The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short‐Horizon Investors

This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short‐horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information influences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. We identify conditions under which public information increases or decreases price informativeness, and when multiple equilibria may arise. Our analysis shows that public information not only directly endows prices with more (public) information, it can also have an important indirect effect on the degree to which prices reveal private information.     

Price informativeness and institutional ownership: evidence from Japan

Using extensive intraday transaction and institutional ownership data of Japan, this study investigates the question of whether institutional ownership increases the extent to which equity prices reflect information about the firms’ fundamentals (the degree of price informativeness) and the roles played by various types of institutional investors. The results indicate that the presence of institutional investors, especially foreign institutions, increase the amount of information aggregated in the stock prices. Such relation is robust to various liquidity measures, possible presence of endogeneity in the ownership structure, and alternative measures of price informativeness.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Corporate Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices

We examine the association between voluntary corporate disclosure and the informativeness of stock prices. We measure corporate disclosure using the AIMR-FAF annual corporate disclosure ratings. We define price informativeness by the association between current stock returns and future earnings changes: more informative stock price changes contain more information about future earnings changes. To measure this association, we regress current returns against (current and) future earnings changes. The aggregated coefficient on the future earnings changes, which we refer to as the future ERC, is our measure of informativeness (association).We hypothesize and find that greater disclosure is associated with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings (i.e., higher future ERC). These results provide empirical support for the widely held, but heretofore empirically undocumented, belief that greater disclosure provides information benefits to investors.     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.     

Choosing to Disagree: Endogenous Dismissiveness and Overconfidence in Financial Markets

The psychology literature documents that individuals derive current utility from their beliefs about future events. We show that, as a result, investors in financial markets choose to disagree about both private information and price information. When objective price informativeness is low, each investor dismisses the private signals of others and ignores price information. In contrast, when prices are sufficiently informative, heterogeneous interpretations arise endogenously: most investors ignore prices, while the rest condition on it. Our analysis demonstrates how observed deviations from rational expectations (e.g., dismissiveness, overconfidence) arise endogenously, interact with each other, and vary with economic conditions.     

Do foreign investors improve stock price informativeness in emerging equity markets? Evidence from Vietnam

Most of previous studies on stock price informativeness tend to focus on the context of mature stock markets while this issue is more acute in emerging equity markets where regulatory and institutional structure are weak. This paper examines the relationship between foreign ownership and stock price informativeness in Vietnam stock market. We utilize a data set covering firm attributes of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange over the period 2007–2015. Employing different estimation techniques for panel data, the empirical results indicate that foreign investors improve stock price informativeness in Vietnam stock market. The finding from this paper confirms the important role of foreign investors in emerging equity markets.     

Does Anticipated Information Impose a Cost on Risk‐Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.     

Information provision in financial markets

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improving the precision of prior information is a more efficient way to do so. More accurate prior information decreases asymmetric information problems and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices, while a more accurate public signal increases price informativeness. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, expected welfare can sometimes fall as prior information or the public signal become more precise.     

Oil price uncertainty and stock price informativeness: Evidence from investment-price sensitivity in China

We study the effects of oil price uncertainty (OPU) on stock price informativeness based on investment-price sensitivity. Using Chinese stocks from 2008 to 2021, we find a negative relationship between OPU and the strength of Tobin's q (a standardized measure of prices) for predicting investment opportunities. This finding is likely due to the crowding out of informed investors rather than the financial constraints brought by a higher cost of capital. Investment-price sensitivity also decreases more among firms in less-competition, high sales volatility, and lower analysts' attention. What is more, the reduction in investment-price sensitivity is more concentrated in public utilities, agriculture & livestock, and industry instead of in real estate or commerce industries. These findings indicate that OPU decreases the acquisition of information related to firms, and consequently, price informativeness for future investment decisions.     

Sidelined Investors, Trading-Generated News, and Security Returns

This article studies information blockages and the asymmetricrelease of information in a security market with fixed setupcosts of trading. In this setting, "sidelined" investors maydelay trading until price movements validate their private signals.Trading thereby internally generates the arrival of furthernews to the market. This leads to (1) negative skewness followingprice run-ups and positive skewness following price rundowns(even though the model is ex ante symmetric), (2) a lack ofcorrespondence between large price changes and the arrival ofexternal information, and (3) increases in volatility followinglarge price changes.     

The Impact of Regulation FD on Institutional Investor Informativeness

Although there is conflicting evidence and resulting skepticism regarding the value provided by professional investment management, Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2004) document institutional investor informativeness relative to seasoned equity offering (SEO) purchases. We find that Regulation Fair Disclosure's significantly reduces institutional investors’ ability to identify mispriced SEO firms. Informativeness is diminished not by investors following analysts who have experienced a reduction in forecasting accuracy, but limiting investors’ direct access to private information. This information loss is replaced by reliance on a greater number of public information variables resulting in less consideration for prudence proxies and a liquidity motive and more for higher price momentum.     

Options trading and the cost of debt

Equity option markets can have a dual effect on firms' cost of debt. On the one hand, options attract more informed investors, which increases price informativeness and reduces information asymmetries in the market, facilitating firm financing. On the other, by attracting more informed investors who provide reassurance regarding managerial career concerns, options can increase the potential for risk shifting in firms. We explore these two channels via different tests on corporate bond yields and use different econometric specifications including quasi-natural experiments to mitigate endogeneity concerns. We find evidence consistent with the preeminence of the risk-shifting channel when private managerial risk-taking incentives are sufficiently high and debtholders are more exposed to expropriation.     

Risk aversion, liquidity, and endogenous short horizons

We analyze a competitive model in which different informationsignals get reflected in value at different points in time.If investors are sufficiently risk averse, we obtain an equilibriumin which all investors focus exclusively on the short term.In addition, we show that increasing the variance of informationlesstrading increases market depth but causes a greater proportionof investors to focus on the short-term signal, which decreasesthe informativeness of prices about the long run. Finally, wealso explore parameter spaces under which long-term informedagents wish to voluntarily disclose their information.     

The roles of past returns and firm fundamentals in driving US stock price movements

This paper provides new empirical evidence that incorporating past stock returns from different time horizons can enhance the ability of firm fundamentals to better explain stock price movements but this benefit dissipates under uncertainty. We apply both OLS and state-space modeling to US firms' stock price movements over the period from 1999 to 2012 to compare the roles of the two main types of information typically used by equity investors. Empirical results reveal the importance of firm fundamentals over longer term horizons for particularly, small-cap stocks with greater information uncertainty. Furthermore, when market uncertainty is high, fundamentals unambiguously dominate in driving stock price movements of smaller sized firms indicating that uncertainty at the firm and market level both create attention bias on firm fundamentals.     

International accounting harmonization and global equity markets

We show harmonizing domestic GAAP with foreign GAAP can have deleterious effects on security market performance, specifically price informativeness and trading volume. Harmonization effects result from interaction between two forces. Direct informational effects depend on whether harmonization increases or decreases GAAP precision. Expertise acquisition effects depend on benefits and costs to foreign investors of becoming domestic GAAP experts. These countervailing forces can result in harmonization to more (less) precise GAAP increasing (decreasing) or, unexpectedly, decreasing (increasing) price informativeness and trading volume. We also observe this for a cost of capital metric. Thus, harmonization is not necessarily a desirable singular goal.     

Earnings management,incentive contracts and private information acquisition

This paper analyzes the optimal design of compensation contracts in the presence of earnings management incentives, and its interplay with investors’ information acquisition decisions. We consider a setting in which compensation contract is based on both accounting earnings and stock price when an agent engages in predictable, pernicious earnings management and stock price is endogenously determined in a Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (NREE) that reflects both the public information from reported earnings and a costly, noisy signal privately acquired by investors. We show that an increase in the precision of the firm’s financial reporting system could reduce the informativeness of stock price and exacerbate the agency problem by inducing lower productive effort and higher earnings management, implying that the firm may not choose a more precise financial reporting system.     

The Effect of Trading Halts on the Speed of Price Discovery

Trading halts are aimed at reducing information asymmetry by granting investors the opportunity to reassess trades upon arrival of new, substantial information. This study is the first to address the efficiency of the price discovery process with respect to time, i.e., the speed of adjustment to new information. A unique database allow us to conduct an event study analysis and measure the impact of trading halts on price discovery while controlling for content, operational and value effects. We find that information dissemination following trading halts is over 40% faster and that abnormal trading activity is positively related to the speed of price adjustment.     

Stock price informativeness on the sensitivity of strategic M&A investment to Q

Using a strategic merger sample that covers the period from 1985 to 2011, we find that the acquirer’s stock price firm-specific information, the new information created by investors about the value of firm fundamentals, increases the positive sensitivity of strategic merger investment to the acquirer’s Q; the target’s stock price firm-specific information increases the negative sensitivity of merger investment to the target’s Q. These results suggest that managers learn from financial markets in identifying strategic merger investment opportunities by transferring assets from poorly managed firms to well managed firms. In addition, the target’s stock price firm-specific information itself increases the acquisition size, indicating that informed acquirer managers are more likely to take out large merger investment. Last but not the least, stock price informativeness increases merger synergies and post-merger performance, suggesting that informed managers make better merger investment that increases shareholder value. Our study contributes to the recent increasing stream of studies on managerial learning from the market.     

Market Effects of Recognition and Disclosure

Our recognition and disclosure model reveals that price informativeness is determined by the interaction of the qualities of three information sources—the recognized amount, the disclosed information, and the information revealed by price—and accounting expertise acquisition. It also reveals that recognition of an accounting amount alters each of these, thereby affecting price informativeness. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that recognition of a highly unreliable accounting amount, rather than simply disclosing it, can result in greater price informativeness. Likewise, recognition of a highly reliable amount can result in lower price informativeness. Our findings suggest that, because of the effects of aggregation, basing recognition decisions on reliability alone is too simplistic. Reliability relative to relevance is key, not reliability per se. We also find that recognition and disclosure affect the coefficients in a regression of price on accounting amounts.