贸易政策不确定性与公司现金股利决策

文章以2003-2019年A股制造业上市公司为样本,研究宏观贸易政策不确定性对公司现金股利决策的影响.研究发现:贸易政策不确定性上升时,公司支付现金股利的意愿和水平会明显下降;这种负面影响与公司风险承担能力、内部治理水平均相关,说明行为同时受风险预防动机和代理动机驱动.据此,文章认为,当外部贸易环境较不确定时,既要增强公司产业链上下游协调能力和提升企业家信心,也要加强外部监管、引导公司实施积极平稳的现金股利政策,进而提升资本市场活力和吸引力.     

Learning-by-Doing and Strategic Trade Policy

The paper models international rivalry between a domestic firm that is going through a learning-by-doing phase, and a mature foreign rival. It is shown that the optimal production subsidy for the domestic firm depends on the degree of strategic sophistication of the foreign firm. Optimal production subsidy rules are derived under various scenarios. They are shown to be very sensitive to the specification of the game between the domestic and the foreign firms. Whether the optimal subsidy should decrease over time depends on the strategic sophistication of the foreign firm.     

战略贸易政策新进展与发展中国家贸易政策

通过对战略贸易政策在贸易的政治经济学、不确定性、不完全承诺和不完全信息等四个方面的新进展进行讨论,得出结论:新贸易理论的新进展使得脱胎于发达国家的战略贸易政策更加接近发展中国家市场经常失灵的现实,从而对发展中国家的贸易政策有重要的指导意义。     

贸易政策、增长和就业

直到现在,理论模型还去无法把贸易政策与更快的均衡增长联系起来,而且,实证文献有严重的数据方面的问题,因此,经济学家们还在贸易政策与经济运行的关系上争论不休。但是,最近的内生增长理论已经提供了更坚实的理论基础。有越来越多的证据表明,在外向型经济中,新技术能更快地被采用,外向型的贸易政策与储蓄率之间可能还是存在着某些联系的。而且,许多研究者进行的实证分析表明,在越开放的经济中,增长速度越快,创造的就业机会越多。所以,外向型贸易政策对增长、就业可能起正面的作用。     

Strategic Trade Policy Under Uncertainty*

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) model by considering market uncertainty, exploring nonlinear policy, and examining firms' choices of strategic variables. By investigating the interrelationship between trade policy and market conduct, we find that unlike the often-studied linear policy, a nonlinear policy can influence the domestic firm's choice of strategic variables and hence alter the market conduct in favor of the domestic country. Therefore, a nonlinear policy proves strictly superior to a linear one.     

Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

Ignorance Is Bliss as Trade Policy

Consider domestic consumers that purchase from foreign firms. A presumption would be that consumers prefer being informed when quality is uncertain and exogenous. However, in a multifirm framework based on previous models, consumers can be worse off if they are informed of the quality. Further, in the Salop-circle model, consumers may prefer not learning even though expected high-quality output is greater with learning. Moreover, the possibility that consumers prefer uncertainty increases with the probability that products are of low quality. Essentially, the benefit of screening quality (better matching) can be less than its cost (higher prices from market segmentation).     

Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure

We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions), the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a subsidy. If firms commit to vertical structure before governments commit to policy then under output competition firms choose integration, whereas if policy precedes structure then at least one firm chooses separation. Under price competition separation is a dominant strategy regardless of whether the structure decision is made before or after the policy decision.     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Strategic Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Costs

The paper examines optimal strategic trade policy under a heterogeneous cost oligopoly. The first‐best policy involves a structure of firm‐specific export subsidies/taxes in which the government favours the most efficient firms only with a sufficiently low social cost of public funds.     

Trade Policy Transparency and Investor Confidence: Some Implications for an Effective Trade Policy Review Mechanism

This paper is concerned with the value of the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism, particularly its transparency role and its potential role in policy stability, for investor confidence in developing countries. The implications of reduced risk and uncertainty regarding trade policy for investor confidence, and ultimately for the capital stock and the long-run structure of production, are examined in an analytical model. Certainty equivalence is employed to assess the general equilibrium effects of risk and uncertainty. Their reduction can boost risk-adjusted returns, leading to an increase in long-run levels of capital.     

Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution

The paper develops a model in which foreign and domestic manufacturers producing differentiated goods sell through spatially differentiated retailers. There is free entry into retailing but access to the retail distribution network (by manufacturers) may be controlled. The author considers a domestic vertical control mechanism in which domestic retailers carry only domestic brands (termed “domestic dealing”) and compares the use of tariffs on imports and the enforcement of domestic dealing restrictions as means of increasing domestic welfare. It is shown that domestic dealing will always be prohibited when tariffs can be used. When trade policy is not available, however, domestic dealing may be desirable.     

On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy

The paper derives conditions for second best environmental policy when there are foreign countries which fail to implement appropriate environmental regulations. It is shown that in such cases, efficiency in the global economy will not be achieved unless domestic environmental regulations are supplemented by trade provisions. The result is independent of whether environmental problems are local or international. Furthermore, when trade provisions are implemented, efficiency requires that domestic environmental taxes are fixed at the Pigouvian tax rate. The results imply that there is an economic rationale for regulating the trade between signatories and non-signatories of international environmental agreements. Efficient trade regulations will either take the form of trade restrictions or trade promotions, depending on whether the environmental problem is created by production or consumption activities, and whether the net import of the relevant commodity is positive or negative. It is argued that an efficient climate agreement, signed by a group of fuel-importing countries (e.g., the OECD countries), should include a subsidy on the import of fossil fuels.     

完善中国对外贸易政策的思考

目前,中国的经常项目和资本项目都处于顺差状态,但外贸出口仍面临严峻的考验。为了实现国际收支平衡和国内经济的健康发展,应该进一步完善外贸政策,加强宏观调控,实行有管理的自由贸易,并注重扩大进口和增加内需,同时努力培育中国的自有品牌。     

Environment and Trade: The Relationship of International Trade and Environmental Policy

Followers of urban affairs and public policy have written much over the years about the rise of suburbia and development beyond older city boundaries in the US, whether such development is called urban, suburban, or ex-urban sprawl. Many researchers have focused on various issues concerning sprawl, especially on the unintended consequences that new development has had for municipal finances, neighborhood income and residential segregation, and transportation planning, among other issues. Over the last decade, a new area in the literature on sprawl has focused on how the “built environment” of residential areas can impact health and emergency services. We contribute to this latest set of papers on sprawl by trying to empirically estimate the impact of sprawl in metropolitan regions on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) spending on “public assistance.” This assistance encompasses spending on debris removal, emergency protective measures, and rehabilitating or rebuilding of infrastructure, public buildings, public utilities, parks and recreational areas, in post-disaster relief efforts. In our exploratory analysis, the results indicate that urban sprawl is a factor in influencing the level of FEMA’s public assistance spending.     

Institutionalism and New Trade Theory: Rethinking Comparative Advantage and Trade Policy

Gomory and Baumol (2000), and Samuelson (2004) have raised concerns about international trade’s future impact on U.S. national income. The focus is how globalization may affect the size and distribution across countries of gains from trade. Though their analysis is developed using a pure trade theoretical framework, it has strands in common with institutionalist thinking. Their findings spotlight the need for a new U.S. trade policy agenda aimed at maximizing the U.S. share of gains from trade, and complementing conventional Keynesian open economy macroeconomic analysis.