企业家为何要进行媒体呈现*——基于企业家微博的实证检验

随着社交媒体的广泛应用,越来越多的企业家从企业幕后走向台前。本文利用中国上市公司2010—2017年企业家新浪微博的使用数据进行了实证检验。结果发现：（1）高科技企业更倾向于企业家媒体呈现;（2）企业家媒体呈现能够提升企业股票流动性,且微博发布数量越多,股票流动性上升越明显;（3）进一步对企业家微博内容进行文本分析后发现,相比于披露式微博,个性化微博更有助于提升股票流动性,正向情感倾向和负向情感倾向微博均会导致股票流动性的提升。本文结论为信息化时代企业转型升级过程中的企业家行为提供重要参考。     

市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率—来自中国银行业的证据

商业银行是中国社会融资的主要渠道,银行向社会提供流动性的效率直接决定了社会融资的效率.为弥补流动性创造研究在效率和中观层面的不足,文章采用中国商业银行2000?2015年微观数据,探讨了市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率之间的关系,得到以下结论:(1)市场竞争与流动性创造效率之间存在倒U形关系,中国银行业存在最优的市场结构;(2)银行市场势力过强是中国商业银行流动性创造效率较低的重要原因,银行市场势力越强,其流动性创造效率越低;(3)市场竞争程度与市场势力的流动性创造效率系数之间存在不显著的负相关关系,寄希望于通过增强中国银行业竞争程度来改善银行市场势力过强所导致的流动性创造效率过低,作用可能非常有限.中国应沿着"增强商业银行流动性创造能力,扩大直接融资规模"的改革方向继续前进.文章的研究丰富了已有文献,而且为中国银行体系改革的顶层设计提供了重要参考.     

The Politics of Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis

This paper studies the effects of economic governance and political institutions on portfolio investment during the Global Economic Crisis of 2008–2009. Leveraging a unique cross‐national dataset on portfolio flows immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it shows that countries with “better institutions” – those with more (or less) democratic, more (or less) constrained or more accountable political systems – were no less vulnerable to portfolio outflows than countries with “worse institutions.” However, countries with better governance prior to the crisis – those with better regulatory apparatuses, rule of law, property rights, and those considered less politically risky – experienced lower net portfolio capital outflows after Lehman. Governance is in fact the strongest predictor of portfolio capital flows during the global flight to liquidity, while political institutions perform poorly. The findings shed light onto the political factors that mediated how the collapse of Lehman affected national financial markets the world over, and have implications for literatures on the political economy of foreign investment, as well as for broader topics of institutions, governance, and economic performance.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Network efficiency and the banking system

Inspired by the Coasean “market versus firm” dichotomy, we offer a new definition of efficiency by applying the notions of network cost and network efficiency as developed in complex network theory. Network analysis is relevant for every system of interconnected exchanging agents. One such system is the banking sector. It is showed that the notions hereby presented may improve upon the results of Allen and Gale’s standard model of the interbank market, where banks exchange liquidity and where troubles in a region of the market may lead to systemic collapse.     

Model uncertainty and liquidity

Extreme market outcomes are often followed by a lack of liquidity and a lack of trade. This market collapse seems particularly acute for markets where traders rely heavily on a specific empirical model such as in derivative markets like the market for mortgage backed securities or credit derivatives. Moreover, the observed behavior of traders and institutions that places a large emphasis on “worst-case scenarios” through the use of “stress testing” and “Value-at-Risk” seems different than Savage expected utility would suggest. In this paper, we capture model-uncertainty using an Epstein and Wang [Epstein, L.G., Wang, T., 1994. Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty. Econometrica 62, 283–322] uncertainty-averse utility function with an ambiguous underlying asset-returns distribution. To explore the connection of uncertainty with liquidity, we specify a simple market where a monopolist financial intermediary makes a market for a propriety derivative security. The market-maker chooses bid and ask prices for the derivative, then, conditional on trade in this market, chooses an optimal portfolio and consumption. We explore how uncertainty can increase the bid–ask spread and, hence, reduces liquidity. Our infinite-horizon example produces short, dramatic decreases in liquidity even though the underlying environment is stationary. We show how these liquidity crises are closely linked to the uncertainty aversion effect on the optimal portfolio. Effectively, the uncertainty aversion can, at times, limit the ability of the market-maker to hedge a position and thus reduces the desirability of trade, and hence, liquidity.     

Monetary–fiscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions

I develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand monetary–fiscal interactions with liquidity frictions. Agents face idiosyncratic investment risks and meet financial intermediaries in competitive search markets. Asset liquidity is determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the financial intermediaries, and it drives the financing constraints of entrepreneurs (those who have investment projects) and their ability to invest. In contrast to private assets, government bonds are fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest. A higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs׳ portfolios and raises investment. However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures: a higher level of distortionary taxation and/or a higher real interest rate. A long-run optimal supply of government debt emerges. I also show that a proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies can avoid a deep financial recession.     

Search and the market for ideas

We study a market where innovators, who are good at coming up with ideas, can sell them to entrepreneurs, who might be better at implementing them. The market is decentralized, with random matching and bargaining. Ideas are characterized by five salient features: they are indivisible; partially nonrival; intermediate inputs; subject to informational frictions; and difficult to collateralize. This last feature gives rise to a demand by entrepreneurs for liquidity. We determine which ideas get traded in equilibrium and compare this to the efficient outcome, emphasizing the impact of bargaining and liquidity considerations. Among other applications, we study how outcomes in the idea market affect the labor market.     

Insights on endogenous money and the liquidity preference theory of interest

It is argued that the debate between “structuralist” and “horizontalist” has long been obscured because of inadequate treatment, in both approaches, of the credit-money supply and of the total money supply. As a result, endogenous money models still have serious limitations today. On the one hand, the bank loan markup and the loan interest rate are exogenous in the horizontalist model, which supposes that they do not depend on the money/liquidity market conditions (as if bank loans did not compete with the existing liquidity). On the other hand, although interest rates are endogenous in the structuralist model, they result from inappropriate treatment of the loan supply and money/liquidity supply. This article aims to remove these shortcomings. It offers a theoretical framework and formal modeling where the creditworthy demand for loans determines the bank loan supply, given the central bank refinancing interest rate, while the total supply and demand for liquidity-money determines the markup and the market rate of interest in accordance with Keynes’s liquidity preference theory. In this framework, the post Keynesian theory of endogenous money and Keynes’s “verticalist” view prove to be analytically complementary.     

Trade cost reduction and foreign direct investment

While the “proximity-concentration” theory suggests a positive relationship between trade cost and foreign direct investment (FDI), there is ample evidence showing a negative relationship between them. We show that the possibility of exporting back to the home country from a host country, which is often referred as “home-country export platform FDI”, may generate a negative relationship between trade cost and FDI. Market demand and product market competition may play important roles in this respect.     

Credit quantity and credit quality: Bank competition and capital accumulation

In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the conflicting evidence emerging from the recent empirical studies of the effects of bank competition on economic growth. We obtain them developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model of capital accumulation where banks operate in a Cournot oligopoly. More banks lead to a higher quantity of credit available to entrepreneurs, but also to diminished incentives to offer relationship services that improve the likelihood of success of investment projects. We also show that conditioning on one key parameter resolves the theoretical ambiguity: in economies where intrinsic market uncertainty is high (low), less (more) competition leads to higher capital accumulation.     

流量垄断的理论框架与规制路径

数据要素的流动反映了市场供需信号的传递，流量竞争的本质是交易机会的争夺。数字平台的核心功能是流通，其以提高信息撮合效率为抓手进行注意力竞争，这决定了撮合对象的范围可以无限广阔，关注生产的相关市场界定则会因撮合市场跨多个生产领域而难以界定“基准产品”，因此流量代表的注意力相关市场难以测定。基于“联系一结构”视角，本文认为数字生态中存在中心、次中心和外围这三种角色，并从“平台-数据-算法”（PDA范式）三个维度进一步固化中心独占流量入口的格局，形成了中心对次中心，次中心对外围成本依次转移的“中心一外围”依附剥削体系。针对以控制交易机会分配为目的的流量垄断，本文提出三条规制路径：第一，在反垄断分析框架中突出相关时间市场；第二，拓展反垄断法中交易相对人的内涵，实现结构性平台对联系性平台跨生态开放为目标的互联互通；第三，导入开放平台原则，对结构性平台划定必需设施，构建数字平台的寡头竞争规则。     

Investment climate and firm productivity: an application to Vietnamese manufacturing firms

The fundamental aspect of a national competitive advantage is a good investment climate. Understanding the role of the investment climate in generating firm productivity has received extensive attention by policymakers and economists in many countries. The article studies the effect of different dimensions of the investment climate on firm productivity. Using a large dataset of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, the article finds that deficiencies in the investment climate are prejudicial to firm productivity and competition. Furthermore, in examining the effect of corruption in association with the quality of the business environment, the study also investigates the possibility that corruption may compensate firms for a bad investment climate or at least may neutralize the negative impact of inefficient government regulations. In other words, corruption acts as ‘speed money’ to improve the efficacy of the provision of public services or provides leeway for entrepreneurs to bypass the inefficient regulations. This situation, however, is extremely harmful to the economy in the long run because it distorts the market and erodes the incentives for productive investments. Developing countries therefore need to put much more effort into institutional reforms, especially fighting corruption and efficiency in the provision of public goods and services.     

Learning rational expectations in an asset market

Will traders in a risky asset market learn Muthian expectations when they initially lack the necessary information? If some traders learn from their observations, will market dynamics depend only on “fundamentals,” as implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis? This paper shows that at any finite point in time the answer to these questions is “no”. The context is a constant absolute risk aversion model with two kinds of traders and asymmetric information. The market converges asymptotically to a rational expectations equilibrium where prices depend only on fundamentals and the market is efficient.     

七次降息对储蓄、贷款及货币供应量影响的实证分析

我国已连续七次下调利率 ,以 1 998年为界 ,前三次利率下调的基本特征是“恢复性调整” ,即适应物价由高走低的变化。后四次利率下调则是“调控性调整” ,主要针对 1 997年 1 0月以来我国首次出现物价负增长的现象 ,央行试图适度放松银根。本研究采用月度数据 ,分段对比分析。实证结果表明 :(1 )在 1 995年 1月— 1 999年 1 0月期间 ,我国居民储蓄存款和金融机构贷款的利率弹性不是表现在总量变动上而是表现在结构变动上。 (2 )影响储蓄变动的第一因素是股市变动 ,其次是个人收入 ,再次是利率 ;影响金融机构贷款变动的第一因素是金融机构存款的变化 ,其次是固定资产投资的变动。 (3 )七次利率下调减缓了货币流动性下降 ,但作用微小     

A characterization of perfectly competitive economies with production

This paper answers the question, what do you need for perfect competition with production? The answer given is that you need to realize an allocation in which no individual contributes a surplus to anyone else. This essentially amounts to giving each individual his “marginal product.” In the model of perfect competition, profits are competitively determined rents: they reflect the marginal product of entrepreneurs. And the competitive theory of value derives from the competitive theory of distribution.     

Collateral rehypothecation,safe asset scarcity,and unconventional monetary policy

We build a mark-to-market model where commercial banks can enlarge their balance sheets, repledging the available collateral several times to exchange liquidity through the interbank market. In bad times, the fall of risky asset price disrupts the length of the repledging chain due to the increase of the haircut and the decrease of external assets' value. In such a scenario, the central bank can intervene implementing unconventional monetary policies by purchasing a fraction of the banking system's external assets, both safe treasury bonds, and risky asset-backed securities, to inject liquidity. Our results show that a quantitative easing policy that purchases only safe assets is highly ineffective in restoring the intermediation activity to the pre-crisis level due to its inability to sustain the risky asset price and the repledging chain of collateral. Instead, focusing on risky assets only, the monetary authority can sustain risky asset prices, avoiding the freezing of the money market.     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Market Valuation and the q Theory of Investment

This study re-evaluates the role of the stock market in Japanese corporate investment decisions based on time-series data. Employing the time-series technique, we examine why the performance of Tobin's average q -type investment function is poor. We construct a series of average q and another of marginal q (a more fundamental profitability measure of investment) and investigate the relationship between the two. A cointegrating relationship is not detected between the two measures, both of which have a unit root. The divergence of average q from marginal q is not narrowed even if the imperfect competition of the output market is taken into consideration. We also examine which q measure is more relevant to Japanese corporate investment decisions by estimating separately the investment function with two measures of q as an explanatory variable. The estimation results show that entrepreneurs place more emphasis on marginal q than on average q in investment decisions.
JEL Classification Number: E22.