做国际贸易,而较次的企业做国内贸易这一现象,该理论认为,自由贸易可以提高产业生产率水平和社会福利,所以在政策上应该促进自由贸易而不是贸易保护。     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?

We provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators' trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator's state impacts his or her vote on free trade agreements. To the extent that antitrust and trade liberalization are both viewed as pro‐consumer in nature, we would expect to see a positive relationship between antitrust enforcement in their legislative district and Congressional votes in support of trade liberalization. We find evidence suggesting that consumer preferences do play a role in legislative decisions on trade policy.